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How to Analyze a 

War Without Fronts 

Vietnam 1965-72 



Thomas C. Thayer 

Office oj the Assistant Secretary of Defense ( PA&E), Washington, D.C. 


Classified by OASD ( PA&E ) 

Subject to general declassification schedule of 
Executive Order 11652. 

Automatical^ downgraded at two-year inter¬ 
vals. 

Declassified on December 31, 1978. 







ALL OF THE MATERIAL CONTAINED HEREIN HAS BEEN 
DECLASSIFIED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 


This document is the private work of 
the author, who reserves the right of 
first publication. He alone is 
responsible for the analysis and 

© 1976, BY THOMAS C. THAYER conclusions. They are not intended 

to reflect the views and position of 
the Department of Defense or of any 
other Government or private 
organization. 


UNCLASSIFIED 


CONTENTS 

Journal of Defense Research, Series B: Tactical Warfare 

Volume 7B, Number 3, Fall 1975 
Published December 1, 1975 

Foreword_ vii 

Preface_ ix 

PART I. SOME BASIC PATTERNS 

I. Need for Quantitative Analysis in a War Without Fronts_ 767 

II. Intensity and Locale of the Fighting_ 774 

III. What Were the Basic Patterns of Resource Allocation?_ 780 

IV. Who Were the Forces That Fought the War?_ 785 

PART II. THE MAIN FORCE WAR 

V. How Did the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Forces Operate?_ 799 

VI. How Did Allied Ground Forces Operate?_ 808 

VII. Improving the Effectiveness of South Vietnamese Forces_ 811 

VIII. The Air War_ 824 

IX. Stalemate_ 834 

PART III. THE CASUALTY TOLL 

X. The Military Casualties_ 845 

XI. United States Casualties Analyzed_ 852 

XII. How Many Civilian Casualties?___ 861 

(Contents continues on following page.) 


Distribution List and Changes of Address 

The Journal of Defense Research is published in two series, Strategic Warfare (Series A) 
and Tactical Warfare (Series B). Series A appears at irregular intervals, depending upon 
the accumulation of enough papers to make up a reasonable number of pages. Series B 
appears quarterly. Inquiries regarding placement of individuals or libraries on the distribu¬ 
tion list for either series or both, as well as those regarding changes of address, should be 
addressed to the Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1400 W ilson Blvd., 
Arlington, Va. 22209, Attention: Mr. Fred A. Koether, Director, Technical Information. 
Office (telephone 202-694-5919; Autovon 224-5919). 


UNCLASSIFIED 
















UNCLASSIFIED 


PART IV. THE PACIFICATION DIMENSION 

XIII. Trying to Measure Population Security_ 871 

XIV. How Well Did the Territorial Forces Perform?_ 883 

XV. Gauging Vietnamese Ponular Attitudes_ 894 

XVI. Chieu Hoi_ 905 

XVII. How Well Was the Viet Cong Politico-Military Apparatus Dismantled?_ 912 

XVIII. Refugee Problems_ 919 

XIX. How Extensive Was Land Reform?_ 928 

XX. How Well Was Inflation Contained?__ 933 


EDilogue—1975__ 938 

APPENDIX 

Index to Articles in the Southeast Asia Analysis Reports (January 1967 Through 

January 1972)_ 944 


UNCLASSIFIED 












UNCLASSIFIED 


FOREWORD 


(U) The first thing that struck me when I became involved with Vietnam was 
how different it was from most U.S. experience. Compared to World War II 
or the Korean War, for example, it was so different as hardly to be explicable 
in conventional military terms. Instead it was a multidimensional politico- 
military conflict encompassing not only out-of-country bombing and a “main 
force” war of more or less conventional forces, but a guerrilla struggle, a 
clandestine terror war, and the like. Another sharp departure was the relative 
lack of any battle lines which could be drawn on maps, or of the conventional 
large-scale battles and maneuver by which military victories are usually won. 
It was, as Thayer says, a “war without fronts.” Also striking was the frag¬ 
mentation of the Vietnam conflict. It took varied forms in 10,000 different 
hamlets, 250 districts, and 44 provinces. The forces engaged ranged from 
divisions to individual terrorists and guerrillas. 

(U) For all these reasons, conventional means of assessing what was happening 
usually proved unsatisfactory, if not misleading. For example, conventional 
order-of-battle analysis hardly sufficed to assess the effect of the attrition 
strategy which our side pursued. This situation spurred a whole series of efforts, 
mostly by Americans, to find better ways of evaluating what was really going 
on. It gradually became apparent, at least to Secretary McNamara and some 
others like myself, that by far the most useful insights came from quantitative 
analysis of the accumulating mass of field data by a handful of civilian and 
military analysts in the Southeast Asia Office of the OASD/SA. I thought at 
the time that their periodic SEA Analysis Reports were the best single source 
available on how the conflict was really going. I still think so, even though on 
occasion my staff and I vigorously questioned their conclusions. And their 
analyses often had direct impact on the Washington decision process, notably 
on the issue of whether the attrition strategy could succeed, on the impact of 
our bombing, and on how U.S. withdrawals might best be conducted. 

(U) Thomas C. Thayer was the Director of the SEA office during 1966-72, and 
the only one who served in it from its beginning almost to its end. His analytic 
recapitulation of the key trends in the Vietnam conflict, drawn mostly from the 
SEA Analysis Reports written at the time, provides an indispensable window 
on the real course of the Vietnam War. While it does not claim to comprehen- 


UN CLASSIFIED 


UNCLASSIFIED 


sively analyze all facets of that tortuous conflict, without it no historian or 
analyst can begin to grasp how the war was fought—and with what results. 

(U) It is a prime source for “lessons” to be learned by our defense establishment, 
however uncomfortable some of these might prove to be. Equally useful, it 
also deflates many of the pervasive myths still common among the critics of 
our Vietnam involvement. For example, the factual evidence as to the extent 
and causes of war damage, civilian casualties, and refugee flow is quite different 
from that so often alleged. Thus, Thayer’s work is an indispensable contribution 
to something long overdue—systematic and dispassionate reconstruction, based 
on the best available evidence, of what actually happened in Vietnam. 

R. W. Komer 
The Rand Corporation 


Vlll 


UNCLASSIFIED 


{ 


UNCLASSIFIED 


PREFACE 

(U) This book has two key characteristics. First, it focuses on what happened 
in South Vietnam during the U.S. troop involvement there. It does not deal 
with events in Washington, Hanoi, Paris, or other capitals of the world. 
Second, the analysis is quantitative (although written for the layman), and it 
focuses on a few key dimensions of the war, using data that were available to 
decision makers in Washington. It does not address personalities or decisions. 
The primary focus is on outputs in the form of results and effects. Almost 
every page is keyed to what the data say. 

(U) Two interrelated themes run through the work. First, the Vietnam conflict 
was a war without fronts, different from the “conventional” wars we fought 
in Europe and Korea. Second, to monitor such a war, one must track movement 
along certain dimensions that describe it. 

(U) The dimensions analyzed here do not cover all aspects of the war. To be 
included in this analysis, a dimension had to be considered important to the 
outcome of the war and there had to be useful statistical data to measure 
movement along it. For example, Allied ground operations were an important 
aspect of the war, but there are too many problems with the data to provide 
systematic analysis of those operations and their effects at this time. This task 
must await the patient efforts of the historians, who will also have to cover the 
helicopter operations, the role they played, and the effects they had. 

(U) The analysis is presented in four basic parts. Part One discusses some basic 
patterns of the war. It opens with the contention that quantitative analysis is 
needed to describe and understand a war without fronts, because it is not 
possible to follow the progress of such a war by observing the movements of a 
few simple lines across maps. It is necessary to look for patterns and trends in 
the thousands of events occurring all over the country. The next two chapters 
examine some basic patterns in the tempo and locale of the fighting and in the 
allocation of resources. The fighting proceeded on the basis of an annual cycle 
of combat, which recurred every year and which was heavily concentrated in a 
relatively small area of the country. In terms of resource allocation, the Allied 
war effort was first and foremost an air war. Finally, Chapter IV closes Part I 
by introducing the forces that fought the war and notes that the Allied attri¬ 
tion strategy did not destroy the VC/NVA (Viet Cong/North Vietnamese 
Army) forces. 

(U) Part Two addresses the main-force war. It opens with an analysis of VC/ 
NVA operations, this analysis suggesting that a continuing chain of small 
incidents of indirect fire, harassment, and terror, punctuated by a few large 
attacks on the ground, was used as an effective substitute for conventional 
military tactics until very late in the war. Chapter VI discusses the problems of 
dealing with the ground-operations data and presents a few tentative findings, 
but no systematic analysis. Efforts to improve the effectiveness of the South 


UNCLASSIFIED 


IX 


UNCLASSIFIED 


Vietnamese forces are discussed next, with emphasis on problems of leadership, 
training, and shortages of troops in combat units. Chapter VIII questions the 
effectiveness of the air war and presents basic data covering the herbicide 
operations. The discussion of the main-force war is then concluded with some 
data suggesting why the VC/NVA forces were able to survive the Allied attrition 
strategy and achieve a stalemate by December 1972, despite the seemingly 
overwhelming odds against them. 

(U) The American public’s perception of the casualty toll in this war was 
probably much greater than in previous wars, and there was a consequent 
impact. Some of the casualties occurred in the presence of television cameras, 
and the toll was published every week. Part Three, concerned with the casual¬ 
ties, presents the figures for the military battle deaths on both sides and then 
goes on to analyze the U.S. casualties in terms of who died and where and how 
they died. Finally, an estimate of the South Vietnamese civilian casualty toll 
is developed and compared with the Kennedy Subcommittee estimate. 

(U) A key objective of both sides in Vietnam was to gain the support, or at 
least control, of the population. This is less important in a conventional war, 
and it constituted a new challenge to the Americans involved in the Vietnam 
conflict. The pacification program developed as a response to this need, and it 
became a key part of the Allied war effort, even though it received relatively 
few of the resources. It was also uniquely a Vietnamese program, compared to 
the military effort, although it was guided by American advisors. 

(U) Part Four explores various key facets of the pacification dimension of the 
war. It finds that pacification was cost effective and seemed to work over a 
period of time, particularly from 1967 on, when the limited resources allocated 
to the program were increased somewhat. Evidence suggests that as time went 
on the security of the population grew. The territorial forces are seen to have 
been the most cost-effective military forces on the Allied side, and the Chieu 
Hoi defector program furnished, at very low cost to the Allies, an escape 
mechanism for VC/NVA troops to drop out of the war. The popular attitudes 
of the Vietnamese are explored and are seen in this text to center around hopes 
for peace, security, and economic improvement. Although the Viet Cong 
political-military apparatus was not dismantled, it was battered; but this was 
a by-product of the war, rather than the result of any intense targeting on the 
part of the Allies. Refugee problems were enormous; but many of the so-called 
refugees had come to the cities actually to get better jobs and they should 
more properly have been called migrants. The land reform program carried 
out in South Vietnam in the midst of the war was a remarkable accomplish¬ 
ment, and it just may in fact have been the most ambitious and progressive 
land reform in the Twentieth Century—but nobody noticed. Finally, inflation 
in South Vietnam, while serious, was contained to a much better extent there 
than it as in Korea during that war, a result of the U.S. programs that were 
designed to combat the problem. 

(U) This book is written from the perspective of the author’s ten-year involve¬ 
ment with the Vietnam war, which has led me to view the conflict in much 
the same way a metropolitan police chief might look at his war against crime. 
He has no fronts in his war, either. So he looks for patterns and trends and 
deploys his police officers accordingly. At the same time, he works hard to make 


x 


UNCLASSIFIED 


UNCLASSIFIED 


friends with the people he is serving, realizing that in this way he can achieve 
maximum effectiveness. Nevertheless, he certainly doesn’t expect his war 
against crime to end at any time in the foreseeable future. 

(U) In writing the results of the analyses, we can draw another analogy, this 
time to the sports page in the daily newspaper. There are no “fronts” to be 
followed here, either; rather one must observe and report the activities of a 
series of teams engaging in thousands of events. But when an event happens, 
the sportswriters are able to put it in perspective by comparing it with past 
patterns of events, thereby enabling the reader to judge the importance of the 
event at hand. 

(U) The dozen or so analysts who struggled with Vietnam data in the Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) attempted to develop 
the same sort of perspective on events in the war for the top leaders of the 
Department of Defense. They succeeded to some extent, although the present 
reader will undoubtedly arrive at his own judgment. 

(U) This is not an account of the adventures of those analysts, although it does 
cover some of the work they did. The main objectives here are to pull together 
the key elements of that work, flesh it out so as to cover additional key issues, 
and try to give the reader some perspective on what happened in Vietnam 
while American troops operated there. 

(U) Most of the analyses produced by the Systems Analysis groups were 
“published” in a classified monthly journal, the Southeast Asia Analysis Report. 
This was an unofficial document published and distributed as a stimulus to 
more analysis and discussion of the war. (The appendix to the present work 
contains a full description of the Report and an index of all the articles that 
appeared in it.) 

(U) The Report was a “no holds barred” document, the publication of which 
was opposed by some military leaders. On at least two occasions, they recom¬ 
mended to the Secretary of Defense that it be limited to internal use by the 
Secretary’s staff, so as to “reduce the dissemination of incorrect and/or mis¬ 
leading information to senior officials of other governmental agencies, as well 
as our commanders in the field.” 

(U) Others held a more favorable view (see the appendix). Even when they 
disagreed with the Report’s conclusions (they often did, and their rebuttals 
were published in it), these readers were usually generous and complimentary 
in their comments regarding its objectives and value. Some even thought it 
was “ . . . perhaps the most searching and stimulating periodic analysis 
put out on Vietnam.” At any rate, the Report generated a lot of attention and 
interest—if not enough action. Much of the analysis presented here has its 
roots in the work published in the Southeast Asia Analysis Report. 

(U) The Systems Analysis group also furnished most of its work directly to top 
Department of Defense officials concerned with the conduct of the war, much of 
the work indeed being done in response to the latters’ requests for answers to 
specific questions. This output took the form of a steady stream of memoranda, 
staff analyses, and fact sheets, often furnished on short notice in response to 
urgent requests. The analytic environment was turbulent and noisy, but 
this served to generate a real sense of urgency and relevance. 


UNCLASSIFIED 


XI 


UNCLASSIFIED 


(U) Any written work having its roots in ten years of full-time effort and taking 
an additional 2% years of spare time to write owes much to many people. 
Unfortunately, I cannot hope to acknowledge all the debts, but I would like 
to start with the late James W. Johnson, an operations research veteran of 
three wars, who told me in Vietnam in 1963 that we had to start looking for 
patterns if we were ever to understand what was going on. Alfred Schwartz, 
working with painstaking thoroughness in Washington, later found amazingly 
precise and stable patterns in Viet Cong and North Vietnamese combat actions, 
and thus encouraged me to stay the course and keep searching. 

(U) None of this work would have been done without the incredibly able leader¬ 
ship of Alain Enthoven, Ivan Selin, Gardiner Tucker, Victor K. Heyman, 
Philip A. Odeen, and Clay McManaway, all of whom fostered a spirit of free 
inquiry despite the problems it brought them and imposed very tough standards 
of performance on those of us engaged in the undertaking. Some of my com¬ 
patriots who made notable contributions to the analyses presented here are 
(in no particular order) Lt. Col. Watha J. Eddins, USA, Dr. James Blaker, 
Col. Dale Vesser, USA, Mr. Frederick Leutner, Lt. Col. Matthew P. Caulfield, 
USMC, Mrs. Sylvia Bazala (who was in Vietnam during the traumatic events 
of 1975), and Maj. James Boginis, USA, who is no longer in service. 

(U) As to the writing of this book, it would not have been done without the 
encouragement of Robert W. Komer, Raymond Tanter, James Blaker, and 
Alexander Tachmindji, who were kind enough to struggle through the initial 
manuscript and provide many invaluable ideas, comments, and suggestions 
for improving it. 

(U) While it is true that this book would not have been written without the 
contributions of all the people mentioned above, as well as countless others 
who gathered data, made reports to Washington, furnished computer support 
etc. over the years, I am fully and solely responsible for everything said in the 
pages that follow. 

(U) Having written this volume, I come to the conclusion that no one can write 
a book without the full support and encouragement of his family. Certainly, 
I never could have. So I dedicate this work to Ginny, Tina, John, and Jim, 
who make life such a wondrous adventure. 


i 


Xll 


UNCLASSIFIED 


UNCLASSIFIED 


PART ONE 

SOME BASIC PATTERNS 


UNCLASSIFIED 




















































































































































































































CONFIDENTIAL 


Chapter I 

Need for Quantitative Analysis in a War Without Fronts 

The longest war in our history, it was the most reported and most visible 
to the public—but the least understood. 

The public was also confused because it was impossible to follow the war 
by simple lines on a map as in other wars. (}) 

Gen. W. C. Westmoreland, U.S. Army (Ret.) 


In no other war have we been deluged by so many tidbits of information, 
for we have been accustomed to an orderliness associated with established 
battlelines. Here, though, we have had to make our decisions based not upon 
enemy regimental course of action, but rather upon the isolated actions of 
Communist squad-sized elements. ( 2 ) 


(U) War, General Sherman once observed, is hell. 
He might reasonably 7 have added that war, at the 
very least, is confusing. Lack of knowledge of the 
enemy’s intentions, lost messages, misunderstood 
missions, misdirected supplies, and a plethora of 
other problems and questions hamper the strategic 
and tactical commanders in their never-ending 
quest for final and decisive victory. The tasks of 
the commander would be so much easier if he 
could only base his decisions on competent analysis 
of comprehensive and reliable data dealing with 
the enemy’s mode of operation. But of course 
the enemy knows this very well, and one of his 
most important activities is the denial of useful 
information to his adversary.* 

(U) Thus, much of the commander’s attention is 
directed toward the correction of the first of the 
problems mentioned above—the lack of knowledge 
as to the enemy’s intentions—and toward an 
understanding of the enemy’s strategy and tactics. 
Concomitantly, the commander is most anxious 
as to the status of his own operations: What 
progress is being made? 

*References for Part One are on page 795. 


Maj. Gen. Harris B. Hollis, U.S. Army 

(U) In a “conventional” war, such as the two 
World Wars and the Korean conflict, two main 
items are needed to monitor the progress of the 
campaign, and that’s about all: 

• What is the state of the forces on each side? 

• Where is the front, and which way has it 
been moving? 

If “friendly” forces are stronger than “enemy” 
forces and are pushing the enemy back, then the 
friendly forces are winning, because the objective 
in a conventional war is simply 7 to destroy the 
other side’s capability 7 to fight. When the North 
Koreans pushed the U.S. and South Korean forces 
down into a small perimeter area around Pusan 
in 1950, even a child could look at the maps in 
the newspapers and tell that the U.S.-ROK 
forces were not doing well. 

(U) But the Vietnam War was not a conventional 
war. It was a highly atomized struggle to influence 
the population in thousands of villages, a war 
that was fragmented to the extent that there were 
few large battles—rather, there were some 3,500 
actions per month carried out by the Viet Cong and 


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the North Vietnamese forces at company level or 
lower. There were about 35,000 tactical air sorties 
per month; and 44 provinces, 260 districts, and 
11,000 hamlets became involved and played their 
own parts. The French, having engaged in a 
similar conflict in the same areas a generation 
earlier, coined the apt description, applicable 
equally to their own experience and ours: The 
Vietnamese wars were both “wars without fronts.” 

(U) This could explain why the Vietnam War was 
so difficult to grasp, why the U.S. leadership and 
public found it so hard to judge real progress 
and detect important trends and changes. The 
war was different. The fact of the matter is that 
the United States, eminently prepared to cope 
with a conventional war, was simply not ready 
for a war without fronts. There were no “front 
lines,” and our commanders and analysts were 
at first unable to deal with their absence. 

(U) In Vietnam, only one of the sets of data 
needed to keep track of a war was present, namely, 
the order-of-battle information for both sides. 
Other than that, the highly atypical nature of the 
VC/NVA forces, with their regulars, guerrillas, 
part-time village defense forces, and politico- 
military infrastructure, made it quite difficult to 
assemble and collate valid data on the whole 
VC/NVA lineup, particularly on the guerrilla 
forces and the all-important infrastructure. Forces 
from both sides often operated in the same areas 
at the same time, and they did this for years. 
Our commanders and analysts had to have some 
substitute for the front line if they were to under¬ 
stand the war and how it was going. 

(U) The substitute turned out to be a systematic, 
quantitative analysis of the hundreds, even thou¬ 
sands, of “countless” events occurring in many 
parts of Vietnam every day. Any given action was 
seldom important by itself, and at first glance, no 
patterns were seen. Analysis, however, revealed 
persistent patterns and cycles. From these, analysts 
(i even those in Washington) were able to monitor the 
war with surprising precision by examining trends 
over time and patterns across space in the forces, 
the military operations and activities, the casualties, 
the security oj the population, and the economic wel¬ 
fare of the population. 

(U) This type of analysis allowed them to judge 
the importance of a given event or set of events to 

768 JDRB 


the overall progress of the war. For example, the 
VC/NVA offensive in the spring of 1970 was 
greeted in Washington as an escalation of the war 
b}^ those unfamiliar with the basic trends that had 
been under way for at least two years. By the 
end of the first week, our analysts were able to 
tell the top officials that the 1970 offensive did not 
signify a major VC/NVA escalation of the war, 
because it was not as intense as the comparable 
offensive in 1969, which in turn had been less 
intense than the Tet offensive in 1968. The pattern 
of statistics showed that the war as a whole was 
continuing to wind down, even though an offensive 
had just been launched. The VC/NVA was going 
through the motions of its regular offensive, but 
with less intensity than in the previous year. 

(U) Now the quantification of the war is often 
criticized as being excessive and largely mislead¬ 
ing—the body count is a favorite example used to 
support this criticism. Quantification may indeed 
have been overdone, but analysis of the key issues 
certainly was not. Much stress was placed on 
things like the body count, and this focus did 
create incentive systems all of its own. But there 
is a difference between analysis and quantification 
according to old-style rules of thumb. The problem 
was that quantification became a huge effort, but 
analysis remained a trivial one. This is unfortu¬ 
nate—perhaps tragic—because those limited ana¬ 
lytic efforts that were undertaken yielded much 
useful insight into the war and into the prospects 
for achieving U.S. objectives, given the way the 
war was being fought. 

(U) Much of the analysis that follows is quanti¬ 
tative, so it is appropriate to address the problem 
of whether statistics from the Vietnam War are 
good enough to analyze. Sir Josiah Stamp (1880— 
1941) had a few pertinent words on the subject: 

The government are very keen on amassing 
statistics. They collect them, raise them to the 
nth power, take the cube root and prepare 
wonderful diagrams. But you must never forget 
that every one of these figures comes in the 
first instance from the village watchman, who 
just puts down what he damn pleases. 

(U) Perhaps. But the village watchman often 
pleases to tell the truth, and in any case, he 
probably reports about the same way most of the 
time. So one must learn to look for a constant bias 
in reporting. The individual numbers may not be 

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completely accurate, but the trends and changes 
in relationships among them may reveal quite a 
bit about what is going on in the village and how 
that village compares with other villages. 

(U) This is the way to deal with the Vietnam data, 
which have been subjected to strong criticism 
and which have the problems of any data reported 
by officials whose main job is to operate and 
manage, not to report. The writer has concluded, 
after years of working with them,* that many of 
the data from Vietnam during the U.S. involve¬ 
ment are good enough for systematic analysis, 
although their accuracy varies widely. 

(U) The difficulty of getting good data from the 
theater of combat operations is, after all, not 
unique to the war in Vietnam. Experience in 
operations research in World War It, in Korea, 
and later in Vietnam revealed that it is extremelv 
difficult to obtain valid and accurate quantitative 
data in the field. In World War II, the strongly 
held opinions regarding the effects of strategic 
bombing on Germany were subsequently deflated 
by the strategic bombing survey. Also in World 
War II, the reported number of successful attacks 
on submarines was discovered to have been in¬ 
flated by a factor of about 15, especially prior to 
1944. In Korea, as early as Nov. 1, 1950, the 
officially reported number of tanks destroyed by 
both air and ground attacks was high by a factor 
of nine. And again in Korea, the official United 
Nations reports of “kills” of Chinese Army 
personnel added up to 2% times the total number 
that were actually involved in the fighting.f 

(U) A war without fronts, then, generally does 
not fit neat analytic models, and the Vietnam 
War was no exception to this. Hence, there was 
a need to search for empirical regularities, or 
patterns, in the data. Hypothetical strategic 
nuclear confrontations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union may fit certain analytic 
models, but the Vietnam historical case is probably 
too “messy” for such models.]; 

♦Including 3}i years in South Vietnam. 

flnterview with James W. Johnson in Vietnam ca. 1964. 
Mr. Johnson, working for the Research Analysis Corp. 
and stationed in Vietnam at the time, was an operations 
analyst with extensive experience in World War II and 
the Korean War. 

JOn the other hand, there were limited aspects of the Viet¬ 
nam situation that were amenable to analytic modeling. 


(U) In addition to the lack of analytic models, I 
another reason to search for patterns is concerned 
with the relation of patterns to objectives, 
doctrine, and strategy. One might assume that 
objectives held, doctrine followed, and decisions 
made regarding strategy in a conflict would 
generate certain patterns of behavior. For ex¬ 
ample, a Bendix study( 3 ) suggests that doctrine 
and decisions regarding Vietnam implied regulari¬ 
ties in the occurrence of particular conditions and 
events. The Bendix approach to the analysis of 
Vietnam was to search for regularities in the data 
that could be translated into explicit doctrine or 
decision rules. Finding geographical stability of 
fighting by the VC/NVA forces, for instance, may 
reflect strategy in favor of small-unit actions by 
independent groups in limited geographical areas. 

(U) In this example, as in any attempt to extract 
meaning from masses of data, the analysis must 
first of all be systematic. In particular, to under¬ 
stand a war without fronts such as the one in 
Vietnam, one must analyze three sets of data: 
the forces, the operations, and the status of the 
population. We now move on to a consideration 
of these three in turn. 

(U) The forces of the other side must be analyzed 
in painstaking detail through intelligence infor¬ 
mation. Personnel strength, troop inputs and 
losses, types of units, and locations must all be 
studied. In Vietnam this encompassed the VC/ 
NVA force data, casualty data, infiltration and 
recruitment data, and locations (by province or 
geographical utm coordinate) of the combat units 
down to battalions and companies. The VC/NVA 
guerrillas, infrastructure, and other secret appa¬ 
ratus were also included, and this, as already 
indicated, complicated the problems of tracking 
the order of battle to an extent far beyond previous 
experience. 

(U) From the data, it was possible to draw 
inferences about the success of the attrition strat¬ 
egy (it wasn’t working), the will of the North 
Vietnamese to persist in carrying on the war (they 
refilled decimated units year after year), and the 
ability of VC/NVA forces to operate freely in 
populated areas (VC/NVA units found it increas¬ 
ingly difficult to operate in certain populated 
areas). 


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(U) Our own forces must also be studied in even 
more detail than those of the enemy, including not 
only all of the items listed above, but also the 
equipment status of our units, their estimated 
combat capabilities, desertion rates, and quality 
of leadership, the ratios of combat to support units, 
and so on. Since the United States was supplying 
the RVNAF forces in Vietnam, special efforts were 
needed to make sure the Americans were con¬ 
stantly up to date in their knowledge of the 
RVNAF’s real strength, equipment, and per¬ 
formance. 

(U) From a detailed knowledge of the Allied forces 
in Vietnam it was possible to draw inferences 
about the prospects for success of the attrition 
strategy, about the prospects of improving the 
RVNAF to the point where the United States 
could withdraw, and about expected casualty 
rates. Desertion rates gave some clues about troop 
morale. Calculation of the proportion of forces 
available for combat (as opposed to support), 
revealed much about Allied combat capabilities 
and about prospects for providing security to the 
population in the countryside. 

(U) The enemy’s operations must be recorded in 
detail, including a separate report of each action 
or incident, giving the date, time, location (utm 
map coordinate), estimated type and size of force 
(for both sides), nature of action (indirect fire, 
assault, etc.), enemy combat deaths, the combat 
deaths and wounded by type of force and nation¬ 
ality for our own side (Regional Force, U.S. 
military, etc.), and any other items of particular 
interest (mortar rounds fired, etc.). This can all 
be reported in two or three sentences. Such report¬ 
ing is essential, because when the individual 
reports are plotted by hand or put into a computer 
to search for patterns, it’s surprising what a good 
analyst can learn about the enemy’s objectives 
and style of operation. 

(U) From the patterns revealed by the enemy’s 
operations, it is possible to draw a wide variety of 
inferences about his objectives, strategies, tactics, 
and strength for comparison with other sources of 
data about these facets of his effort (captured 
documents, prisoner interrogations, etc.). In 
Vietnam, for example, VC/NVA documents that 
were captured called for killing more Americans to 
erode support for the war. An analysis of targeting 


in the VC/NVA operations clearly showed an 
increasing effort—successful, one should note to 
kill more Americans in actions initiated by the 
VC/NVA. The types of operations and their 
intensity in given locations revealed clues to the 
strength and composition of the VC/NVA forces 
in those areas. For example, surmised shortages of 
ammunition could be, and were, reflected in the 
fewer mortar rounds that were fired during 
indirect attacks by fire. 

(U) The operations of our own forces required 
the same type of reports as those concerned with 
the enemy, except that now air and other support 
operations had to be added. Each combat action 
needed to be reported, not just the overall opera¬ 
tion. Ironically, the U.S. ground forces, except 
for the Marines in Military Region 1, did not do a 
very good job of this. It is very difficult to describe 
the pattern of U.S. ground actions in Military 
Region 3 except in broad terms, for example, 
without digging through a great deal of narrative 
material. 

(U) Since a war without fronts is a struggle to 
gain the support of the population —particularly in 
rural areas—it is critically important to know the 
size of the population, where its members live, 
what ethnic groups are present, and how well off 
it is in terms of security and standard of living. 
Indicators of how much support each side has and 
from what portions of the population this support 
emanates also must be developed and monitored 
carefully. From these data, if reported with reason¬ 
able accuracy, it is possible to track progress 
toward the ultimate objective in a war without 
fronts—that is, toward acquiring the wholehearted 
support of the people, which tends to leave the 
enemy without a basis for successful operation. 
If there is no progress, then this too can be noted. 

(U) Most of the items related to forces, operations, 
and population were reported fairly well. Reports 
of individual VC/NVA incidents and South Viet¬ 
namese ground combat actions are available in 
computerized form from 1963 through 1972. 
Reports of individual air strikes began in 1965. 
The pacification officials did a particularly 
thorough job of systematic reporting starting in 
1967, with HES (Hamlet Evaluation System) and 
other large computerized reporting systems pro¬ 
viding consistent coverage of a wide variety of 


770 JDRB 


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pacification problems related to the status of the 
South Vietnamese population. 

(U) There was no shortage of data from Vietnam 
for analysis. On the contrary, there probably were 
more than was needed for analytical purposes, 
and it took quite a while to sort through them, 
determine the key statistics, and try to figure out 
what they meant. Vietnam was an unusually 
statisticized war , precisely because everyone was 
groping for understanding . Most of the data were 
developed primarily for the management of com¬ 
plex programs, not for analysis, and the analysts 
worked from a stream of operational and manage¬ 
ment reports, not from data collected specifically 
for analysis. This also characterizes the data 
presented in this book: Almost all of the informa¬ 
tion came from reports prepared for purposes other 
than analysis. 

(U) The sources of data used here include cables, 
narrative reports, statistical reports, letters, com¬ 
puter printouts, computer tapes, maps, data 
plotted on maps, field trips, interviews, etc., cover¬ 
ing many facets of the forces (including casualties), 
operations, and status of the population in South 
Vietnam. All of the data are from Vietnam, mostly 
from MACV (Military Assistance Command, 
Vietnam) and its subordinate commands. None of 
the data originated in Washington. 

(U) The data are presented here primarily in the 
form of time-series statistical tables, showing pat¬ 
terns across time and space, along with a few maps 
showing patterns across space. The data have not 
been transformed into graphs, figures, etc., because 
of the limited space available and also because of a 
desire to make the raw data available to other 
analysts. 

(U) In sum, a great deal of information of varying 
validity and consistency was available, the prob¬ 
lem being to figure out how to analyze it without 
getting lost in the numbers. Consequently, the 
analysts developed a six-step process to deal with 
the problem. 

(U) The first step was to determine the question, 
problem, or hypothesis that needed to be exam¬ 
ined. This had to be done carefully so as to focus 
the problem as sharply as possible before plunging 
into the large amounts of available data. It was 


\A/ 


quickly learned not to waste time wandering 
through large bodies of data on statistical fishing 
expeditions, since these were seldom productive 
and they consumed too much time. 


(U) After the problem or question was stated, the 
second step was to see what the statistics said 
about it. First, it was necessary to decide what 
data were relevant to the problem and assemble 
them in a systematic way from the messages, 
reports, statistical tables, and computer files that 
constituted the sources used. After they were 
assembled, the data were then applied to the 
problem in a search for patterns in the form of 
trends, levels, locations, and mixes. (Time series 
data were used in most of the analysis.) A statis¬ 
tical finding or set of findings was the result. 


(U) The third step was to take a close look at the 
statistical finding of step two to see if it made 
common sense. Did it confirm or fit the perceptions 
of experienced observers? If it did, it was used 
without further ado. If it did not, then this was 
taken as an indication that either a mistake had 
been made or an exciting finding had been dis¬ 
covered. In either case, the calculations were 
rechecked and another closer look was taken in an 
attempt to confirm the accuracy of the basic data. 
If the finding survived this scrutiny, it became 
necessary to go through a fourth, and possibly 
fifth, step before publishing, which would be the 
sixth step. 


(U) The fourth step was to check cables, reports, 
intelligence, and other narrative material in search 
of an explanation for the odd finding. 


(U) If that didn’t furnish an explanation, then it 
was necessary either to travel to Vietnam (step 
five) to have a look at the situation on the ground, 
or to talk to people who had been involved in the 
situation—for example, to military commanders or 
pacification advisors who were there. This step 
was the most time consuming, but it always 
resolved the problem. 

(U) Step six was to publish the finding, always 
including a caveat, where necessary, that it was 
the result of a preliminary analysis and that com¬ 
ments and rebuttals would be welcomed. (Defense 
analysts received a profusion of both.) Also, the 
right was reserved to say next month that what 


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had been said this month was wrong, which 
occasionally turned out to be the unfortunate case. 
The rule was that we should never try to defend 
yesterday’s mistake. 

(U) The six steps didn’t necessarily occur in 
sequence, because our analysts were always read¬ 
ing reports and cables and maintaining contact 
with people who were in or had come from the war 
area. Thus, the various steps often occurred 
simultaneously. 

(U) Probably the most dramatic case in which the 
steps proceeded rigorously in sequence began with 
a statistical finding that the VC/NVA forces in 
Vietnam had more influence over fluctuations in 
casualty rates than the Allied forces did (see 
Chapter IX). Occurring at a time of massive U.S. 
presence and high operating rates, the finding 
ran counter to the conventional wisdom: It 
didn’t make “sense.” The data checked out all 
right, but the narrative reports gave no explana¬ 
tion. A detailed study of the combat actions, plus 
interviews with S.L.A. Marshall and several U.S. 
combat commanders, finally suggested that the 
VC/NVA controlled its own casualties because 
more of its troops (and those of the Allies) were 
killed when the VC/NVA decided to stand and 
fight. If it chose to run, the casualties were low on 
both sides. And when the VC/NVA did choose to 
fight, it was usually dug-in and well hidden, 
taking the Allied forces by surprise and firing 
first. These findings were published along with a 
request for comments, and after some controversy 
they were eventually accepted as correct by the 
U.S. military and civilian officials involved in the 
Vietnam war. 

(U) The basic rule for drawing inferences from the 
data presented in the following chapters is: The 
less accurate the data are, the larger the differences 
must be to draw a valid inference, and vice versa. 
For example, data on VC/NVA forces, casualties, 
and operations tend to be less accurate than 
similar data for the Allied forces, so the inferences 
to be drawn from the VC/NVA data are limited to 
those that result from large differences. On the 
other hand, the data dealing with U.S. combat 
deaths in Vietnam are quite accurate, and 
inferences are drawn from relatively small 
differences. 


(U) Few tests of statistical significance were 
carried out on the data presented in this book, 
and none are presented in the text. Instead, 
intuition and experience were relied upon for de¬ 
ciding when differences were large enough to 
warrant an inference. Extensive interviews, read¬ 
ing, and personal observation of the war while 
in Vietnam for 3j4 years and later from the 
United States for another nine years are the basis 
for the judgments applied to the data to }deld 
inferences. 

(U) A final aspect of this section on methodology 
and inference is concerned with the validity and 
reliability of data. One meaning of validity has to 
do with the extent to which indicators actually 
measure the phenomena under investigation. For 
example, does the PAAS (Pacification Attitude 
Analysis System) yield valid indicators of Viet¬ 
namese attitudes toward such things as peace 
and security? 

(U) One way of enhancing the validity of indi¬ 
cators is to have multiple bases for drawing an 
inference from the indicator to the concept. 
Indeed, this manuscript uses multiple streams of 
evidence to increase the validity of inferences to 
concepts under investigation. For example, Chap¬ 
ters XV and XIII deal with Vietnamese attitudes 
toward the war and population security measure¬ 
ment, respectively. 

(U) Chapter XV reports the convergence of an 
official JUSPAO (Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office) 
1965 survey and a Columbia Broadcasting System 
(CBS) 1966-67 unofficial survey. The official and 
the unofficial surveys, the latter being carried out 
without the knowledge of the U.S. Government, 
converged on the finding of an overwhelming pre¬ 
ference being given by the Vietnamese to economic 
over military goals in the mid-1960’s. With the 
increase in combat after 1967, there is a corres¬ 
ponding change in emphasis in favor of security 
over economic goals, as demonstrated in an 
analysis of PAAS dated from 1969 to 1973. In 
fact, the manuscript shows convergence of pat¬ 
terns from PAAS survey data and patterns in 
military-event data from the SEAPRS (Southeast 
Asia Province Reports System) file. Such con¬ 
vergence may be evidence of the validity of both 
data files. 


772 JDRB 


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(U) In Chapter XIII, the study again utilizes data 
from different files and demonstrates convergence 
in drawing an inference to a concept. Judgment- 
derived HES (Hamlet Evaluation System) data 
correlate closely with aggregate data omVC/NVA 
incidents. If the HES is a valid indicator of 
security, one expects HES scores to correlate with 
security as indexed in some independent manner, 
such as by the VC/NVA incident file, which indeed 
they do. 

(U) Finally, HES and PA AS are compared in 
Chapter XIII, which finds that PAAS is more 
pessimistic than HES regarding security. The 
chapter then goes on to conclude that the data 
(from both HES and PAAS) all combine to 
suggest the possibility of gaining some notion of 
how secure, or how well under control, the popu¬ 
lation is, but this all depends upon how security 
and control are defined. 

(U) Thus, the basic approach to validity here is 
to address data based on ( 1 ) reports of events (for 
example, VC/NVA incidents), (2) judgment (for 
example, HES), and ( 3 ) surveys (for example, 
PAAS) and compare streams of evidence about a 


concept to see if they converge so as to support a 
given inference. 

(U) Reliability refers to ( 1 ) the consistency in 
coding or reporting of one coder or reporter at 
several points in time or among several coders or 
reporters at one point in time and (2) the extent 
to which the reported values correspond to true 
values. With respect to reliability, we have already 
acknowledged in this chapter that if our purpose 
is to discover trends and basic patterns, then this 
makes fewer demands on the reliability of the data. 
That is, if one is interested in comparing patterns 
across time or space, then the data can be less 
reliable than if one’s purpose was to make 
statements about a single month or single province. 

(U) The data from Vietnam are considered to be 
sufficiently reliable for the uses to which they were 
put in this manuscript. The}^ were not invented 
by a computer, but are based on thousands of 
repeated on-the-ground observations over periods 
of years. To repeat, the basic rule here is that 
drawing inferences from less reliable data requires 
larger differences than doing so from more reliable 
data. 


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JDRB 773 


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Chapter II 

Intensity and Locale of the Fighting 


(U) Before moving on to the details of the war, 
it is necessary to describe three basic patterns 
that serve as a backdrop for everything to come: 

• The intensity of combat in each year from 
1964 to 1972, 

• The annual cycle of combat, and 

• The locations of the heaviest fighting. 

(U) In a war without fronts, these factors are 
significant, because such wars are so different 
from conventional conflicts. In a “normal” war 
everyone knows where the big battles occurred 
and what their intensities were, but the war in 
Vietnam had to be pieced together through 
quantitative analysis. At first glance, it seemed 
simply that small battles were occurring all over 
the country at all times of the year; but systematic 
analysis revealed important patterns, which gave 
clues to VC/NVA strengths and intentions. 
Equally important, the patterns took on sig¬ 
nificance because of the slow, grinding attrition 
strategies pursued by both sides. Milestone 
events were rare, and the war had to be tracked 
by following the slowly developing patterns of 
events. Indeed, the progress of the U.S. attrition 
strategy could be measured realistically only in 
this manner. 

THE INTENSITY OF COMBAT 

(U) The best way to measure the intensity of 
combat in a war without fronts is to examine the 
levels and fluctuations of combat deaths among 
friendly forces. This type of data is among the 


most accurate reported from the war in Vietnam, 
and by their very nature, they reflect the tempo 
of the fighting. To seek converging evidence, the 
analysis here also looks at the fluctuations in the 
estimates of VC/NVA combat deaths. 

(U) Table 1 and Fig. 1 show the basic trend. 
Combat intensity in Vietnam grew every year until 
1968, after which it declined until 1972 , when the 
North Vietnamese launched a final round of intense 
fighting to gain territory before signing the cease 
fire agreement in January 1973. The Allied and 
VC/NVA combat death figures both fit the pattern 
exactly, as do the numbers of VC/NVA military 
forces and VC/NVA battalion-size attacks. The 
pattern seems self-evident now, but in 1969-71 
great concern over “escalation” of the war was 
expressed each time the VC/NVA opened its 
winter-spring campaign. Fortunately, analysts 
were able to point out quickly each time that the 
new campaign opened on a weaker plane than that 
of the year before. In 1972, the real escalation 
was obvious. 

THE ANNUAL CYCLE OF COMBAT 

(U) Figure 2 and Table 2 suggest that the basic 
yearly combat cycle of the Vietnam war during 
the American involvement went somewhat as fol¬ 
lows. The heaviest fighting each year always 
occurred during the period from February through 
June. On the average, it was the month of May 
that produced the year’s highest number of Allied 
combat deaths, followed by April, February, 
March, and June. (Combat deaths in June were 


774 JDRB 


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Table 1 . The combat intensity peaked in 1966 and 

1972. (Table unclassified.) 


In Thousands 

1964 

1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

Allied Combat 










Deaths a/ (U) 

8 

13 

18 

23 

43 

32 

28 

25 

40 

VC/NVA Combat 










Deaths (U) 

17 

35 

55 

88 

181 

157 

104 

98 

132 


Source: Table 6, Southeast Asia Sta tistical Summary , nfflr. 

Asisi-stant: Secretary of Defense, (Comptroller), April 1973, 


a/RVNAF-US-3rd Nation. 



Figure 1. Combat intensity peaked in 1968 and 1972 
(Figure unclassified.) 

lower than in May in six of the seven years 
analyzed, because the VC/NVA winter-spring 
offensive usually ended during June.) July was 
always a month of relative lull, with Allied combat 
deaths always being fewer than those in June; and 
in five of the seven years studied the July deaths 
were also fewer than those of August. In August- 
September the intensity of combat went up again, 
but the period from October through January was 
normally quiet. October, on the average, produced 
the fewest combat deaths among the Allies, and 
it was always a month of comparative lull. Allied 
combat deaths were below those in September 
during every year studied, while in five of the 
seven years the October deaths were also below 
those in November. 

(U) In summary, the basic pattern consisted of 
heavy fighting from February through June, a lull 
in July, renewed combat in August and September, 
a lull in October, and relatively low activity until 
February, when the cycle started all over again- 


l able 2. The cycle of Allied combat deaths in 
South Vietnam; monthly averages for 1966 through 
1972. (Table unclassified.) 


Jan 

- Dec 





Combat Cycle. 

Jan 

2177 



Feb 

2864 

Feb 

2864 

Mar 

2871 

Mar 

2871 

Apr 

2919 

Apr 

2919 

May 

3427 

May 

3427 

Jun 

2752 

Jun 

2752 

Jul 

2097 

Jul 

2097 

Aug 

2361 

Aug 

2361 

Sep 

2300 

Sep 

2300 

Oct 

1880 

Oct 

1880 

Nov 

1936 

Nov 

1936 

Dec 

2011 

Dec 

2011 



Jan 

2177 

By Quarter 





By Combat Cycle 

Jan- 

Mar 2637 



Apr- 

Jun 3032 

Feb- 

Jun 2967 

Jul- 

Sep 2253 

Jul 

2097 

Oct- 

Dec 1942 

Aug-Sep 2330 


Oct- 

Jan 2001 


c _ ... _ . . . _ --in Table 6, Statist ics on 

g putheast Asia , Southeast A sia Statistical Summary . Office of 

e \ Sl f ant Se ^ retar y °f Defense (Comptroller) March 25 1971 

through January 17, 1973, pp. 1-7. ’ 



Figure 2. The heaviest fighting always occurred during 
the first half of the year. (Figure unclassified.) 


(U) A basic determinant of the cycle was the 
weather. In the northern part of South Vietnam 
(Military Region 1) the rainy season extends from 
September through January. In the southern part 
of the country and in the Laos panhandle (where 
the infiltration roads and trails were located) it 
extends approximately from May through Sep¬ 
tember. The rain closed down the NVA infiltration 
routes in Laos and made it difficult for the North 
Vietnamese to continue their major offensive in 
the south. The terrain got progressively worse as 
they drew down men and supplies that couldn’t 
be replaced until the infiltration corridors reopened 
in October. 


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'Fable 3. Most Communist offensives occurred during 
the dry season (September 1952-July 195 f). 
Calculated from data found in B. Fall’s The 
Two Vietnams; New York: Praeger, 1966, page 
123. (Table unclassified.) 


Dry Season October (1952-53) 

Number of Offensives Underway 

1 

November (1952-53) 

2 

December (1952-53) 

3 

January (1953-54) 

2 

February (1953-54) 

3 

March (1953-54) 

4 

April (1953-54) 

4 

Subtotal - 19 

Rainy Season May (1953-54) 

3 

June (1953-54) 

1 

July (1953-54) 

1 

August (1943) 

0 

September (1952-53) 

2 

Subtotal - 7 



(U) Thus, the best time to launch a major VC/ 
NVA offensive was between January and April, 
when all of South Vietnam has a dry season, and 
that is actually when all the major offensives started. 

(U) The cycle can be explained in the following 
manner. By October of each year, the VC/NVA 
troop strength and supplies were low. The rain 
stopped in Laos, and the infiltration of men and 
supplies for the winter-spring offensive began. At 
some point during the time from February to 
April, the VC/NVA had accumulated enough 
troops and placed enough supplies in position to 
begin its major offensive of the year. The infiltra¬ 
tion continued, but it gradually dwindled as the 
rains started again in Laos and the VC/NVA went 
into the final phase of its offensive, ending it in 
June. By July the offensive was finished and 
infiltration through Laos had slowed to a trickle. 
At this point, much of the terrain in the southern 
part of South Vietnam was under water. By mid- 
August the VC/NVA had regrouped well enough 
to launch a brief summer offensive, and this lasted 
into September, at which time the rains started 
once again in the northern part of South Vietnam. 
Finally, October brought the low point, and the 
cycle would start all over again: In November, 
infiltrators and trucks would be sighted coming 
down the trails in Laos and the buildup for the 
following year’s winter-spring offensive would be 
under way. 

(U) This cycle is important because it lends 
perspective to analysis of the tempo of combat. 
If one knows that May is usually the toughest 
month of the year, it’s easier to remain calm when 


casualties rise above April’s levels. By the same 
token, if it is known that the infiltration cycle 
always starts up again in October—November, 
then there is no surprise when fresh North Viet¬ 
namese troops are suddenly reported heading 
down the trails to South Vietnam. Instead, the 
focus in both cases is on the level of activity and how 
it compares with similar periods of previous years. 
Trends can be tracked accurately in this manner, 
if the data are reasonably reliable. 

(U) As a matter of interest, and to illustrate the 
strength and persistence of the annual cycle, it is 
appropriate to point out that the cycle was 
operating in the French Indochina War (1946-54). 
This should be no surprise, since the weather cycle 
did not change. In writing about that war, Edgar 
O’Ballance speaks of the campaigning season: 
“During the ‘campaigning’ season of 1949-50, 
the French military command let things slide.”( 4 ) 
And, “When the rains ended in late September 
1951, the campaigning season opened cau¬ 
tiously.”^) Finally, . . by October 1952, 
the end of the rainy season. General Salan was 
not able to muster any appreciable extra numbers 
of French troops for offensive operations.”( 6 ) 

(U) The Communist offensives from September 
1952 through July 1954 seem to fit the general 
dry-season-wet-season cycle well. Table 3 col¬ 
lapses the two years into one 12-month cycle and 
shows the number of offensives under way during 
a given month. Viet Mini) offensive activity 
peaked during the dry season; 19 of the 26 “offen¬ 
sive months” were dry season months. The battle 
at Dien Bien Phu was fought from March 13 to 
May 7, 1954, during the annual peak of the 
combat cycle. 

WHERE DID MOST OF THE FIGHTING 

OCCUR? 

(U) In viewing the war in Vietnam, there is a 
common tendency to assume that all parts of the 
country are similar and that the fighting is eventy 
distributed throughout the country. That this is 
not the case is shown by Table 4 and Fig. 3. The 
heaviest fighting tended to be highly localized. 

(U) Allied combat deaths in South Vietnam were 
particularly heavy in a few provinces, suggesting 
that combat was much more intense there than in 
other areas. In the overall period from 1967 through 


776 JI)RB 


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Table 4. Five provinces accounted jor one-third oj 
the Allied combat deaths (1962 through 1972). 
(Table unclassified.) 



1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

lQtal 

Period 

Five Provinces 
Were in Top Ten 

Every Year: 

% 






% 

Rank 

Quang Tri (MR-1) 

12 

10 

5 

6 

7 

12 

9 

1 

Quang Nam (MR-1) 

8 

10 

8 

6 

6 

6 

8 

2 

Binh Dinh (MR-2) 

6 

4 

5 

8 

9 

6 

6 

3 

Quang Ngai(MR-l) 

7 

4 

6 

5 

4 

5 

5 

5 

Dinh Tuong(MR-4) 

4 

5 

6 

5 

5 

4 

5 

6 

% of Total 

37% 

33% 

30% 

30% 

31% 

33% 

33% 


Five Additional 

Provinces With 
Very Hiqh Combat 

Death Rates: 









Tay Ninh (MR-3) 

3 

6 

10 

7 

4 

1 

5 

4 

Thua Thien(MR-1) 

5 

4 

2 

4 

2 

3 

4 

7 

Kontum (MR-2) 

4 

2 

4 

3 

3 

5 

3 

8 

Kien Hoa (MR-1) 

2 

2 

3 

4 

5 

4 

3 

9 

Quang Tin (MR-1) 

4 

2 

4 

4 

3 

2 

3 

10 

% of Total 

18 % 

16% 

23% 

22% 

17% 

15% 

18% 


Ten Provinces - 









Total % of Country- 








Wide Friendly 
Combat Deaths 

55% 

49% 

53% 

52% 

48% 

48% 

51% 



Command Systems Support Center, Department of Defense. 



TAY NINH (5%) 
DINH TUONG (5%) 


KIEN HOA (3%) 


KONTUM (3 


TRI (9%) 

THIEN (-4%) 

G NAM (0%) 

TIN (3%) 

NGAI (5%) 

DINH (6%) 


Figure 3. Percentage of combat deaths among friendly 
troops, by province, 1967-72. (Figure unclassified.) 



Figure 4. Territory held by the Viet Minh after Dien Bien 
Phu. (Figure unclassified.) 

1972, five provinces accounted for a third of the 
Allied combat deaths, and jour of them are in the 
northern part oj the country. The pattern is a stable 
one. All five provinces ranked among the top ten 
and accounted for roughly a third of the deaths in 
each year. Stated another way, combat in the five 
top provinces was almost four times as intense as 
it was in the other 39 provinces. 

(U) The top ten provinces accounted for half of the 
Allied combat deaths. The other 34 accounted for 
the remainder. All five provinces of Military 
Region 1 are among the top ten, as are Kontum 
and Binh Dinh in Military Region 2. The other 
three provinces are farther south, Tay Ninh in 
Military Region 3 and Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa 
in Military Region 4. The French, when operating 


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Figure 5. Viet Minh deployment, Sept. 30, 1953. (Figure 

unclassified.) 


in South Vietnam, also had their worst troubles in 
these areas.* 

(U) The most intense fighting of the French 
Indochina War took place in North Vietnam, but 
the northern areas of South Vietnam also saw 
heavy combat. The most southern part of South 
Vietnam was quieter, but there were definite 
pockets of Viet Minh strength. Perhaps the best 
portrayal of the situation, in the absence of 
statistics, is shown in the maps of Figs. 4 and 5. 

*(U) A study by the Bendix Corporation for the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency classifies the prov¬ 
inces of South Vietnam into a two-dimensional structure of 
mutually exclusive province clusters, based on a complex 
analysis of 11 variables describing total war deaths, various 
categories of personnel strengths, and activities. The two 
dimensions are labeled “regular force” and “territorial 
force” and are further subdivided into “high” and “low” 
clusters. The eight-province cluster labeled “high regular 
force” includes eight of the provinces in the “top ten” 
cited above. The exceptions, Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa 
provinces, are labeled “high territorial force” in the Bendix 
analysis. Thus, both analyses agree that the war was 
intense in the ten provinces; see Ref. 7. 


(U) Figure 4( 8 ) shows the territory held by the 
Viet Minh after Dien Bien Phu fell in 1954. 
Except for the cities of Hue, Tourane (now 
Danang), and Quang Tri, the area of most intense 
fighting during the American involvement was 
under Viet Minh control, although the latter 
were not able to gain title to it at the Geneva 
Conference. Farther south, the Viet Minh held 
the northern part of Tay Ninli province, the 
Plain of “Jones” (Reeds), Camau (at the southern 
tip of the country), and other pockets of territory. 

(U) Figure 5( 9 ) shows the estimated deployment 
of the Viet Minh battalions on Sept. 30, 1953. 
The pattern is similar: a heavy concentration of 
regular battalions in the north, reaching down into 
South Vietnam’s Military Region 2, with a lighter 
concentration of regional battalions farther south. 

(U) In discussing their worst trouble spots, the 
French noted that:( 10 ) 

What we have observed in Indochina confirms a 
fact already known in our African possessions: 
There exists a permanence or continuity in the 
centers of unrest. History and geography reveal 
that certain regions are traditional cradles of 
insurgent movements, and these later serve as 
preferred areas for the guerrillas. 

It is in the provinces where the population has 
always shown itself to be proud, bold, and in¬ 
dependent that the revolt has taken on the most 
acute and intense forms. ... It is striking to 
compare some recent engagements with the 
history of certain battles which occurred during 
the conquest. The events were often the same 
and even happened at the same places. 

It should be no surprise that the same areas con¬ 
tinued to be troublesome to the South Vietnamese 
and Americans. 

CONCLUSION 

(U) In summary, the three basic patterns of the 
war without fronts in South Vietnam consisted of 
the following: 

• An increase in combat every year from 1964 
to a peak in 1968, followed by a period of de¬ 
clining intensity each year until 1972, when 
the VC/NVA launched its offensive in prepara¬ 
tion for the cease-fire agreement and combat 
peaked again. 

• An annual cycle of combat, in which the 
heaviest fighting took place during the first 


778 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 







CONFIDENTIAL 


half of each year, followed by a lull during the 
second half. 

• A stable concentration of the most intense 
combat in the northern part of SoutltVietnam 
and in three provinces farther south. Activity 
elsewhere in the country was much lower. 

These patterns serve as a basic background to 
much of what follows, and they need to be kept in 
mind constantly as the details of the war are 
described. 

(U) Anyone trying to understand a war without 
fronts would be wise to determine the history of 
combat intensity, check the weather cycle, and 
carefully examine whether the fighting historically 
was concentrated in a few areas. The history of 
the intensity of combat will indicate whether the 
war is building up or winding down and will 


enable an observer to “calibrate’’ the war’s inten¬ 
sity for comparisons within itself over periods of 
time and with similar wars elsewhere (for example, 
South Vietnam in comparison with Cambodia). If 
there is a cycle of combat, it will be possible to 
predict when the most intense fighting and the 
lulls can be expected, which will serve as a useful 
planning aid. Close monitoring of the cycle will 
provide an accurate gauge of the trends and 
highlight any significant changes in the foe’s 
timing, which in turn may give clues to his inten¬ 
tions and the state of his forces. If the fighting is 
concentrated in a few areas, then plans can be 
developed accordingly and any changes in the 
patterns can be monitored, even if the changes 
occur extremely slowly, as they so often do in a 
war without fronts. 


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JDRB 779 


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Chapter III 

What Were the Basic Patterns of Resource Allocation? 


(U) Besides the tragic cost in lives, the Vietnam 
War was enormously costly to the United States 
in terms of resources, partly because firepower was 
used to prevent casualties.* According to the 
official Department of Defense estimates, the 
Vietnam War cost $112 billion through June 
1974.** These are not even the full costs to the 
Department, but the incremental costs (that is, 
the expenditures over and above what would have 
been spent on the forces in peacetime). 

(U) Why was it so expensive? The answer lies in 
the way the war was fought—American style, 
with the most expensive forces available.f An 
examination of resource allocation in the fiscal 
years 1969-71 shows why the war cost so much, 
and the pattern of spending reveals much about 
how the war was fought: essentially in a conven¬ 
tional style that was ill-suited to the successful 
prosecution of a war without fronts. This happened 
because large U.S. (and GVN) organizations be¬ 
came involved in the war and tended to play out 
their institutional repertoires instead of adjusting 
in major ways to meet the situations they faced. 
The pattern of resource allocations reflected this 
phenomenon. J 

A PROGRAM BUDGET FOR THE WAR 

(U) To determine where an organization or a 

*Most of the material in this chapter is from Refs. 11 and 
12 . 

**$145 billion in 1974 dollars. 

fin 1969, operating a South Vietnamese division cost about 
one-twentieth as much as operating a U.S. division. 

JFor a full discussion of this facet of the war effort, see 
Ref. 13. 


nation really puts its emphasis, try to figure out 
where its money goes. Since money is the best 
common measure of resource inputs, how is it 
spent? This, more than statements of objectives 
or purposes, will suggest where the emphasis lies 
and what is considered to be most important. 
A good way to do this is to develop a program 
budget that looks carefully at what the money is 
to be spent for in terms of outputs and only 
secondarily at who is going to spend it. A con¬ 
ventional budget looks primarily at who is going 
to spend the money in terms of inputs. 

(U) As an example of what this difference means 
in the Department of Defense, the program budget 
is structured in broad functional categories such 
as strategic forces, general-purpose forces, mobility 
forces, logistics, reserve forces, etc. It includes 
ground, naval, and air forces in each of the 
categories, but the emphasis is on how much is to 
be spent for each of the major defense programs. 
The conventional budget in Defense focuses on 
the military services in terms of inputs: military 
personnel, operations and maintenance, procure¬ 
ment, etc. 

(U) In 1970, U.S. Government agencies directly 
involved with the Vietnam War collected detailed 
cost data for the fiscal years 1968-71 in a compre¬ 
hensive program budget framework. Information 
was obtained in South Vietnam and from overseas 
bases to provide detail and to verify the use of 
resources consumed by operating units. Interviews 
with operations officers at military region and 
division level in South Vietnam, together with 
MACV operational data, provided the basis for 


780 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 



CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 5. Program budget cost of Vietnam activities , 
fiscal 1969-71, in billions of U.S. dollars. (Table 
classified Confidential.) 



FY 69 

FY 70 

FY 71 

7. Change 

FY 69-71 a/ 


(C) 

(C) 

(C) 


Military Operations/Investment 

U.S. 

17.6 

14.8 

11.3 

-36 

Vietnamese 

2.6 

3.1 

3.8 

+46 

Third Country 

.5 

NA 

.5 

0 

Total 

20.7 


15.6 

-25 

Civil Operations/Investment 

U.S. 

.4 

NA 

.3 

-16 

GVN 

.4 

NA 

.5 

+15 

Total 

.8 


.8 

0 

Grand Total 

21.5 


16.4 

-24 


Cost to 

U.S. 

20.4 

14.7 

-28 

Cost to 

GVN 

1.0 

1.6 

+52 

Cost to 

Third Countries 

.1 

.1 

+ 4 

Total 


21.5 

16.4 

-24 


NA = not available. 

a/ Percentages based on unrounded dollar amounts. 

Source: "Where the Money Went", Southeast Asia Analysis Report , August- 
October 1971, p. 28. 

allocating costs to the major functions that U.S., 
South Vietnamese, and third-country forces per¬ 
formed in the war. 

(U) The program budget has some limitations. 
First, it is not directly comparable to official 
Department of Defense estimates of the cost of 
the war, and it is used only to show resource 
allocations. Second, the project ended before 
fiscal 1968 cost estimates for the Army and fiscal 
1968 and 1970 civil cost estimates were completed. 
(The fiscal 1968 data were so incomplete that they 
are not shown here.)( 14 ) Third, it is impossible to 
obtain program budget figures for this analysis 
for fiscal 1972 or later. The program budget was 
a one-time effort, primarily because of the substan¬ 
tial collection and analysis needed to produce it. 

(U) The program budget shows the full cost of 
resources expended in South Vietnam by the 
Allies, as well as of operations and programs out¬ 
side of the country but directly related to Vietnam. 
The total costs in the program budget are less 
than other estimates of the cost of the war, 
because they do not include support costs in the 
continental United States. (The major exclusions 
are the costs of training U.S. forces in the United 
States, the costs of transporting equipment and 
supplies to Vietnam, and the costs of maintaining 
the rotational manpower base.) Also, some re¬ 
sources, budgeted for the war in a given fiscal 
year, may actually be expended elsewhere or in 
another fiscal year, so the program budget is not 


Table 6. Cost of U.S./RVNAF forces, fiscal 1969- 
71. (Table classified Confidential.) 



FY 1969 


FY 1971 


U.S. Forces 

$ Billions 

7. 

$ Billions 

7. 

Land Forces 

4.6 

23 

3.7 

25 

Naval Forces 

.4 

2 

.1 

1 

Air Forces 

9.3 

46 

5.3 

35 

General Support 

3.3 

16 

2.2 

14 

Total 

17.6 

87 

11.3 

75 


RVNAF 


Regular Land Forces 

1.5 

7 

1.8 

12 

Territorial Forces 

.4 

2 

.7 

4 

Naval Forces 

★ 

★ 

.1 

1 

Air Forces 

.2 

1 

.3 

2 

General Support 

.5 

3 

.9 

6 

Total 

2.6 

13 

3.8 

25 


Total U.S. & RVNAF 


Land Forces 

6.1 

30 

5.5 

37 

Territorial Forces 

.4 

2 

.7 

4 

Naval Forces 

.4 

2 

.2 

2 

Air Forces 

9.5 

47 

5.6 

37 

General Support 

3.8 

19 

3.1 

20 

Grand Total 

20.2 

100 

15.1 

100 


* Less than $.05 billion or . 57«. 


a/ Percentages based on unrounded dollar amounts. 

Source: "Where the Money Went", Southeast Asia Analysis Report , 

August-October 1971. 

directly compatible with Department of Defense 
b udget figures for fiscal 1969-71. 

THE COSTS 

(C) Table 5 shows the total costs to the Allies 
of the Vietnam War in program budget terms 
for fiscal 1969-71. It suggests that in fiscal 1969: 

• (C) The total program budget cost of U.S., 
South Vietnamese, and third-nation operations 
and investment was $21.5 billion, with 96 
percent for military purposes. 

• (C) United States military activities cost 
$17.6 billion, or 82 percent of the total, while 
Vietnamese military activities cost only $2.6 
billion (12 percent). Third-country activities 
cost $500 million. 

• (C) Civil activities cost only $800 million, or 
4 percent of the total. 

• (C) The United States paid for most of the 
Vietnamese and third-country activities. 

(C) By fiscal 1971 , several changes are evident: 

• (C) Reductions in U.S. military activities as 
part of the Vietnamization lowered the annual 
cost of Allied activities by $5.1 billion, a 
reduction of 24 percent from fiscal 1969 
(from $21.5 billion down to $16.4 billion). 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 7. Forces versus activities , fiscal 1969; cost in millions of 


U.S. dollars. (Table classified Confidential.) 


__ Interdiction _ 

Main Force Territorial 

In-Country Out-of-Country Operations Security _ Other _ Total 



U. S. 

RVNAF 

U. S. 

RVNAF 

U. S. 

RVNAF 

U. S. 

RVNAF 

U. S. 

RVNAF 

U. S. 

RVNAF 

Total 

Land Forces 

Army 

990 

239 

2 

9 

2584 

548 

143 

606 

174 

67 

3893 

1469 

5362 

Marines 

3 

- 

- 

- 

611 

8 

107 

- 

- 

- 

721 

8 

729 

Territorial 

— 

_ 

_ 

_ 

_ 

_ 

_ 

346 

_ 

26 

— 

372 

372 

Total 

993 

239 

2 

9 

3195 

556 

250 

952 

174 

93 

4614 

1849 

6463 

Naval Forces 

56 

4 

47 

- 

217 

12 

11 

29 

32 

- 

363 

45 

408 

Air Forces 

Army 

153 

- 

50 

- 

1856 

- 

116 

- 

102 

- 

2277 

- 

2277 

Air Force 

1341 

98 

2401 

3 

736 

51 

3 

- 

266 

23 

4747 

175 

4922 

Navy 

29 

- 

1102 

- 

34 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

1165 

- 

1165 

Marines 

56 

— 

144 

— 

942 

_ 

— 

_ 

39 

_ 

1181 

__ 

1181 

Total 

1579 

98 

3697 

3 

3568 

51 

119 

- 

407 

23 

9370 

175 

9545 

General Support 

Army 

- 

- 

- 

- 

1130 

112 

- 

- 

916 

291 

2046 

403 

2449 

Air Force 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

516 

40 

516 

40 

556 

Navy 

- 

- 

- 

- 

1 

20 

- 

- 

532 

13 

533 

33 

566 

Marines 

- 

- 

- 

- 

184 

1 

- 

- 

19 

1 

203 

2 

205 

Territorial 

- 

— 

- 

— 

— 

— 

_ 

22 

_ 

16 

_ 

38 

38 

Total 

- 

- 

- 

- 

1315 

133 

- 

22 

1983 

361 

3298 

516 

3814 

TOTAL 

2628 

341 

3746 

12 

8295 

- 752 

380 

1003 

2596 

477 

17645 

2585 

20230 


Source: "Where the Money Went," Southeast Asia Analysis Report , August-October 1971, p. 32. 


• (C) United States military activities declined 
$6.3 billion, from $17.6 billion to $11.3 billion. 

• (C) During the same period, the costs of South 
Vietnamese military operations rose nearly 
50 percent—up $1.2 billion—to help fill the 
gap left by the departing U.S. forces. They 
reached $3.8 billion, or 23 percent of the 
total costs in fiscal 1971, up from 12 percent 
in fiscal 1969.* 

• (C) Civil activities ($800 million) and third- 
country military activities ($500 million) 
remained constant. 

• (C) The U.S. share of the costs dropped in 
fiscal 1971. South Vietnamese funding rose 
by $600 million between fiscal 1969 and 1971, 
bringing their share up. 

*The exact percentage share that the United States paid 
for cannot be calculated from the tables here, because 
they do not indicate how the counterpart funds (which 
were liens on South Vietnamese resources) were allocated. 

782 JDRB 


• (C) Table 5 and details not shown here suggest 
that the United States paid a large part of 
the third-country costs. 

(U) Thus, a look at the program budget suggests 
that military activities accounted for about 95 per¬ 
cent of the total, with the United States paying for 
most of the military and civil activities. The 
impact of Vietnamization is evident in the fiscal 
1971 figures, which show the Vietnamese to be 
absorbing more of the costs than they did in fiscal 
1969, before the U.S. withdrawals began. 

ON WHAT FORCES DID WE SPEND THE 

MOST? 

(U) Table 6| shows the costs of U.S. and Viet¬ 
namese military forces by type for fiscal 1969 and 
1971. In fiscal 1969: 


fThc details are in Tables 7, 8, and 9. 

CONFIDENTIAL 







































































CONFIDENTIAL 


I able 8. forces versus activities, fiscal 1970; cost in millions of U.S. dollars. (Table classified Confidential.) 


Interdiction 



In-Country 

Out-of 

-Country 

Main Force 
Operations 

Territorial 

Security 

Other 


Total 



U. S. 

RVNAF 

U. S. 

RVNAF 

U. S. 

RVNAF 

U. S. 

RVNAF 

U. S. 

RVNAF 

U. S. 

RVNAF 

Total 

Land Forces 

Army 

996 

31 

11 

- 

2693 

736 

174 

426 

170 

55 

4044 

1248 

5292 

Marines 

5 

- 

- 

- 

399 

12 

61 

1 

- 

- 

465 

13 

478 

Territorial 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

_ 


435 

_ 

99 


534 

534 

Total 

1001 

31 

11 

- 

3092 

748 

235 

862 

170 

154 

4509 

1795 

6304 

Naval Forces 

66 

21 

14 

- 

105 

49 

15 

70 

55 

- 

255 

140 

395 

Air Forces 

Army 

225 

- 

176 

- 

1187 

- 

73 

- 

155 

- 

1816 

- 

1816 

Air Force 

1031 

101 

1954 

13 

594 

87 

1 

- 

234 

45 

3814 

246 

4060 

Navy 

20 

- 

771 

- 

38 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

829 

- 

829 

Marines 

135 

- 

126 

- 

498 

_ 

_ 

_ 

36 

_ 

795 


795 

Total 

1411 

101 

3027 

13 

2317 

87 

74 

- 

425 

45 

7254 

246 

7500 

General Support 

Army 

- 

- 

- 

- 

1159 

611 

- 

- 

696 

79 

1855 

690 

2545 

Air Force 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

434 

91 

434 

91 

525 

Navy 

- 

- 

- 

- 

3 

53 

- 

- 

324 

26 

327 

79 

406 

Marines 

- 

- 

- 

- 

157 

4 

- 

- 

34 

2 

191 

6 

197 

Territorial 

- 

- 

- 

_ 

_ 

_ 

_ 

22 

_ 

21 

_ 

43 

43 

Total 

- 

- 

- 

- 

1319 

668 

- 

22 

1485 

219 

2807 

509 

3716 

TOTAL 

2478 

153 

3052 

13 

6833 

1552 

324 

954 

2138 

418 

14825 

3090 

17915 

Source: ' 

'Where the 

Money Went," 

Southeast 

Asia Analysis 

Report, 

August- 

■October 

1971, p. 

33. 




• (C) Air activities* cost $9.5 billion , almost half 
(4-7 'percent) of the total. Most of the air costs 
were for interdiction ($5.4 billion); in addi¬ 
tion, the air forces accounted heavily for 
main-force operations ($3.6 billion), almost as 
much as the share attributed to the land 
forces ($3.8 billion). 

• (C) Land forces cost $6.1 billion (30 percent 
of the total), mostly ($5 billion) for main- 
force operations and ground operations along 
South Vietnam’s borders (interdiction). Most 
of the rest ($900 million) reportedly was spent 
for assistance to the territorial forces in 
security missions (but one informed observer 
has noted that the regular forces reported in 
this category often—maybe 50 percent of the 
time—were simply resting between main- 
force operations.) 

• (C) Territorial forces ($400 million) and naval 
forces ($400 million) make up the rest of the 
combat costs, each accounting for 2 percent 
of the total. 

• (C) General support, consisting of logistics, 

♦Including all helicopters (combat and support) and the 
fixed-wing aircraft (C 130’s, etc.) which moved troops and 
supplies. 


administration, communications, etc. cost 
$3.8 billion, or 19 percent of the total. 

(C) In fiscal 1971 the picture is slightly different: 

• (C) The cost of U.S. air activities declined 43 
percent, dropping from 47 percent of the total 
in fiscal 1969 to 35 percent in fiscal 1971. 

• (C) Land-force costs dropped to $5.5 billion, 
down $600 million, to account for 37 percent 
of the total shown (as opposed to 30 percent 
in fiscal 1969). 

• (C) Territorial-force costs increased from 
$400 million to $600 million. 

(U) In sum, the money was spent mostly for U.S. 
air forces and for the regular land forces that carried 
out main-force operations. Relatively little was spent 
for territorial security. Between fiscal 1969 and 
1971, the territorial forces showed some gains, but 
they still received few of the resources that were 
available. 

RESOURCE ALLOCATION BY MAJOR 

ACTIVITY 

(C) The emphasis in fiscal 1969 was on main- 
force operations and interdiction, which accounted 


CONFIDENTIAL 


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CONFIDENTIAL 

"Fable 9. Forces versus activities, fiscal 1971; cost in millions of U.S. dollars. (Table classified Confidential.) 


Interdiction 


In-Country 

Out-of-Country 

Main Force 
Operations 

Territorial 

Security 

Other 


Total 

U.S. RVNAF 

U.S. RVNAF 

U.S. RVNAF 

U.S. RVNAF 

U.S. RVNAF 

U.S. 

RVNAF Total 


Land Forces 

Army 

847 

146 

10 

48 

2402 

821 

179 

681 

77 

76 

3515 

1772 

5287 

Marines 

2 

- 

- 

- 

186 

13 

31 

- 

- 

- 

219 

13 

232 

Territorial 

_ 

_ 

_ 

_ 

_ 

_ 

_ 

529 

_ 

120 

_ 

649 

649 

Total 

849 

146 

10 

48 

2588 

834 

210 

1210 

77 

196 

3734 

2434 

6168 

Naval Forces 

37 

20 

12 

1 

38 

33 

5 

73 

21 

- 

113 

127 

240 

Air Forces 

Army 

160 

- 

128 

- 

876 

- 

52 

- 

113 

- 

1329 

- 

1329 

Air Force 

549 

20 

1707 

53 

502 

149 

(a) 

- 

184 

88 

2942 

310 

3252 

Navy 

21 

- 

669 

- 

42 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

732 

- 

732 

Marines 

63 

_ 

57 

_ 

157 

- 

_ 

_ 

12 

— 

289 

_ 

289 

Total 

793 

20 

2561 

53 

1577 

149 

52 

- 

309 

88 

5292 

310 

5602 

General Support 

Army 

- 

- 

- 

- 

567 

416 

- 

- 

942 

248 

1509 

664 

2173 

Air Force 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

384 

92 

384 

92 

476 

Navy 

- 

- 

- 

- 

7 

58 

- 

- 

189 

49 

196 

107 

303 

Marines 

- 

- 

- 

- 

90 

2 

- 

- 

16 

1 

106 

3 

109 

Territorial 

_ 

_ 

_ 

_ 

_ 

_ 

_ 

4 

_ 

21 

_ 

25 

25 

Total 

- 

- 

- 

- 

664 

476 

- 

4 

1531 

411 

2195 

891 

3086 

TOTAL 

1679 

186 

2583 

102 

4867 

1492 

267 

1287 

1938 

695 

11334 

3762 

15096 

a _ 

Less 

than $500,000. 












Source: 

"Where 

the Money Went," 

Southeast 

Asia 

Analysis 

Report. 

August- 

-October 

1971, p. 

34. 




for more than 70 percent of the costs. Main-force 
operations cost $9 billion, or 42 percent of the 
$21.5 billion total program budget. Interdiction 
operations by air and land forces cost $6.7 billion, 
or 31 percent of the total; over half ($3.7 billion) 
went to air interdiction outside of the country. 

(U) Despite the declining intensity of the war and 
the changing mix of forces, two-thirds of the money 
in fiscal 1971 was spent on main-force operations 
(39 percent) and interdiction (28 percent). Ter¬ 
ritorial security operations by the South Viet¬ 
namese Regional and Popular Forces still ac¬ 
counted for a small part (2.5 percent) of the costs. 

CONCLUSION 

(U) In terms of resources, then, it was a “U.S. 
war,” in which the costs of U.S. forces were immensely 
higher than those of South Vietnamese forces. As to 
the type of war, it was, in terms o f resource allocation, 
first and foremost an air war and, second, an 
attrition campaign on the ground against VC/NVA 
regular units. Pacification was a very poor third in 
the priorities. 


(U) It is difficult to separate the pacification 
expenditures from civil and military outlays (the 
latter including territorial security), but it is 
clear that even the greatly expanded pacification 
program of fiscal 1969-71 received only a small 
fraction of the U.S.-GVN outlays, even though it 
was supposed to be a major dimension of the 
combined effort. For example, in fiscal 1969, 
artillery support alone cost about five times as 
much as all of the territorial forces, who benefited 
little from it. * 

(U) In the words of one high-level participant, 
“If we had ever realized at all levels where the 
money really went in relation to what impact it 
had, it is at least questionable whether the United 
States would have fought the war the way it did.”f 

* Artillery-naval gunfire cost of $2.07 billion from page 50 
of “Where the Money Goes,” SEA Report, divided by the 
$410 million cost of territorial forces shown in Table 7. 
Of course, since the all-Vietnamese territorial forces are 
cheap, this could give a misleading impression of their real 
contribution to the Allied war effort. See Chapter XIV 
on their comparative effectiveness. 

tPersonal comment to the author. 


784 JDRB 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


Chapter IV 

Who Were the Forces That Fought the War? 


(U) In any war, each combatant must learn as 
much as he can about the other side’s forces, and 
each spends a lot of time and energy on the effort 
to do so. The war in Vietnam was of course no 
exception to this; and so the forces on each side 
are discussed here, beginning with the VC/NVA 
and concluding with the Allies. 

(U) It is particularly important to develop a 
meticulous and detailed record of the enemy’s 
forces in a war without fronts. The government’s 
greatest problem is likely to be how to describe, 
identify, and locate scattered insurgent units who 
spend much of their time dispersed and in hiding. 
The insurgent, on the other hand, has to keep 
track of the government units so that his forces, 
usually smaller and outgunned, don’t get caught 
by surprise. Since the insurgent units are usually 
scattered and have great mobility, it is doubly 
important for the government to maintain a 
detailed historical analysis of the trends and 
patterns of the insurgent’s movement, so that it 
can anticipate and head off insurgent actions 
before they affect the civilian population. To 
reemphasize: The insurgent troops won’t be lined 
up behind a front. They’ll be scattered and 
moving in the areas where government forces are 
present , and they’ll be hard to find. Detailed analysis 
oj the sizes , trends , and movements of their units is 
needed if they are to be kept out of populated areas. 

VC/NVA FORCES 

DIFFICULTY OF PRODUCING THE ESTIMATES 

(U) The VC/NVA forces in the Vietnam War were 
CONFIDENTIAL 


difficult to count, for several reasons. First, they 
were structured in a way that was unfamiliar to 
U.S. analysts, and the North Vietnamese and 
Viet Cong forces were often mixed up together. 
It was difficult to know who to count and how to 
count them. Should the nebulous “secret self- 
defense forces” be counted? How about the 
VC/NVA cadre? What about units outside of 
South Vietnam who could and did enter at any 
time? Second, the VC/NVA forces fought dif¬ 
ferent^ than units in a conventional war. Most of 
the combat actions were hit-and-run raids con¬ 
ducted by small VC/NVA units scattered around 
the country, only a few such actions each year 
involving as much as a battalion. The VC/NVA 
units spent most of their time hidden away some¬ 
where, not out fighting. Battalions, for example, 
usually fought only two or three times a year, 
and even then they tried to move in secrecy until 
the moment they attacked. Third, the adoption 
of an attrition strategy by the United States— 
“destroy the enemy forces”—complicated the 
process by making the number of VC/NVA forces 
a prime measure of success or failure. But if 
force levels rose, it was difficult to claim success; 
for awhile, this created resistence to estimates that 
suggested higher VC/NVA force levels than before. 
Besides, analysts often disagreed in their estimates 
of the force levels, and the whole order-of-battle 
process involved much controversy, many con¬ 
ferences, and lots of compromises. 

(U) Finally, as noted in Chapter I, detailed 
historical analysis is essential to understanding a 

JDRB 785 


5P8- 672 0 - 75 -3 



CONFIDENTIAL 


war without fronts, and that includes estimates of 
force levels. Commanders, analysts, and policy 
makers needed to know what the major VC/NVA 
force trends were. Until 1968, the estimates 
depended mostly on prisoner interrogations and 
captured documents, and there were time lags in 
updating them. For example, a document captured 
in June might indicate that a given VC/NVA unit 
was twice as large in the previous January as the 
Allies had thought. This meant that not only did 
the intelligence analysts have to update the current 
estimate; they also had to go back and correct the 
listing for last January and the intervening four 
months so as to show the correct force-level trend. 
Having been trained in the concept that current 
estimates are sufficient (that’s all that is needed in 
a conventional war), they were reluctant to retro¬ 
gress in this way, and they had to be prodded to 
do so. Eventually, the employment of additional 
sources of intelligence from 1968 onward elimi¬ 
nated some of this need for retrospective 
adjustments. 

(U) The VC/NVA’s highly unconventional force 
structure had four basic components: combat 
forces, administrative service forces, irregulars, and 
the VC/NVA politico-military infrastructure^ 15 ) 

(U) The combat forces consisted of the VC/NVA 
maneuver and combat support units. Of these, 
the maneuver units comprised infantry, armor, 
security, sapper, and reconnaissance elements at 
the platoon level and upward. The combat support 
units comprised the fire support companies, and 
battalions, as well as the air defense and technical 
service battalions. 

(U) Administrative service personnel consisted of 
the military staffs of COSVN (the Central Office 
for South Vietnam)* and the VC/NVA head¬ 
quarters at the military region, military sub- 
region, province, and district levels, as well as 
the rear technical units of all types that were 
directly subordinate to the COSVN headquarters. 

(U) The irregulars were organized forces composed 
of guerrilla, self-defense, and secret self-defense 
elements, which were subordinate to the village- and 
hamlet-level VC/NVA organizations. These forces 
carried out a wide variety of missions in support 

*The VC/NVA’s headquarters for directing the campaign in 
South Vietnam. 


of VC/NVA activities and provided a training and 
mobilization base for the combat forces. Guerrillas 
were full-time forces organized into companies and 
platoons, which did not always stay in their home 
village or hamlet. Typical missions for guerrillas 
involved collecting taxes, protecting village party 
committees, and conducting terrorism, sabotage, 
and propaganda activities. Self-defense forces were 
a part-time paramilitary structure, which defended 
hamlet and village areas controlled by the VC/ 
NVA. These forces, which did not leave their 
home area, conducted propaganda, constructed 
fortifications, and defended their homes. The 
secret self-defense forces were a clandestine VC/ 
NVA organization whose general functions in 
GVN-controlled villages and hamlets were the 
same as those of the self-defense forces in VC/ 
NVA-controlled areas. But their operations in¬ 
volved intelligence collection in addition to 
sabotage and propaganda activities. 

(U) The VC/NVA politico-military infrastructure 
was the apparatus through which the VC/NVA 
controlled its entire effort in South Vietnam, 
including its military forces (except the NVA 
divisions). It embodied the Peoples Revolutionary 
Partv control structure, which included a com- 
mand apparatus at the national level (COSVN) 
and the leadership of a parallel front organization, 
the NLF (National Front for the Liberation of 
South Vietnam), which extended from the national 
level down through the hamlet level. 

(U) These descriptions in themselves suggest some 
of the problems involved in estimating VC/NVA 
force levels. The combat and combat support units 
were probably the easiest to count, because they 
spent much of their time inside South Vietnam, 
although they didn’t show themselves very often. 
Much of the administrative service force was out¬ 
side the country, in Laos or Cambodia. The 
COSVN was the most important headquarters, 
but it stayed out of the country, as did the units 
that supported the infiltration routes. And of 
course much of the logistical tail for the NVA 
forces remained in North Vietnam. The Allied 
forces had little or no access to any of the VC/ 
NVA support areas until very late in the war, and 
consequently the difficulties of estimating VC/ 
NVA forces there were formidable. There was 
great interest in knowing how much of the force 
was composed of Viet Cong personnel from the 


786 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 



CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 10 . VC/NVA force estimates changed. Source: u Revised Estimates oj VC/NVA Order of Battle 

SEA Analysis Rpt., December 1967 , page 4 . (Table classified Confidential.) 


A / 

3 / 

Old Estimater- 
Total Forces 

New Estimate^/ Combined Estimate^ 

Military Forces Total Forces 

Combat Strength- 

VC 

62,852 

62,852 

62,852 

NVA 

53,700 

53,700 

53,700 

Total 

116,552 

116,552 

116,552 

Administrative Service 

25,753 

38,000 

38,000 

Irregulars—^ 

Guerrillas 

37,587 

81,300 

81,300 

Self Defense and 

Secret Self Defense 

75,173 

f/ 

75,173-162,600 

Total 

112,760 

156,473-243,900 

VC/NVA Infrastructure 

39,175 

f/ 

84,000 

Total 

294,240 

235,852 

395,025-482,452 


a/ The presentation and strength estimates used by MACV before 31 October 1967. 
b/ MACV's new presentation, without self-defense, secret self-defense, and 
political cadre and with his new strength estimates of administrative 
service and guerrilla strengths. 

c/ The pre 31 October 1967 total OB presentation with the new estimates 
of administrative service, guerrilla and political cadre strengths, 
d/ Includes confirmed, probable, and possible. 

e/ "The old data divided the 100,000 to 120,000 irregulars, roughly putting 
one-third of them into the guerrilla and the other two-thirds into self- 
defense and/or secret self-defense personnel." - MACV Briefing on Enemy 
Order of Battle , 24 November 1967. 

f/ "The self-defense forces provide a base for recruitment as well as for 

political and logistical support, but are not a fighting force com¬ 
parable to the guerrillas. Although secret self-defense forces cause 
some casualties and damage, they do not represent a continual or 
dependable force and do not form a valid part of the enemy's military 
force. The political cadre (infrastructure) has no military function". - 
MACV Briefing on Enemy Order of Battle , 24 November 1967. 


south and how much of it consisted of North 
Vietnamese troops who came down in infiltration 
trails. It was seldom possible to tell them apart, 
although gross changes in the mix of the forces 
were discernable. 

(U) The irregulars and VC/NVA infrastructure 
posed additional problems. Even if an accurate 
count was possible, were they military forces that 
should be counted in the same way as the regulars? 
After counting them all for awhile, MACV finally 
decided in October 1967 to retain the guerrillas in 
the military order of battle, but not the self- 
defense forces, secret self-defense forces, and the 
VC/NVA infrastructure. One effect of this change 


was to lower the estimated force level, as shown in 
Table 10. 

(U) Table 10 is complicated, but so is the problem. 
Briefly, the old estimate (first column) includes all 
of the categories, while the new estimate (second 
column) no longer includes the self-defense forces 
and Viet Cong infrastructure, but shows large 
increases in administrative service and guerrilla 
personnel. The net result is a decrease of about 
58,000 in the VC/NVA force level. The third 
column shows what would have happened to the 
force level had all the elements been included in a 
single total; it goes up by at least 100,000. This 
didn’t mean that VC/NVA forces had increased 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 787 


















CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 11 


VC INVA forces in South Vietnam, December 31 strength in thousands. ab ' c (Table classified 

Confidential.) 



1964 

1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

REGULAR COMBAT FORCES 

North Vietnamese (NVA) 

(U) 

(U) 

(U) 

(U) 

(C) 

(C) 

(C) 

(C) 

(C) 

tt e/ 

Units— , 

Fillers in VC Units- 

6 

30 

54 

69 

80- 85 

70- 75 

63- 67 

53- 58 

99-115 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

20- 25 

20- 25 

15- 20 

15- 20 

15- 15 

NVA TOTAL 

6 

30 

54 

69 

100-110 

90-100 

78- 87 

68- 78 

114-130 

Viet Cong - TOTAL—^ 

50 

64 

64 

63 

50- 60 

30- 40 

32- 43 

27- 38 

24- 35 

Total Combat 

56 

94 

118 

132 

150-170 

120-140 

110-130 

95-115 

138-165 

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES 

NVA 

4 

4 

5 

6 

40- 50 

40- 50 

40- 50 

35- 45 

45- 60 

VC 

39 

46 

46 

43 

40- 50 

40- 50 

40- 50 

40- 50 

35- 48 

TOTAL 

43 

50 

51 

49 

80-100 

80-100 

80-100 

75- 95 

80-108 

GUERRILLAS 

81 

82 

121 

81 

60- 70 

40- 50 

30- 40 

25- 35 

25- 35 

GRAND TOTAL^ 

180 

226 

290 

262 

290-340 

240-290 

220-270 

195-245 

243-308 


a./Estimates for 1964-1967 are from Table 105, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), January 10, 1973, p. 4, and are based on summary 
information in the MACV-J2, JGS-J2, Order of Battle Summary, retroactively adjusted, 
k/Estimates for 1968-1972 are from "Adjusted DIA Estimates for VC/NVA Forces in RVN/Cambodia- 
Retro-OB-Strengths," March 13, 1973. c_/ Includes enemy forces in-country and in border areas. 

d_/ In addition to those in North Vietnamese Army Units, there are also NVA personnel in Viet 
Cong units, but no estimate of the number in such units is available until the 4th quarter of 
1968. e/ Includes personnel in maneuver and combat support battalions. fj For 1964-1967 
the total enemy strength estimate is considered accurate to plus or munus 20,000. 


that much, but simply that newly captured docu¬ 
ments revealed additional forces that had been 
there all along. The example illustrates the order- 
of-battle problems associated with the unconven¬ 
tional VC/NVA force structure. 

(U) Other problems arose as a result of making 
the destruction of VC/NVA forces the primary 
Allied military objective in the war.* Until Viet- 
namization began in earnest during the summer of 
1969, the main U.S. military objective was to 
destroy the VC/NVA forces faster than they 
could be replaced. This generated pressure to hold 
the force levels down and to lower them, if possible. 
For example, during 1967 the intelligence esti¬ 
mates showed a steady drop in VC/NVA guerrilla 
strength, reportedly the result of heavy combat 
losses and mounting recruit problems. However, 
the intensity of the 1968 Tet offensive led to 
questions about the decline, and an analysis of the 
guerrilla data reported separately in the HES 
(Hamlet Evaluation System)! also cast doubts 
upon it. Instead of a decline from 116,000 guer¬ 
rillas in March 1967 to 81,000 in December, a 

♦See Chapter IX for an analysis of the attrition strategy. 
fSee Chapter XIII for a description and analysis of HES. 

788 JDRB 


HES-based estimate suggested a guerrilla force of 
155,000, which remained nearly constant all 
vear.( 16 ) This is not to assert that the HES esti¬ 
mate was correct, but simply to make the point 
that all estimates of guerrilla strength should be 
viewed with strong skepticism. 

(U) By now, the reader may be asking whether 
the VC/NVA force estimates have an}^ validity at 
all. The estimators were aware of the great 
uncertainties in their estimates, and they did their 
best to furnish a reasonably accurate picture of 
the VC/N\A forces, although their reluctance to 
provide good retrospective estimates for accurate 
trends persisted. But the fact is that an enormous 
effort went into the estimates, and they probably 
improved as the years passed. The presence of 
uncertainties was recognized by stating the esti¬ 
mates in ranges instead of as single figures—on 
Dec. 31, 1972, for example, the spread was 65,000 
troops. Despite the problems, the figures are 
useful, and they must be addressed in any attempt 
to describe what happened in Vietnam. 

vc/nva force levels and trends 

(U) Troop Strength. Table 11 displays the data 
available on VC/NVA troop strengths since 1964. 

CONFIDENTIAL 





















































CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 12 . VC/NVA battalions in South Vietnam; number of battalions , December 81. a (Table classified 

Confidential.) 


North Vietnamese (C)-§/ 

1964 

1965-—0.966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

m_ 


SSL. 

SSL 

SSL 

SSL 

SSL 

SSL 


Maneuver 

12 

41 

75 

103 

129 

149 

120 

122 

285 

Combat Support 

0 

14 

31 

43 

45 

54 

55 

50 

118 

Total 

12 

55 

106 

146 

174 

203 

175 

172 

403 b/ 

Viet Cong (C)a/ 

Maneuver 

66 

96 

86 

99 

125 

132 

118 

112 

59 

Combat Support 

7 

9 

9 

13 

17 

17 

20 

17 

5 

Total 

73 

105 

95 

112 

142 

149 

138 

129 

64 b/ 

a/ 

Grand Total (C) — 

85 

160 

201 

258 

316 

352 

313 

301 

467 


Source: Table 105, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary , Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller), January 10, 1973, pp. 1-4. Includes enemy forces in-country and in border 
areas. The data for 1970, 1971 and 1972 for this table are based on summary information 
included in the MACV All-Source Unit Strength Summary . Unlike the data shown for prior 
years, which are based on summary information included in the MACV-J2, J2-JGS Order of Battle 
Summary , these estimates do not reflect retroactive adjustments. They represented MACV-J2's 
best current estimate of enemy strength and battalions at the end of each month. 

a/ Excludes Administrative Service battalions. 

b/ All Viet Cong units estimated to be 70 percent or more filled with North Vietnamese personnel 
were shifted to the NVA category, but no retroactive adjustments were made to show a more 
accurate trend. 


The 1964-67 and 1968-72 periods were estimated 
differently, and intelligence analysts warned that 
the}^ would not track. They considered all the 
figures to be rough estimates (note the wide ranges 
of the 1968-72 figures), but would have put more 
credence in the later figures than in the earlier 
ones. According to Table 11: 

• (U) The total VC/NVA force fluctuates to 
some extent from year to year, but overall, it 
remains quite stable.* The difference between 
the 1965 estimate and the low end of the 1972 
estimate is only 8 percent (the high estimate 
is 36 percent higher). 

• (U) About two-thirds of the combat force 

*(U) Between 1965 and 1967 the VC/NVA forces increased 
only 16 percent. Between 1968 and 1972 they fell only 
9 percent or 16 percent, depending on the high or low 
estimates, respectively. As additional evidence of stability, 
it is interesting to note that the 1964-67 estimates range 
from 180,000 (1964) to 290,000 (1966). The low ends of 
the 1968-72 estimates are almost the same: 195,000 to 
290,000. The high ends fall into a range of 245,000 to 
340,000. All three sets of estimates have ranges of about 
100,000. 


after 1968 were estimated to be NVA troops, 
including NVA fillers in Viet Cong units. These 
percentages didn’t change much until 1972, 
when the NVA share climbed to 80 percent. 
Again, the reader should not impute to the 
NVA-VC force-mix estimates any precision 
that is not there. 

• (U) The administrative services forces re¬ 
mained stable in the early and later estimates, 
but they doubled in going from one to the other. 

• (C) The guerrilla strength remained at about 
80,000 in 1964-65, rose to 120,000 f in 1966, 
and then fell back to 80,000 again in 1967. 
The 1968-72 estimates start lower than the 
earlier estimates, and then they decline more 
by the end of 1971. (Estimating the size of the 
guerrilla forces is difficult, and this generated 
much controversjf within the intelligence 
community. Disagreements about the esti¬ 
mates probably exist even today, so they 

fThe 120,000 figure is questionable, because it doesn’t fit 
the other patterns of the 1964-67 period. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


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Table 13 . Allied troops tripled by 1969, then 
declined 25 percent as U.S. and third-nation 
troops 'withdrew. (Table classified Confidential.) 


Year End 


Strength In 

1964 

1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

Thousands 

RVNAF (C)- / 

na_ 


!U1_ 


iUL. 


fci 

ici_ 


514 

571 

623 

643 

819 

969 

1047 

1046 

1090 

US (U) 

23 

184 

385 

486 

536^ 

^ 475 

335 

158 

24 

3rd Nation (U)—^ 

.5 

23 

53 

59 

66 

70 

68 

54 

36 

Total (C) 

538 

778 

1061 

1188 

1421 

1514 

1450 

1258 

1150 


Source: Table 3, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary , Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), February 14, 1973. 
a/ Includes regular, regional, and popular forces, but not para-military 
forces, such as CIDG, national police, RD cadre. People's Self-Defense 
Forces, etc. 

b/ Includes military forces of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and 
Thailand, plus a few civilians from the Philippines, Republic 
of China, and Spain. 

c/ U.S. troop strength peaked in April 1969 at 543,400. 

should be used with care.) It is important to 
note that the reduction in guerrilla strength 
from 1968 through 1972 accounted for 75 to 
100 percent of the total force decline during 
that five-year period. 

(U) VC/NVA Battalions. Table 12 suggests that 
the total number of VC/NVA maneuver and com¬ 
bat battalions fluctuated in the same way as the 
combat strength, except in 1969, when the troop 
strength fell but the number of battalions re¬ 
portedly increased. This suggests that the average 
size of the VC/NVA battalion fell in 1969, which 
appears to be what actually happened. Calcula¬ 
tions of average strength per battalion can be 
misleading, but in this case the data do seem to 
suggest that the average battalion size was 
between 500 and 600 troops at the end of each 
year from 1964 through 1968. Then, with heavy 
losses having occurred in the 1968 Tet offensive, 
the average battalion size dropped to 300 to 400 
by the end of 1969 and remained in that range. 

(U) Incidentally, Table 12 shows what happens 
when a current estimate is changed but no retro¬ 
spective adjustment is made to clarify the trend. 
In 1972, the North Vietnamese battalions in¬ 
creased from 172 to 403, while the Viet Cong 
battalions declined sharply. A good portion of the 
increase stemmed from a decision to shift all 
Viet Cong battalions having 70 percent or more 



Figure 6. The RVNAF troop buildup did not begin until 
the U.S. troop strength had peaked. (Figure classified 
Confidential.) 

NVA personnel into the NVA category. This 
doubled the NVA battalions, while halving the 
Viet Cong battalions. Actually, the situation 
didn’t change at all as much as might be inferred 
from the table; but without a retrospective adjust¬ 
ment, it is impossible to figure out what the 
trends really were. For example, the table shows 
a decline of 65 Viet Cong battalions. Were these 
all shifted to the NVA category or did some dis¬ 
appear? There is no way to tell from the table 
without a retrospective adjustment, and one is 
not available. 

ALLIED FORCES 

(U) Six nations contributed military forces to 
fight the VC/NVA in South Vietnam: The United 
States, Republic of Vietnam, Republic of Korea, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand. South 
Vietnam furnished most of the forces, followed 
by the United States and then Korea. (The 
Koreans provided most of the third-nation forces.) 
All of the countries furnished ground forces, while 
the naval and air forces were contributed by South 


790 JDRB 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


Vietnam and the United States. To simplify, the 
data are presented here in three categories: 
RVNAF (Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces), 
United States, and third nation. 

FORCE LEVELS AND TRENDS 

(U) Table 13 shows that Allied military strength 
almost tripled between the end of 1964 (538,000) 
and the end of 1969 (1,514,000).* But by the end 
of 1972 (1,150,000) it had declined to the 1967 level 
(1,188,000). The major U.S. buildup was in 1965, 
1966, and 1967, but the RVNAF buildup came 
later, in 1968, 1969, and 1970. During the period 
1965-67, the U.S. forces increased by 465,000, 
but only 130,000 troops were added to the RVNAF. 
In the three years after the 1968 Tet offensive, 
the RVNAF added 405,000 troops, as U.S. forces 
declined by 150,000. (Figure 6 shows the pattern.) 

(U) RVNAF {Republic oj Vietnam Armed Forces). 
The South Vietnamese military forces had three 
major components: regular forces, Regional Forces, 
and Popular Forces. The regular forces were 
composed of ARVN (Army), VNMC (Marine 
Corps), VNN (Navy), andVNAF (Air Force), and 
these were all designed to perform the functions 
one would expect of such forces. Theoretically, 
they could be used anywhere in South Vietnam, 
but actually only a few of them operated through¬ 
out the country. Most confined their operations 
to one of the four military regions. The Regional 
Forces started out as infantry companies that 
stayed within a district or province of South 
Vietnam and never operated outside of it. Later 
in the war, the Regional Forces were upgraded to 
battalions, and they began to operate in adjoining 
provinces when needed, particularly during the 
1972 offensive. The Popular Forces were local 
platoons assigned to specific villages, f They 
manned the outposts, guarded the bridges, and 
attempted to maintain security in their villages, 
and they were not supposed to be used in any 
other area. 

(C) Table 14 displays the RVNAF forces for 
1965-72. The buildup of the total RVNAF force 

*The total Allied strength peaked in February 1970 at 
1,525,000. 

fVillages in Vietnam have boundaries similar to a township 
in the United States. A hamlet is a specific geographical 
concentration of people. 

CONFIDENTIAL 


"Fable 14. The RVNAF doubled in size. {Table 
classified Confidential.) 

Year-End Strength 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 

I n Thousands _(U1_ _£uy_ _£U}_ _£C1_ (&_ _£C1_ (C) 

Regular Forces : 

Amy (ARVN) 220 268 284 303 380 416 414 408 460 

Navy (VNN) 12 15 17 16 19 30 41 42 42 

Marines (VNMC) 7 7 7 8 9 11 13 14 16 

Air Force (VNAF) _11 _13 _15 _16 _19 _37 _45 _50 52 

Sub-Total 250 303 323 343 427 494 513 514 570 

Regional 

Forces (RF ) - 196 132 150 151 220 261 283 284 301 

Popular 

Forces (PF ) 168 136 150 149 172 214 251 248 219 

Total RVNAF (C) 514 571 623 643 819 969 1047 1046 1090 


Source: Table 3, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary . Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), February 14, 1973. 


is evident, and the table shows how each force 
fared in it: 

• (C) The RVNAF doubled between 1964 
(514,000) and 1972 (1,090,000). Within the 
total, the regular forces also doubled, with 
the Army dominating, while the Regional 
Forces tripled. After a decline in 1965, the 
Popular Forces eventually increased by 50 per¬ 
cent t to reach their peak and then began to 
decline in 1971, falling more noticeably in 
1972. 

• (U) Within the regular forces, the impact of 
Vietnamization begins to show in 1969 and 
1970, with sharp increases in the Navy and 
Air Force. The Navy in 1972 was 3% times as 
large as it was in 1964, and the Air Force was 
about five times as large. The Army buildup 
started in 1968, with the Tet offensive, and it 
was fairly complete by the end of 1969, 
although there was an additional spurt in 
1972. The figures reflect the Vietnamization 
program’s emphasis on building up the ground 
forces first, while waiting for the long-lead- 
time programs for the Air Force and Navy to 
take effect. 

• (U) The mix of the RVNAF force structure 
(regulars on the one hand and Regional and 
Popular Forces on the other) did not change 
much, but the combination of rapid growth in 
Regional and Popular Forces and later U.S 

JAbove the level at the end of 1964. 

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Table 15. South Vietnamese paramilitary forces 
tripled. (Table classified Confidential.) 


Year-End Strength 

In Thousands 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 


an an an an an an an ici_ 


Civilian Irregular 

Defense Groups (CIDG) 

22 

29 

35 

38 

42 

35 

0 

* 0 

0 

National Police 

31 

52 

58 

74 

79 

85 

88 

114 

121 

Revolutionary Development 
Cadre b/ 

0 

0 

0 

44 

53 

52 

44 

33 

23 

Others c/ 

jO 

0 

0 

0 

5 

7 

7 

4 

4 

Total Para-Military 

53 

81 

93 

156 

179 

179 

139 

151 

148 


Source: Table 3, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Feb. 14, 1973. 
a) Program of conversion to border defense and ARVN completed December 1970. 
b/ Includes Troung Son Cadre who worked with the Montagnards. 
c/ Kit Carson Scouts and Armed Propaganda Teams (APT). 


withdrawals had the effect of shifting emphasis 
in the remaining Allied force toward territorial 
operations. For example, the Regional and Popular 
Forces accounted for 27 percent of the Allied 
force in 1968, before U.S. withdrawals, but by 
the end of 1972 they accounted for 45 percent. 

(U) South Vietnamese Paramilitary Units. Table 
15 shows that the personnel strengths of the 
South Vietnamese paramilitary units tripled 
between 1964 and 1972 These data are often 
displayed with the RVNAF totals, and they 
therefore call for brief mention at this point (a 
detailed discussion of each force and its perform¬ 
ance appears in Chapter XIV). Four major 
groups are shown. The CIDG (Civilian Irregular 
Defense Groups—usually Montagnards) were 
advised by U.S. Special Forces Teams along the 
South Vietnamese borders of Laos and Cambodia. 
Their mission was primarily to provide border 
security. They really should be included in the 
RVNAF totals from the beginning, because they 
performed military missions and also because 
they were incorporated into the RVNAF in 1969 
and 1970 as border defense units. The National 
Police quadrupled, showing particularly rapid 
growth in 1971 as the importance of developing 
an effective police force was recognized. The RD 
Cadre (Revolutionary Development Cadre) were 
the cutting edge of the pacification program. 
After a modicum of security was established in an 
area, the RD Cadre went in to bring government 
programs to the people and to organize support 
for the Government of Vietnam. As the table 
indicates, this program was phased out as the need 


Table 16. United States forces in South Vietnam; 
end-oj-year strength in thousands. (Table un¬ 
classified.) 


Year-End Strength 

In Thousands 


s.A 1 

1964 

1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

Army 

15 

117 

239 

320 

360 

331 

351 

120 

14 

Marine Corps 

1 

38 

69 

78 

81 

55 

25 

(.6) 

1 

Air Force 

6 

20 

53 

56 

58 

58 

43 

29 

8 

Navy & Coast Guard 

1 

9 

24 

32 

37 

31 

17 

8 

1 

Total 

23 

184 

385 

486 

536 

475 

336 

157 

24 


Source: Table 103, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary , Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), February 7, 1973. 
a/ Includes temporary duty (TDY) personnel. 

for it diminished. Other paramilitary groups 
included the Kit Carson Scouts, who assisted 
friendly forces, and the Armed Propaganda 
Teams, who operated in villages where security 
was tenuous. Both groups drew their people from 
VC/NVA defectors who surrendered to the 
Government of Vietnam through the Chieu Hoi 
Program (see Chapter XVI). Finally, the PSDF 
(Peoples Self-Defense Forces) added several hun¬ 
dred thousand villagers to the local troops charged 
with village security. Their numbers are not 
shown in Table 15, because the data are not 
comparable to those for the other paramilitary 
forces (although PSDF data do appear in Chapter 
XIV). 

(U) U.S. Forces. In December 1964, there were 
23,310 U.S. troops in South Vietnam. The total 
peaked at 543,400 in April 1969, and by the 
end of 1972 it had returned to the 1964 level 
(24,172).( 17 ) Table 16 shows the pattern and how 
the strength of each military service changed over 
time. The Army and Marine Corps accounted for 
80 percent of the forces.* 

(U) It has already been noted that the bulk of the 
U.S. forces arrived in Vietnam during 1965-67 and 
then redeployed to the United States in 1970-72. 
The Air Force was built up the fastest and re¬ 
mained in Vietnam the longest. It reached 90 
percent of peak strength by the end of 1966, and 
14 percent of its peak strength remained at the 
end of 1972. The Marine Corps arrived early and 
left early. It reached 85 percent of its peak strength 


*The cumulative number who had served in Vietnam from 
Jan. 1, 1965 through Sept. 30, 1972 is: Army, 1,641,969; 
Navy, 144,062; Air Force, 356,724; and Marine Corps, 
447,725, for a total of 2,590,480. 


792 JDRB 


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Table 17. Authorized force levels in South Vietnam , 
in thousands. (Table unclassified.) 






Force 





Sea Program 

Number 

Approval 

Date 

Level 

Authorized 

Effective 

Increase/ 

Build-up 

1 (Phase I) 

Jul 

31, 

65a / 

190.1 

Jun 

67 



2 (Phases XI, IIA, IIIR) 

Dec 

U, 

65a / 

393.9 

Jun 

67 


+203.8 

3 

Jul 

2, 

66b/ 

437.0 

Jun 

67 


+43.1 

4 

Nov 

18, 

66c/ 

470.0 

Jun 

68 


+33.0 

5 

Aug 

14, 

67d / 

525.0 

Jun 

69 


+55.0 

6 

Apr 

4, 

68e/ 

549.5 

Jun 

69 


+24.5 

Withdrawal 

7 (Increment 1) 

Jun 

8, 

69f/ 

524.5 

Aug 

31, 

69 

-25.0 

8 (Increment 2) 

Sep 

16, 

69g/ 

484.0 

Dec 

15, 

69 

-40.5 

9 (Increment 3) 

Dec 

15, 

69h/ 

434.0 

Apr 

15, 

70 

-50.0 

-115.5 

President announces 
reduction of 150,000 US 
spaces. Done in 

stages. 

Apr 

20, 

701/ 

(284.00) 

May 

1, 

71 


10 (Increment 4) 

Jun 

3, 

70j/ 

384.0 

Oct 

15, 

70 

-50.0 

11 (Increment 5) 

Oct 

12, 

70k/ 

344.0 

Dec 

31, 

70 

-40.0 

12 (Increment 6) 

Mar 

1, 

711/ 

284.0 

May 

1, 

71 

-60.0 

-150.0 

President announces 
reduction of 100,000. 

Done in 3 stages. 

Apr 

7, 

71m/ 

(184.0) 

Dec 

1, 

71 


13 (Increment 7) 

Apr 

9, 

71n / 

254.7 

Jun 

30, 

71 

-29.3 

14 (Increment 8) 

Apr 

9, 

71o/ 

226.0 

Aug 

31, 

71 

-28.7 

15 (Increment 9) 

Apr 

9, 

71 E / 

184.0 

Dec 

1, 

71 

-42.0 

-100.0 

16 (Increment 10) 

Nov 

12, 

71 a / 

139.0 

Jan 

31, 

72 

-45.0 

17 (Increment 11) 

Jan 

13, 

72r / 

69.0 

May 

1, 

72 

-70.0 

18 (Increment 12) 

Apr 

26, 

72s/ 

49.0 

Jul 

1, 

72 

-20.0 

19 (Increment 13) 

Jun 

28, 

72t / 

39.0 

Sep 

1, 

72 

-10.0 

20 (Increment 14) 

Aug 

28, 

72u/ 

27.0 

Dec 

1, 

72 

-12.0 

-157.0 


Footnotes to Table 17 


a. SEA Programs 1 and 2 were referred to as Phase I and 
Phase II Deployments, respectively. Phase II was then 
modified, and programs Phase IIA and Phase IIB 
were adopted in late 1965 and early 1966. A draft 
Presidential memorandum of Dec. 11, 1965 incor¬ 
porated the Phase II Deployments, called the “Decem¬ 
ber Plan.” 

b. SecDef memorandum, July 2, 1966, “Southeast Asia 
Deployment Plan.” 

c. SecDef memorandum, Nov. 18, 1966, “Southeast Asia 
Deployment Program #4.” 

d. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) 
memorandum, Aug. 14, 1967, “Southeast Asia Deploy¬ 
ment Program #5.” 

e. Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, April 4, 
1968, “Southeast Asia Deployment Program #6.” 

/. Presidential announcement on June 8, 1969, followed 
by SecDef memorandum, July 15, 1969, “Southeast 
Asia Deployment Program #7.” 

g. Presidential announcement on Sept. 16, 1969, followed 
by SecDef memorandum, Oct. 6, 1969, “Southeast 
Asia Deployment Program #8.” 

h. Presidential announcement on Dec. 15, 1969, followed 
by Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) 

by the end of 1966 and then virtually withdrew by 
the end of 1971. The Army and the Navy built up 
at slower rates, not approaching their peak 
strengths until the end of 1967. This is not sur¬ 
prising, because the Army deployed four times as 
many troops as any other Service. 

(U) Table 17 displays the stages of the U.S. force 
buildup in South Vietnam and the subsequent 


memorandum, Feb. 9, 1970, “Southeast Asia Deploy¬ 
ment Program #9.” 

i. Presidential announcement on April 20, 1970 to reduce 
150,000 troop spaces in South Vietnam by May 1, 1970, 
promulgated by incremental redeployments, SEA Pro¬ 
gram #10 through SEA Program #12. 

j. Presidential announcement on June 3, 1970, followed 
by Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) 
memorandum, Aug. 27, 1970, “Southeast Asia Deploy¬ 
ment Program #10.” 

k. Presidential announcement on Oct. 12, 1970, followed 
by Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) 
memorandum, Dec. 16, 1970, “Southeast Asia Deploy¬ 
ment Program #11.” 

l. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) 

memorandum, March 1, 1971, “Southeast Asia Deploy¬ 
ment Program #12.” 

m. Presidential announcement of April 7, 1971 to reduce 
100,000 U.S. spaces in South Vietnam by Dec. 1, 1971. 

n. SecDef memorandum, April 9, 1971, “U.S. Redeploy¬ 

ments,” followed by Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Systems Analysis) memorandum, June 2, 1971, 

“Southeast Asia Deployment Program #13.” 

o. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) 

memorandum, July 15, 1971, “Southeast Asia Deploy¬ 
ment Program #14.” 

p. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) 

memorandum, Sept. 28, 1971, “Southeast Asia Deploy¬ 
ment Program #15.” 

q. Presidential announcement of Nov. 12, 1971 to reduce 
45,000 U.S. spaces in South Vietnam by Jan. 31, 1972 
and SecDef memorandum, Nov. 15, 1971, “U.S. Rede¬ 
ployments From South Vietnam,” followed by Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) memorandum, 
Dec. 30, 1972, “Southeast Asia Deployment Program 
#16.” 

r. Presidential announcement of Jan. 13, 1972 to reduce 
70,000 U.S. spaces in South Vietnam by May 1, 1972 
and SecDef memorandum, Jan. 13, 1972, “U.S. Rede¬ 
ployments From the RVN,” followed by Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) memorandum, 
March 17, 1972, “Southeast Asia Deployment Program 
#17.” 

s. Presidential announcement of April 26, 1972 to reduce 
20,000 U.S. spaces in South Vietnam by July 1, 1972 
and SecDef memorandum, May 4, 1972, “Redeploy¬ 
ments From the RVN,” followed by Assistant Secre¬ 
tary of Defense (Systems Analysis) memorandum, 
June 12, 1972, “Southeast Asia Deplovment Program 
#18.” 

t. Presidential announcement of June 28, 1972 to reduce 
10,000 U.S. spaces in South Vietnam by Sept. 1, 1972 
and SecDef memorandum, July 1, 1972, “U.S. Rede¬ 
ployments From the RVN,” followed b}^ Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) memorandum, 
“Southeast Asia Deployment Program #19.” 

u. Presidential announcement of Aug. 28, 1972 to reduce 
12,000 U.S. spaces in South Vietnam by Dec. 1, 1972 
and SecDef memorandum, Sept. 5, 1972, “U.S. Rede¬ 
ployments From the RVN,” followed by Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) memorandum, 
“Southeast Asia Deployment Program #20.” 


withdrawal. The buildup, in six steps, culminated 
in a peak authorized U.S. force level of 549,500 
spaces. (The actual strength peaked at 543,400, 
or 6,100 below the authorized level.) 

(U) The withdrawals, or redeployments, took 
place in 14 increments which for convenience can 
be grouped into four major steps. In the first step, 
the President made three separate announcements 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 18. Third-nation forces; end-oj-year strength in thousands. (Table classified Confidential.) 



1964 

JSL 

1965 

IIO. 

1966 

1967 

m_ 

1968 

1969 

1970 

Ifii, 

1971 

Ifil. 

1972 

J£L 

Australia 

.2 

1.5 

4.4 

6.8 

7.6 

7.6 

6.8 

2.0 

0 

Korea 

.2 

20.7 

45.6 

47.8 

49.9 

50.2 

48.6 

45.7 

35.4 

New Zealand 

.03 

.1 

.2 

.5 

.6 

.5 

.6 

.1 

0 

Philippines 

.03 

.1 

2.1 

2.0 

1.6 

0.2 

0.1 

.1 

.1 

Thailand 

.02 

.02 

.2 

2.2 

5.9 

11.8 

11.6 

6.0 

0 

Total 

.5 

22.4 

52.5 

59.3 

65.6 

70.3 

67.7 

53.9 

35.5 


Source: Table 3, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary , Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), February 14, 1973, 


authorizing the redeployment of 115,500 U.S. 
troops, thus reducing their number to a level of 
434,000 on April 15, 1970. In the second step, the 
President announced a force reduction of 150,000 
by May 1, 1971, dropping the authorized level to 
284,000. This reduction took place in the three 
increments (4, 5, and 6) shown in the table. Then, 
in another single announcement, the President 
reduced the forces by 100,000. This resulted in an 
authorized force level of 184,000 on Dec. 1, 1971. 
This was also done in three increments (7, 8, and 
9). The final step (prior to the cease-fire agree¬ 
ment) consisted of five Presidential announce¬ 
ments that reduced forces by 157,000, to a level of 
27,000 by Dec. 1, 1972. The cease-fire agreement 
then provided for the withdrawal of the remaining 
U.S. forces. 

(U) Third-Nation Forces. Australia, Korea, New 
Zealand, and Thailand all contributed military 
forces to fight in Vietnam, and the Philippines 
sent a civilian contingent. The Korean (ROK) 
forces comprised 80 percent of the third-nation 
contribution. They built up to a force of about 
45,000 by the end of 1966, and most of them were 
still in Vietnam at the end of 1972. The Korean 
units operated primarily in Military Region 2 
and a few operated in Military Region 1. Table 18 
displays the third-nation personnel strengths by 
country. 

CONCLUSIONS 

(U) At least two patterns and a question emerge 
from the data presented in this chapter. The first 


pattern reflects the shift in force composition on 
both sides as the years passed. The VC/NVA 
forces consisted progressively less of Viet Cong 
and more of the North Vietnamese Army (paral¬ 
leling and influencing the second trend noted 
below). The decline in Viet Cong strength and 
compensatory increase in North Vietnamese Army 
troops (even as fillers in ostensibly Viet Cong 
units) was notable. In contrast, the Allies relied 
increasingly on outside forces (United States, 
Republic of Korea, and other third nations) in the 
early years 1965-68 and then reverted mostly to 
RVNAF. Thus, the VC/NVA relied increasingly 
on North Vietnamese Army troops from outside of 
South Vietnam, while the Allies relied more on the 
RVNAF troops from within South Vietnam. 

(U) A second pattern is the gradual change in the 
kind of war both sides fought. This will become 
clearer after reading Chapters V and VI. To over¬ 
simplify, the VC/NVA built up from primarily 
Viet Cong guerrilla operations (and forces) to 
progressively greater emphasis on main forces. 
This trend accelerated as regular North Viet¬ 
namese Army units were brought in, first, for the 
kill in 1964-65 and, then, to counter the U.S. 
buildup. Gradual Allied attrition of the Viet Cong 
also made the VC/NVA effort more and more of 
a main-force war, culminating ironically in its 
most conventional effort of all—the Easter 1972 
offensive that made use mostly of regular North 
Vietnamese Army troops with artillery and armor. 
The Allies were predominately regulars all along 
(including RVNAF regular forces), but the 1967- 
72 pacification effort gradually built up the 


794 JDRB 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


Allied counterguerrilla and anti-VC infrastructure 
effort. Meanwhile, gradual U.S. withdrawal re¬ 
duced the Allied main forces. Hence, the Allied 
style and force structure was becoming somewhat less 
conventional as the VC/NVA became notably more 
conventional. 

(U) The question emerging from this chapter is 
why the Allies couldn’t destroy the VC/NVA 
forces, since they outnumbered them by substan¬ 
tial margins throughout the war. 

(U) A comparison of the Allied and VC/NVA 
forces (Tables 11 and 13) shows that the Allies 
always outnumbered the VC/NVA by at least 
three to one. During 1969-71, the ratio was almost 
six to one. Despite this advantage, the Allies could 
not destroy the VC/NVA forces, and the VC/NVA 
force level at the end of 1972 was in fact slightly 

REFERENCES 

1. W. C. Westmoreland, lecture presented at 
Tufts University, Medford, Mass., Dec. 12, 
1973, pp. 25 & 15, respectively, for the first 
and second quotations. 

2. H. W. Hollis, MACV Senior Officer Debriefing 
Report, 25th Infantry Division, U.S. Army, 
Sept. 15, 1969 to April 2, 1970. 

3. W. G. Prince, Analysis ojVietnamization, Vols. 
I, II, and III, Bendix Corp., Ann Arbor, 
Mich., November 1973. 

4. E. O’Ballance, The Indo-China War 1945-54. 
London: Faber and Faber, 1964 (p. 110). 

5. Ibid., p. 157. 

6. Ibid., p. 175. 

7. W. G. Prince, Analysis ojVietnamization Sum¬ 
mary and Evaluation, Vol. I, draft final report, 
The Bendix Aerospace Systems Division, 
Ann Arbor, Mich., July 1973. 

8. O’Ballance, op. cit., p. 248. 

9. V. J. Croizat, A Translation From the French: 


higher than in 1965.* The VC/NVA forces seemed 
to be considerably weaker by 1972, but their army 
remained intact. If the additional Allied advan¬ 
tages of mobility, firepower, and combat support 
are taken into account, it is even more difficult to 
understand how the VC/NVA survived. But 
survive it did, despite the Allied attempt to 
destroy it. The analysis in Chapter IX suggests 
some possible reasons why the VC/NVA were able 
to hold out and wl^ they finally accepted the 
stalemate and signed the cease-fire agreement in 
January 1973. 


*This may be due in part to the tendency of the intelligence 
community to be more willing to add units to the “enemy” 
order of battle than to drop them, despite the attrition 
objective. Also, the estimates probably improved in the 
later years, with a more complete accounting for the 
VC/NVA combat units and support troops, and this may 
have had the effect of raising the levels of the estimates. 

FOR PART ONE 

Lessons of the War in Indochina, Vol. 2, 
RM-5271-PR, The Rand Corp., Santa Mon¬ 
ica, Calif., May 1967, p. 107. 

10. Ibid., p. 33. 

11. “Where the Money Goes,” SEA Analysis Rpt., 
Nov.-Dee. 1970, pp. 50-59. 

12. “Where the Money Went,” SEA Analysis 
Rpt., Aug.-Oct. 1971, pp. 26-34. 

13. R. W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: 
Institutional Constraints on U.S. Performance 
in Viet-Nam, R-967-ARPA, The Rand Corp., 
Santa Monica, Calif., August 1972. 

14. “Where the Money Went,” op. cit., p. 27. 

15. MACV Monthly Order of Battle Summary, 
Aug. 31, 1967. 

16. “Enemy Guerrilla Forces in 1967,” SEA 
Analysis Rpt., March 1968, p. 6. 

17. Southeast Asia Statistical Summary, Off. of the 
Asst. Sec. Defense (Comptroller), Feb. 7, 1973, 
Table 103. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 795 




















UNCLASSIFIED 


PART TWO 

THE MAIN FORCE WAR 


UNCLASSIFIED 



















































































CONFIDENTIAL 


Chapter V 


How Did the Viet Gong and North Vietnamese Forces Operate? 


(U) This chapter is based on all the reports of 
VC/NVA-initiated actions in South Vietnam. 
Many incidents probably weren’t reported, but 
those that were recorded are sufficient to deter¬ 
mine the style, patterns, and trends of VC/NVA 
actions. The analysis examines the various types 
of VC/NVA operations, their levels and trends 
over time, where they were concentrated, and 
how the targeting of Allied forces changed over 
time. 

(U) In a war without fronts, it is particularly 
important to keep a detailed historical record 
of the enemy’s pattern of actions. As with the 
forces, the actions will be scattered about the 
country, and they may appear random and 
individually unimportant at first glance. If 
the enemy is well organized and is operating 
seriously, analysis will reveal that his actions, 
far from being random, follow well-defined 
patterns. These patterns are extremely important, 
since they provide concrete evidence of what the 
enemy is doing, sometimes contrasting with what 
he says he is doing, and sometimes supporting it. 
Incident patterns yield many clues about intent, 
strategy, strength, and weakness.(*)* 

(U) The annual cycle of combat should be kept 
in mind (Chapter II) as a key facet of the VC/ 
NVA style of operation, continuing year after 
year as a basic background to the patterns 
explored here—heavy fighting from February 
through June, a lull in July, renewed combat in 

* References for Part Two begin on page 840. 

CONFIDENTIAL 


August and September, and a lull in October, all 
followed by relatively low activity until February, 
at which time the cycle started all over again. 

(U) Table 19 displays the official Department of 
Defense statistics concerning VC/NVA-initiated 
actions in South Vietnam; but these data present 
several problems. One is that the reporting cate¬ 
gories were changed without retrospective adjust¬ 
ments, and thus, the time series was disrupted, f 
For example, incidents involving indirect fire of 
20 rounds or more were not counted as attacks 
until late 1966, and this boosted the total number 
of attacks in subsequent years in a major way 
(see Table 20). The same problem is seen in the 
harassment and terrorism data for 1965-66. In 
mid-1966, the harassment category was established 
without a retrospective adjustment and here, too, 
the trend is disrupted. 

(U) The most serious problem in dealing with the 
official figures is that they do not include VC/NVA 
actions reported by the Vietnamese National 
Police and other civilian authorities. These data 
started to become available in the final quarter of 
1967, but they are not included in Table 19. The 
latter includes only the military reports, and it 
therefore omits some of the terrorism, sabotage, 
and propaganda incidents that were reported. 
Finally, the summary data limit analysis of VC/ 
NVA actions to types of action by military region. 
To analyze incidents by casualties, provinces, 

fThis problem was encountered in looking at trends in 
VC/NVA forces. 

JDRB 799 




CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 19. VC/NVA actions in South Vietnam; official Department oj Defense figures.' 1 (Table classified 

Confidential.) 



1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

Attacks 

(U) 

SSL. 


SSL. 

(C) 

SSL. 

SSL. 

SSL. 

Battalion Size or 

Larger (C) 

73 

44 

54 

126 

34 

13 

2 

106 

Other (C) 

612 

894 

2,422 

3,795 

3,787 

3,526 

2,242 

6,478 

Sub-Total (U) 

685 

938 

2,476 

3,921 

3,821 

3,539 

2,244 

6,584 

Other 

Harassment (C) 


10,288 

19,231 

18,233 

18,640 

19,148 

10,648 

11,997 

Terrorism (U) 

20,730 

14,585 

1,963 

1,047 

1,375 

1,904 

2,333 

819 

Sabotage (C) 

4,132 

2,212 

1,443 

1,609 

1^9 

185 

101 

134 

Propaganda (C) 

1,974 

1,504 

801 

102 

43 

73 

367 

24 

AA Fire (C) 

4,008 

8,128 

13,290 

13,078 

10,167 

8,734 

6,846 

817 

Total (C) 

31,529 

37,655 

39,204 

37,990 

34,245 

33,583 

22,599 

20,375 


Source: Table 2 Statistics on Vietnam by Month, Southeast Asia 
Statistical Summary , Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (Comptroller), April 11, 1973, pp. 1-8. 
(Based on summary data from the MACV-OPREP reports). 


Table 20. VC/NVA actions in 


South Vietnam; computer data, including military and civilian reports. 
(Table classified Confidential.) 


Attacks 

1965 

SSL. 

1966 

SSL. 

1967 

UO_ 

1968 

(U) 

1969 

SSL. 

1970 

1971 

SSL. 

1972 

SSL. 

Ground Assault (C) 
Indirect Fire Only (C) 
Sub-Total (U) 

685 

685 

906 

32 

938 

1,538 

992 

2,530 

1,500 

2,410 

3,910 

1,615 

2,237 

3,852 

1,770 

1,630 

3,400 

1,615 

1,009 

2,624 

2,429 

4,074 

6,503 

Harrassment 









Harassment by Fire (C) 
Other Harassment (C) 
Sub-Total (C) 



15,502 

7,566 

23,068 

13,435 

9,716 

23,151 

13,812 

10,638 

24,450 

12,927 

12,056 

24,983 

7,682 

9,973 

17,655 

8,939 

8,906 

17,899 

Political & Coercion (C) 



1,756 

3,237 

2,776 

3,844 

3,552 

5,658 

Anti-Aircraft Fire (C) 



12,066 

12,646 

9,706 

8,081 

6,794 

774 

Total Actions 



39,420 

42,944 

40,784 

40,308 

30,625 

30,834 


Difference from Table 1 

Total 216 4,954 6,539 6,725 8,026 10,459 


Source: VCriA and TIRS Computer Files, Department of Defense, National 
Military Command Systems Support Center. 


800 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 




































































CONFIDENTIAL 


Fable 21. More than 95 percent oj the VC/NVA ground assaults were conducted by small units. (Table 

classified Confidential.) 


VC/NVA Ground Assaults 

1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

Total 

By N 

Battalion Sized or 

in) —1.U) 

ia_ 


1Q_ 

1£L 

1Q_ 

J£L 

(U) 

Larger UnitsJV(C) 

73 

44 

54 

126 

34 

13 

2 

106 

452 

Small Units^ (C) 

612 

862 

1,484 

1,374 

1,581 

1,757 

1,613 

2,323 

11,596 

Total Ground Assaults (U) 

685 

906 

1,538 

1,500 

1,615 

1,770 

1,615 

2,429 

12,058 

a/ Sources: VCIIA and 

TIRS Computer 

Files, 

Department of 

Defense, 

National 



Military 'Command Systems Support Center, 
b/ From Table 1 above. 

c/ Residual figure derived by subtracting battalion sized or larger attacks 
from total ground assaults. 


targets, and detailed types (ground assaults and 
standoff fire attacks, for example), it is necessary 
to turn to two computer files which, taken to¬ 
gether, record the details of individual actions 
reported by the military or civil authorities and 
provide data that are suitable for detailed analysis. 

(U) Table 20 displays the complete data in sum¬ 
mary form. It contains all of the data shown in 
Table 19 plus the additional civilian data collected 
from late 1967 on, so the totals are much higher 
than those in Table 19.* The attack data and 
antiaircraft data agree with Table 19 quite well, 
because they were reported only through the 
military channel. The additions lie in the areas of 
harassment, terrorism, sabotage, and nonviolent 
political coercion ^propaganda, etc.). The effect of 
adding indirect rire (20 rounds or more) to the 
attack category in late 1966 shows up clearly. 
Such incidents accounted for more than half of the 
total attacks during the 1967-72 period. 

(U) Table 20 shows clearly the unconventional 
style of the VC/NVA brand of war. Most of their 
actions—standoff attacks, harassment, and terror¬ 
ism—did not involve direct contact between their 
ground forces and those of the Allies, the emphasis 
in terms of numbers being on indirect attacks and 
small-scale harassment and terrorism. The VC/ 
NVA ground assaults against Allied forces accounted 
for less than 5 percent of the total actions during 

* Duplication between the military and civilian reports has 
been screened out; incidents are counted only once, even 
if they appear in both types of reports. 

CONFIDENTIAL 


1965-72, and as seen below , more than 95 percent oj 
the assaults were attacks by VC/NVA units smaller 
than a battalion. 

(U) The various categories of action shown in 
Table 20 are different enough to require separate 
analysis. For example, a ground assault is usually 
a much more serious action than an indirect attack 
by fire, so it doesn’t make much sense to add them 
and then look only at the total. Thus, the analysis 
regroups the incidents into ground assaults, stand¬ 
off attacks, harassment, coercion, and antiaircraft 
incidents. 

GROUND ASSAULTS 

(U) The VC/NVA ground assaults! are shown in 
Table 21. Here, the figures probably understate 
the actual rate at which ground attacks took 
place, because VC/NVA attacks in reaction to 
Allied operations were seldom, if ever, included in 
the data. Such actions were normally reported 
under the heading of Allied operations, not 
VC/NVA attacks, on the assumption that Allied 
units, not the VC/NVA units, were on the offensive 
in such situations.! Thus, the figures in the table 
probably represent the minimum VC/NVA attack 
rate. 


fA ground assault occurs when troops physically attack 
and make contact with a target or objective. An attack 
consisting of no more than artillery fire is not an assault, 
because assault troops do not take part and no direct 
contact is made with the objective, 
t This assumption is open to challenge; see Chapter IX. 

JDRB 801 


588 - 67 ? 0 - 75-4 
























CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 22. VC/NVA ground assaults were distributed jairly evenly among the military regions. (Table classi¬ 
fiedl Confidential.) 


Military Region 









1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

Total 

MR 1 

408 

305 

305 

366 

332 

657 

2,373 

MR 2 

288 

391 

573 

706 

551 

491 

3,000 

MR 3 

426 

438 

393 

243 

205 

406 

2,111 

MR 4 

416 

366 

342 

450 

471 

873 

2,918 

MR Not Reported 

0 

0 

2 

5 

56 

2 

65 


Table 23. More than 85 


percent oj the indirect fire incidents were harassments every year until 1972. (Table 

classified Confidential.) 



1967 

1968 

3 ./ 

Attacks by Fire^- 



MR 1 

367 

616 

MR 2 

74 

270 

MR 3 

267 

831 

MR 4 

284 

692 

Unknown 

0 

1 

SVN Total 

992 

2410 

Harassment by Fire^ 

MR 1 

5642 

4150 

MR 2 

1245 

1713 

MR 3 

4057 

3123 

MR 4 

4558 

4445 

Unknown 

0 

4 

SVN Total 

15502 

13435 


Total 



MR 1 

6009 

4766 

MR 2 

1319 

1983 

MR 3 

4324 

3954 

MR 4 

4842 

5137 

Unknown 

0 

5 

SVN Total 

16494 

15845 


1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

Total 



1£L 


..CP).. 

409 

454 

300 

2262 

4408 

387 

299 

141 

463 

1634 

928 

267 

153 

818 

3264 

513 

604 

275 

523 

2891 

0 

6 

140 

8 

155 

2237 

1630 

1009 

4074 

12352 


4087 

3781 

1543 

1686 

20889 

1748 

1947 

959 

1437 

9049 

4034 

1510 

1314 

1976 

16014 

3942 

5675 

3589 

3836 

26045 

1 

14 

277 

4 

300 

13812 

12927 

7682 

8939 

72297 


4496 

4235 

1843 

3948 

25297 

2135 

2246 

1100 

1900 

10683 

4962 

1777 

1467 

2794 

19278 

4455 

6279 

3864 

4359 

28936 

1 

20 

417 

12 

455 

16049 

14557 

8691 

13013 

84649 


Source: SEAPRS Computer File, Department of Defense, National Military 

Command Systems Support Center, 
a/ 20 rounds or more, 

b/ Less than 20 rounds. 


802 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 













































CONFIDENTIAL 


(U) Table 21 suggests that the VC/NVA fought a 
small-unit war. More than 95 percent of its ground 
assaults during the eight-year period were conducted 
by units smaller than a battalion. Even in the peak 
combat years of 1968 and 1972, sirrah units 
accounted for more than 90 percent of the reported 
attacks. The total number of ground assaults was 
stable for this five-year period, having doubled 
between 1965 and 1967 and then leveled off at 
about 1,600 per year from 1968 to 1972. Only in 
1970 was there as much as a 10-percent deviation 
from the average. Then the 1972 offensive brought 
a 50-percent increase. On the other hand, after 
1966, the fluctuations in battalion-size attacks 
became a fairly good guide to the intensity of the 
war. They peaked in 1968, declined steadily in 
1969-71, and then rose again in 1972. 

(U) Table 22 shows that VC/NVA ground assaults 
were fairly evenly distributed among the four 
military regions during the six years shown. No 
military region saw less than 20 percent of the 
action, and none saw more than 28 percent. But 
the emphasis did vary from year to year. For 
example, Military Region 2 accounted for 37 
percent of all the assaults for the three years from 
1969 through 1971. And Military Region 3, after 
accounting for 27 percent of the action during the 
first three years, suddenly dropped to 15 percent 
for the final three years. As would be expected, 
the VC/NVA ground assaults were concentrated 
in the same provinces in which Allied combat 
deaths were highest. The ten provinces showing 
the highest Allied death rates include eight of the 
provinces undergoing the highest VC/NVA ground- 
attack rates.* 

STANDOFF ATTACKS 

(U) Standoff attacks—that is, attacks by in¬ 
direct fire—are considered in two categories here. 
The first category includes indirect fire of 20 
rounds or more of mortar, rocket, or artillery 
shells which, along with ground assaults, were 
classified as attacks in the official statistics. The 
second category consists of harassment by indirect 
fire of less than 20 rounds from mortars, rockets, 
or artillery, or fire from small arms. These are 

*To convert the list of ten provinces with the highest 
Allied death rates into the list of ten with the highest 
ground-assault rates, simply drop Kien Hoa and Quang 
Tin from the death list and add Pleiku and Phu Yen. 


grouped with other types of harassment in the 
official figures. But since the two types of action 
are alike except for the number of rounds fired, 
they are analyzed together here. 

(U) Typically, an attack by fire consisted of about 
30 rounds. Although military in style—requiring 
advanced planning, logistic support, etc.—there 
was no attempt to assault the target. A standoff 
attack was generally a means of exerting military 
pressure on a target that the VC/NVA could not 
hope (or did not desire) to defeat. Enemy forces 
inflicted an Allied combat death for every 50 to 
60 rounds they fired,( 2 ) and although they some¬ 
times suffered casualties from Allied counter¬ 
battery fire, they usually escaped unharmed. 

(U) Harassments by indirect fire usually were 
isolated incidents, not coordinated with other 
types of military action and essentially constitut¬ 
ing an extension of terrorist activity. Using a 
small mortar (81 or 82 mm), the VC/NVA would 
fire six or seven rounds; and for every 25 rounds 
fired, an Allied soldier or civilian would be killed, 
usually at no cost to the VC/NVA except for 
ammunition^ 2 ) 

(U) Table 23 indicates that the annual average of 
indirect fire incidents was quite stable at about 
15,000 per year, except for 1971, although a slight 
declining trend is evident. More than 85 percent of 
such incidents consisted of harassing fire in every 
year except 1972, when the high rate o f artillery fire 
introduced into Military Region 1 altered the balance. 
The table also suggests that harassments by fire 
were almost level during 1968-70. 

(U) Military Region 4 experienced 34 percent of 
all standoff attacks during the six-year period and 
44 percent of the small attacks during the final 
three years of that period. Military Region 1 
experienced 30 percent of the standoff attacks. But 
in 1972 alone, Military Region 1 accounted for nearly 
20 percent of the six-year total, denoting the 
intensity of the 1972 offensive there and the VC/ 
NVA shift to more conventional tactics. In Mili¬ 
tary Region 3, harassment by fire dropped sharply 
in 1970 and remained low from then on. This pat¬ 
tern is similar to that for ground assaults. 

HARASSMENT AND POLITICAL COERCION 

(U) Table 24 displays incidents of harassment 
(other than indirect fire) and VC/NVA acts of a 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 803 



CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 24. Harassment and political coercion. 
(Table classified Confidential.) 



1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

Total 

Harassment 

00 

i!0_ 



1£1_ 

ici_ 

iMl_ 

MR 1 

2911 

3411 

2901 

3735 

2945 

3229 

19162 

MR 2 

1499 

1878 

1911 

2831 

2119 

1903 

12141 

MR 3 

1908 

2707 

4004 

3271 

2999 

1765 

16654 

MR 4 

1248 

1690 

1822 

2217 

1875 

2055 

10907 

Unknown 

0 

0 

0 

2 

35 

8 

45 

Total 

7566 

9716 

10638 

12056 

9973 

8960 

58909 


Political- 

Coercion 

MR 1 

114 

349 

243 

710 

1206 

1464 

4086 

MR 2 

1100 

' 1755 

1476 

1474 

1306 

2102 

9213 

MR 3 

381 

790 

888 

1239 

722 

1171 

5191 

MR 4 

161 

343 

169 

421 

318 

921 

2333 

Total 

1756 

3237 

2776 

3844 

3552 

5658 

20823 


Source: SEAPRS Computer File, Department of Defense, National Military 

Command Systems Support Center. «. 

political or coercive nature. Harassment includes 
acts of sabotage and terror, with terror reflecting 
incidents against civilians that result in casualties: 
assassinations, abductions, or wounded. The politi¬ 
cal and coercive category includes actions that 
were directed at civilians, but which did not inflict 
casualties: propaganda, holding meetings, enter¬ 
ing hamlets, etc. 

(U) The table indicates that harassments averaged 
about 9,800 per year for the six-year period from 
1967 through 1972. They did peak in 1970, but 
the level was fairly constant throughout the 
period. Military Region 1 accounted for a third of* 
all the harassments, with Military Region 3 close 
behind, while Military Region 4, which led in 
harassments by fire, was lowest in other types of 
harassment. 

(U) Acts of a political or coercive nature, without 
casualties, averaged about 3,500 per year. These 
were concentrated in Military Region 2 (44 
percent), and they showed a rising trend, while 
again, Military Region 4 had the lowest reported 
number of such incidents. The figures from Mili¬ 
tary Region 4, by the way, are low enough to 
raise questions about the accuracy of reporting 
there. Indeed, this type of incident was in any 
case probably reported less accurately than any 
of the others, because it was less serious (no 
casualties) and consequently more likely to escape 
the notice of authorities. Thus, the political- 
coercion figures should not be taken too seriously. 


TERRORISM 

(U) Figures dealing with terrorism are included 
in the harassment category of Table 24, but 
terrorism is such an important VC/NVA activity 
that it needs special coverage. Terror is a tradi¬ 
tional weapon of the insurgent, and in South 
Vietnam the Communists began using terror 
again in 1957 as part of their renewed campaign 
to unite Vietnam under a Communist government. 
General Giap recognized the value of terror as a 
guerrilla war tactic when he said, “. . . the most 
correct path to be followed by the people to 
liberate themselves is revolutionary violence 
(terror) and revolutionary war.” The VC/NVA 
use of terror in South Vietnam was aimed at 
several important goals: 

• (U) Intimidation of the people. The VC/NVA 
assassinated, abducted, threatened, and har¬ 
assed the population in order to force its co¬ 
operation, to obtain laborers and porters 
when needed, to. collect taxes, food, and other 
supplies, and to prevent the local inhabitants 
from giving intelligence to Allied forces. 

• (U) Elimination of enemies. Certain in¬ 
dividuals, particularly GVN officials (hamlet 
and village chiefs, for example), National 
Police, RD Cadre, school teachers, and 
individual citizens who defied VC/NVA threats 
were specifically marked for elimination. If 
the individual was unpopular, so much the 
better, since the VC/NVA could claim credit 
for removing an “enemy” of the people. 

• (U) Propaganda. Within Vietnam, the VC/ 
NVA pointed to its terror tactics as signs of 
its strength and presence throughout the 
country, even in the cities that traditionally 
were government strongholds. The VC/NVA 
also tried to influence external factors, such 
as the Paris Peace Talks and world public 
opinion, by terror attacks on well-known U.S. 
and Vietnamese personalities (for example, the 
attacks on the Commander of U.S. Naval 
Forces in Vietnam and on several high GVN 
officials). Such actions gave the VC/NVA 
publicity and helped boost the morale of its 
members. 

(U) According to Bernard Fall( 3 ) and Jay 
Mallin,( 4 ) terror was used as a tactic to isolate the 


804 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 






















CONFIDENTIAL 


Fable 25. Officials were most likely to be killed and other civilians most likely to be kidnapped .“ (Table 

unclassified.) 


Officials 

1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

Total 

Killed 

209 

168 

285 

362^ 

342 

464 

352 

518 

2700 

Kidnapped 

323 

176 

192 

172k/ 

119 

160 

67 

134 

1343 

Other Civilians 




5027—^ 






Killed 

1691 

1564 

3421 

5860 

5483 

3419 

3887 

30352 

Kidnapped 

7992 

3634 

5177 

8587^/ 

6170 

6771 

5322 

12985 

56638 

Total Killed 

1900 

1732 

3706 

5389k/ 

6202 

5947 

3771 

4405 

33052 

Total Kidnapped 

8315 

3810 

5369 

8759^/ 

6289 

6931 

5378 

13119 

57970 

a/ Source: Table 2, 

Southeast 

Asia 

Statistical Summary, 

Office 

of the 


Assistant 

Secretary of 

Defense 

(Compt 

roller) 

, April 

11, 



1973, pp. 1-9. 

b/ Prior to August 1968, includes terrorist incidents reported by the SVN 


National Police. Beginning August 1968, includes additionally those 
incidents reported through military channels. 


rural areas from the cities, rural areas being easier 
for the VC/NVA to control, since the people had 
not been provided with security by the Vietnamese 
Government in the past. The elimination of a few 
key GVN people (the hamlet chief, police chief, 
local school teacher, etc.) was usually all that was 
necessary to intimidate the people. Then, once the 
rural bases were set up—so the theory went—the 
cities would be isolated and would eventually fall 
to VC/NVA control through economic pressure, 
terror tactics, and lack of popular support for the 
government. The rural terror campaign was 
complemented by terror tactics in the cities, which 
served different purposes from terror in the 
countryside. In the cities, the Communists sought 
to discredit the government and to undermine the 
economy by discouraging business activity, caus¬ 
ing investment capital to flee, and disrupting 
transportation and communication. 

(U) The Communists explained the function of 
terror in formulating a three-pronged strategy— 
military, diplomatic, and political—in their 
COSVN Resolution No. 9 (July 1969). Military 
force was to be directed to exert pressure, to cause 
the United States to speed its withdrawal (and 
shorten the time available for strengthening the 
Government of Vietnam), and to keep the Gov¬ 


ernment of Vietnam on a wartime footing. Diplo¬ 
macy was to marshal world opinion in the Com¬ 
munists’ favor, and the “political struggle’’ was to 
be accelerated so as to lay the groundwork within 
South Vietnam itself. Integral to the political 
struggle would be the liberal use of terrorism to 
weaken and destroy local government, strengthen 
the party apparatus, proselyte among the popu¬ 
lace, erode the control and influence of the 
Government of Vietnam, and weaken the RVNAF. 
If positive benefits coidd not be gained, COSVN 
No. 9 indicated, then the VC/NVA would settle 
for creating “fiercely contested areas.” The Com¬ 
munists intended to “motivate” the peasants in 
all rural areas, regardless of whether they were 
contested or were controlled by either side. (One 
experienced observer noted that they sometimes 
settled for simply teaching the peasants how to 
remain neutral.) 

(U) In summary, terrorism is the means by which 
the VC/NVA entered (or reentered) populated 
areas in South Vietnam. Provinces that experi¬ 
enced high levels of terrorism had fairly large 
populations, and historically they were the sites 
of VC/NVA bases. It is in these areas that the 
VC/NVA felt it could rekindle sympathy for its 
cause, nullify the effect of the GVN presence, and 


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Table 26 . The VC/NVA increased its targeting of 
U.S. forces; U.S. versus RVNAF shares oj KIA 
from, VCjNVA-initiated actions; monthly averages. 
(Table unclassified.) 


Combat Deaths 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

U.S. 

57 

102 

215 

231 

RVNAF 

443 

463 

483 

400 

Total 

500 

565 

698 

631 

U.S.7. 

11 

18 

31 

37 


Sources: SEA Analysis Rpt. : "Enemy Emphasis on Caus¬ 
ing U.S. Casualties" (April 1969, p. 30) and "Enemy 
Targeting of U.S. and RVNAF Forces" (Feb. 1970, p. 2) 


make inroads into GVN control. In contrast, 
terrorism in areas traditionally opposed to the 
VC/NVA (for example, Catholic Hoa Hao) gen¬ 
erally stiffened the people’s resistance. 

(U) Incidents of terror were reported individually 
from South Vietnam for several years, and before 
mid-1968, two sets of terrorism data were collected 
and used separately. One set consisted of Viet¬ 
namese National Police data, which were reported 
to Washington in the USAID monthly report of 
assassinations and abductions, and the other set 
was reported through U.S. and Vietnamese mili¬ 
tary channels, coming to Washington in the 
OPREP-5 reports. CORDS consolidated the two 
sets of information into the Terrorist Incident 
Reporting System (TIRS), which covered the 
period from late 1967 on. 

(U) Table 25 shows the reported number of 
terrorist victims in South Vietnam. In reading this 
table it is important to remember that the figures 
showing persons “killed” do not include the entire 
toll exacted by the VC/NVA. Many additional 
civilians were killed in VC/NVA attacks and in 
actions not included in the terrorism reports (see 
Chapter XII for an analysis of civilian casualties). 

(U) Table 25 suggests that GVN officials were 
twice as likely to be killed as kidnapped, an 
average of 340 officials being killed each year, as 
opposed to 170 being kidnapped. Officials ac¬ 
counted for 8 percent of the killed, but only 2 
percent of the kidnapped. For other civilians, the 
pattern is the exact opposite. They were twice as 
likely to be kidnapped as killed, and more of them 
were kidnapped in years of large enemy offensives 


(1968 and 1972) than in other years, probably 
because of the large VC/NVA demand for porters 
and other support. 

(U) After estimating that one South Vietnamese 
person in a thousand would be a terrorist victim in 
1971 , an analysis in August 1971 attempted to 
place the terrorism data from South Vietnam in 
perspective by comparing them to Bureau of the 
Census statistics on U.S. crime rates. ( 5 ) On the 
basis of 1971 terrorism rates, the analysis found 
that: 

. . . the VC/NVA are assassinating people in 
Vietnam at a rate which is about 50 percent 
higher than the murder rates of the three worst 
U.S. cities (28 per 100,000, compared to murder 
rates of 18.6 in Charlotte, N.C. and 18.1 for 
Columbia, S.C. and Shreveport, La.). 

. . . woundings occur at a rate of 50 per 100,000, 
about one-third the aggravated assault rate in 
the U.S. (152 per 100,000). 

. . . terrorist incidents not involving casualties 
(extortion, taxation, etc.) occur at a rate of 24 
per 100,000, about 84 percent below the robbery 
rate in the U.S. (147 per 100,000).* 

ANTIAIRCRAFT INCIDENTS 

(U) Antiaircraft incidents are not analyzed in 
detail here, although the data are shown in Table 
19. An antiaircraft incident requires two elements: 
first, the flight of an aircraft and, second, some¬ 
one on the ground able and willing to fire at it. 
The number of such incidents tended to fluctuate 
with the level of Allied air sorties: As the number 
of sorties rose, so did the amount of antiaircraft 
fire in South Vietnam, and vice versa. However, 
in 1972, when the number of air sorties tripled, 
the number of antiaircraft incidents fell from 
6,800 in 1971 to 800 in 1972. Such a drastic 
change in the face of intense combat suggests 
that pilots simply stopped reporting antiaircraft 
fire, rather than that such fire had stopped. 
Finally, antiaircraft incidents are a sure sign that 
the “enemy” is on the ground; and analysis of 
the pattern of such incidents, particularly if they 
cluster over periods of time, often provides a 
good guide to the location of insurgent camps or 
bases during the early stages of an insurgency, 
when intelligence usually is sparse. 

*But remember that such incidents in South Vietnam are 
not reported very well. 


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VC/NVA TARGETING OF U.S. FORCES 

(U) Table 26 presents evidence that the VC/NVA 
increasingly targeted U.S. forces from 1966 through 
1969. The U.S. proportion of AlliecU-combat 
deaths from VC/NVA-initiated actions increased 
each year, from 11 percent in 1966 to 37 percent in 
1969. This rising trend was produced mainly by 
the fact that RVNAF deaths remained fairly 
constant, while U.S. deaths resulting from these 
actions increased in every year shown. The lone 
exception occurred in 1969, when RVNAF deaths 
resulting from VC/NVA-inspired incidents de¬ 
clined while U.S. deaths increased relatively 
little. (But U.S. combat deaths resulting from 
other actions dropped 35 percent in 1969, which 
further accents the thrust of VC/NVA targeting.) 

(U) The rising numbers of U.S. forces during the 
period might seem to explain the apparently 
increasing VC/NVA tendency to target U.S. 
troops; that is, it could simply have been that 
the number of targets increased. But this explana¬ 
tion does not satisfy, because the strength of the 
RVNAF grew much more than that of the U.S. 
forces during the period shown. The U.S. com¬ 
ponent of the total Allied forces dropped from 36 
percent at the end of 1966 to 31 percent by the end 
of 1969 (see Table 13, page 790). Thus, the in¬ 
creasing proportion of U.S. combat deaths was 
most likely the result of intentional concentra¬ 
tion on U.S. targets to keep the U.S. casualty 
rates as high as possible. The VC/NVA guidance 


for the “summer offensive” in 1969 supports this 
interpretation: 

In short, during the 1969 spring offensive 
we killed many Americans. The most significant 
success of the 1969 spring offensive was that it 
boosted the antiwar movement in the United 
States, which seriously affected the American 
plan of aggression. 

What we should do: For each additional day’s 
stay, the United States must sustain more 
casualties. For each additional day’s stay, they 
must spend more money and lose more equip¬ 
ment. Each additional day’s stay, the American 
people will adopt a stronger antiwar attitude 
while there is no hope to consolidate the puppet 
administration and Army.( 6 ) 

CONCLUSION 

(U) The large numbers, small size, and dispersed 
nature of the various types of VC/NVA incidents / 
clearly suggest the need to perform quantitative 
analysis to seek the patterns of activity that yield 
clues about the VC/NVA strategy and mode of 
operation. Essentially, the strategy called for 
constant small-scale harassment, punctuated by a 
few high points of activity, particularly during the 
first half of the year. Battalion-size attacks were 
relatively rare, as were ground assaults in gen¬ 
eral. Continual indirect fire , harassment , and 
terror were the characteristics oj the VC/NVA 
strategy , and the data show how much the enemy 
used them year after grinding year as a good, sub¬ 
stitute for conventional tactics throughout the country. 
The Communists' war was truly a war without fronts. 


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Chapter VI 

How Did Allied Ground Forces Operate? 


(U) The statistical reporting to Washington of 
Allied ground operations in South Vietnam, 
particularly the reporting by the U.S. Army, was 
so unsystematic that no tables can be presented 
here, because the figures are not very useful, 
even for simple analysis of trends and comparisons. 
The reporting of the U.S. Marines was far better, 
but the specialized analysis of those data will be 
left to that organization. Vietnamese reporting 
of ground operations was more consistent than that 
of the U.S. Army. This chapter simply explains 
a few of the problems in dealing with the data 
and presents some of the major themes that 
emerged from fragmentary analyses of ground 
operations that appeared in the Southeast Asia 
Analysis Report. 

DATA PROBLEMS 

(U) The confusion in reporting data about ground 
operations probably resulted from a persistent 
inability to understand a war without fronts. 
It was difficult to figure out what to report and 
even more difficult to figure out how to report it. 
Moreover, the problem was compounded by 
MACV’s unwillingness to enforce uniformity of 
reporting and its strong resistance to changes 
suggested by outsiders. Basically, the reporting 
“system” divided the ground operations of 
Allied forces into large operations and small 
operations. 

(U) A large operation was defined as one con¬ 
ducted by an Allied force of three companies or 
more,( 7 ’ 8 ) and the number of such large operations 


was a statistic often displayed as an indicator of 
the tempo of operations by the Allies. But this 
statistic in itself gave no clue to the sizes or dura¬ 
tions of the operations. 

(U) The sizes and lengths of large operations were 
supposed to be described by a statistic called 
“battalion-days of operation,” the title suggesting 
that each day a battalion spent on a combat 
operation counted as one battalion-day. But 
comparing the battalion-days to the number of 
battalions supposedly involved often showed more 
battalion-days than were theoretically possible 
with the battalions on hand. This stemmed from 
two factors. First, battalion-days weren’t really 
battalion-days at all; they were aggregations of 
company-days. Three compa^^-days equaled one 
battalion-day. But lots of battalions had four 
companies, so they generated four company-days, 
or 1.33 “battalion-days” per day. Second, the 
battalion-days measurement soon came to cover 
every day of a battalion’s (or company’s) exist¬ 
ence. Thus, after correcting for company-days, 
most of the battalions still showed up as operating 
at something virtually every day, and this de¬ 
graded the concept of battalion-days as a measure 
of combat effort. 

| (U) Another common statistic was “operational 
day of contact.” A contact was an action that 
resulted in the application of firepower by either 
VC/NVA or Allied forces. An operational day of 
contact for a large unit operation was credited 
for each 24-hour period in which contact during 
that operation had been made.( 9 ) As the Army 
staff pointed out, the operational day of contact 


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was not a good measure of Allied military activity 
“. . • because an operation qualifies under 
this category if it has one or more contacts in a day 
(it could have had a dozen and be enumerated as 
one operation with contact).”( 10 ) True enough. 

(U) Aside from the problems inherent in the | J 
statistics, there were problems of inconsistent and 
misleading reporting. In 1968, U.S. operations in 
Military Region 3 were reported as a single large 
operation ( Toan Thang—Resolved to Win) after 
April. All of the battalion-days were reported as 
accumulating in Tay Ninh province, although 
U.S. forces operated in other Military Region 3 
provinces. ( n ) Military Region 3 also reported all 
U.S. operations in 1968 as being combined U.S.- 
Vietnamese operations, whether both nations 
actually participated or not.( 12 ) Further, the Allied 
operations reporting from MACV did not provide 
a realistic breakdown of different types of opera¬ 
tions. For example, in Military Regions 1 and 2, 
practically all operations in 1969 were reported as 
“Search and Clear.” But in Military Region 3 

they were called “reconnaissance in force.”( 13 ) 

• 

(U) Similar problems occurred in the statistics 
regarding small-unit actions. The first problem 
was the incompleteness of U.S. reporting, except 
that done by the Marines in Military Region 1. 
Ninety percent of all small-unit actions reported 
by U.S. forces were conducted in Military Region 
l.( 14 ) Military Region 2 simply didn’t report 
actions by small U.S. units at all until 1969, and 
Military Region 3 stopped reporting them that 
same year, despite evidence" from outside the 
official reporting system that small-unit actions 
remained prevalent there. ( 15 ) In contrast, the 
Vietnamese reported practically everything as a 
small-unit action (bridge guards, check points, 
routine patrols, etc.).( 14 ) Thus, any analysis of 
small-unit actions from the official data is 
extremely difficult and any results quite uncertain, 
although the analysis of small-unit actions that 
involved actual contact is of some use. 

(U) To the reader, the futility of attempting 
systematic analysis with the available statistics on 
ground operations should now be evident. 

SOME TENTATIVE FINDINGS 

(U) Given the problems in handling the data 
covering operations on the ground, the analysts in 


most early studies of Allied ground-force effective¬ 
ness had to focus on the efficiency of the various 
Allied forces in killing members of the VC/NVA. 
Later, as pacification data and methods of analyz¬ 
ing it developed, a broader view of the effective¬ 
ness of Allied forces came into being. Here, the 
focus is on inflicting casualties on the VC/NVA. 

(U) The U.S. and third-nation forces tended to 
take over the mission of fighting the main forces 
of the VC/NVA when they entered the conflict. 
From 1965 through 1968 there was a tendency to 
assign the Vietnamese regular units to security 
missions in all the military regions except Military 
Region 4, where few U.S. forces were present. 
After the buildup of the Vietnamese Regional and 
Popular Forces in 1969 and 1970 and the initial 
withdrawals of U.S. forces, the emphasis shifted 
to freeing the Vietnamese battalions from security 
duties and commiting them to offensive combat 
against the main forces of the VC/NVA. If these 
two points are kept in mind, an analysis of the 
statistics through 1969 yields some tentative con¬ 
clusions about the operations of the U.S. and Viet¬ 
namese forces on the ground in South Vietnam. 
But the conclusions must remain tentative, 
given the data problems and the inadequacy of 
using VC/NVA combat deaths as the primary 
index of effectiveness. 

(U) There is some evidence that actions by the 
South Vietnamese troops slackened in 1966 as the 
U.S. and third-nation troops went into full-scale 
offensive combat. The RVNAF killed 20 percent 
fewer VC/NVA in 1966 than in 1965, although the 
total combat deaths among VC/NVA forces rose 
50 percent during 1966. ( 16 ) 

(U) Analysis of data for the period from 1966 
through 1969 indicated that, man for man, the 
Vietnamese regular battalions were only 50 to 60 
percent as effective as U.S. battalions in killing 
personnel of the VC/NVA. Stated another way, on 
an average, each man in a Vietnamese battalion 
got credit for killing about half as many VC/NVA 
troops as each man in a U.S. battalion. ( 17,18 ) By 
this measurement , the Vietnamese consistently ex¬ 
ceeded the MACV calculation that a Vietnamese 
battalion was equivalent to only 31 percent of a U.S. 
battalion. ( 19 ) And they did it during a period in 
which they were receiving only one-tenth of the 
artillery and tactical air support per man in a 


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maneuver battalion that a soldier was receiving in a 
U.S. maneuver battalion. ( 20 ’ 21 ) (The Vietnamese did 
receive more support in later years, however.) 
The Vietnamese combat battalions in Military 
Regions 2 and 3 consistently appeared to be much 
less effective than those in Military Regions 1 and 
4.( 8 - 16 - 22 ) 

(U) Except during the Tet offensive period in 
1968, some 70 percent of U.S. artillery rounds were 
fired in situations of light or inactive combat 
intensity, as judged by the reporting artillery 
unit^ 23 ) Expenditures of artillery ammunition in 
Vietnam remained fairly constant between June 
1967 and June 1970, and in the latter month they 
were only 6 percent below the highest monthly 
rate ever recorded (February 1968). Variations in 
the intensity oj the main-force conflict (trending 


downward from 1968 until 1972), the considerable 
pacification gains during 1969-70 (see Chapter 
XIII), and U.S. redeployments all had little appar¬ 
ent effect on artillery consumption during the three- 
year period. ( 23 ) 

(U) Clearly, analysis of Allied operations on the 
ground in Vietnam is an essential requirement for 
full understanding of that war, or any war without 
fronts. Unfortunately, a systematic analysis of 
these ground operations and their effectiveness will 
probably require at least as much effort as went 
into the rest of this book, and it will have to await 
the patient efforts of historians who can sift 
through the thousands of pages of detailed descrip¬ 
tion of those operations. Even then, there may be 
some question as to the consistency required of the 
data that must be compiled if a systematic 
quantitative analysis is to be produced. 


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Chapter VII 

Improving the Effectiveness of South Vietnamese Forces 

I guess you can take men from any nation on earth, give them leadership, 
time to train, and produce an effective combat force. 

Gen. Matthew B. Ridgeway, U.S. Army (Ret.) 


(U) Wars without fronts tend to occur mostly in 
the less developed countries of the world, and 
several of them have seen the participation of 
forces from outside of the country, usually assist¬ 
ing the government (but in South Vietnam 
assisting both sides). One of the lessons that seems 
to have emerged from these wars is that indigenous 
troops are the ones that win, not outsiders; and if 
the government is to win the military side of the 
war, its troops have to be good enough to do it. 
The outsiders seldom can win for them. 

(U) Developments in Vietnam indicated that, 
fundamentally, the capabilities of RVNAF forces 
and of the Government of Vietnam in general 
would determine the outcome, so it is fitting to 
look at some of the problems of the RVNAF and 
the progress that was made toward solving them 
before U.S. forces were finally withdrawn. In 
Chapter VI, it was noted that, even before 
Vietnamization had a chance to take hold, the 
RVNAF regular force battalions, man for man, 
were about half as effective as U.S. battalions— 
this, without the tremendous firepower and other 
support enjoyed by the U.S. troops. Not bad, 
considering the RVNAF’s handicaps. The prob¬ 
lems that we refer to, however, were not unique 
to the RVNAF. They occur in varying degrees in 
most armies, including that of the United States. 

(U) This chapter focuses on the problems of the 
RVNAF in striving to become a fully effective 
combat force and on what the U.S. did or did 
not do about them. The concentration is on leader¬ 


ship, training, and shortages of troops in combat 
units. 

HOW THE KOREAN ARMY IMPROVED( 25 ) 

(U) After Vietnamization became U.S. policy in 
early 1969, members of the Systems Analysis 
office interviewed Gen. Matthew B. Ridgeway, 
USA (Ret.), as part of their search for ways to 
improve the South Vietnamese armed forces. 
General Ridgeway had been successful in trans¬ 
forming a weak and demoralized South Korean 
Army into an effective fighting force, and his 
views were sought for their possible application to 
the South Vietnamese forces. General Ridgeway 
noted that the two wars were more different than 
alike. He also said, “From this distance, I wouldn’t 
presume for a minute to judge the Vietnam 
situation. I have never been there.” ( 26 ) Nonethe¬ 
less, his views were quite pertinent to the upgrad¬ 
ing of the South Vietnamese Army, although they 
were not applied with much vigor. 

(U) General Ridgeway’s advantage in Korea was 
that he commanded the South Korean Army. 
Backed by the powerful and strong-willed Presi¬ 
dent of South Korea, Syngman Rhee, General 
Ridgeway and his U.S. subordinates fired incompe¬ 
tent Korean commanders freely, replacing them 
with the best ones they could find. This was an 
enormous advantage in upgrading the South 
Korean Army, and General Ridgeway “never 
could understand why they have a dual command 


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in South Vietnam. Why in hell didn't they put the 
ARVN under Westmoreland?”( 27 ) 

(U) The principles applied by General Ridgeway ^ 
in Korea are best stated by him: 

The building of any military establishment 
into an effective combat force rests on several 
basic principles which are the same the world 
over. In general, a military establishment’s 
effectiveness is dependent primarily on its 
officer corps and secondarity on its noncommis¬ 
sioned officer corps. Of course, weaponry is an 
essential, time to train is essential, but the 
focus must always be on the officer corps. It 
takes time to produce an effective combat force 
and there are a multiplicity of functions which 
have to be carried out before an armed force is 
effective. No amount of equipment or numbers 
of personnel can be substituted for the basic 
ingredient of leadership^ 28 ) 

What I want to stress above everything else 
is the foundation of an Army—its officer corps. 
With one, any problem can be overcome; with¬ 
out one, all other efforts are in vain. This is the 
one principle I never stopped stressing when 
we were building the Korean Army.( 28 ) 

And: 

I told President Rhee in the presence of his 
Minister of Defense, "we aren’t going to get 
anywhere with your Army until you get some 
leadership. You haven’t got it from the Minister 
of Defense on down and until you get it, it’s 
just hopeless. Don’t you ask me to arm any 
more of your people. You’ve lost enough equip¬ 
ment now to equip six of our divisions.” 

This wasn’t just carping criticism. These 
fellows had a division commander with the 
experience level of a U.S. Army captain and a 
young one at that. They just hadn’t had the 
training and the experience. Regardless, Presi¬ 
dent Rhee was tough on them. He even fired his 
Minister of Defense. ( 27 ) 

(U) Besides leadership, General Ridgeway em¬ 
phasized that continuous training is critical: 

Oh yes, training is a continuing function. It 
should go on at all times, even during combat. 

In some ways, it is the finest training you can 
get because that is your ultimate reason for 
existence—to be effective in combat. Every 
chance we had in World War II and Korea, we 
trained. Started at the bottom and worked up. 
We took advantage of every opportunity to 
leave the lines and train. Some of those combat 
exercises in Korea were great. We put the 
officers of ROK divisions up on a hillside there 
to observe the exercise taking place in the 
valley. This had a tremendous effect. ( 26 ) 


LEADERSHIP 

(U) Throughout the war in Vietnam, U.S. reports 
cited poor leadership as the South Vietnamese 
Army’s major deficiency, but progress in resolving 
this problem remained unsatisfactory. The main 
reason was that Vietnamese officers (especially in 
the field-grade ranks) often owed their promotions 
more to political acumen than to battlefield per¬ 
formance,* and it was difficult to get the South 
Vietnamese to remove poor officers, because of 
their family and political ties. Other factors also 
contributed to the problem. Between 1967 and 
1970, the South Vietnamese forces grew by 60 
percent, creating an even stronger demand for 
leaders, but qualified officers remained scarce. 
Combat losses and the diversion of military 
leaders into essential nonmilitar}^ jobs further 
aggravated the situation. Finally, MACV was 
never willing to put enough pressure on the South 
Vietnamese to persuade them to replace the 
poorest military leaders with better ones. This 
was in sharp contrast to the pacification advisers’ 
success in getting the South Vietnamese to put 
better leaders into key pacification jobs. 

(U) The main key to the effectiveness of an 
RVNAF unit was the competence of its com¬ 
mander. He set the tone of the unit because his 
subordinates were usually reluctant to take any 
initiative without his lead. Also, leadership in a 
Vietnamese unit tended to be uneven compared to 
that in a U.S. unit. If a U.S. commander was 
killed or disabled in combat, his second in com¬ 
mand was expected to take command and was 
trained to do so, and the unit continued to fight. 
When a Vietnamese commander was killed, his 
unit sometimes fell apart immediately, even 
though the other officers survived, because they 
often were not well qualified, trained leaders. 
Stated another way, the competence of the leaders 
in a U.S. unit was normally more uniform than 
that of the leaders in a South Vietnamese unit. 

*(U) RVNAF promotion authorities: While recom¬ 
mendations for annual and special promotions were made 
by promotion boards and unit commanders, respectively, 
the actual promotions were made only by the following 
promotion authorities: President (for general officers), 
Prime Minister (permanent colonel), Minister of Defense 
(functional colonel through permanent major), Chief, 
Joint General Staff (functional major and below). The 
Chief, J GS delegated a portion of his promotion authority 
to subordinate commanders. Thus, all field-grade promo¬ 
tions (major-colonel) had to be approved by a top authority 
in Saigon. 


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(U) An analysis in February 19 7 0( 29,30 ) indicated 
that the capability of an ARVN division com¬ 
mander was a key factor in the performance of all 
RVNAF forces in the area under his-command. 
Unlike the case in the U.S. military forces, the 
ARVN division commander retained tight, control 
of all operations and activities in his dta (Divi¬ 
sion Tactical Area), allowing little leeway for the 
initiative of his subordinates. The analysis sug¬ 
gested that there was a close relationship between 
ARVN leadership and ARVN performance and 
that there was some effect on RF/PF (Regional 
Force/Popular Force) combat performance in the 
dta. Divisions with good commanders had good 
overall leadership and good performance, while 
poor divisions had mediocre commanders. For 
example, General Truong, who commanded the 
ARVN 1st Infantry Division, was widely recog¬ 
nized as an excellent combat leader by both 
Vietnamese and Americans. The performance rat¬ 
ings and indicators showed that his division ranked 
first or second in almost every category when 
compared with all other ARVN divisions. On the 
other hand, the 5th and 18th ARVN Divisions had 
the worst performance ratings, and in August 
1969, as a result of U.S. pressure, the commanders 
of those divisions were finally removed. 

(U) In an analysis during the following month 
(March 1970), ( 31 ) further evidence of the associa¬ 
tion between leadership and combat effectiveness 
was found through analysis of the relationships 
among three ratings of ARVN units: combat 
effectiveness, leadership, and quality of personnel.* 
Within each division the three ratings usually 
showed similar patterns, but among the divisions, 
the trends and their timing were quite different. 
The main result was a high correlation between 
combat effectiveness and leadership in ARVN 
infantry divisions, but only a moderate one 
between combat effectiveness and the rated quality 
of ARVN troops. This suggested that improving 
leadership was more likely to increase combat effec- 

*(U) SEER (the System for Evaluating the Effectiveness 
of RVNAF) included a quarterly report in which the U.S. 
advisors of battalions and higher units responded to 157 
questions on various aspects of the unit, its personnel, and 
its operations. The analysis here is concerned with the 
questions and ratings pertaining to combat effectiveness, 
leadership, and quality of personnel. The ratings were 
composed of the weighted answers to selected questions. 
For example, personnel ratings measure the physical con¬ 
dition of the troops, how eager for combat and how loyal 
they are, how effectively morale incentives are used, and 
how often pay is delayed. 


tiveness than improving the quality of the troops. 
Additional evidence from a regression analysis 
suggested that improvement of leadership would 
yield four times as much improvement in combat 
effectiveness as an equivalent increase in the 
quality of the troops. Precision should not be 
imputed to the results, but the statistical rela¬ 
tionships between the rated quality of leadership 
and the rated quality of performance was fairly 
strong. More important, the results fit the views 
expressed by General Ridgeway, as well as the 
doctrine of the U.S. Army. Good leadership is 
critical to combat performance. 

(U) If the quality of ARVN division commanders 
was so important, it follows that the U.S. evalua¬ 
tions of each commander should have been as 
candid and accurate as possible. Unfortunately, 
as Table 27 indicates, the U.S. advisors’ assess¬ 
ments gave the impression that all of the ARVN 
division commanders were quite capable. Exper¬ 
ienced observers disagreed. It is clear that the 
advisors’ reports were not too helpful and that 
they had to be read as one reads efficiency reports. 
An “able” commander, for example, was probably 
inferior to an “excellent and aggressive” com¬ 
mander. Worse, one “highly respected and 
admired . . . competent general officer” was 
obviously nothing of the sort to those who knew 
him best (“coward and military incompetent”). 

IMPACT OF A CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP: 
THE ARVN 7th DIVISION( 32 ) 

(U) The ARVN 7th Division in 1969-70 provides 
an example of what can happen to an ARVN 
division when a good leader takes command. The 
withdrawal of U.S. 9th Division units from 
Military Region 4 in the summer of 1969 left the 
ARVN 7th Division in charge of the area where the 
U.S. units had operated. It soon became apparent 
that the division was not up to the task it faced. 
Recognizing the problem, President Thieu relieved 
the division’s commander and appointed an 
aggressive brigade commander (from the ARVN 
Airborne Division) to the job. No other measures 
were taken, nor was additional support furnished. 
The new commander quickly turned the division 
into an effective fighting unit, furnishing strong 
evidence that replacing a poor commander with a 
good one was the best way to improve a poor 
ARVN division. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 813 



CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 27 . Comments on ARVN division commanders. (Table unclassified.) 


Commanders 


DIA and Advisor Comment 


Experienced Observer Comment 


MS Ngo Quang Truong 
(1st Infantry Division) 
43 months as CG 


BG Nguyen Van Toan 
(2nd Infantry Division) 
24 months as CG 


BG Le Ngo Trien 

(22nd Infantry Division) 

6 months as CG 


Col. Vo Van Canh 
(23rd Infantry Division) 
17 months as CG 


MG Nguyen Van Hieu 
(5th Infantry Division) 
6 months as CG 


"one of the hardest working and most professionally 
competent officers in the Vietnamese Armed Forces... 
an excellent and aggressive commander... 


"an excellent leader and Intelligent, decisive, and 
conscientious officer who is concerned for the welfare 
of his troops... consistently displays his personal 
courage under fire to encourage his troops." (US 
source) "unwilling to use his troops in any way that 
would endanger them...rumored to be corrupt and a 
playboy." (Vietnamese source) 

"Displays the highest moral fibe desired of a leader. 
Decisions made by him reflect careful analysis of the 
situation and matured judgment... He is highly re¬ 
spected by his subordinates as a good leader who is 
not hesitant to praise or punish when demanded by the 
situation...has the capability of assuming the high¬ 
est office in RVNAF." 

"hard-working, thorough, and highly motivated. 

Col. Canh is considered a well-qualified officer. 

Very good division commander. Strong minded, 
aggressive. Well gnunded in tools of his trade. 
Accepted advice :e.dily. Knew his strong points 
and weak points. Not particularly politically 
oriented. Ready to ;c<ept g v<rnment policy; not 
a political can. Scheduled to be promoted to BG. 

Very attenti'r to le -.ires of US com. a u ers in the 
area. Very honest. Personally brave, ready to 
lead by example." 

"one of the ablest senior Vietnamese 'tficers." 

Former CG of the 22nd Infantcy Division. 


1. "Outstanding, aggress v» commander." 

2. "Terrific. Better tha.i most US. On the go 
and out witu units all the time. Tough on sub¬ 
ordinates. 'In' with JGS so he gets good people 
and is able to promote them and hold them. 

1. "Crossly overrated. Division performance 
is marginal. Lacks aggressiveness. Would re¬ 
lieve him." 

2. "Super defensive. Lacked aggressiveness. 
Looking upward rather than down—not good to his 
people. Couple of very bad reports from province 
advisors in his area." 

1. "Good reputation, but I don't know him. Was 
pleased to see Hieu relieved." (See 5th Division 
below.) 


1. "Good reputation, but I don't know him." 

2. "Never met him, but I recall at the time of 
his appointment middle grade ARVN officers were 
asking, 'How did this guy get in?' His repu¬ 
tation is not high among this group. 


1. "Poor as 22nd Division commander. Americans 
are over-impressed by his fluent Englisn, which 
he learned in Malaysia." 

2. "When Hieu was in the 22ad Division it was 
like 2nd Division perf o >tp .nee—non-innovating 
and careful, even when enemy forces were de¬ 
pleted. Insufficient concern with the RF and 
PF while in the 22nd Division and conflicts 
with province officials." 


BG Lam Quang Tho 
(18th Infantry Division) 
6 months as CG 


MG Nguyen Xuan Thinh 
(25th Infantry Division) 


BG Nguyen Thanh Hoang 
(7th Infantry Division) 

19 months as CG, relieved 
in January 1970 


BG Nguyen IChoa Nam 
(7th Infantry Division) 
1 month as CG 


Col. Tran Ba Di 

(9th Infantry Division) 

19 months as CG 


BG Nguyen Vinh Nghi 


"He exudes self confidence and has a noticeable in¬ 
fluence on the actions of his junior officers. He 
is highly respected and admired... a competent gen¬ 
eral officer. 


"The 25th Division, prior to the assumption of 
command by General Thinh, was general]’’ considered 
to be worst combat unit in ARVN. Thinh has begun to 
make changes that will eventually improve the 25th's 
reputation...sets an example for his men...Improving 
in aggressivness and the mastery of commanding a 
division." 

"a professional military officer who is highly intel¬ 
ligent, extremely shrewd, quick to apprehend, and is 
deliberate in thinking and speech. He commands the 
attention of his subordinates." Replaced in Jan. 1970 
by Col. Nguyen Khoa Nam, former commander of che 3rd 
Airborne Brigade. 

"outstanding leadership ability. His full devotion 
seems to be being a full time soldier. His services 
are sought all over Vietnam...one of tne great 
leaders in this country... one of the most competent 
officers I have ever known." 

"Colonel Di clearly commands the divisions, however, 
his leadership is weak dealing with significant 
failures by some of his commanders and sometimes 
with poor staff performance... this lack of force 
and aggressiveness extends to conbat operations in 
that his units seldom take full advantage of enemy 
contacts by exploiting them effectively. In other 
respects, his competence as a commander is far 
above average." 


"very intelligent. He replaces MG Nguyen Van Minh.. 
under Minh the 21st Division was one of South Vietnam's 
finest combat units. 1 ’ 


1. "Coward and military incompetent, despite 
his six foot height and bearing. Was the armor 
commander at the crucial battle at Ap Hao, 
which ARVN lost." 

2. "Don't know him as . division commander. 
Tall, good military bearing—US officers 
think he's great and he gives good briefings. 
The Vietnamese generals think he's a dud. 

They hate his guts. He always looks up. 

Doesn't aggressively carry out his duty. Rides 
the fence." 

1. "Fair commander. Clearly the 25th Division 
is unimpressive." 

2. "Don't know enojgh about him to comment. 


2, "Relieving him was a good move. He was 
a lousy province chief. Super defensive, in¬ 
decisive. Didn't replace poor officials. Tried 
to do all the work himsel' 7 , didn't use his staff." 


1. "Good reputation." 

2. "Don't know him." 


1. "Better than before, but only fair." 

2. "As a province chief he made such effective 
use of RF-PF in 1963-64 that no ARVN battalions 
were needed in Phong Binh or to protect Can Tho, 
despite the presence of substantial VC forces 

in the province. The Vietnamese say he is 
doing a good job, but the Division is in a tough 
area and the problems of operating the division 
tactically seem beyond him. Lacks the necessary 
experience at Division level. Would do well if 
he had an absolutely first rate advisor who could 
help him with the tactics of employing the Division." 

1. "Poor commander in the 21st Division, but ex¬ 
cellent staff officer as chief of staff in I CTZ." 

2. "Slick Chief of Staff in I CTZ. Super defensive 
posture—put barbed wire around Bac Lieu. The 
Division lost lots of its old steam—I attribute 
this to Gen. Nghi's domineering—scares his com¬ 
manders. Overrated." 


814 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 








CONFIDENTIAL 


(U) In the second half of 1969, the performance of 
the AR\ N 7th Infantry Division deteriorated 

r which it was 

ill-prepared. The U.S. 9th Division had i 
the 7th Division’s tactical area fo:r~2^ years, 
leaving the ARVN division to carry out defensive 
missions. The 7th Division had spent onty 30 to 40 
percent of its time on offensive combat missions 
during the U.S. division’s tenure, about the same 
proportion as the Regional Forces in the division 
tactical area. Only one or two 7th Division battal¬ 
ions had participated in joint operations with U.S. 
forces for a few days each month, accounting for 
only 1 percent of the divisions’ battalion-days of 
operation. Just before the U.S. forces left, the 
VC/NVA began sending reinforcements to the 
division tactical area, including a North Viet¬ 
namese regiment and fillers for some Viet Cong 
battalions. The result of all this was a dismal 
performance for the 7th Division during the second 
half of 1969. The division killed only 125 VC/NVA 
troops per month, 42 percent below the number 
killed by the Regional Forces and barely more than 
those killed by the Popular Forces in the division 
tactical area. Moreover, an entire battalion was 
badly mauled by a Viet Cong main-force battalion 
late in the year. 

(U) United States advisors attributed many of the 
division’s problems to poor leadership, Brigadier 
General Hoang being known for conservatism 
and his subordinates lacking initiative. By the end 
of 1969, U.S. advisors rated the 7th Division 
seventh in leadership and ninth in operational 
effectiveness among the ten ARVN divisions. 

(U) Seeing the problem, President Thieu relieved 
General Hoang in January 1970 and installed 
Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Nguyen Khoa Nam, the 
dynamic and aggressive commander of the 3rd 
Airborne Brigade, as the new 7th Division com¬ 
mander. At the time, Colonel Nam’s U.S. advisors 
indicated that he had “outstanding leadership 
ability” and judgment and that “his services are 
sought all over Vietnam; he has excelled in all 
areas.” This was the only significant change. 
Support from the Vietnamese marines and other 
ARVN units in the division tactical area remained 
about the same. Tactical air support and heli¬ 
copter airlift sorties declined in 1970. Helicopter 
gunship sorties and artillery rounds increased, 


but they remained below the countrywide average 
for South Vietnamese regular battalions. 

(U) Colonel Nam’s arrival had two immediate 
effects on the 7th Division’s performance. Its 
tempo of operations picked up, and its motivation 
and leadership improved. The division ceased its 
u 9 to 5” pattern of operations and moved its base 
of operations out from My Tho and Ben Tre 
cities into the field. Offensive combat operations 
increased to 60 percent of the division’s effort, up 
from 30 to 40 percent during the U.S. 9th 
Division’s tenure and 45 percent after its depar¬ 
ture. The division achieved this by passing some 
of its pacification and security duties to the 
Regional and Popular Forces. During the first 
half of 1970, the 7th Division achieved its highest 
number of VC/NVA killed (190 per month) and 
its highest kill ratio (3.5 VC/NVA to 1 ARVN) 
since the Tet offensive of 1968. For the first time 
since 1968, the division killed about as many 
VC/NVA and achieved a better kill ratio (3.5 
versus 2.4 to 1) than the Regional Forces did in 
the division tactical area. 

(U) Colonel Nam quickly gained the respect and 
admiration of the U.S. and ARVN officers who 
worked with him. He delegated authority to his 
regimental commanders and encouraged them to 
do the same in directing their battalion com¬ 
manders. One of his first acts was to relieve the 
commander of the 12th Regiment and replace him 
with a newly promoted ARVN lieutenant colonel 
who had a good record as a ranger unit commander 
in Military Region 1. In May, Colonel Nam 
replaced the weak commander of the 11th Regi¬ 
ment. And the U.S. advisors reported that the 
commander of the 10th Regiment turned out to be 
a “real gem” after Colonel Nam gave him more 
authority. By June 1970 all three commanders 
were competing in a useful wa}^. 

(U) In 1970 the 7th Division took the initiative 
against the same VC/NVA forces that had mauled 
before. It prevented further inroads 



against military targets, me m^o//u ttiamiet 
Evaluation System-1970) suggests that population 
“security” increased by 9 to 17 percent in the 
division tactical area during the first half of 1970, 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDItB 815 


CONFIDENTIAL 


compared to a 3- to 8-percent increase country¬ 
wide. At the end of June, 65 percent of the 
population in that division tactical area received 
the top security ratings,* compared to 48 percent 
in the previous December, and 45 percent of the 
rural population was controlled by the Govern¬ 
ment of Vietnam, compared to 36 percent six 
months before, f While the operational success of 
the 7th Division had not yet reduced the overall 
threat to the division tactical area, HES/70 sug¬ 
gests that the VC/NVA forces in populated areas 
were steadily being reduced: On June 30 they 
reportedly affected only 46 percent of the popula¬ 
tion in the division tactical area, compared to 66 
percent the previous December (1969). The U.S. 
Senior Advisor to Kien Hoa Province, where most 
of the increase in terrorism had occurred, stated 
in June 1970 that the civilian population’s reaction 
to armed incursions by the Communists into 
populated areas “is encouraging” and that “it is 
clear that the enemy is fast losing what little 
voluntary popular support he ma}^ once have had.” 

(U) The evidence clearly indicates that Colonel 
Nam “turned the division around.” The lone action 
of putting a competent commander in charge pro¬ 
duced these profound favorable effects. No other 
changes were necessary. 

SHORTAGE OF SENIOR OFFICERS 

(U) The RVNAF officer corps was bottom heav}^ 
during 1967-70 (and probably later), with too 
many junior officers (aspirants and lieutenants) 
and not enough senior officers (captains through 
colonels). The persistent shortage of senior officers 
resulted partly from the increased need for officers 
to fill out the expanding RVNAF force structure 
(up 60 percent from 1967 through 1970), as 
authorized billets increased faster than officer 
promotions. 

(U) But the main reason for the shortfall was South 
Vietnamese reluctance to promote officers to the 
important grades of captain and above .| 


*HES ratings of A or B; see Chapter XIII. 
fRural Security Indicator ratings; see Chapter XIII. 

+ General Yien was head of the Vietnamese Joint General 
Staff. 


promoting large numbers of officers in the field 
grade.” ( 33 ) The South Vietnamese JGS (Joint 
General Staff)|_ 

by failing to carry out its announced 
1968 and 1969 promotion objectives and falling 
short of its 1970 objective, too. It is also significant 
that the Vietnamese corrected the imbalance in 
the noncommissioned officer corps much better 
than they did in the officer structure. Finally, the 
officer corps was bottom-heavy even before the 
rapid buildup began early in 1968; only half of the 
authorized billets for captain through colonel were 
filled in April of that year.( 34 ) 

(U) The evidence suggests that the RVNAF 
reluctance to promote officers into the senior 
grades was the major reason for the shortfall in 
these important grades. This was the product of a 
promotion system that responded more to the 
politics of the senior generals than to the needs of 
the professional military service. As a result, the 
system was unable to respond to the require¬ 
ments for professional officers and to the war 
itself. For example, by 1970 the RVNAF still had 
not loosened the educational requirements for 
commission, nor had it ever used its quotas for 
battlefield promotions. ( 35 ) The steady expansion 
in the size of RVNAF overtook army politics, in 
the sense that the need for more senior officers— 
and hence, promotions—outstripped the capacity 
of the RVNAF political system to sanction such 
promotions. 

(U) In 1970, the RVNAF promotion system pro¬ 
vided for two general types of promotions, annual 
and special. Annual promotions were made on the 
basis of selection lists similar to those used in the 
U.S. Army, while special promotions were made 
on the basis of commanders’ recommendations. A 
few were granted as special battlefield promotions, 
but most went to individuals who had served “ meri¬ 
toriously '’ in noncombat positions.(™) Promotions 
to second lieutenant (from aspirant) and first 
lieutenant were automatic after the required times 
in grade, ( 37 ) and the views of senior officers did 
not come into play until promotions to captain 
and above were considered. 

(U) As already noted, in April 1968 the RVNAF 
had only about half of its authorized captains and 
above. Moreover, the number had dropped by 
10 percent (800) during the previous year despite 


816 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 




CONFIDENTIAL 


a 20 percent increase in the regular forces. ( 34 ) 
Some progress is evident by the end of 1969, as the 
RVNAF doubled the number of senior officers 
(7,000 to 14,000) while the total personnel of 
regular and regional forces increasecr~bnly 50 
percent.* But authorized appointments for cap¬ 
tain and above increased 80 percent, and so, 
despite its efforts, the RVNAF was able to fill 
only 62 percent of the authorized billets. ( 38 ) 
Meanwhile the categories of aspirant and lieu¬ 
tenant remained “overstrength” as new entries 
almost kept up with new authorizations, although 
some progress in correcting the imbalance was 
seen. The category was about 25 percent above 
its authorized strength in April 1968, ( 34 ) and it 
fell to 20 percent above at the end of 19 69.( 38 ) 
Also, the NCO imbalances were on the wa}^ to 
correction^ 38 ) 

(U) Thus, despite the great increase in captains 
and above, this remained the lagging category. 
There is no way to evaluate the validity of all of 
the increased authorizations, and it is conceivable 
that the needs were inflated; but the evidence 
suggests that by U.S. standards the RVNAF had 
a significant shortage of senior officers.( 39 ) At any 
rate, morale could not have been high in a service 
where, in June 1968, if all authorized jobs were 
held, 62 percent of the lieutenant colonels were 
holding colonel’s jobs, 48 percent of the majors 
were holding lieutenant colonel’s jobs, and 47 
percent of the captains were holding major’s 
jobs.( 40 ) 

PERFORMANCE IN COMBAT WAS NOT 
THE WAY TO GET AHEAD 

(U) The most difficult hurdle in developing combat 
leadership was that RVNAF officers had no incen¬ 
tive to seek combat commands, because com¬ 
manders in the field were least favored for pro¬ 
motion. In November 1969, only 12 percent of the 
battalion commander billets were filled by lieu¬ 
tenant colonels, but more than half of all the 
billets authorized at that rank were filled by 
lieutenant colonels. This suggests the extent to 
which staff officers were promoted ahead of com¬ 
bat commanders. ( 41 ) 

(U) Most battalion and regimental commanders 
were officers who were one or two ranks below the 

*The Popular Forces had no officers. 

CONFIDENTIAL 


rank authorized for the job, and in November 
1969, two battalions were led by first lieutenants. 
Elite units such as airborne and cavalry battalions 
did better, even though the infantry battalions in 
ARVN divisions bore the brunt of the fighting. 
The typical infantry battalion commander in an 
ARVN infantry division was a captain filling a 
lieutenant colonel’s slot, and he had 12 years of 
commissioned service and 13 months on the job. 
Airborne and cavalry units were usually led by 
lieutenant colonels with more experience.^ 1 ) 

(U) The pattern of promotions also shows the 
lack of emphasis on combat performance. Battle¬ 
field commissions were rare, and MACV noted that 
the criteria for them were too stringent. ( 40 ) The 
figures support the contention. In 1966, only two 
battlefield promotions were granted,( 42 ) and the 
following years saw little improvement. In 1967, 
4 percent of the total advancements were battle¬ 
field promotions,( 42 ) while the figure for the first 
half of 1968 was 5 percent( 40 ) and for 1970 it was 
2 percent.( 43 ) The staff favorites did better: 19 
percent of the promotions in 1966, twenty-six 
percent in 19 6 7, ( 42 ) and 59 percent in the first half 
of 1968 were special nonbattlefield promotions. ( 40 ) 
Moreover, in 1967 the promotion boards selected 
for promotion only 33 percent of the officers 
eligible for annual promotions. ( 42 ) The emphasis 
on “special nonbattlefield” performance is clear. 
No wonder RVNAF performance in combat wasn’t 
better! 

CORDS REPLACED POOR PACIFICATION 

LEADERS 

(U) In October 1970, a memorandum to the 
Secretary of Defense, observed that: 

Some progress has been made in improving 
RVNAF combat leadership during the past 
year. 

These changes should lead to improvements 
and MACV undoubtedly played a significant 
role in bringing them about .... However, 
aside from the pacification effort, there is little 
sign of a systematic and continuous MACV 
effort to have the GVN replace poor combat 
commanders with good ones. The MACV- 
CORDS system for having better provincial 
and district officials appointed works quite 
well, but no other MACV staff section uses it.( 44 ) 

(U) The CORDS system had the following ele¬ 
ments^ 44 ) 

JDRB 817 


588 - 672 0 - 75-5 



CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 28. RVNAF maneuver * battalions did not 
train much. (Table classified Confidential.) 

% of Total Tlmer^ 


1969 

1970 

IQ 2Q 3Q 4Q 

IQ 2Q 3Q 4Q 


ARVN Infantry 
Battalions b/ 

3.2 

3.4 

6.5 

6.9 

5.9 

4.8 

7.7 5.7 

c / 

Cavalry, Airborne,— 
Ranger and Marine 
Battalions 

N/A 

N/A 

4.9 

6.0 

4.6 

4.1 

11.2 7.9 


a/ Reflects total time devoted by battalions to training and provides 
for combining the time spent by smaller units into battalion-days. 
Time spent on major training programs, such as national and division 
level training, is also included. 

b/ Source: MACV SEER Report . Part I (ARVN, VNMC, VNN) 4th Qtr. Cy 70., 
p. 86. Units are those in ARVN Infantry Divisions and Separate 
Regiments. 

c/ Ibid ., 4th Qtr Cy 70, p. C-18. 3rd Qtr. cy 70, p. C-18. 

2nd Qtr CY 70, p. C-18. 1st Qtr. cy 70, p. C-18. 

4th Qtr CY 69, p. C-19. Latest Figure taken in each case. 

• (U) A CORDS agreement with President Thieu 
gave it the right to call his attention to 
officials who should be replaced. The President 
delegated authority in such matters to Prime 
Minister Khiem. 

• (U) A MACV directive written by CORDS 
spelled out how an advisor could try to get a 
Vietnamese official relieved (but it applied 
only to CORDS). It told the advisor how to 
prepare a dossier, who had authority to 
relieve each type of official, and what channels 
to use. 

• (U) Once a year each CORDS advisor pre¬ 
pared a dossier on his counterpart’s ability 
and performance and sent it to an automated 
central file in Saigon. 

(U) If an advisor wished to have his counterpart 

relieved, he started the following procedure: 

• (U) He prepared a dossier, citing at least 
three or four specific instances that justified 
replacement of the official. 

• (U) He passed the dossier to his U.S. province 
senior advisor, who checked with the province 
chief to see if he agreed and who expanded 
the dossier to include the official’s basis of 
power, political and family connections, etc. 

• (U) The dossier then moved up to the mili¬ 
tary region level, for discussion with the 
military region commander. 

• (U) It was then passed to Saigon, where 
CORDS conducted an investigation. If 

818 JDRB 


CORDS decided the advisor was correct, 
the head of CORDS sent a letter to the 
Prime Minister citing the CORDS-Thieu 
agreement and asking that the man be 
relieved. Often, he was. 

(U) This system enabled CORDS to pressure the 
GVN to replace virtually all of the worst province 
and district Chiefs in 1969-70. Moreover, CORDS 
developed dossiers on all Vietnamese officers who 
had served in key pacification jobs during that 
time. It used them not only to fire incompetents, 
but to identify capable leaders for key jobs. It is 
difficult to understand why MACV didn’t develop 
a comparable set of dossiers for the RVNAF 
combat leaders. 

(U) On October 13, 1970, the Secretary of Defense, 
writing to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff said: “I want to stress again the high priority 
and extreme importance I place on our efforts to 
improve RVNAF leadership in Vietnam.” He 
then went on to ask: . . do you think that the 

MACV-CORDS system for replacing poor prov¬ 
ince and district chiefs could be adapted to improve 
the leadership of RVNAF military units?” ( 45 ) 
Apparently it could not, because there is no evi¬ 
dence that it ever was. 

TRAINING OF THE RVNAF GROUND 

FORCES* * 

(U) This analysis concentrates primarily on the 
training of South Vietnamese regular ground 
forces, the ARVN (Army) and VNMC (Marine 
Corps), during 1968-70. The reasons for this 
focus are: ( 1 ) the success of Vietnamization 
depended primarily on the ground forces, (2) 
detailed data are readily available for 1968-70, but 
not for later years, and (8) the Regional and 
Popular Forces are covered in Chapter XIV. 

*This analysis is based on Refs. 46 through 48. As noted 
on page 31 of the October 1969 analysis, it is also based on 
data derived from MACV training programs; reports on 
RVNAF schools and training centers; U.S. Army reports 
of U.S. training support for Vietnamese; comments made 
by the Secretaries of the Military Services and the Chair¬ 
man, Joint Chiefs of Staff in their review of the RVNAF 
Improvement and Modernization Program; and observa¬ 
tions contained in U.S. Army Senior Officer debriefing 
reports. In addition, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgeway (USA, 
Ret), Gen. James A. Van Fleet (USA, Ret), Maj. Gen. 
Cornelius B. Ryan (USA, Ret), and Brig. Gen. Arthur S. 
Champany (USA, Ret) were contacted to obtain back¬ 
ground information on Korean War training programs. 

CONFIDENTIAL 









CONFIDENTIAL 


MANEUVER BATTALION TRAINING 

(U) Table 28 is based on the MACV SEER* 
reports, and it shows the proportion of-time that 
the maneuver battalions spent on training during 
1969-70. After spending about 3 percent of their 
time on training in the first half of 1969, the 
average rose to about 6 percent for the rest of the 
period. The annual cycle oj combat is reflected in 
the figures, which show a smaller proportion oj time 
spent on training during the first halj oj the year, 
when the fighting was at its yearly peak, than during 
the last halj, when fighting subsided to lower levels. 

(C) Table 29 shows that 35 percent of all regular 
RVNAF maneuver battalions spent no time in 
training in 1969; 18 percent conducted 10 or less 
days of training; and 27 percent received more 
than 30 days of training. ( 49 ) 

(U) Training programs for the maintenance of unit 
combat proficiency were conducted at training 
centers as unit refresher training (a four-week 
course for infantry battalions) or as command- 
supervised in-place training. Each unit was sup¬ 
posed to complete refresher training once every 
three years.( 50 ) Figure 7 shows the percentage of 
ARVN infantry battalions and special units that 
either ( 1) had completed battalion refresher train¬ 
ing between 1967 and the end of 1970, (2) were in 
training at the end of 1970, or ( 3 ) were overdue 
for refresher training on that date. The 1st and 
2nd Divisions and the ranger units in Military 
Regions 1 and 2 were the only units who completed 
all of their refresher training during the three-year 
period.( 50 ) An accelerated program to provide 
refresher training was planned for 1970, but 
“increased combat activity” led to cancellation of 
about half of the proposed training^ 50 ) (Combat 
activity in 1970 was well below that in 1968 or 
1969.) 

(U) There is little agreement on how much unit- 
refresher training is best, but many experienced 
observers do agree that it is essential for maintain¬ 
ing and improving the leadership, morale, spirit, 
and effectiveness of an army. In the Korean War, 
South Korean units were taken out of combat and 
sent to a center for systematic training, starting 
with the individual soldier and working up to 
division level exercises with live fire, but the 

* System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF. 

CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 29. One-third oj the RVNAF maneuver 
battalions received no training during 1969. 
(Table classified Confidential.) 


No. Maneuver 
Battalions ^ 

7. of 
Total 

No. Days Training 
Per Battalion 

No. Bn Days 
Training 

No. Bn Days 
Available 

65 

35 

0 

0 

23,725 

34 

18 

1-10 

180 

12,410 

15 

8 

11-20 

232 

5,475 

21 

12 

21-30 

562 

7,665 

32 

17 

31-40 

1576 

11,670 

18 

10 

over 40 

1089 

6.570 

185 

100 


3139 

67,515 


a/ Includes all ARVN, Ranger, Airborne and Marine maneuver battalions. 


plus the cavalry squadrons. 

frequency of this training is not known. Experi¬ 
enced observers indicate that a refresher training 
period each year would be ideal, with the follow-up 
training being conducted regularly at the unit. (In 
1969, the Vietnamese Marine Corps began to plan 
for one refresher period every two years.)! 

(U) The evidence suggests that the average South 
Vietnamese maneuver battalion trained an average 
of about 3 hours per week at most. Some units 
didn’t train at all, and others trained much less 
than 3 hours per week; of course, some trained 
more. Compared to accounts of the Korean 
experience, the South Vietnamese training during 
1968-70 appears deficient. 

(U) One of the main problems was the emphasis 
on recruit training because of the force buildup 
after 1968 and the high loss rates from casualties 
and desertions. This tended to fill up the national 
and divisional training centers, and it set back the 
schedule for refresher training. However, the 
Secretary of the Army reported that RVNAF 
use of training centers in the first half of 1969 was 
29,000 below that which was programmed (most 
of the shortfall occurred during the first quarter, 
when the 1969 post-Tet offensive occurred),( 52 ) 
so the buildup does not entirely explain the lack 
of emphasis on refresher training. 

(C) Moreover, the record of follow-up training at 
the unit to improve combat skills was not good 
either. Advisors reported that about 17 percent 
of the units trained for less than 20 minutes per 
week, on average, during 1970.( 53 ) About 50 
percent trained for less than 2 hours per week, 
or an average of less than one day per month.(° 3 ) 
About 17 percent of the units trained about 4 

fThe substance of the entire paragraph is from Ref. 51. 

JDRB 819 













CONFIDENTIAL 


hours per week or more.( 53 ) Thus, not much time 
was devoted to the training of South Vietnamese 
maneuver battalions during 1969 and 1970. 


100n 


ARVN Infantry Battalions 



MR 1 


Special Units 


MR 4 


100 


75 


50 


25 


0 


o 

O 

e> 

O 

!3 


S3 

!3 

53 

PQ 

Pd 

pd 

Pd 

Pd 

< 

r-i 

CM 

CO 




u 

> 


§H Completed 

In training 
12/31/1970 

K Overdue 

Figure 7. ARVN/VNMC refresher training. (Figure 
classified Confidential.) 


(C) To compound the problem, about half of the 
training conducted was not very effective. In 1969, 
advisors rated about half of the training to improve 
combat skills as being ineffective or marginal.( 54 ) 
In 1970, the rating system changed, and the 
advisors rated about 22 percent of the training as 
being poor and an additional 40 percent as being 
only fair.( 53 ) So some units didn’t train at all, and 
half of the training that was conducted was con¬ 
sidered ineffective or marginal. 

(C) United States advisors also reported on the 
training of company-grade officers and noncom¬ 
missioned officers in RVNAF units. These ratings 
are not a direct measure of battalion training 
effectiveness, but they help fill in the picture of 
training conditions. Thirty-three percent of the 
company-grade officers were rated below average 
in training during 1968( 57 ) and 1969.( 54 ) About 25 
percent were rated poor in 1970, after the rating 
system was changed (another 45 percent were 
only fair).( 53 ) About half of the noncommissioned 
officers training was rated below average in 1968( 47 ) 
and 1969,( 54 ) with 33 percent rated poor and 
another 40 percent fair in 1970.( 53 ) No trends, 
favorable or unfavorable, were evident. 

(C) Finally, 20 to 30 percent of the advisors 
consistently reported that the operations staffs of 
the divisions, regiments, and battalions were 
ineffective when it came to planning and imple¬ 
menting training programs in 1969 ( 56 ’ 57 ) and in 
1970.( 58 ) A trend toward lower ratings was evident 
during 1970. 

THE RVNAF TRAINING SYSTEM 

(U) On paper, the RVNAF ground forces had an 
impressive military school and training system 
by 1969. Pressed on them by MACV, it was 
generally patterned after the U.S. Army system, 
and it consisted of formal schools, individual train¬ 
ing, and unit training programs, but the system 
had major deficiencies.^ 59 ) The Central Training 
Command was not staffed to control the training 
effort. The system for rotating training cadre into 
and out of training centers didn’t work. Poor in¬ 
structors remained in training centers for as long as 


820 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 














































CONFIDENTIAL 


seven years. Key officials at training centers and 
Service schools had no combat experience. Combat 
experience or lessons learned in combat were not 
being related to the training programs. Training 
facilities were inadequate. And to fuffLer com¬ 
pound the problems, corruption was alleged to be 
widespread in the training centers, with conse¬ 
quent effects on the recruits. To complete the 
picture, there was a tendency to assign incom¬ 
petent division commanders to training commands 
after they had been fired from commanding their 
divisions. ( 60 ) 

TRAINING COSTS 

(U) Early in 1970, a U.S. plan for the RVNAF 
improvement and modernization program in¬ 
dicated that only 3 percent of 1970 funds for that 
program were for training. Most of these (2.7 
percent) were for training the South Vietnamese 
Air Force. A tiny portion (0.2 percent) of the 
overall total was allocated to training the ground 
forces. ( 61 ) 

(U) In sum, training in the Vietnam War obviously 
did not get anywhere near the priority it got in 
the Korean War, despite the impetus of the Viet- 
namiz&tion program. 

COMBAT UNITS WERE SHORT OF 

TROOPS 

(U) The inability of the South Vietnamese to 
keep the troop strength of their maneuver bat¬ 
talions and other combat units up to authorized 
levels was a chronic problem. True, it was also a 
problem for the U.S. and French armies( 62 )* in 
Vietnam as well, but the problem was compounded 
in the South Vietnamese case by the lack of a 
system for replacing casualties and other losses in 
combat. High desertion rates, particularly in the 
regular force combat units, contributed to the 
problem, and rapid expansion of the RVNAF 
forces also was a factor. Yet, at the same time, 
headquarters and other rear area units were 
generally at much higher strength levels, sug¬ 
gesting that some Vietnamese were avoiding 
combat duty. 


*The French problem is described in the cited reference. 
The American problem is stated by any company or 
battalion commander who took his unit into combat. 


Table 30. The RVNAF desertion rates were stable 
{rates in thousands). {Table classified Con¬ 
fidential.) 


Net Loss to Desertions (C) 

1967 

78 

1968 

116 

1969 

108 

1970 

127 

1971 

140 

1972 

176 

Average RVNAF Troop 

Strength (C) — 

617 

747 

887 

1017 

1052 

1078 

7. of Strength Lost 
to Desertions (U) 

13 

16 

12 

12 

13 

16 


Source: Table 2, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary . Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), April 1973 and other 
dates, pp. 1-6. 


a/ Average RVNAF troop strength was calculated by adding end December 
through end December actual strengths and dividing by 13. 

MANEUVER BATTALION STRENGTH 

(U) In September 1969 the assigned strength of 
the South Vietnamese regular forces as a whole 
was 5 percent above their authorized strength, but 
the Army and Marine maneuver battalions were 
13 percent below theirs. ( 63 ) The MACV calcu¬ 
lated the shortage as being equivalent to 30 
infantry battalions. ( 64 ) But the problem was 
worse than that—delays in replacements and 
other problems reduced the number of soldiers 
actually present for duty in the maneuver units to 
35 percent below that which was authorized. 

(C) A year later, in September 1970, the assigned 
personnel were 26 percent below the number 
authorized, and the maneuver units of the 9th 
and 21st Divisions were 37 percent below their 
authorized strengths. ( 65 ) The 25tli Division was in 
the best shape, with only a 17-percent shortfall^ 65 ) 
After two more years (September 1972), the 
maneuver units had worked their way back up to a 
16-percent shortfall,( 66 ) while the regular forces 
as a whole remained 5 percent overstrength.( 67 ) 
The troops actually present for duty in the 
maneuver units were 28 percent below the au¬ 
thorized level. ( 66 ) 

(U) Little progress in bringing the maneuver 
battalions up to full strength was evident, despite 
considerable MACV concern about the problem. 
A South Vietnamese battalion normally went into 
combat with less than 75 percent of the troops to 
which it was entitled. To add to the problem, once 
the unit got into a major fight for any length of 
time, casualty reports were neither timely nor 
accurate, and the RVNAF svstem did not furnish 
replacements fast enough to keep up with losses. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 821 












CONFIDENTIAL 


'Fable 31. United States and RVNAF desertion 
rates; rates per 1,000 troops per month. (Table 
classified Confidential.) 




1969 


1970 


1971 

RVNAF 

1st Q 2d Q 3d Q 4thQ 

IstQ 2d Q 3d Q 4thQ 

IstQ 

Gross Desertions 

11.3 

12.5 11.4 

10.9 

10.9 12.9 13.4 

11.9 

12.9 

a 

Net Desertions— 

10.2 

11.0 10.1 

9.1 

9.4 11.0 11.6 

9.3 

10.9 

U.S. Army (world-wide) 







Desertions 

4.2 

3.3 3.6 

3.6 

4.5 5.1 6.4 

6.4 

6.4 

AWOL 

10.7 

9.0 10.1 

9.1 

12.1 12.8 14.7 

14.7 

15.7 


&/ Adjusted for returns to military control. 

Source: "RVNAF Desertions", Southeast Asia Analysis Report . June- 

July 1971, p. 12. 


This occurred repeatedly in the highlands of 
Military Region 2( 68 ) and in the Lam Son 719 
operation into Laos during 1971. ( 69 ) But desertions 
were the worst problem. 

THE DESERTION PROBLEM 

(U) The problem of RVNAF desertions received 
considerable attention throughout the war, and 
all sorts of measures were proposed and adopted in 
efforts to curb the flow. Table SO suggests that the 
desertion problem was endemic and that the measures, 
at best, simply had the effect oj maintaining the 
status quo. In the four “normal ” years shown, 12 
to 13 percent oj the troops deserted. In the two years 
of heavy combat (1968 and 1972), the rate went up to 
16 percent. The percentages suggest great stability, 
and no trends oj any kind are apparent. 

(U) Desertions were a serious problem. In the 
normal years they outnumbered RVNAF combat 
deaths by about 6 to 1, while in the two peak years 
they outnumbered deaths by about 4.5 to 1. Again, 
the relationship is quite stable, as might be ex¬ 
pected from the stability of the RVNAF combat 
death rates discussed in Chapter X. In terms of 
losses of personnel, then, desertions were at a more 
serious level than combat deaths. 

(C) The regular forces accounted for about 60 
percent of the desertions, with the Regional and 
Popular Forces accounting for about 23 percent 
and 17 percent, respectively.* More important, 
the ground combat units of RVNAF (20 percent oj 
the jorce) accounted jor 50 percent oj all desertions 
and jor 80 percent of the desertions from the reqular 
jorcesj 70 ’ 71 ) 

♦Calculated from the data in Refs. 70 and 71. 


(C) The data indicate that 30 percent of the 
average ARVN (Army) combat strength deserted 
every year.( 72 ) Some returned, but most did 
not—at least there are no records of their return. 
For example, in December 1971 only 9 percent of 
the deserters from combat units returned (27 
percent of the deserters from noncombat units 
returned) and a year later, in December 1972, only 
3 percent returned.( 73 ) Where did they all go? 
Many of them apparently left the regular combat 
units, went home, and enlisted in the Regional 
Forces or Popular Forces to be closer to their 
homes. How many went from the ARVN to the 
territorial forces is not known, because the 
RVNAF did not develop any way of identifying 
deserters who joined other units. ( 74 ) 

(U) Although the desertion rates oj combat units were 
higher than those of the other jorces, a comprehensive 
statistical analysis covering a two-year period (1968- 
69) jailed to show any statistical relationship between 
casualties suffered in a unit and the desertion rate. ( 75 ) 
A study of U.S. advisors’ responses to questions 
about the causes of desertion supports the finding, 
because it indicates that family-connected matters 
were the principal cause of desertion. Only 4 
percent of the advisors’ responses identified com¬ 
bat intensity as a cause for desertion. ( 76 ) 

(U) Several Vietnamese studies, including inter¬ 
views with 520 deserters, identified the following 
causes of desertion :( 77 ) (1) deficiencies in leader¬ 
ship, (2) homesickness, (3) concern for welfare of 
the family, (If) inability to make the transition 
from the civilian to military way of life, (5) fear 
of hardship and danger, and (6) leniency in the 
treatment of deserters, which made desertion 
preferable to the rigors of military life. Home¬ 
sickness and family hardships were the causes 
cited most often by the deserters. The relationship 
of leadership to desertions was especially apparent 
in combat units. Generally, units which had good 
leaders and good combat records had low desertion 
rates—for example, the 1st Infantry Division. 

(U) In sum, the ARVN and VNMC (Marine) 
combat units had the real desertion problem within 
the South Vietnamese jor ces. Taken as a group, these 
units experienced desertions at four to five times 
the rate for noncombat Army units and the 
Popular Forces, and at about three times the rate 
for the Regional Forces. ( 74 ) Family problems gene- 


822 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 











CONFIDENTIAL 


rated most oj the desertions, not fear of combat. 
Whatever the cause, most desertions were appa¬ 
rently permanent, and they eroded the effective¬ 
ness of the regular combat units. On—the other 
hand, the deserters who went into the Regional 
and Popular Forces may have increased the 
effectiveness of those important forces, because of 
their experience with the regular units. 

(U) Comparing the RVNAF desertion rates to the 
rates for two types of unauthorized absences 
defined for U.S. forces (awol and desertion) 
provides a useful perspective to the Vietnamese 
problem. The RVNAF desertion criteria differed 
from those for U.S. awol's and desertions. A U.S. 
soldier was carried as being awol for 30 days and 
then was administratively designated a deserter. 
A Vietnamese soldier was considered a deserter if 
he was absent without leave for more than 15 days. 
Thus, if RVNAF desertion rates were not out of 
line with U.S. unauthorized absences, they ought 
to have been higher than U.S. desertion rates, but 
below U.S. awol rates. 

(U) This was precisely the case, at least from June 
1969 through March 1971 {21 months), and possibly 
later. Table 31 shows that the gross desertion rate 
for RVNAF ranged from 10.9 to 13.4 per thousand 
troops per month in 1969, 1970, and the first 
quarter of 1971. United States Army desertions 
(worldwide) in the same period ranged from 3.3 to 
6.4 per thousand troops per month, about 30 to 
50 percent of the RVNAF gross rate. However, the 
U.S. rate of absence without leave climbed steadily 
during the period and surpassed the Vietnamese gross 
desertion rate for the last five quarters shown. 
Additionally, the U.S. Army awol rate was at or 


above the RVNAF net desertion rate for the last 
seven quarters (21 months) shown. 

(U) United States Army data showed that the 
average awol was absent about 11 days. If a 
reasonable distribution above and below that aver¬ 
age value is assumed, then a significant number of 
Army awol’s would have been classified as 
deserters under the RVNAF criteria. If the U.S. 
Army had used the 15-day criterion for deserters, 
Vietnamese desertions probably would have run 
about 30 to 40 percent higher than U.S. desertions. 
However, the crux of the Vietnamese problem was 
the permanance of desertions. During the period 
shown in Table 31, only about 14 percent of the 
Vietnamese deserters were reported as having 
returned to military control. In contrast, about 60 
percent of the U.S. Army awol’s returned to 
military control. Of course, there is no way of 
determining how many of the Vietnamese deserters 
signed up with the territorial forces near home. 

CONCLUSION 

(U) It seems clear in retrospect that the MACV 
could profitably have put more emphasis on 
improving RVNAF from the very beginning of 
the large U.S. involvement in 1965. Really serious 
efforts did not get under way, except in the area of 
pacification, until the Vietnamization program 
began in earnest early in 1969. The RVNAF made 
some progress in solving its problems, but never 
really got serious about it. It was a fairly good 
fighting force of more than 1 million troops by the 
time the last U.S. troops pulled out, but it was not 
going to be good enough. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 823 


CONFIDENTIAL 


Chapter VIII 

The Air War 


(U) In a war without fronts there is a temptation 
to use all the air power available to the govern¬ 
ment forces for strikes at the hundreds of fleeting 
targets offered by the insurgents. And in such 
operations, the amount of air power employed will 
depend primarily on "the number of aircraft 
ready to fly. It is not often realized how large a 
role the U.S. and South Vietnamese air operations 
played in the Allied?* attrition strategy. (The 
program budget in Chapter III suggests the ex¬ 
tent of the emphasis.) The bulk of these air opera¬ 
tions was directed broadly at supporting the 
attrition strategy in South Vietnam and along the 
Ho Chi Minh Trail, not, as was commonly 
believed, at North Vietnam. 

(U) This analysis focuses on the remarkably 
extensive—and expensive—U.S. and South Viet¬ 
namese operations by fixed-wing combat aircraft 
in Southeast Asia, including the B-52 bombers. 
It does not cover helicopter operations or the 
operations of the fixed-wing aircraft (C-130, etc.) 
that moved troops and supplies. Nor does it 
cover the North Vietnamese air force, which 
operated almost exclusively in defense of North 
Vietnam. 

SIZE AND COSTS 

(U) These Allied air operations were enormous in 
size and cost. United States and South Vietnamese 
fixed-wing aircraft flew about 3.4 million combat 
sorties in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, 
and Cambodia during the period from 1965 
through 1972. The costs ran into the billions of 


dollars, with the full program budget costs being 
probably about $14 billion for the three-year fiscal 
period 1969-71.* In December 1967, the incre¬ 
mental costs of bombing North Vietnam in 1968 
were estimated to be about $2.2 billion. ( 78 ) 
In mid-1970, it was estimated that the incremental 
costs of the U.S. and South Vietnamese fixed-wing 
combat air operations in South Vietnam and Laos 
were about $3.4 billion in fiscal 1970.( 79 )f Air 
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps losses of fixed- 
wing aircraft to hostile actions and accidents cost 
about $5 billion.( 80 )t 

(U) The total costs of the air effort are not readily 
available, but the cost estimates given above are 
enough to indicate that this was the largest and 
costliest air effort in the history of warfare. Fortu¬ 
nately, the cost in U.S. lives was fairly low, 
considering the size of the effort. Only 3 percent 
of the U.S. deaths in the Vietnam War resulted 
from the operations of fixed-wing aircraft (see 
Chapter XI).( 81 ) 

SORTIE LEVELS, TRENDS, AND 
LOCATIONS 

(U) Table 32 displays the numbers of sorties by 
fixed-wing aircraft and trends for the U.S. and 
South Vietnamese Air Forces in Southeast Asia, 
and it is seen that after the U.S. buildup in 1965, 

*Based on air force costs of Navy and Air Force shown in 
Tables 7, 8, and 9 of Chapter III. 

fSupport for the Royal Laotian Air Force was subtracted 
from the estimate shown in the reference cited. 

t Fly a way costs of procuring the lost aircraft; includes 
noncombat aircraft. 


824 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 



CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 32. About 3A million combat sorties were 
flown in Southeast Asia in the period 1965-72; 
figures in thousands. {Table classified Confi¬ 
dential.) 



1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

U.S. Attack: 

IHL 


SSL. 

SSL 

SSL 

SSL 

SSL 

SSL 

Tactical Aircraft (C) 

103 

254 

320 

372 

300 

193 

122 

167 

B-52 (C) 

Other Combat Tactical 

1 

5 

10 

21 

19 

15 

13 

28 

Aircraft Sorties a/ 

54 

135 

177 

197 

217 

177 

125 

116 



1 

~“““ 

" 





Sub-Total (C) 

158 

394 

507 

590 

536 

385 

260 

311 

VNAF 

Attack (C) 

Other Combat Tactical 
Aircraft (C) 

Sorties 

23 

32 

30 

23 

33 

38 

43 

53 

1 

1 

4 

2 

1 

1 

15 

11 



' 


“ 




Sub-Total (C) 

24 

33 

34 

25 

34 

39 

58 

64 

TOTAL 

Attack (C) 

127 

292 

360 

416 

352 

246 

178 

248 

Other a/ (C) 

55 

137 

181 

199 

218 

178 

140 

127 




1 

— 




Total (C) 

182 

427 

541 

615 

570 

424 

318 

375 


Sources: Tables 34, 35, and 36, which follow. 

a/ "Other" sorties include combat air patrol (CAP, escort, reconnaissance, 
and other non-attack sorties. 

the two forces together averaged 465,000 combat 
sorties per year. As indicated above, the total was 
about 3.4 million; and of these, the U.S. flew more 
than 90 percent. The total number of sorties grew 
each year to their peak of 614,000 in 1968, and 
then they declined (as the U.S. forces withdrew) 
until 1972, when the U.S. and VNAF sortie rates 
increased to meet the Communist offensive. The 
total number of U.S. tactical aircrajt sorties {attack 
plus other types) in all of Southeast Asia increased 
only 15 percent in 1972, but the B-52 sorties doubled 
{up 115 percent). In both cases, the percentage 
increases within South Vietnam itself were much 
larger. The impact of Vietnamization began 
to show in 1970, when the VNAF tactical air 
sorties increased for the first time, continuing to 
increase in 1971 and 1972. In 1968, the Vietnamese 
flew only 4 percent of the sorties, but in 1972 they 
flew 13 percent. The B-52 sorties were emphasized 
more and more as the time passed. And as a per¬ 
centage of the U.S. attack sorties, they increased 
every year, from 2 percent in 1966 to 15 percent 
in 1972. 

(U) Table 33 shows the locations of targets, and 
it is seen that South Vietnam received the largest 
number of sorties, not North Vietnam or Laos. 
Approximately 45 percent of all combat sorties 
were flown in South Vietnam, while 22 percent 
were flown in North Vietnam, 28 percent in Laos, 
and 4 percent in Cambodia. 


Table 33. Almost half of the U.S. and VNAF 
combat sorties were flown in South Vietnam; 
sorties in thousands. (Table classified Confidential.) 




1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 



ssl 

-QO_ 

SSL 

SSL. 

SSL. 

SS1_ 

SSL. 

SSL. 

South Viet-Nam 

(C) 

105 

203 

261 

307 

289 

159 

74 

175 

North Viet-Nam 

(C) 

61 

147 

191 

172 

37 

37 

24 

106 

Laos (C) 


16 

77 

89 

136 

242 

186 

159 

69 

Cambodia (C) 


- 

- 

- 

- 

2 

42 

61 

25 

Total 


182 

427 

541 

615 

570 

424 

318 

375 


Sources: Tables 34, 35, and 36, which follow. Cambodia totals include the 
"secret" sorties previously reported as being in South Viet-Nam. 

(U) The results of the interdiction campaigns are 
best illustrated by the U.S. air operations in 
North Vietnam and southern Laos. These two 
target areas together consistently accounted for 
about half of the sorties, but the distribution 
between them shifted each time the rules of engage¬ 
ment changed. When political decisions allowed 
North Vietnam to be bombed, most of the sorties 
went there, but when they didn’t the sorties 
shifted to Laos. The shift into Laos is seen clearly 
in 1969, after the November 1968 bombing halt in 
North Vietnam. When bombing in North Vietnam 
was permitted again in 1972, the sorties shifted 
back into that area from Laos. In 1972, when 
Laos and North Vietnam were both off limits, 
the available sorties simply swung into Cambodia 
until there, too, the bombing was halted. 

(U) Thus, the distributions and rates of out-of¬ 
country interdiction sorties apparently depended 

Table 34. The United States flew more than 80 
percent of the combat sorties flown in South 
Vietnam; sorties in thousands. {Table classified 
Confidential.) 



1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 


SSL. 

SSL. 

SSL. 

SSL. 

SSL. 

SSL. 

SSL 

SSL 

U.S. 









Attack: 









Tactical Air (C) 

66 

125 

170 

205 

155 

76 

16 

80 

B-52 (C) 

1 

4 

7 

17 

11 

4 

2 

19 

Other (C) 

14 

41 

50 

60 

89 

50 

22 

20 

Total (C) 

81 

170 

227 

282 

255 

130 

40 

119 

VNAF 









Attack (C) 

22 

32 

30 

23 

33 

28 

31 

49 

Other (C) 

_2 

_JL 

_4 

_2 

_1 

JL 

_3 

_7 

Total (C) 

24 

33 

34 

25 

34 

29 

34 

56 

Total 









Attack (C) 

89 

161 

207 

245 

199 

108 

49 

148 

Other (C) 

16 

42 

54 

62 

90 

51 

25 

27 

Grand Total (C) 

105 

203 

261 

307 

289 

159 

74 

175 


Sources: Table 1304, October 3, 1974, and Table 1322, May 13, 1974, both 

prepared by the Department of Defense, OASD (Comptroller), 
Directorate for Information Operations. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 825 
















CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 35. Vietnamization improvement showed up Table 36. When the rules forbad bombing m North 
as VNAF sorties in Cambodia. (Table classified Vietnam , the sorties were switched to Laos until 
Confidential.) the rules permitted bombing in the north again. 

(Table classified Confidential.) 


Sorties in Cambodia (000) 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

U.S. 


12L. 

!CL_ 

1£L 

Attack: 





Tactical Air (C) 


15 

17 

7 

B-52 (C) 

2 

3 

1 

2 

Other (C) 


14 

12 

_8 

Total (C) 

2 

32 

37 

17 

VNAF 





Attack (C) 

- 

10 

12 

4 

Other (C) 

*** 

_0 

12 

_4 

Total 







10 

24 

8 

Sources: Table 1304, October 3, 

1974 and 

Table 1323, 

July 


prepared by the Department of Defense, OASD (Comptroller), 
Directorate for Information Operations. 

more on the numbers of sorties potentially avail¬ 
able with the aircraft in the theater than on 
strategy or considerations of the relative effective¬ 
ness of the sorties among the target areas. Probably 
the best analogy would be the use of a fire hose, 
running under full pressure most of the time and 
pointed with the same intensity at whichever 
area is allowed, regardless of its relative import¬ 
ance in the scheme of things. In the words of 
Sen. Stuart Symington: “In fact, as the general 
just said—which I knew—orders were that if 
you do not need the planes against Vietnam, use 
said planes against Laos.”( 82 ) 

(U) Table 34 shows the combat sorties flown in 
South Vietnam for the eight-year period of 1965- 
72. After the U.S. buildup in 1965, the U.S. and 
VNAF aircraft together flew an average of 210,000 
combat sorties per year in South Vietnam for 
the next seven years or, as noted above, 45 percent 
of the total flown in all of Southeast Asia. The 
United States flew 83 percent of the sorties in 
South Vietnam, but this percentage changed 
significantly as the tempo of combat there declined 
between 1968 and 1971 and as Vietnamization 
took hold. In 1968, the United States flew 92 
percent of the sorties. By 1971, the percentage 
had dropped to 54 percent, because U.S. sortie 
rates dropped 70 percent, while the VNAF rates 
went up about 10 percent. The real effect of 
improvement in the VNAF shows in 1972, when 
U.S. sorties tripled, but still were able to account 
for only 68 percent of the total. The effects of 
Vietnamization on the VNAF sortie rates do not 
show up in South Vietnam until 1972, because the 
earlier gains simply provided the VNAF sorties 
flown in Cambodia from 1970, as shown by Table 35. 


Sorties (000) 


1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 



m_ 

m_ 

m_ 


1CL_ 


ici_ 


North Viet-Nam 










Attack: 










Tactical Air 

(C) 

26 

81 

106 

92 

c/ 

1 

2 

46 

B-52 (C) 


- 

b/ 

1 

1 

- 

- 

- 

4 

Other (C) 


35 

66 

84 

79 

37 

36 

22 

56 

Total 


61^ 

147^ 

191— ; 

172 

37 

37 

24 

106 

Attack: 










Tactical Air 

(C) 

10 

48 

44 

75 

144 

101 

88 

34 

B-52 (C) 


- 

1 

2 

3 

6 

8 

9 

3 

Other (C) 


6 

28 

43 

58 

92 

77 

62 

32 

Total 


16 

77 

89 

136 

242 

186 

159^ 

69^ 


Sources: Table 1304, October 3, 1974, Table 1321, July 19, 1974, and 

Table 1323, July 19, 1974, all prepared by the Department of 
Defense, OASD (Comptroller), Directorate for Information 
Operations. 

a/ VNAF flew the following sorties in North Viet-Nam: 1965 - 563 attack 
and 274 other; 1966 - 814 attack and 6 other; 1967 - 127 attack, 
b/ The U.S. flew 280 B-52 sorties in North Vietnam in 1966. 
c/ The U.S. flew 286 attack sorties in North Viet-Nam in 1969. 
d/ The VNAF flew 364 attack sorties in Laos during 1971 and 383 attack 
plus 2 other sorties there in 1972. 

(U) Table 36 shows again the relationship between 
the sortie rates flown in Laos and North Vietnam. 
When the rules forbade attack sorties in North 
Vietnam, the sorties switched to Laos, until the 
rules allowed bombing in North Vietnam again. 
Together, Laos and North Vietnam consistently 
accounted for about 50 percent of the U.S. and 
VNAF combat sorties flown in Southeast Asia, 
but the distribution of sorties between the two 
countries varied with the rules of engagement. 

(U) After halting the bombing campaign against 
North Vietnam in late 1968, the United States 
continued to fly 2,000 to 3,000 reconnaissance and 
other nonattack sorties per month over North 
Vietnam, in accordance with the “understandings” 
that accompanied the bombing halt. The few 
attack sorties shown during that period and in 
1971 were presumably the protective reaction 
strikes by escorts protecting reconnaissance air¬ 
craft that had been fired upon. Because of the 
tough antiaircraft defenses in Laos and North 
Vietnam, the attack sorties there required more 
escort and protection than in South Vietnam. In 
the years of active bombing of the north, only 52 
percent of the sorties were attack sorties. The 
figure for Laos was 59 percent and for South 
Vietnam, 73 percent. 


826 JDRB 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


'Fable 37. The B-52 bomber sorties peaked in 1972. ( Table classified Confidential.) 




1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 



I2)_ 

'(U) 

SSI. 

SSL. 

SSL 

SSL 

SQL 

SQL 

South Viet-Nam 

(C) 

1320 

4290 

6609 

16,505 

11,494 

3697 

2386 

19,289 

North Viet-Nam 

(C) 

- 

280 

1364 

686 

- 

- 

- 

4,440 

Laos (C) 


18 

647 

1713 

3,377 

5,567 

8500 

8850 

2,799 

Cambodia (C)— 






2,437 

2906 

1319 

1,855 

Total (C) 


1338 

5217 

9686 

20,568 

19,498 

15103 

12555 

28,383 


Sources: For 1966 through 1972: Table 1304 (October 3, 1974), and 

Tables 1320, 1321, 1322, 1323, Sorties and Losses, Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 
Directorate of Information Operations, May 13, 1974 and 
July 19, 1974. For 1965: "An Appraisal of ARC LIGHT 
(B-52) Operations", Southeast Asia Analysis Report , 
September 1967, p. 25. 

a/ Includes the "secret" bombing in Cambodia during 1969 and 1970. 


B-52 OPERATIONS 

(U) The B-52 sorties are separately identified in 
Tables 32 through 36 to provide a comprehensive 
view of the air combat effort. Interest in B-52 
strikes during the war and their costs were both 
high enough to call for separate treatment here, 
before we go on to an analysis of the effectiveness 
of the tactical air operations. 

(U) The Arc Light program, B-52 strikes in 
Southeast Asia, started on June 18, 1965 with 27 
sorties against targets in South Vietnam; and an 
average of 220 sorties per month were flown during 
the rest of 1965. In December 1965, targets 
were struck in Laos for the first time. North 
Vietnamese targets near the Demilitarized Zone 
were added in April 1966, and the DMZ itself was 
first hit in July 1966. The B—52’s were all based at 
Anderson Air Base, Guam until April 11, 1967, 
when strikes were launched from U Tapao, 
Thailand. ( 83 ) 

(U) Table 37 displays the numbers of B-52 sorties 
by target country for 1965 through 1972. It shows 
that, in absolute terms, B-52 sorties increased 
until 1968 and then declined slowly until 1972, 
when they rose 125 percent to the highest level 
ever. The increased use of B-52’s as a proportion 
of the total air effort has already been noted above. 


South Vietnam accounted for 58 percent oj all the 
B-52 sorties flown in Southeast Asia. Laos was 
second with 28 percent and Cambodia third with 
8 percent. North Vietnam was the target of 6 per¬ 
cent of the sorties, and two-thirds of those were 
flown in' 1972. 

ANALYSIS OF TACTICAL AIR 
OPERATIONS 

(U) In mid-1970, Allied tactical air operations in 
Southeast Asia were analyzed to examine their 
effectiveness and their impact on VC/NVA activi¬ 
ties and Vietnamization. The main findings are 
summarized below as an introduction to the 
analysis that explores the points in detail :( 84 ) 

(C) Close Air Support in South Vietnam. Only 4 
percent of the total air effort in Southeast Asia 
was flown in support of Allied troops in contact 
with VC/NVA units in South Vietnam. Most of the 
remaining sorties interdicted known or suspected 
VC/NVA locations, roads, and supply storage 
areas. 

(C) Interdiction in Southern Laos. Air operations 
over the Laotian panhandle struck at a flow of 
Communist supplies from North Vietnam equal 
to only about 15 percent of the total VC/NVA 
supply requirements in South Vietnam. Even 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 38. Approximately 10 percent of the sorties 
in South Vietnam supported Allied troops in 
contact with the VC/NVA. (Table classified 
Confidential.) 




Attack 

Percentage 



Monthly Sorties 

of Total 

(C) 


(Jul 69 - Mar 70) 


Support of Allied Troops in Contact (TIC) 




From Strip Alert Aircraft 

722 

6 


From Preplanned Strikes 

329 

3 


From Armed Reconnaissance Missions 

21 



Total 

1,072 


(C) 

Immediate Strikes (Other than TIC) 




Known Enemy Locations 

1,851 

15 


Suspected Enemy Locations 

778 

6 


Preparation of Allied Positions 

203 

2 


Anti-Aircraft Sites 

222 

2 


Total 

3,054 

25 

(C) 

Preplanned Strikes (Not-Diverted) 




Known Enemy Locations 

3,470 

28 


Suspected Enemy Locations 

3,996 

32 


Preparation of Allied Positions 

708 

5 


Anti-Aircraft Sites 

164 

1 


Total 

8,338 

66 

(C) 

Total Sorties 

12,464 

100 

Source: "Southeast Asia Tactical Aircraft Operations", Southeast 

Asia 


Analysis Report , June-July 1970, p. 22, (Based on USAF DASCLOG 
Computer File). 


with the intensive bombing, the VC/NVA still 
moved supplies that were adequate to continue, or 
increase, its operations. 

(C) Northern Laos. About 75 percent of U.S. air 
support for the Royal Laotian forces in Northern 
Laos struck logistic targets; yet the flow of supplies 
into northern Laos consistently exceeded by a 
significant margin the requirements of Communist 
forces there. North Vietnamese manpower re¬ 
quirements and casualties in this area were not a 
significant drain on the total manpower pool. 

(C) Communist Bloc Support to North Vietnam. Air 
operations imposed no critical materiel costs on 
North Vietnam, since its allies paid for most of the 
resources destroyed. North Vietnam’s foreign aid 
during the three years up to 1970 was two to three 
times as large as the costs of keeping her forces in 
South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos supplied 
and replacing the damage caused by the bombing 
of North Vietnam. 

(U) The tactical air operations performed two 
primary missions, close air support and interdic¬ 
tion of troop and supply movements. 

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 

(U) The objective of close air support was to 
furnish fire support to the troops on the ground 


quickly when they needed it. However, only a 
small proportion of the sorties were needed for this 
purpose. Approximately 10 percent of the fixed- 
wing air strikes in South Vietnam were flown to 
support Allied forces in contact with Communist 
forces.* Another 25 percent responded to requests 
for “immediate” strikes on targets of opportunity 
(for example, VC/NVA troops, occupied base 
camps, antiaircraft sites, etc.). Most of the 
remaining sorties (two-thirds of the total) were 
preplanned 24 hr or more in advance, and they 
struck known or suspected Communist locations, 
roads, and supply storage areas (see Table 38). 

(U) If one extrapolates from these figures, it seems 
likely that no more than 25 percent of all the attack 
sorties flown in Southeast Asia were closely linked 
to combat taking place on the ground or to freshly 
sighted targets.! This suggests that most of the 
enormous tactical air effort in Southeast Asia 
concentrated on interdicting supplies and, oc¬ 
casionally, personnel movements. 

(U) Table 39 suggests that interdiction had even 
taken some priority over close air support for 
South Vietnamese troops. RVNAF units in South 
Vietnam received less air support than U.S. units — 
only about 60 percent as many sorties per battalion 
and 25 percent as many per man killed in action in 
1969 and early 1970. The table also indicates that 
support for both U.S. and RVNAF troops in 
contact used about 10 percent of the total sorties 
received. Finally, RVNAF’s share of the total air 
support for U.S. forces and the RVNAF rose 
from 33 percent in early 1969 to 43 percent in 
early 1970, as Vietnamization began to take effect 
with the withdrawal of U.S. units. 

THE INTERDICTION CAMPAIGNS 

(U) As already noted, the interdiction campaigns 
are best shown by the U.S. air operations in Laos 
and North Vietnam, although as just seen, prob¬ 
ably 75 percent of the sorties flown in South Viet¬ 
nam are best characterized as interdiction. It has 
also been shown that the distribution and rates of 
interdiction sorties in Laos and North Vietnam 


*Only 4 percent of the Southeast Asia total. 

fThe pattern for artillery fire is the same. In fiscal 1968 
and 1969, except for the Tet 1968 period, about 70 percent 
of all U.S. artillery rounds were fired in a situation of light 
or inactive combat, as judged by the reporting artillery 
unit. See Chapter VI. 


828 JDRB 


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Table 39. South Vietnamese troops received less 
air support than the U.S. units. (Table classified 
Confidential.) 


Total Attack 

Sorties 

Received Per Month 

(Jan 69 - Feb 70) 

Support for Troops^ - 
in Contact with 
VC/NVA 

Total Air 
Support 
Received 

RVNAF 




514 

4,639 

U.S. 




939 

8,130 

RVNAF as 7. 

of U.S. 



557. 

577. 

Total Attack 

Sorties 

Per 

Person Killed 



in Action 






RVNAF 




0.3 

3.0 

U.S. 




1.3 

11.3 

RVNAF as 7. 

of U.S. 



247. 

257. 

Total Attack 

Sorties 

Per 

3 / 

Battalion— 



RVNAF 




5 

46 

U.S. 




9 

81 

RVNAF as 7. 

of U.S. 



567. 

577. 


Source: "Southeast Asia Tactical Aircraft Operations", Southeast Asia 
Analysis Report , June-July 1970, page 24. 
a/ For these calculations assume one RVNAF battalion equates to 0.6 U.S. 
battalions. 

depended more on the numbers of sorties available 
than they did on strategy. The important question, 
however, is not how the sorties were allocated, but 
how effective they were. 

(U) As most often stated, the objectives of the 
operations in Laos, North Vietnam, and later, 
Cambodia were: 

• (U) To impose a ceiling on VC/NVA combat 
activity in South Vietnam by reducing the 
flow of supplies below the amounts required 
to support high activity levels, the primary 
concern being the Communist ability to 
launch an offensive serious enough to upset 
Vietnamization. 

• (U) To promote a settlement by imposing a 
meaningful cost on the North Vietnamese in 
terms of their materiel and human resources 
(to be meaningful, the costs had to be at or 
near maximum levels that the North Viet¬ 
namese were willing to sustain). 

(U) All of the estimates of supply flows down 
through North Vietnam are uncertain, and among 
the least certain are the amounts estimated to have 
been destroyed b}^ air strikes. Nonetheless, exten¬ 
sive analysis suggests the following tentative 
conclusions: 

• (U) The VC/NVA probably received about 
70 percent of its supplies for operations in 
South Vietnam from sources inside the coun¬ 


Table 40. Foreign aid to North Vietnam exceeded 
the cost oj supplying the VC/NVA forces. (Table 
classified Confidential.) 


($ Millions) 
Calendar Year 


COSTS 


1967 

1968 

1969 

g / 

Costs of Supplies Shipped To;- 


I£1 



Northern Laos 


53 

61 

58 

Southern Laos 


45 

63 

60 

Total 


98 

124 

118 

Costs of Trucks Destroyed:—^ 





Northern Laos 


1 

1 

3 

Southern Laos 


6 

44 

38 

Total 


7 

45 

41 

Costs of Supplies. Equipment, and 

Industry Destroyed in North 

Viet-Namc/ 


139 

85 


Costs of Air Defense in North Vietnam- 

235 

122 

83 

TOTAL COSTS 


479 

376 

242 

AID 

,d/ 




Total Foreign Aid to North Viet-Nam 




Economic 


380 

480 

470 

Military TOTAL AID 

COMPARISONS 


650 

T7030 

395 

075 

220 

Total Costs as 7 . of Foreign Aid 


467. 

437. 

357. 

Total Costs as 7 . of Military Aid 


747. 

957. 

1107. 


Source: "Southeast Asia Tactical Aircraft Operations", Southeast Asia 

Analysis Report , June-July 1970, p. 29. 
a/ Computer from CIA estimates of supply shipments and estimated costs per 
ton of supplies of $1,300 for Northern Laos and $1,100 for Southern Laos, 
b/ Computed from DIA estimates of truck attrition and estimated cost of 
$6,000 per vehicle. 

£/ OASD/SA estimates, based on several earlier studies, 
d/ CIA/DIA estimates. 

try. About 15 percent of its supplies was 
estimated to come from North Vietnam over 
the supply routes through Laos, target of the 
primary air interdiction effort. 

• (U) About one-third of all supplies shipped 
into Southern Laos were estimated to have 
made it into South Vietnam through 1970. 
The rest were estimated to be destroyed by 
air strikes, consumed in transit, or stockpiled 
in Laos. After 1970, the Allies may have done 
better because of the truck-killing C-130 
gunships that were so effective operating at 
night, but the Communists still managed to 
move enough supplies and manpower south to 
keep the war going and to launch another 
major offensive in 1972, although the most 
intense fighting was supplied largely through 
North Vietnam across the DMZ. 

• (U) Apparently, there were plenty of supplies 
to ship, because the estimated flow of imports 
into North Vietnam was 20 times the size of 
estimated supply shipments from North 
Vietnam into Laos. 

(U) These conclusions seem to suggest that the more 
than 1.5 million sorties flown in the out-of-country 
interdiction campaign did not choke off VC/NVA 
combat activity in the south. They probably did 
impose a ceiling , but it was pretty high. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 829 






























CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 41. Emphasis on targeting trucks in southern 
Laos boosted the VC/NVA losses. (Table classified 
Confidential.) 




Drv Season 

Wet Season 

Drv Season 



Nov 68-April 69 

May 69-Oct 69 

Nov 69-Apr 70 

(C) 

Targets Struck (average 
monthly sorties) 





Moving Vehicles 

1,826 

751 

2,471 


Storage Areas and Truck 
Parks 

4,261 

3,377 

2,562 


Roads^ 

4,747 

2,101 

2,105 


Anti-Aircraft 

730 

300 

1,006 


Other 

609 

976 

1,009 


Total Sorties 

12,173 

7,505 

9,153 

(C) 

Estimated Supply Destruc- 
tionb/ 





Tons Destroyed (000’s) 

26.8 

8.4 

31.9 


Tons per Sortie 

0.37 

0.19 

0.58 


Source: "Southeast Asia Tactical Aircraft Operations", Southeast Asia 


Analysis Report , June-July 1970, p. 307. 
a/ LOC's, Traffic Control Points, 

b/ USAF Estimate. 


(U) What about the second objective—to impose 
a meaningful cost on the North Vietnamese? Here, 
too, the apparent results were not too encouraging. 
Table 40 suggests that the air operations probably 
did not impose critical materiel costs on North 
Vietnam, since its allies paid for most of the 
resources destroyed. North Vietnam’s estimated 
foreign aid during 1967-69 was two or three times as 
large as the costs of keeping its forces in South 


Table 42. Gunships were at least six times as 
effective in truck kills per sortie as other aircraft. 
(Table classified Confidential.) 



Reported Bomb 
Damage Per Sortie 

Estimated Supplies 

Destroyed Per Sortie 

(C) Results From Truck 

Trucks Destroyed/ 


Attacks 

Damaged 

Tons 

High-Performance 

Jets®/ b/ 

0.27 

0.67 

Slow-Moving Attack 
Aircraft ®/ £•/ 

0.37 

0.92 

Aircraft Gunships^ —^ 

2.40 

5.99 

Total From Truck 

Attacks £/ 

0.35 

0.86 

(C) Results From Storage 

Area/Truck Park Attacks 

Secondary Fires/ 

Explosions 

Tons 

All Aircraft f/ 

1.64 

0.61 


Source: "Southeast Asia Tactical Aircraft Operations", Southeast Asia 


Analysis Report . June-July 1970, p. 31. 
a/ Results during randomly selected time periods of 1969-70 dry season, 
b/ F-4, F-100, F-105, A-4, A-6, A-7. 
c / A-l 

d/ AC-119, AC-123, AC-130. 

e/ Calculated first by assuming 55 percent of trucks are loaded and carry 

3.8 tons of supplies and second by adding 0.187 tons per truck-related 

secondary fire or explosion (under the assumption that 50 percent of 

truck-related secondaries result from roadside caches not cargo in trucks). 

f/ Results achieved by all tactical aircraft from November 1969 to April 

1970. Calculated by assuming each secondary fire or explosion associated 
with an air strike against a storage area target means 0.375 tons of 
supply destruction, 
g/ November 1969-April 1970. 


Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos supplied and replacing 
the damage in North Vietnam caused by the bombing. 

(U) The results indicate that Secretary of De¬ 
fense Robert S. McNamara was correct when he 
stated in November 1966: “A substantial air 
interdiction campaign is clearly necessary and 
worthwhile. . . . But at the scale we are now 
operating, I believe our bombing is yielding very 
small marginal returns, not worth the cost in pilot 
lives and aircraft. ,, ( 85 ) 

INTERDICTION TARGETING AND 
AIRCRAFT EFFECTIVENESS 

(U) Table 41 shows the relative emphasis of 
strikes in southern Laos against trucks, roads, 
and supply storage areas and the resulting ef¬ 
fectiveness in destroying supplies. During the 
1969-70 dry season interdiction program, the 
United States shifted its target emphasis to 
moving vehicles, increasing these strikes from 15 
percent of the total in the 1968-69 dry season to 
27 percent of the total a year later. The shift 
destroyed about 20 percent more supplies and 
increased the average amount of destruction per 
sortie by 55 percent. 

(U) The increased supply destruction resulted 
largely from more trucks destroyed, which 
stemmed from the large increase in truck-kill 
sorties and the addition of highly effective gunship 
aircraft (AC-119’s and AC-130’s) to the inter¬ 
diction force. Table 42 suggests that the gun- 
ships were at least six times as effective in truck 
kills per sortie as the other types of aircraft, but 
on the other hand they did require significant 
numbers of tactical aircraft as escorts on their 
missions. 

AIR SUPPORT FOR ROYAL LAOTIAN 

OPERATIONS 

(U) The objectives of air operations in northern 
Laos were to help limit the capability of the>VC/ 
NVA to advance during the dry season and to 
impose meaningful costs on Communist efforts. 
Table 43 compares North Vietnamese supply losses 
and combat deaths in northern Laos with losses in 
other theaters and with available North Viet¬ 
namese resources. It suggests that Allied air 
operations in northern Laos had little impact on 


830 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 
































CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 43. Impact of Allied operations in northern 
Laos. (Table classified Confidential.) 


(C) VC/NVA Personnel Losses 

Total VC/NVA casualties in Northern Laos 

As percentage of VC/NVA casualties in South Viet-Nam 
Number Years of Available Manpower Reserves 
in NVN at Above Loss Rate 


_ _Monthly Average 

Rates FY 1970 


10 - 12,000 

8-107. 

14 years 


(C) Enemy Supply Losses 

Total supply losses in North Laos (tons) 450-900 
As Percentage of supply losses in South Laos 20-407. 
As percentage of supply inputs to North Laos 12-257. 


Source: "Southeast Asia Tactical Aircraft Operations", Southeast Asia 
Analysis Report . June-July 1970, p. 35. 



— Mission tro<k 
Populated aroa 


Figure 8. South Vietnam defoliation missions, January 
1965 to February 1971. (Figure classified Confidential.) 



Figure 9. South Vietnam defoliation missions, January to 
December 1967. (Figure classified Confidential.) 

available North Vietnamese manpower or supply 
flows. Losses are small relative to those in other 
theaters and to available manpower and supplies. 

THE BOMBING CONCLUSION 

(U) When the political impact of the bombing is 
added to its other costs, the effectiveness of the 
way the air war was conducted is open to question. 
Indeed, the military themselves kept pointing out 
how political constraints impeded the optimum 
use of airpower. But these constraints applied 
mostly to North Vietnam and Cambodia. No 
comparable restraints existed in South Vietnam 
and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, where 
the vast bulk of the sorties were flown. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 831 




















CONFIDENTIAL 




Figure 10. South Vietnam crop destruction missions, 
January 1965 to February 1971. (Figure classified 
Confidential.) 

THE SPECIAL CASE OF HERBICIDE 
SPRAYING OPERATIONS 

(U) Two of the most controversial U.S. operations 
in South Vietnam were the programs to defoliate 
vegetation and to destroy crops. The controversy 
reached such a fever pitch by the end of 1970 that 
the spraying of crops and use of the herbicide 
called Orange (alleged to be harmful to humans) 
were stopped by order of the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense early in 1971. Another result was a 
directive from Congress to the Department of 
Defense to fund a study of the effects of herbicides 
in Vietnam by the National Academy of Science. 
This study is now available to interested readers 
and is not dealt with here.( 86 ) Nor is a defense of 
the herbicide program attempted. The size and 


Figure 11. South Vietnam crop destruction missions, 
January to December 1967. (Figure classified Confi¬ 
dential.) 

dimensions of the defoliation and crop destruction 
programs are simply described. 

(U) The main source of data was a computer file 
that contained a record of everv sprav mission 
flown in South Vietnam. This was used to make 
the computer plots displayed in following pages 
and to develop the statistical findings set forth 
below. Analysis of data on herbicide operations in 
South Vietnam through 1970 showed that: 

• (U) Herbicides could not have caused wide¬ 
spread devastation throughout all of South 
Vietnam, because from 1962 to 1970, herbicide 
was sprayed on less than 10 percent of its land 
area. 

• (U) In 1967, the year of greatest herbicide 
use, less than 3 percent of the country was 


832 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 







CONFIDENTIAL 


defoliated; about 2.4 percent of the land under 
cultivation was subject to crop destruction. 

• (U) The Hamlet Evaluation System (see 
Chapter XIII) indicated that aborrt>-3 per¬ 
cent of the population lived in defoliated 
areas; less than 1 percent lived where crops 
were destroyed. 

(U) Herbicide operations were conducted under 
rigid controls involving both U.S. and GVN 
authorities at all levels. Crop destruction was 
confined to the lightly populated rice deficit high¬ 
lands of Military Regions 1 and 2; at no time were 
crops destroyed in the country’s food producing 
center (Military Region 4). After 1967, the pri¬ 
mary crop destruction targets were plots of moun¬ 
tain rice and vegetables in areas considered hostile. 
Most (about 90 percent) of all crop destruction was 
confined to areas in and around known VC/NVA 
base areas. 

(U) The map in Fig. 8 shows where the herbicide 
missions were flown in relation to populated 


areas of South Vietnam. As can be seen, large-scale 
defoliation (Figs. 8 and 9) was used in attempts 
to hamper Communist forces in: 

• The DMZ and mountains of Military Region 

1 . 

• Western Kontum and Pleiku. 

• War zones C and D in Military Region 3. 

• Mangrove swamps in the Rung Sat Special 
Zone, the U Minh Forest, the Ca Man 

-Peninsula, and the coasts of Vinh Binh and 
Kien Hoa provinces. Many of these areas 
(Military Region 1, Kontum, Tav Ninh War 
Zone C, and Kien Hoa) were introduced to 
the reader in Chapter II as being areas where 
most of the fighting occurred, in the French 
Indochina War as well as in the U.S.-RVNAF 
War 20 years later. 

(U) Figures 10 and 11 show the areas where crop 
destruction missions were flown from 1965 to 1970 
(Fig. 10) and during 1967 (Fig. 11). 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 833 


CONFIDENTIAL 


Chapter IX 

Stalemate 


(U) The dominant U.S./GVN strategic thrust 
from mid-1965 through at least 1969 was to 
destroy the Communist-organized military forces 
by grinding them down. As Gen. William West¬ 
moreland, Commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam 
for much of the period, has said: “It was, in 
essence, a war of attrition.”( 87 ) He also stated 
what became the more or less standard formula¬ 
tion of the attrition objective: “Attrit, by year’s 
end, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces at a 
rate as high as their capability to put men into 
the field.”( 87 ) This was always stated as one of 
several goals, but at least until late 1969 it was 
always considered the most important one. 

(U) But after several years, the war was acknowl¬ 
edged to be a military stalemate.* Why was this? 
Why did the attrition strategy fail? After all, on 
the face of it, the Allies had all the militarv 
advantages. They outnumbered the VC/NVA 
forces by as much as 6 to 1, and they had far 
superior mobility, firepower, and combat support. 
Yet the Allied forces could not destroy the VC/ 
NVA forces, despite their attrition strategy. Quite 
the contrary, the estimated VC/NVA force level 
at the end of 1972 was higher than in 1965 (see 
Chapter IV). The forces were weaker, but intact. 

(U) It was becoming apparent as early as late 1966 
that the U.S. military strategy of attrition was in 


* According to press reports, if returning American prisoners 
of war asked who won the war, their escort officers were 
to answer: “North Vietnam didn’t win. South Vietnam 
didn’t lose.” Also see: “U.S. Officials See a Vietnam 
Stalemate,” New York Times, May 7, 1974, p. 3. 


trouble. The objective of attriting the VC/NVA 
forces at a rate equal to or greater than their 
ability to infiltrate and recruit new troops was 
not being achieved. This theme is evident in 
Secretary McNamara’s statements of Novem¬ 
ber 17, 1966 in his draft memorandum for the 
President: 

... if MACV estimates of enemy strength are 
correct, we have not been able to attrit the 
enemy forces fast enough to break down their 
morale and more U.S. forces are unlikely to do 
so for the foreseeable future . . .( 88 ) 

. . . the data suggest that we have no prospects 
of attriting the enemy force at a rate equal to or 
greater than his capability to infiltrate and 
recruit, and this will be true at either the 
470,000 U.S. personnel level or 570,000. ( 89 ) 

If we assume that the estimates of enemy 
strength are accurate, the ratio of total friendly 
to total enemy strength has only increased from 
3.5 to 4.0 to 1 since the end of 1965. Under the 
circumstances, it does not appear that we have 
the favorable leverage required to achieve 
decisive attrition by introducing more forces. ( 90 ) 

(U) The Communist forces survived because North 
Vietnam had enough manpower and the will to 
rebuild the VC/NVA units after each offensive. 
Furthermore, the VC/NVA was able to control its 
casualty rates to a great extent by controlling the 
number, size, and intensity of combat engage¬ 
ments, and it could therefore limit its losses to 
what it could afford. 

(U) By the middle of 1967, it was clear that the 
availability of the North Vietnamese manpower 


834 JDRB 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


pool and the willingness to send it south would 
prevent the Allies from winning the war of attri¬ 
tion. After more than two years of American troop 
involvement, the number of NVA troopson South 
Vietnam was less than 2 percent of the North 
Vietnamese male labor force and less than 3 
percent of the male agricultural force. By com¬ 
parison, the U.S. forces in Southeast Asia at that 
time amounted to about 1 percent of our male 
civilian labor force.( 91 ) 

(U) After the 1968 Tet offensive, statistical 
analysis again suggested that manpower reserves 
in North Vietnam were sufficient to meet 1968 
requirements and that they could even support a 
higher level of mobilization without significant 
shortages, although there would probably be some 
strains in the labor force. The analysis also noted 
that if North Vietnam mobilized the same per¬ 
centage of its population as South Vietnam, its 
full-time military force would double in size.( 92 ) 

(U) Another set of calculations after the 1968 
offensives suggested that, at first half 1968 loss 
rates (the highest of the war), available North 
Vietnamese manpower would be exhausted in 
about 30 years and Viet Cong manpower in 3% 
years. The Viet Cong and NVA together appeared 
able to last about 12 years.( 93 ) The analysis was 
crude, but it does give some idea of the VC/NVA’s 
potential staying power in the face of loss rates so 
high that they never occurred again. It also 
suggests that the Viet Cong forces could be attrited. 
Indeed, by the end of 1972 most of them were 
gone; only 20 percent of the VC/NVA forces were 
estimated to be Viet Cong. The rest were North 
Vietnamese troops, even in traditional Viet Cong 
units (see Chapter IV). 

(U) The foregoing statements were all very rough 
estimates, based on the best data available in 
1967-68. But they have turned out to be about 
right. They accurately foreshadowed the Allied 
inability to win the war of attrition. 

(U) A second major reason the VC/NVA forces 
were able to survive the Allied strategy of attrition 
was that they were able to exercise considerable 
control over their loss rates and thus keep those losses 
from going beyond the limits they could afford. They 
did this by deciding when and where large-scale 
combat would occur—they held the initiative in 
this respect. 


(U) The vastly superior forces of the Allies found 
it difficult, despite repeated offensives, to pin down 
and defeat an enemy who chose to evade combat. 
A key aspect of the VC/NVA’s ability to avoid 
combat was its use of sanctuaries in North 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, which remained off 
limits to U.S./GVN ground forces for political 
reasons until 1970-71. 


(U) The following analysis assumes that the ability 
to control casualty rates is one way to measure 
military initiative in South Vietnam. To win the 
war of attrition, the Allies must hold the military 
initiative. Specifically, the tempo of Allied of¬ 
fensive operations must control the tempo of 
Communist combat deaths; if Allied operations 
increase, VC/NVA deaths must rise accordingly, 
whether they want them to or not. 

(U) A statistical analysis after the 1968 offensives 
indicated that the VC/NVA had much more influence 
over fluctuations in both its combat deaths and U.S. 
combat deaths than did the Allied forces. ( 94 ) It 
concluded that the VC/NVA held the basic military 
initiative in South Vietnam because it could alter 
the combat death levels by changing the frequency 
and intensity of its attacks.* Changing the tempo 
of Allied operations had little effect. 

(U) The very strong relationship between VC/NVA 
attacks and U.S. combat deaths was interpreted 
to mean that if the VC/NVA desired to increase 
U.S. casualties, at the cost of increasing its own, 
then it could simply step up its offensive operations 
and its willingness to fight U.S. forces whenever 
the opportunity arose. The lack of a similar rela¬ 
tionship between casualties and any of the Allied 
activity indicators was interpreted as a lack of 
casualty control by U.S. forces, as long as they 
persisted in a policy of maximum pressure on the 
VC/NVA main forces at all times. 

(U) A later study used the same statistical correla¬ 
tion technique to see whether the earlier rela¬ 
tionship continued to hold after the Tet offensive 
in 1968. ( 95 ) When the period after Tet 19681 was 
compared with the previous period,J the rela- 

* Attacks include all VC/NVA attacks (large, small, and by 
fire) and they are used here as an indicator of the level of 
the VC/NVA willingness to fight and to take casualties. 

fJuly 1968-November 1969. 

^January 1966-June 1968. 


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JDRB 835 



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Table 44. Correlation analysis: VC/NVA attacks 
against combat deaths; all figures are in R 2 . 
(Table unclassified.) 


VC/NVA Attacks 

3 ./ 

Pre-1968 Offensives— 


Combat 

Deaths 

VC/NVA 
.55 U 

U.S. 

RVNAF 

.63 

.10 

Through 1968 Offensives^ 

.84 

.87 

.68 

Post-1968 Offensives^ 

.77 

.22 

.28 


Source: "Military Initiative in South Vietnam: A Follow-Up", 
Southeast Asia Analysis Report , January 1970, p. 36. 


a/ July 1965 through December 1967. 
b/ January 1966 through June 1968. 
cl July 1968 through November 1969. 

tionships between VC/NVA attacks and Allied 
combat deaths declined substantially. The cor¬ 
relations between U.S. battalion and larger 
operations with contact and combat deaths 
increased as dramatically. This was taken as a sign 
that the military initiative in terms of control over 
U.S. combat deaths had been shifting to the 
United States after June 1968, as it shifted away 
from an aggressive, maximum-pressure strategy. 
However, the VC/NVA ability to control fluctua¬ 
tions in its own deaths remained high. 

(U) Table 44 shows the relationships between 
combat deaths in South Vietnam and VC/NVA 
attacks. The correlations between VC/NVA at¬ 
tacks and its oum combat deaths did not change 
much after the 1968 offensives. This suggests that 
there was little change in the VC/NVA’s ability to 
alter its level of combat deaths by changing its 
level of attacks. Before 1968, it could presumably 
control about 85 percent of the fluctuations; after 
June 1968, it seemed to have some control over 
about 75 percent of the changes,* enough to 
frustrate the Allied attrition strategy. 

(U) Table 44 also suggests that the correlation 
between VC/NVA attacks and U.S. combat deaths 
changed significantly in the Allies’ favor after the 
Tet offensive. Before and during the offensive the 
VC/NVA seemed to control about 85 percent of 

* All percentages are based on the R 2 coefficients derived 
from statistical correlation analysis. The R 2 indicates the 
degree of relationship between the variables, that is, the 
proportion of total variation in one variable explained by 
the other. An R 2 of 0.50 indicates that 50 percent of the 
variation in one variable can be explained by variation in 
the other. In this case, the R 2 are 0.84 and 0.77, respectively. 


Table 45. Correlation analysis: friendly battalion 
operations with contact against combat deaths; 
figures in R 2 .( 95 ) (Table unclassified.) 

Allied Operations VC/NVA KIA U.S. KIA RVNAF KIA 

Pre-1968 Offensives a/ .05 .02 NA 

Through-1968 Offensives b/ .07 .10 NA 

Post-1968 Offensives c/ .66 .63 .19 

a/ July 1965 through December 1967. 

b/ January 1966 through June 1968. 
c/ July 1968 through November 1969. 

the fluctuations in U.S. combat deaths by changing 
its level of attacks and willingness to fight. After¬ 
wards it could control only about 20 percent of the 
variation in U.S. combat deaths.** Moreover, the 
pre-1968 figure of 63 percent indicates that the 
relationship did not simply drop back to pre-Tet 
days; a real change appears to have taken place. 
The VC/NVA also could no longer significantly 
increase U.S. casualties by simply increasing its 
attacks. Similarly, the RVNAF figure dropped 
after June 1968, but it remained higher than 
before Tet 1968 (0.28 versus 0.10). 

(U) In short, the VC/NVA no longer exerted the 
control over U.S. combat deaths that it did 
before, although it still retained considerable con¬ 
trol over its’tnvn combat deaths. Put another way, 
the VC/NVA still lost large numbers of troops only 
when it was willing to, but it could no longer 
increase U.S. and Allied combat deaths easily when 
it wanted to. 

(U) The following conclusions emerge from the 
analysis. Up to and through the 1968 offensives, the 
VC/NVA maintained a fair degree of control over 
fluctuations in its own combat deaths and those of 
the Allies , particularly o f U.S. forces. By increasing 
its willingness to take casualties (signified by a 
rising attack rate), the VC/NVA could increase 
Allied casualties, or by reducing the attack rate it 
could limit its own combat deaths. The Allies, on 
the other hand, appeared to have little control 
over changes in their own combat deaths or those 
of the VC/NVA (see Table 45). This is interpreted 
to mean that the VC/NVA held the military initia¬ 
tive in South Vietnam through June 1968, at 
least in terms of casualties. 

(U) Assistant Secretary of Defense Alain 
Enthoven summed up the problem on March 20, 

**The R 2 were 0.87 and 0.22, respectively. 


836 JDRB 


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1968 in his first memorandum about Vietnam to 
the new Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford: 

One important fact about the war imVietnam 
is that the enemy can control his casualty rate, 
at least to a great extent, by controlling the 
number, size, and intensity of combat engage¬ 
ments. If he so chooses, he can limit his 
casualties to a rate that he is able to bear 
indefinitely. Therefore, the notion that we can 
“win” this war by driving the VC/NVA from 
the country or by inflicting an unacceptable 
rate of casualties on them is false. Moreover, a 
40 percent increase in friendly forces cannot be 
counted upon to produce a 40 percent increase 
in enemy casualties if the enemy doesn’t want 
that to happen. ( 96 ) 

(U) However, after the Tet offensives in 1968, the 
initiative shifted somewhat. The U.S. forces gained 
considerable control over both their own combat 
deaths and those of the Communists, although the 
latter's ability to retain control over fluctuations in 
their own deaths remained high, as shown in Table 45. 

(U) The results seem to say that major fluctuations 
in VC/NVA losses were still fundamentally de¬ 
termined by its willingness to fight, but that the 
U.S. forces learned how to step up their opera¬ 
tions and fight much more efficiently when the 
VC/NVA stepped up its attacks. 

(U) A second reason why the initiative may have 
shifted toward the Allies is that losses of trained 
VC/NVA cadre and personnel, particularly during 
the 1968 offensives, apparently lowered the 
fighting effectiveness of the Communist forces in 
South Vietnam. The results of the accelerated 
pacification campaign in the second half of 1968 
and the further gains made without stiff opposition 
until 1972 both testify to the serious beating the 
VC/NVA cadre and units took during the Tet 
offensive. Largely because of these losses, Hanoi 
apparently elected to conserve and rebuild its 
forces during 1969-71, while awaiting U.S. 
withdrawal. 

(U) But even the shift in initiative was not enough 
for the Allies to drive the VC/NVA forces from the 
field and win a clear-cut victory. The VC/NVA 
military forces were weakened significantly in the 
years following 1968, but they remained strong 
enough to launch a major offensive in 1972 and 
were still active late in 1974. 

(U) How did they do it?( 97 * 98 ) In terms of total 

CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 46. The Allies always outnumbered the 
VC/NVA by at least 3.5 to 1. (Table classified 
Confidential.) 



Manpower (000) 

End of Year 

1965 

M- 

1966 

1967 

m. 

1968 

ici_ 

1969 

S£l_ 

1970 

1971 

S£l. 

1972 

ILL 

(C) 

ALLIES - 

807 

1096 

1226 

1463 

1549 

1450 

1258 

1150 

(C) 

VC/NVA 

ALLIED/VC/NVA 

226 

290 

262 

315 

265 

245 

220 

276 

<U) 

Force Ratio 

3.6 

3.8 

4.7 

4.6 

5.8 

5.9 

5.7 

4.2 


Sources: Tables 11, 13, and 14 in Chapter IV. 
a/ Includes CIDG forces. 

b/ Mid points of VC/NVA range estimates from Chapter IV are used here. 


military manpower, the Allies always outnumbered 
the VC/NVA forces by at least three to one, and 
the ratio approached six to one during 1969-71 
(see Table 46). But the cutting edges of fighting 
forces are the troops in maneuver battalions, and 
Allied superiority jails away sharply on this basis, 
because the Allied foxhole strength, and particularly 
the U.S. foxhole strength, was much lower than the 
public realized. Instead of outnumbering VC/NVA 
forces by almost 6 to 1 in 1970, the advantage falls 
to 1.6. Moreover, the ratio remains fairly steady 
during the 1965-71 period, instead of rising as the 
total manpower ratio does. And it actually shifts 
to an Allied disadvantage of 0.8 to 1 in 1972 (see 
Table 47). The comparison is revealing, because 
the maneuver forces are the principal ones avail¬ 
able to each side for combat and their size imposes 
a limit to offensive activities.* 

(U) Furthermore, the commitment of some of 
these forces to defensive missions further reduced 
Allied offensive capabilities. For instance, the 
Allies had large and continuing needs for combat 
forces to secure military bases, lines of communi- 
cation (roads, canals, etc.), and populated areas. 
An analysis of force allocations in January 1968 
suggested that only 40 percent of the Allied 
maneuver forces were available for offensive 
operations during that month. 

(U) Of course, Allied offensive forces could be 

*This force comparison would be misleading if a large 
portion of the Allied or VC/NVA enemy offensive forces 
were committed against forces—GVN paramilitary or VC 
guerrillas—not included in the comparison. Evidence from 
1967 indicates about 60 to 70 percent of Allied main-force 
activity was probably directed against VC/NVA main-force 
units, and vice versa. For instance, during 1967, 67 percent 
of the VC/NVA incidents against Allied forces were against 
U.S./FW/ARVN main forces and only 33 percent against 
the territorial forces. (") 

JDRB 837 









CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 47. The Allied advantage declined sharply 
when the comparison is limited to combat man¬ 
power. (Table classified Confidential.) 



Manpower (000) 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 


End of Year 

i2L_ 

SSL. 

SSL. 

S£l_ 

fcL_ 

SSL. 

(U) 

ALLIES—^ 

218 

240 

223 

188 

145 

119 

(C) 

VC/NVA 

132 

160 

130 

120 

105 

152 

(U) 

ALLIED/VC/NVA 
Force Ratio 

1.7 

1.5 

1.7 

1.6 

1.4 

.8 


a/ Strengths were calculated by assuming 550 men per RVNAF battalion, 
and 1,000 men per U.S./3rd Nation battalion for the Maneuver 
Battalions shown in Table 100, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary , 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 

January 24, 1973. 

Total regular combat force figures from Table 11 of Chapter IV. 

Mid point of range estimates is used here. 

increased by shifting units from security missions 
back into offensive operations, and this happened, 
especially during VC/NVA offensives, but there 
was always a risk of leaving the population unpro¬ 
tected. The RVNAF’s ability to shift forces to 
where they were needed was always severely 
limited until late in the war, when the territorial 
forces had become numerous enough and strong 


enough to take over most of the security missions 
(as shown in Chapter XIV). 

(U) The VC/NVA’s strategic situation was quite 
different. It didn’t have to use many of its regular 
forces for defensive missions. It had no cities to 
defend, and its base areas and lines of communi¬ 
cation were not held and defended by large 
numbers of troops. It also had the advantage of 
sanctuaries up to 1970-71. Most of the VC/NVA 
regular forces were free to engage Allied forces as 
they saw fit, as long as they didn’t incur heavy 
losses too frequently. 

(U) Given the commitment of regular forces to 
security missions for much of the war, the remain¬ 
ing Allied forces held no significant advantage 
over the VC/NVA forces that could potentially be 
committed against them. The force ratio in this 
situation ranged from an Allied advantage of 1.2 
to 1 to an Allied disadvantage of 0.7 to 1. Stated 
another way, the VC/NVA potential sometimes 
outnumbered the Allied maneuver forces by 1.4 
to 1, measured on this basis (see Table 48). 


Table 48. The VC/NVA outnumbered the Allies halj the time in terms of combat troops available for offensive 

operations. (Table classified Confidential.) 




1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 


Manpower (000) 

QD 

S£l_ 


m_ 



(C) 

ALLIES ~ 

in 

184 

162 

131 

81 

101 

(C) 

VC/NVA 

132 

160 

130 

120 

105 

152 

(U) 

ALLIED/Enemy 

.8 

1.2 

1.2 

1.1 

.8 

.7 


Force Ratio 


a/ The allied regular force manpower engaged in offensive combat operations 

was calculated by arriving at the average number of allied battalions 
engaged in combat operations each day in the month of January for the 
years 1968 through 1973, and then assuming 550-man RVNAF battalions 
and 1000-man U.S. - 3rd Nation battalions. The number of allied maneuver 
battalions on combat operations is available for each day in the "Ground 
Operations Daily Summary" in the National Military Command Center 
Operations Summary . 

Source: Total Regular Combat Force figures from Table 11 of Chapter IV. 
Mid points of range estimates are used here, 
b/ Allied figures are for January following the year shown, i.e., 1967 

figure is actually Jan. 1968 data. VC/NVA figures are end of year shown. 


838 JDRB 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 49. Growth 


of the Regional and Popular Forces improved the Allied position after the U.S. troops 
withdrew. (Table classified Confidential.) 



Manpower in Ground 

Combat Maneuver 

Units (Year end - 000) 

1967 

ua_ 

1968 

£L 

1969 

IC1_ 

1970 

icy. 

1971 

ici_ 

1972 

S£l_ 


ALLIES . 

All Regular Forces—' 

(C) 

218 

240 

223 

188 

145 

119 

(C) 

VN Regional Forces^/ 

98 

143 

170 

184 

185 

196 

(C) 

VN Popular Forces^/ 

134 

155 

193 

226 

223 

197 


CIDG c/ 

38 

42 

35 

- 

- 

- 


Total (C) 

488 

580 

621 

598 

553 

512 


VC/NVA c/ 







(C) 

Regular 

132 

160 

130 

120 

105 

152 

(C) 

Guerrillas 

81 

65 

45 

35 

30 

30 

(C) 

Total 

213 

225 

175 

155 

135 

182 


ALLIED/ENEMY 







cu) 

Force Ratio 

2.3 

2.6 

3.5 

3.9 

4.1 

2.8 


a/ Includes RVNAF, U.S. 

and 3rd National Regular 

Forces. 




b/ Regional Forces (RF) 

combat 

manpower 

calculated as 65 

percent 

of RF 


total strength, and Popular 

Forces (PF) as 90 

percent 

of PF total. 


See "RF/PF Effectiveness”, Southeast Asia Analysis Report , August 1969, p. 13. 
c/ Source: Table 11 of Chapter IV. 


(U) The two sets of combat force ratios in 
Tables 47 and 48 are not precise—far from it. 
They are based on the best data available, some 
of which are rough estimates. However, the 
findings deserve serious consideration, because 
even if the ratios are wrong by 50 percent , they still 
say that the foxhole force ratio did not favor the 
Allies nearly as much as the total manpower figures 
suggest. The data may be rough, but the findings 
seem roughly right,* and they do help explain 
why the Allies were unable to win the war of 
attrition. 

(U) The comparisons do not tell the whole story, 
because the Allies enjoyed overwhelming 
superiority (or so it seemed) in firepower (particu¬ 
larly air and artillery), logistics support, and 
rapid movement of troops. However, there is 
evidence that the VC/NVA was able to fight in a 
way that nullified many of the Allied advantages. 

(U) One such way was for the VC/NVA to mass 
its forces to exploit favorable opportunities while 
tying down Allied forces by using small forces! to 
attack and harass outposts, roads, waterways, 
and the population. In this way the VC/NVA 

*For criticism of the approach, see Ref. 100. 

fAs already noted in Chapter V, more than 90 percent of 
all reported VC/NVA ground assaults were by units 
estimated to be smaller than a battalion—even during 
the peak combat years of 1968 and 1972. 


tied down some of the Allied forces in order to gain 
an edge against others. Such a strategy, combined 
with the use of night operations and thousands of 
standoff attacks by fire, went a long way toward 
neutralizing Allied advantages. The cost in VC/ 
NVA lives was high, but controllable, and the 
Allies were not able to turn their decisive resource 
superiority into a decisive military advantage. 

(U) By the end of 1968, the futility of the attrition 

strategy had become evident to all, as expressed in 

the summary of responses to National Security 

Studv Memorandum 1—the Situation in Vietnam: 
%/ 

There is general agreement with the JCS 
statement, “The enemy, by the type action he 
adopts, has the predominant share in determin¬ 
ing enemy attrition rates.” Three-fourths of the 
battles are at the enemy’s choice of time, place, 
type, and duration. CIA notes that less than 
one percent of nearly 2 million Allied small-unit 
operations conducted in the last two years 
resulted in contact with the enemy and, when 
ARVN is surveyed, the percentage drops to one- 
tenth of one percent. With his safe havens in 
Laos and Cambodia and with carefully chosen 
tactics, the enemy has been able during the last 
four years to double his combat forces, double 
the level of infiltration, and increase the scale 
and intensity of the main-force war, even while 
bearing heavy casualties. (") 

Finally, late in the summer of 1969, the attrition 
strategy ceased to be the prime objective stated 
by MACV. It was superseded by Vietnamization, 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 839 






















CONFIDENTIAL 


which reflected the U.S. decision to gradually dis¬ 
engage from the war. 

(U) If the attrition strategy failed, why did the 
VC/NVA agree to a cease fire? Why not wait until 
U.S. forces finally departed and then attack? The 
answer is not clear, but yet another set of force 
ratios may provide a clue. So far, the discussion has 
considered only total manpower and the cutting 
edge of combat manpower, the regular force 
maneuver battalions. The Viet Cong guerrillas and 
the South Vietnamese territorial forces have been 
neglected. Adding the combat manpower repre¬ 
sented by these forces yields the result shown in 
Table 49. 

(U) The ratios shown in the table do not favor the 
Allies as much as those for total manpower in 
Table 46, but the trend is better. The force ratio 
rose every year until 1972 and portrays an increas¬ 
ingly favorable balance of combat forces, even as 
U.S. troops withdrew. The change in 1972 stems 
from the large buildup of VC/NVA regular forces 
in Military Region 1 for the 1972 offensive. 

(U) The key change is the growth of the Viet¬ 
namese territorial forces, who grew not only in 
numbers, but in improved equipment and other 
factors that increased their effectivensss. Their 
growth enabled them to take over security duties 
from the regular units and to free most of them 
for offensive combat, even as U.S. battalions left 
the country.* 

(U) The effects on Allied manpower available for 
combat and for security missions are fairly clear 
from an analysis of Tables 48 and 49. Allied 

*See Chapter XIV for details of the shift. 

REFERENCES 

1. A. I. Schwartz, Selected Characteristics of VC 
Incidents, Staff Study 137, Weapons Systems 
Evaluation Group, Arlington, Va., Septem¬ 
ber 1967. 

2. “Standoff Attacks: A Major Element of 
VC/NVA Strategy in RVN,” SEA Analysis 
Rpt., Jan.-Feb. 1971, p. 47. 

3. B. Fall, The Two Vietnams. New York: 
Praeger, 1967. 

4. J. Mallin, Terror in Vietnam. Princeton: 
D. Van Nostrand, 1966. 


regular troops on offensive combat operations 
declined from 184,000 in 1968 to 101,000 in 1972, 
a reduction of 83,000. But 127,000 U.S. and 
third-nation troops withdrew from offensive opera¬ 
tions during the same period. Thus, the gain of 
95,000 Regional and Popular Forces troops re¬ 
leased 44,000 RVNAF regular troops to go into 
offensive combat against VC/NVA forces, f An 
additional benefit was that 95,000 RF/PF troops, 
mostly in companies and platoons, could protect 
more population than could 44,000 regular troops 
concentrated in battalions. Finally, and best of all 
for the Allies, the new posture depended solely on 
South Vietnamese troops , not Americans or third 
nations. Moreover, the Communists faced the 
prospect that the Allied posture might get better 
as time passed. 

(U) The patterns, while not conclusive, do sug¬ 
gest that trends unfavorable to the VC/NVA were 
under way and likely to continue, even without 
the presence of U.S. ground and air forces. This 
may have been a factor in the VC/NVA’s de¬ 
cision to settle for the cease fire. Moreover, 
it must be pointed out that while the Allies 
couldn’t defeat the VC/NVA by attacking it 
(because the Communists could control their own 
casualties), its heavy losses when it tried to win by 
all-out offensives in 1968 and 1972 twice forced it 
to retreat to a protracted war strategy and, 
particularly in 1972, to negotiate. Thus, both 
sides faced a stalemate from 1967 on.J 

fl27,000 minus 83,000 equals 44,000. 

tLest the writer be accused of arguing from the benefit 
of 20-20 hindsight, the reader should note that most of 
the analyses and statements cited in this chapter were 
written prior to the end of 1968. The first challenge to the 
attrition strategy came in May 1967 with the publication 
of “The Strategy of Attrition” in the Southeast Asia 
Analysis Report of May 1967, pages 13-15. 

FOR PART TWO 

5. “Terrorism in South Vietnam,” SEA Analysis 
Rpt., Aug.-Oct. 1971, p. 15. 

6. “Enemy Emphasis on Causing U.S. 
Casualties: A Follow-Up,” SEA Analysis 
Rpt., May 1969, pp. 16-17. 

7. “Combat Performance of U.S. and ARVN 
Divisions,” SEA Analysis Rpt., February 
1969, p. 21. 

8. “RVNAF Effectiveness,” SEA Analysis Rpt., 
May 1967, p. 22. 


840 JDRB 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


9. “RVNAF Status—CY 1967,” SEA Analysis 
Rpt., February 1968, p. 23. 

10. “Army Comments on September 1968 
Articles,” SEA Analysis Rpt., October 1968, 
pp. 53-54. 

11. “U.S. Combat Deaths in Vietnam,” SEA 
Analysis Rpt., April 1969, p. 23. 

12. “ARVN Performance in Combined Opera¬ 
tions,” SEA Analysis Rpt., December 1968, 

p. 6. 

13. “U.S. Combat Deaths in Vietnam,” SEA 
Analysis Rpt., September 1969, pp. 11 & 13. 

14. “RVNAF Effectiveness,” SEA Analysis Rpt., 
August 1967, p. 30. 

15. “U.S. Combat Deaths in Vietnam,” SEA 
Analysis Rpt., September 1969, p. 13. 

16. “GVN Regular Force Effectiveness,” SEA 
Analysis Rpt., June 1967, p. 18. 

17. “RVNAF Effectiveness,” SEA Analysis Rpt., 
August 1969, p. 9. 

18. “RVNAF Effectiveness,” SEA Analysis Rpt., 
August 1967, p. 26. 

19. “Capabilitv Studv of U.S. and ARVN 
Infantry Battalions,” Study No. 2-68, 
MACEVAL (Confidential). 

20. “Artillery Support for RVNAF,” SEA Analy¬ 
sis Rpt., September 1967, p. 19. 

21. “Air Support for RVNAF,” SEA Analysis 
Rpt., November 1968, p. 36. 

22. “RVNAF Effectiveness: An Update,” SEA 
Analysis Rpt., September 1968, p. 40. 

23. “Artillery Fire in Vietnam,” SEA Analysis 
Rpt., August 1970, p. 9. 

24. “How the Korean Army Improved: Inter¬ 
view With Gen. Matthew Ridgeway, USA 
(Ret.),” SEA Analysis Rpt., October 1969, 
p. 55. 

25. Ibid., pp. 45-56. 

26. Ibid., p. 53. 

27. Ibid., p. 47. 

28. Ibid., p. 45. 

29. “ARVN Division Commanders,” SEA Analy¬ 
sis Rpt., February 1970, pp. 29-37. 

30. “ARVN/RF/PF Combat Performance and 
Leadership,” SEA Analysis Rpt., April 1969, 

pp. 11-16. 

31. “Leadership and ARVN Combat Effective¬ 
ness,” SEA Analysis Rpt., March 1970, pp. 
21-27. 


32. Unpublished paper, Off. of the Asst. Sec. of 
Defense (Systems Analysis), Aug. 28, 1970. 

34. “RVNAF Leadership,” SEA Analysis Rpt., 
June 1968, p. 43. 

35. “RVNAF Officer and NCO Shortage,” SEA 
Analysis Rpt., March 1970, p. 16. 

36. Ibid., p. 19. 

37. Ibid., p. 20. 

38. Ibid., p. 15. 

39. “RVNAF Leadership,” op. cit., p. 46. 

40. “RVNAF Leadership,” SEA Analysis Rpt., 
August 1968, p. 29. 

41. “RVNAF Leadership,” briefing note, Off. of 
the Asst. Sec. of Defense (Systems Analysis), 
Feb. 4, 1970. 

42. “RVNAF Leadership,” SEA Analysis Rpt., 
June 1968, p. 48. 

43. “RVNAF Leadership,” memorandum for the 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the 
Secretary of Defense, dated June 23, 1971. 

44. “RVNAF Leadership,” memorandum for the 
Secretary of Defense from the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), 
dated Oct. 7, 1970. 

45. “RVNAF Leadership,” memorandum for the 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the 
Secretary of Defense, dated Oct. 13, 1970. 

46. “RVNAF Ground Forces Training,” SEA 
Analysis Rpt., October 1969, pp. 30-43. 

47. “RVNAF Training,” SEA Analysis Rpt., 
February 1970, pp. 55-58. 

48. MACV SEER Reports for each quarter of 
1969 and 1970. 

49. “RVNAF Training,” op. cit., pp. 55-56. 

50. MACV SEER Report, Part I, fourth quarter 
1970, p. 86. 

51. “RVNAF Ground Forces Training,” op. cit., 
p. 33. 

52. Ibid., p. 32. 

53. MACV SEER Report, op. cit., p. 85. 

54. MACV SEER Report, Part I, fourth quarter 
1969, p. 84. 

55. “RVNAF Ground Forces Training,” op. cit., 
p. 35. 

56. MACV SEER Report, Part I, third quarter 
1969, p. 82. 

57. MACV SEER Report, Part I, fourth quarter 

1969, p. 80. 

58. MACV SEER Report, Part I, fourth quarter 

1970, p. 81. 


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JDRB 841 


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59. “RVNAF Training,” op. cit., p. 56. 

60. “RVNAF Ground Forces Training,” op. cit., 
p.'3 V1 

61. “RVNAF Training,” op. cit., p. 58. 

62. V. J. Croizat, “A Translation From the French; 
Lessons oj the War in Indochina ,” Vol. 2, 
RM-5271-PR, The Rand Corp., Santa 
Monica, Calif., May 1967, p. 196. 

63. “ARVN/VNMC Problem Area Progress Re¬ 
port,” SEA Analysis Rpt., Nov.-Dee. 1969, 

p. 22. 

64. MACV SEER Report, Part I, third quarter 

1969, p. 2. 

65. MACV SEER Report , Part I, third quarter 

1970, p. 72. 

66. Army Activities Report; Southeast Asia, final 
issue, as of Dec. 20, 1972, p. 49. 

67. Ibid., p. 45. 

68. “Battle Prospects in the MR 2 Highlands,” 
SEA Analysis Rpt., Nov.-Jan. 1972, p. 49. 

69. “Lam Son 719—Preliminary Evaluation,” 
Off. of the Asst. Sec. of Defense (Systems 
Analysis), April 2, 1971, p. 1. 

70. “Selected RVNAF Personnel Data,” MACV 
Monthly Report (data for October 1967- 
December 1972). 

71. Southeast Asia Statistical Tables, Off. of the 
Asst. Sec. of Defense (Systems Analysis), 
May 1968, table 4B. 

72. Army Activities Report: Southeast Asia, op. 
cit., p. 47. 

73. “Selected RVNAF Personnel Data,” op. 
cit., (data for December 1971 and Decem¬ 
ber 1972). 

74. “RVNAF Desertions,” SEA Analysis Rpt., 
June-July 1971, p. 12. 

75. “Desertions From ARVN/VNMC Ground 
Combat Forces,” SEA Analysis Rpt., Feb¬ 
ruary 1970, p. 47. 

76. “Causes of RVNAF Desertions,” SEA Anal¬ 
ysis Rpt., March 1970, p. 14. 

77. Ibid., p. 11. 

78. “Cost of Bombing North Vietnam,” SEA 
Analysis Rpt., December 1967, p. 40. 

79. “Southeast Asia Tactical Aircraft Opera¬ 
tions,” SEA Analysis Rpt., June-July 1970, 
p. 17. 

80. Southeast Asia Statistical Summary, Off. of the 
Asst. Sec. of Defense (Comptroller), April 18, 
1973, table 353, pp. 1-4. 


81. Tables CAS 2.1 and 2.2, Off. of the Asst. Sec. 
of Defense (Comptroller), April 1973. 

82. Hearings oj Oct. 20-22, 28, 1969, Subcom¬ 
mittee on United States Security Agreements 
and Commitments Abroad, U.S. Senate, 
p. 713. 

83. “An Appraisal of ARC LIGHT (B-52) 
Operations,” SEA Analysis Rpt., September 
1967, p. 25. 

84. “Southeast Asia Tactical Aircraft Opera¬ 
tions,” op. cit., p. 15. 

85. The Pentagon Papers, The Senator Gravel 
Edition, Vol. IV. Boston: Beacon Press 
(p. 374). The statement was made in the 
paper dated Nov. 17, 1966. 

86. The Effects of Herbicides in South Vietnam, 
National Academy of Sciences—National 
Research Council, Washington, D.C., Febru¬ 
ary 1974. 

87. W. C. Westmoreland, lecture presented at 
Tufts University, Medford, Mass., Dec. 12, 
1973, p. 17. 

88. The Pentagon Papers, op. cit., p. 369. 

89. Ibid., p. 370. 

90. Ibid. p. 371. 

91. “Manpower Availability in North Vietnam,” 
SEA Analysis Rpt., September 1967, pp. 3-4. 

92. “Manpower Availability in North Vietnam,” 
SEA Analysis Rpt., May 1968, pp. 1-2. 

93. “North and South Vietnamese Manpower,” 
SEA Analysis Rpt., August 1968, pp. 4-7. 

94. “Military Initiative in South Vietnam,” SEA 
Analysis Rpt., September 1968, pp. 6-18. 

95. “Military Initiative in South Vietnam: A 
Follow-Up,” SEA Analysis Rpt., January 
1970, pp. 35-37. 

96. A. C. Enthoven and K. W. Smith, How Much 
Is Enough? New York: Harper & Row, 1971 
(p. 298). 

97. “A Comparison of Allied and VC/NVA 
Offensive Manpower in South Vietnam,” 
SEA Analysis Rpt., June 1968, pp. 26-32. 

98. “A Comparison of Allied and VC/NVA 
Offensive Manpower in South Vietnam,” 
SEA Analysis Rpt., October 1968, pp. 33-38. 

99. Ibid., p. 33. 

100. SEA Analysis Rpt., August 1968, pp. 46-50. 

101. Congressional Record 118, E4978 (May 10, 
1972). 


842 


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UNCLASSIFIED 


PART THREE 
THE CASUALTY TOLL 


UNCLASSIFIED 




































































































































CONFIDENTIAL 


Chapter X 

The Military Casualties 


(U) Casualties are the tragic by-product of any 
war, and they loomed large in controversies about 
the Vietnam War in the United States and else¬ 
where. This chapter discusses casualty rates on 
both sides, presenting the statistics available and 
analyzing the trends and patterns they show. 
Unfortunately, the statistical style seems cold¬ 
blooded, because figures by themselves can never 
give the reader any real feeling for the suffering, 
death, maiming, and tragedy they represent, 
although the enormity of some of the figures may 
have impact. But some knowledge of casualty 
levels, trends, and locations is necessary to under¬ 
stand a war without fronts, so the data, gruesome 
as they are, must be analyzed. 

(U) The approach centers on combat deaths— 
the kia (killed in action)—because (1) prisoners, 
although they had a large political impact, were a 
small portion of the casualties, and {2) every 
Allied force in Vietnam counted its wounded 
differently, so those figures are not comparable 
among forces. Also, no data are available for 
Communist wounded. For comparative analysis, 
then, the combat death figures (kia) are the best 
measurement. 

VC/NVA COMBAT DEATHS 

ACCURACY PROBLEM 

(U) It is doubtful whether or not anybody, in¬ 
cluding Hanoi, really knows how many VC/NVA 
troops died. As with the figures on VC/NVA 
forces (Chapter IV), there are great uncertainties 


in the kia estimates. This should be no surprise, in 
view of the obvious difficulties of counting VC/ 
NVA casualties. This problem is not unique to the 
Vietnam War, but the Allied attrition strategy 
generated so much emphasis on the “body 
count’’ that the figures received far more atten¬ 
tion than they deserved. Indeed, they cast a 
“killer” pall over the entire Allied effort in 
Vietnam. 

(U) Allied forces simply could not count VC/NVA 
casualties accurately while the war was being 
fought, because it was too difficult and dangerous. 
Many problems existed. Early in the war, the 
VC/NVA placed a high priority on reclaiming its 
dead from the battlefield, so most of them were 
not left to be counted. The terrain in much of 
Vietnam made it difficult to find all of the VC/NVA 
dead, particularly in the jungles and swamps. If 
several Allied units were involved in the same 
action, with each doing its own body count, 
double counting was possible, even likely. Con¬ 
tinuing combat or sniper fire sometimes made it 
too dangerous to do more than estimate VC/NVA 
losses (and it is a safe conjecture that head¬ 
quarters was demanding a “body count” from 
the unit commander). Some of the VC/NVA 
forces were killed by artillery, tactical air, and 
B-52 strikes in areas where the dead could not be 
counted. Finally, if the body count made the 
outcome look bad for the Allied unit, the tempta¬ 
tion to produce an exaggerated estimate was 
strong. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 845 


CONFIDENTIAL 


"Fable 50. The balance-sheet approach showed a discrepancy of 110,000 between VC/NVA force changes 

and VCjNVA deaths. (Table unclassified.) 



(In Thousands) 

1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

Cumulative 

Total 

1. 

/ 

Personnel Inputs— 

116 

172 

143 

305 

156 

115 

119 

158 

1,284 

2. 

Personnel Losses—^ 

59 

92 

141 

262 

244 

161 

147 

192 

1,298 

3. 

Inputs Minus Losses 

57 

80 

2 

43 

-88 

-46 

-28 

-34 

-14 

4. 

VC/NVA Force Level 

46 

64 

-28 

53 

-50 

-20 

-25 

55 

+95 


Changes sJ 


a/ Inputs include estimates of recruitment and infiltration, 

b/ Losses include combat deaths, deaths from wounds (based on intelligence 
community factor of .35 times KIA), Prisoners, and military defectors, 
c/ Based on Table H i n Caapter IV. 


(U) Other difficulties exist, but these illustrate 
the problem. They also indicate why it was not 
possible to count Viet Cong and North Vietnamese 
dead separately, despite pressure from higher head¬ 
quarters to do so. Again, the attrition strategy 
generated the pressure, with its concern about 
trends in the NVA force structure. 

(U) Considerable effort was made to check the 
validity of the VC/NVA loss estimates, but the 
results were not conclusive. One type of analysis 
tried to extrapolate the losses reported in captured 
VC/NVA documents. Another used a balance-sheet 
approach, which subtracted VC/NVA losses from 
VC/NVA inputs (recruitment and infiltration) 
and then compared the answer with the changes in 
estimated VC/NVA force levels. 

(U) At least four attempts were made to extrapo¬ 
late total VC/NVA losses from a sample of cap¬ 
tured VC/NCA documents. The first was a MACV 
study of 70 documents that produced an estimate 
that VC/NVA kia in 1966 were probably 4.5 
percent above the official body count. O In the 
second effort, analysts in Washington refined the 
analysis, used the same 70 documents, and esti¬ 
mated that VC/NVA kia in 1966 were probably 
20 percent below the official figures.(*)* The third 
analysis examined 84 documents in Washington 
and concluded that total VC/NVA kia for 1965 
through 1968 were probably 30 percent lower than 
the official estimates, but that total losses were 
probably higher than the official figures, if 

♦References for Part Three begin on page 867. 


VC/NVA losses to disease were taken into ac¬ 
count. ( 2 ) The fourth, based on 136 documents and 
further refinements in the method of analysis, 
concluded that both VC/NVA kia and its total 
losses probably amounted to about half of the 
official estimates. ( 2 ) (At least one seasoned opera¬ 
tions analyst, with experience in World War II and 
Korea, cuts counts of “enemy” kia by 50 percent 
as a rule of thumb.) The attempts ceased at this 
point. Meanwhile, in a famous interview with 
Oriana Fallaci in 1968, General Giap reportedly 
acknowledged the loss of about 500,000 men in the 
war, which is more than the official kia count of 
435,000 at the end of 1968. It is unlikely that the 
actual figures will ever be known. 

(U) Table 50 shows the balance-sheet approach to 
estimating VC/NVA casualties. Losses were sub¬ 
tracted from estimated VC/NVA inputs, and the 
result was compared with changes in VC/NVA 
force levels, which were estimated separately in 
the order-of-battle process. The table show's inputs 
and losses roughly in balance for the eight-year 
period as a whole, but VC/NVA forces increased 
by 95,000. The result is a discrepancy of about 
110,000 in the balance, which averages out to 
about 14,000 per year. In all but two years (1967 
and 1972), the actual figures moved in the same 
direction, although some yearly discrepancies were 
fairly large. All factors considered, the balance 
isn’t too bad, and it suggests that the various 
estimates of forces, losses, and inputs have some 
coherence, although each was estimated by dif¬ 
ferent people with different tools and techniques. 


846 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 














CONFIDENTIAL 


(U) But the balance is probably helped by two 
factors: The intelligence community periodically 
assessed some losses against the estimated VC/ 
NVA force levels, and MACV actually^used the 
balance-sheet approach to help estimate VC/NVA 
force levels for a while. However, the yearly 
differences between lines 3 and 4 in the table are 
large enough to indicate that these two efforts 
were not undertaken with the aim of producing a 
precise balance. An anonymous analyst has the 
final word on the balance-sheet approach: 

Estimating the enemy’s manpower balance is 
beset with innumerable pitfalls, because of the 
several quantitative series that must be con¬ 
structed on the basis of soft and erratic 
data . . . the margin of error in such esti¬ 
mates is such that they are adequate to judge 
general trends and capabilities, but we would 
issue a strong caveat against expecting any 
estimate to yield even a close balancing of gross 
manpower inputs and attrition. 

(U) Despite the uncertainties in the VC/NVA 
combat death estimates, the figures are worth 
analyzing because the}^ shed some light on the 
VC/NVA’s persistence and approach to the war. 
But such analysis must be confined to general 
trends and patterns. The figures are not accurate 
enough for more than this. 

VC/NVA COxMBAT death levels and trends 

(U) Table 51 displays the official U.S. statistics 
of VC/NVA combat deaths in the Vietnam War. 
These are the best data available, and they are a 
product of intensive efforts to produce reasonably 
good estimates; but the uncertainties are great.* 
The table says that the VC/NVA may have lost 
as many as 850,000 dead during 1965-72, an 
average of more than 100,000 combat deaths 
each year. The trend rose each year to a peak of 
180,000 during 1968, then fell off to about 100,000 
per year by 1970-71. Then the VC/NVA offensive 
in 1972 boosted the toll again. 

(U) Data for 1967 through 1972 showing VC/NVA 
combat deaths by military region in South 
Vietnam indicate that 35 percent of the deaths 
occurred in Military Region 1, which fits the 
pattern of intense combat already shown there. 
Military Regions 3 and 4 each accounted for 20 
percent, and Military Region 2 was in last place 

*Other kia estimates can be found, but they are all con¬ 
sidered less accurate than the figures shown here. 


Table 51. An estimated 850,000 VC/NVA died in 
South Vietnam; figures in thousands. (Table 
unclassified.) 


1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Total 

VC/NVA Deaths 
From Hostile 

Action (U) 35 56 88 181 157 104 98 132 851 


Source: Table 2, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary , Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), August 9, 1972 - 
April 11, 1973, pp. 1-9. 

Data for 1970 includes VC/NVA combat deaths from the U.S.-RVNAF 
operations in Cambodia. Data for 1971 and 1972 includes VC/NVA 
combat deaths from operations in both Laos and Cambodia. 

with 17 percent. Operations in Cambodia and the 
panhandle of Laos during 1970 and 1971 accounted 
for about 5 percent. 

(U) When the combat deaths in Table 51 are 
compared with the reported sizes of the VC/NVA 
forces,! they were high indeed. The estimated 
force size averaged 245,000 for the period, and 
VC/NVA combat deaths reportedly averaged 
106,000 per year. This suggests that more than Jf.0 
percent of the VC/NVA force were killed in action 
every year. The figure for 1968, the year of the Tet 
offensive, was more than 60 percent. Rough as 
these percentages are, given the uncertainties of 
the data, they do suggest that the VC/NVA took 
extremely heavy casualties. 

(U) The rule of thumb for western armies is that 
a military unit ceases to function in combat at the 
point when 30 percent of its troops have been 
killed or wounded. According to the estimates, the 
VC/NVA exceeded this percentage every year 
after 1966 and still managed to keep the war going. 
The cohesion of its units, its infrequent commit¬ 
ment to combat (perhaps once every six months), 
and its careful rebuilding after each campaign all 
help to explain the VC/NVA’s ability to persist in 
the face of very high losses. 

ALLIED COMBAT DEATHS 

(U) Turning to Allied combat deaths, we find that 
some of the concerns about accuracy and reliability 
of the figures can be discarded. United States 
combat deaths were the most accurate statistics 

f Midpoint strength estimates taken from Table 13 of 
Chapter IV. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 847 
















CONFIDENTIAL 

Table 52. Some 222,000 Allied troops died in combat. (Table unclassified.) 




1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

Total 

(U) 

RVNAF 

^ 11,243 

11,953 

12,716 

27,915 

21,833 

23,346 

22,738 

39,587 

171,331 

(U) 

u.s.—/ 

1,369 

5,008 

9,378 

14,592 

9,414 

4,221 

i,380 

300 

45,662 

(u) 

Third 

Nation 31 

566 

1,105 

979 

866 

704 

526 

443 

5,221 

(U) 

Total 

12,643 

17,527 

23,199 

43,486 

32,113 

28,271 

24,644 

40,330 

222,214 


Source: Table 2, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary , Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), April 11, 1973, pp. 1-9. 
a/ Includes combat deaths in Laos and Cambodia, 
b/ Includes RVNAF and Paramilitary combat deaths. 





from the Vietnam War. Enormous effort goes into 
U.S. casualty reporting in any war, with a name, 
rank, and serial number standing behind every 
figure added to the toll—witness the U.S. effort in 
every war to find out what happened to the 
missing. The Vietnamese casualty data are much 
less reliable than those for U.S. casualties. The 
detailed statistics show considerable turbulence in 


the reporting system. Still, they are good enough 
for the limited analysis done here. The accuracy 
of the third-nation casualty data probably lies 
somewhere between the U.S. and Vietnamese data, 
but that is purely a guess. 

(U) Table 52 shows that about 222,000 Allied 
troops were killed in South Vietnam during the 


Table 53. Some 170,000 South Vietnamese troops were killed in combat. (Table classified Confidential.) 



RVNAF: 

1965 

<u) 

1966 

(U) 

1967 

(C) 

1968 

(C) 

1969 

(C) 

1970 

(C) 

1971 

(C) 

1972 

(C) 

Total 

(C) 

Regular Forces 

5044 

4418 

6110 

12930 

8652 

9647 

8864 

19735^/ 

75,360 

(C) 

RF/PF 

6239 

7535 

6606 

11393 

10286 

11738 

13118 

18962^/ 

85,877 

(C) 

Total Militaryll243 

11953 

12716 

24323 

18938 

21385 

21982 

38697 

161,237 

(C) 

Paramilitary 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

3592 

2895 

1961 

756 

890 

10,094 

(U) 

Total 

11243 

11953 

12716 

27915 

21833 

23346 

22738 

39587 

171,331 


Sources: Based on calculations and assumptions using Tables 2 and 53, 
Southeast Asia Statistical Summary , Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Table 2, April 11, 1973, 
pp. 1-8; Table 53, February 16, 1972, pp. 1-5. 
a/ Official figures showing Regular and RF/PF deaths separately are not 
available for 1972. These estimates are based on a sample of OPREP-5 
messages which indicate that 49 percent of the 1972 deaths were RF/PF 
and 51 percent were Regular. These factors were applied against the 
total of 38,697 to develop the figures officially shown. 


848 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 












































CONFIDENTIAL 


eight years of 1965-72, an average of 28,000 per 
year. The South Vietnamese accounted for 77 
percent of the total. The U.S. share of losses was 
21 percent and the third-nation forces lost about 
2 percent. 

(U) As seen in Chapter II, the toll grew each year 
to a peak in 1968 and then declined to the 1967 
level by 1971. The offensive in 1972 raised Allied 
combat deaths to the 1968 level , only this time the 
South Vietnamese took virtually all (98 percent) oj 
the losses. 

(U) The reduction in Allied kia rates from 1968 
through 1971 was caused by a reduction in combat, 
starting in 1969 (after the 1968 peak), and by the 
withdrawal of U.S. troops from mid-1969 on. Note 
that South Vietnamese combat deaths were about 
the same in 1969, 1970, and 1971, while U.S. 
deaths declined sharply, accounting for most of 
the reductions in the totals. 

(U) Chapter II shows that Allied combat deaths 
were not evenly distributed throughout South 
Vietnam, but were heavily concentrated in five 
provinces. They accounted for 11 percent of the 
provinces, but for 33 percent of the Allied combat 
deaths. The pattern is similar to that for VC/NVA 
combat deaths, in that the largest share (35 per¬ 
cent) occurred in the five provinces of Military 
Region 1. 


SOUTH VIETNAMESE COMBAT DEATHS 

(U) Problems of reliability and consistency 
plagued the tabulation and analysis of South 
Vietnamese casualty data, and they provide a 
dramatic illustration of the critical importance of, 
and need for, good reporting. During one sus¬ 
tained period of the war, U.S. combat deaths 
always appeared to be higher than RVNAF deaths. 
This led one Secretary of Defense to believe that 
the Vietnamese weren't carrying their share of the 
load, and he criticized them harshly. Investigation 
of the RVNAF reports eventually showed that the 
Vietnamese statistics being sent to Washington 
were preliminary field reports. The combat death 
totals in them were about 40 to 50 percent below 
the final, verified reports. After these data were 
furnished, Vietnamese deaths were seen to be con¬ 
sistently higher than U.S. combat deaths , and by a 
wide margin. Other problems occurred with the 
Vietnamese data, but U.S. analysts devoted much 
effort to ensuring that the figures were as reliable 
as possible. 

(U) The statistics are presented in Table 53 and 
are considered reliable enough for comparisons and 
trend analysis. The table indicates that the South 
Vietnamese lost about 160,000 military kia and 
about 10,000 paramilitary kia during 1965-72. 
The regular forces accounted for about 45 percent 
of the RVNAF kia, with the territorial forces 


Table 54. Some 46,000 U.S. troops were killed in combat. (Table unclassified.) 


Prior 


MILITARY to 


SERVICE 

1965 

1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

Total 

(U)Army 

185 

898 

3073 

5443 

9333 

6710 

3508 

1269 

172 

30,591 

(U)Marine Corps 

11 

335 

1681 

3452 

4618 

2254 

533 

41 

11 

12,936 

(U)Navy and Coast 
Guard 

4 

75 

120 

311 

464* 

295 ** 

88 

21 

47 * 

1,425 

(U)Air Force 

67 

61 

134 

172 

177 

155 

92 

49 

70 

977 

(U)Total 

267 

1369 

5008 

9378 

14592 

9414 

4221 

1380 

300 

45,929 


Source: "Casualties incurred by U.S. Military Personnel in Connection 

with the Conflict in Vietnam - Deaths Resulting from Actions by 
Hostile Forces", CAS 21.7, Directorate for Information Services, 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). 

* Includes 1 Coast Guard 0 

** Includes 3 Coast Guard 

CONFIDENTIAL JDRB 849 


588-67? O - 7 5 - 7 

























CONFIDENTIAL 

Table 55. Some 5,200 third-nation troops were killed in combat. (Table classified Confidential.) 



1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

Total 

(C) Australia and 

15 5/ 

M_ 


icy. 

1 C 1 _ 

ici_ 

1 C1_ 

1 C1_ 

ici_ 

New Zealand 

60 

76 

104 

99 

70 

31 

- 

455 

(C) Korea 

17 

506 

1005 

824 

t>35 

529 

448 

443 

4407 

(C) Philippines 

- 

- 

8 

•m 

- 

- 

- 

- 

8 

(C) Thailand 

- 

- 

16 

51 

132 

105 

47 

- 

351 

(U) Total 

32 

566 

1105 

979 

866 

704 

526 

443 

5221 


Source: Table 50, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary , Office of the 


Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) April 18, 1973, p. 1. 
a/ Includes one KIA from 1964. 


(Regional and Popular Forces) accounting for the 
remaining 55 percent. As to trends, the RVNAF 
deaths were steady at about 12,000 per year for 
1965-67, jumped sharply to 28,000 in 1968, then 
declined to a level of 23,000 during 1969-71. They 
rose to 40,000 in 1972, RVNAF’s toughest year, 
when the South Vietnamese forces alone suffered 
almost as many combat deaths (39,600) as 
all Allied forces (United States, third nation, 
RVNAF) did (43,500) in 1968. As with desertions 
(Chapter VII), the RVNAF combat deaths were a 
constant percentage of the force , 2.1 percent each 
year , except for 1968 (3.2 percent) and 1972 (3.4 
percent). The stability of the percentages is 
startling, and it suggests a steady state of RVNAF 
combat effort, which grew as the forces grew 
(Chapter IV) and as they fought 50 percent harder 
than normal when faced with the large VC/NVA 
offensives of 1968 and 1972. 

U.S. COMBAT DEATHS 

(U) The general levels and trends of U.S. combat 
deaths are presented here for comparison with the 
other Allied forces, but the detailed analysis of 
their causes, compositions, and locations follows in 
the next chapter. The importance of U.S. combat 
deaths as a burden and an issue in the war justifies 
detailed treatment. Table 54 shows that the U.S. 
Army and Marine Corps accounted for 95 percent 
of the 45,929 U.S. combat deaths through the end 
of 1972. United States deaths peaked in 1968 and 
then declined each year as U.S. troops withdrew. 
By 1972, the toll had declined to 300, down from 
14,600 in 1968. 


THIRD-NATION COMBAT DEATHS 

(C) The Koreans accounted for about 85 percent 
of the 5,200 combat deaths of third-nation forces, 
as shown in Table 55. 

RELATIVE INTENSITY OF THE COMBAT 

DEATH RATES 

(U) Some indication of the intensity of combat 
for the various troops involved can be obtained 
by calculating the percentage of each force killed 
in combat each year. This neutralizes the effect 
of the force size and shows combat intensity more 
clearly when different-size forces are involved in 
the comparison. For example, it has already been 
noted that an average of about 40 percent of the 
VC/NVA forces were reportedly killed every year, 
with a peak of 60 percent killed in 1968. 

(U) The percentage for South Vietnamese forces 
was much lower, as already noted, and it averaged 
about 2.5 percent annually for the entire period 
of 1965-72. It was more dangerous to be a member 
of the territorial forces (RF/PF) than to be in the 
regular forces, because 2.7 percent of the RF/PF 
force died each year, on average, compared to 2.3 
percent of the regulars. This suggests that the odds 
of getting killed in the RF/PF were higher than 
in the regulars. 

(U) The relative intensities of combat for the U.S. 
and third-nation forces was lower still, 1.8 percent 
for the U.S. troops and 1.3 percent for the third- 
nation forces. For comparison, historical data 
suggests that 6.7 percent of the French Expedi¬ 
tionary Forces were killed in Vietnam each year 


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from 1946 through 1954. In Korea, the annual 
combat death rate for U.S. forces was about 5 
percent of the force, although total U.S. combat 
deaths there (33,629) were below the U.S. total in 
Vietnam, because the war was shorter. 

(U) In summary, the VC/NVA casualty rates in 
the Vietnam War were extremely high by any 


standards, even if its losses turn out to be over¬ 
stated by a large margin. The U.S. and South 
Vietnamese combat death rates from 1965 through 
1972 were less than half of the rates suffered bv 
the French in Vietnam and the Americans in 
Korea 1950-53, although the totals were much 
higher in both cases. 


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Chapter XI 

U. S. Casualties Analyzed 




(U) Every war has human and material costs. 
For the United States, the human costs of the 
Vietnam conflict are usually expressed in terms of 
American combat deaths, which approached 
46,000 by the end of 1972. However, the human 
costs went beyond the number killed in action. 
United States forces suffered more than 10,000 
deaths from nonhostile causes in Vietnam. In 
addition, 150,000 troops were hospitalized for 
wounds received in action, and thousands more 
were hospitalized for disease and nonbattle in¬ 
juries. This chapter analyzes U.S. military casual¬ 
ties in Vietnam, with particular emphasis on 
deaths from combat and nonhostile causes. The 
analysis focuses on who died, where, and how. It 
also addresses the key factors that influenced the 
U.S. death rate—influenced it to the extent that 
the rate was actually predicted successfully for 
six months ahead during one period late in the war. 

(U) Table 56 portrays the total number of U.S. 
casualties through March 31, 1973. In addition to 
the losses described above, 150,000 troops were 
wounded but did not require hospital care, another 
1,200 were missing, and 750 were believed to have 
been captured at one point, with 650 of them 
returned to U.S. control by the end of March 1973. 

WHO DIED IN COMBAT? 

(U) Table 57* says that 88 percent of all U.S. 

*Coast Guard deaths are included with the Navy in the 
combat deaths and nonhostile tables (5 kia and 2 non¬ 
hostile deaths). 


combat deaths in Vietnam were Army and 
Marine troops fighting on the ground. An analysis 
done in 1968 showed that 80 percent of all Army 
and Marine combat deaths were suffered by 
troops in maneuver units. ( 3 ) Thus, about 70 
percent of all U.S. combat deaths in Vietnam were 
inflicted on Army and Marine troops serving in 
maneuver units. 

(U) Almost 90 percent of the combat deaths were 
enlisted men, mostly in grades E3 and E4, the 
latter two grades accounting for 60 percent of all 
U.S. kia. The figures are shown in Table 58, 
which also shows that the bulk of the Marine 
Corps enlisted men kia were one grade lower than 
those of the Army and Navy. Only in the Air 
Force did officers account for a significant portion 
(68 percent) of the combat deaths. Later, Table 66 
indicates that 85 percent of the Air Force deaths 
came from aircraft losses, in which the pilots and 
most of the flight crews were officers, so the 
pattern is not surprising. 

(U) More than 85 percent of those who died in 
combat were 25 years of age or younger, with 
Army and Marine troops at the ages of 19, 20, 
and 21 accounting for about 60 percent of the 
overall total. Table 59 also shows that the Marines 
died at younger ages than their Army counter¬ 
parts, about 80 percent of them dying at the age 
of 21 or below, compared to 60 percent for the 
Army. 

(U) Table 60 indicates that 65 percent of the dead 
had served in the Armed Forces for less than two 


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Table 56. Some 56,000 U.S. troops died and more than 300,000 were wounded. (Table unclassified.) 



COMBAT CASUALTIES 

Army 

w a / 

Navy— 

Marine 

Corps 

Air 

Force 

Total 

1 . 

Killed 

25,373 

1,092 

11,477 

502 

38,444 

2. 

Wounded or Injured 
a. Died of wounds 

3,518 

146 

1,451 

48 

5,163 


b. Nonfatal wounds 

Hospital care required 

96,810 

4,178 

51,392 

932 

153,312 


Hospital care not required 

104,723 

5,898 

37,202 

2,518 

150,341 

3. 

Missing 

a. Died while missing 

1,689 

18.7 

5 

449 

2,330 


b. Returned to control 

54 

5 

2 

35 

96 


c. Current missing 

246 

138 

91 

691 

1,166 

4. 

Captured or Interned 

a. Died while captured or interned 

15 

1 

3 

2 

21 


b. Returned to control 

133 

145 

37 

333 

648 


c. Current captured or interned 

23 

35 

7 

16 

81 


TOTAL COMBAT DEATHS—^ 

30,595 

1,426 

12,936 

1,001 

45,958 

5. 

NON-COMBAT CASUALTIES 

Current Missing 

103 

. 

14 


117 

6. 

Deaths 

7,147 

882 

1,681 

593 

10,303 


Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Directorate 

for Information Operations, April 4, 1973, Cumulative from January 1, 1961 
through March 31, 1973. 

a/ Navy figures include a small number of Coast Guard casualties, 
b/ Sum of lines 1, 2a, 3a, and 4a. 


years, and half of them had served less than one 
year. The Marine kia generally had served less 
time than had the Army dead; however, the length 
of service for many of the Army kia is not shown 
in the data, and this may have influenced the 
result. On the other hand, the findings fit the 
pattern of youth already seen for the Marine 
Corps in the previous tables, so they are probably 
about right. 

(U) The one-year tour for all U.S. troops and the 
practice of a six-month tour for U.S. battalion com¬ 
manders may have had the effect of raising the num¬ 
ber of U.S. combat deaths. Twice as many troops 
died during the first six months of their tour as in 
the second six months (Table 61). After the first 
month, the number of deaths declined each month * as 
the tour progressed. Thus, the longer one stayed 
alive after arriving in Vietnam, the better one's 
chances for survival, presumably as the result of a 


Table 57. Soldiers and Marines fighting on the 
ground suffered 88 percent of the U.S. combat 
deaths. (Table unclassified.) 



Army 

Marines 

Navy 

AF 

Total 

Air 

2508 

575 

244 

851 

4178 

Ground 

28087 

12361 

1126 

150 

41724 

Sea 

0 

0 

56 

0 

56 

Total 

30595 

12936 

1426 

1001 

45958 


All U.S. Combat Deaths Through March 1973. 

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 


Directorate for Information Operations, April 4, 1973. 


*Monthly data not shown. 

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Table 58. Ninety 'percent of the combat deaths were enlisted men. (Table unclassified.) 


Rank 

Army 

Marines 

Navy 

Air Force 

Total 

Officers and Warrant 

Officers 

3324 

718 

226 

687 

4955 

Enlisted 

E6-9 

2480 

359 

128 

59 

3026 

E5 

4116 

598 

202 

97 

5013 

E4 

9252 

2030 

434 

103 

11819 

E3 

11040 

3841 

414 

52 

15347 

E2 

296 

5079 

21 

3 

5399 

El 

87 

311 

1 

0 

399 

TOTAL ENLISTED 

27271 

12218 

1200 

314 

41003 

TOTAL 

30595 

12936 

1426 

1001 

45958 

All U.S. Combat Deaths 

Source: Office of the 

through March 1973 

Assistant Secretary of 

Defense 

(Comptroller), 



Directorate for Information Operations, April 4, 1973. 


learning curve, which had to be repeated for each 
new arrival. It is conceivable that longer tours 
might have cut the toll. 

(U) Short tours oj command for battalion commanders 
may have also had the efifect of increasing U.S. 
combat deaths. In South Vietnam during 1965 and 
1966, U.S. Army maneuver battalions under 
experienced commanders suffered battle deaths in 
sizable fire fights at only two-thirds the rate of 
units under battalion commanders with less than 
six months’ experience in command.( 4 ) The short 
battalion commander tour apparently was not 


Table 59. Eighty-five percent died at 25 years oj 
age or younger. (Table unclassified.) 


Age at Death 

Army 

Marines 

Navy 

Air 

Force 

Total 

17-18 

1039 

1557 

13 

0 

2,609 

19 

3492 

3393 

113 

9 

7,007 

20 

8200 

3486 

269 

26 

11,981 

21 

5858 

1787 

262 

36 

7,943 

Subtotal 19-21 

17550 

8666 

644 

71 

26,931 

22-25 

7869 

1902 

436 

214 

10,421 

26-30 

2230 

433 

171 

285 

3,119 

31-35 

1067 

231 

86 

229 

1,613 

Over 35 

840 

147 

76 

202 

1.265 

Total 

30595 

12936 

1426 

1001 

45,958 


All U.S. Combat Deaths through March 1973. 

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 


Directorate for Information Operations, April 4, 1973. 


unique to the Vietnam War, because World War 
II records suggest that man}^ battalion com¬ 
manders served six months or less in that con¬ 
flict. ( 5 ) In Vietnam at least, the data and comments 
from some commanders suggest that the short tours 
generated additional U.S. casualties. 

(U) Table 62 shows that whites accounted for 87 
percent of the U.S. combat deaths. Blacks ac¬ 
counted for 12 percent; by comparison, the 
national population of males of military age in 
1973 was 13.5 percent black.( 6 ) About 14 percent 
of the enlisted deaths and 2 percent of the officers 
killed were blacks. The percentage of blacks in the 
U.S. Armed Forces at the end of 1972 were: 
enlisted, 13.5 percent; officers, 2.3 percent.( 7 ) Any 

Table 60. Sixty-five percent oj the dead had served 
for less than two years. (Table unclassified.) 


Length of Service 

Army 

Marines 

Navy 

Air 

Force 

Total 

Less than 1 year 

10232 

4728 

33 

2 

14995 

1 to 2 years 

9762 

4750 

306 

35 

14853 

More than 2 years 

7174 

3453 

1068 

765 

12460 

Unknown 

3427 

5 

19 

199 

3650 

TOTALS 

30595 

12936 

1421 

1001 

45958 


All U.S. Combat deaths through March 1973 

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 
Directorate for Information Operations, April 4, 1973. 


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'Fable 61. Twice as many troops died during the 
first half of their tours as in the second half. 
(Table unclassified.) 


Months in Country 

Army 

Marines 

Navy 

AIL 

Force 

Total 

First three months 

11502 

3692 

367 

237 X. 

15798 

Second three months 

7489 

2013 

225 

172 

9899 

Third three months 

5045 

1349 

113 

138 

6645 

Fourth three months 

1714 

569 

52 

70 

2405 

Over 12 months 

653 

176 

47 

15 

893 

Unknown-Not reported 

32 

3110 

422 

81 

3645 

TOTAL 

26435 

10909 

1226 

715 

39285 

U.S. Combat deaths January 1967 • 

- December 1972. 



Source: Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of 

Defense 

(Comptroller), 



Directorate for Information. 


Table 62. Blacks accounted for 12 percent of the 
combat deaths. (Table unclassified.) 


Race 

Army 

Marines 

Navy 

Air 

Force 

Total 

Caucasian 26280 

11209 

1375 

963 

39827 

Negro 

3994 

1600 

38 

30 

5662 

Other 

321 

127 

13 

8 

469 

Total 

30595 

12936 

1426 

1001 

45958 

All U.S. 

combat deaths 

through March 

1973. 



Source: 

Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of 

Defense 

(Comptroller), 


Directorate for Information Operations. 


Table 63. Draftees accounted for one-third of the 
U.S. combat deaths. (Table unclassified.) 


Category of Service 

Army 

Marines 

Navy 

Air 

Force 

Total 

Regular 

13037 

11507 

1261 

716 

26521 

Reserve 

2695 

816 

165 

281 

3957 

National Guard 

72 

0 

0 

4 

76 

Selective Service 

14791 

613 

0 

0 

15404 

(Draftees) 

Total 

30595 

12936 

1426 

1001 

45958 


All U.S. combat deaths through March 1973 

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 


Directorate for Information. 


Table 64. More than half of the U.S. combat deaths 
occurred in Military Region 1. (Table classified 
Confidential.) 


Military Region 

Deaths 

Percentage 

MR 1 

20,184 

537, 

MR 2 

5,099 

137, 

MR 3 

10,846 

287. 

MR 4 

1,990 

57. 

MR Unknown 

412 

17. 

TOTAL 

38,531 

1007. 

All U.S. Combat 

deaths January 1967-December 1972. 


Source: Office 

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller), 

Directorate for Information Operations. 



Table 65. Ten provinces accounted for 77 percent 
of the U.S. combat deaths. (Table classified 
Confidential.) 

Province 

U.S. Combat Deaths 


Percentage 

Quang Tri (MR 1) 

6352 


167. 

Quang Nam (MR 1) 

5725 


157. 

Thua Thien (MR 1) 

3382 


97. 

Subtotal 

15459 


407. 

Quang Ngai (MR 1) 

2444 


67. 

Tay Ninh (MR 3) 

2438 


67. 

Binh Duong (MR 3) 

2413 


67. 

Quang Tin (MR 1) 

2245 


67. 

Binh Dinh (MR 2) 

1734 


57. 

Kontum (MR 2) 

1526 


47. 

Hau Nghia (MR 3) 

1303 


47. 

Subtotal 

14103 


377. 

TOTAL - Ten -Provinces 

29562 


777. 

The 34 Other Provinces 

8969 


237. 

GRAND TOTAL 

38531 


1007. 


All U.S. combat deaths January 1967 - December 1972 

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 


Directorate for Information Operations. 

allegation that blacks bore an unfair burden in the 
Vietnam war , at least in terms of combat deaths , is 
not supported by the data. 

(U) Table 63 indicates that one-third of the U.S. 
killed in action were draftees, almost all (96 per¬ 
cent) serving in the Army. About half of the Army 
combat deaths were draftees, but only 5 percent 
of the Marine deaths were, although many were 
probably draft-induced. The regulars (many draft- 
induced) accounted for about 60 percent of all the 
combat deaths, and the reserves for only 9 percent. 
The National Guard accounted for only 76 U.S. 
combat deaths , well below 1 percent of the total. 


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Table 66 . Causes of U.S. combat deaths; all deaths through March 1073. (1able unclassified.) 


Aircraft Loss: 

Army 

Marines 

Navy 

USAF 

Total 

Fixed Wing 

84 

132 

172 

775 

1163 

Helicopter 

2424 

443 

72 

76 

3015 

Subtotal 

2508 

575 

244 

851 

4178 

Gunshot or Small 

Arms Fire 

12327 

5638 

398 

22 

18385 

Indirect Fire 

Artillery/Rocket 

2334 

2117 

319 

109 

4879 

Other Explosion ft 
Multiple Fragmentation 

4133 

3064 

259 

15 

7471 

Wounds 

7385 

1004 

75 

1 

8465 

Subtotal 

13852 

6185 

653 

125 

20815 

Other Causes 

1799 

517 

113 

3 

2432 

Unknown or Not Reported 

109 

21 

18 

0 

148 

Total 

30595 

12936 

1426 

1001 

45958 


a/ Grenades, Mines and Bombs 

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 


Directorate for Information Operations 


(U) The data furnish some clues about the 
description that would probably fit the majority 
of American combat deaths. The typical American 
killed in action was a white , regular , enlisted man 
serving in an Army or Marine Corps maneuver unit. 
He was 21 years old or younger. He had served in 
Vietnam for less than six months and was in the 
military service for less than two years. 

WHERE DID THEY DIE IN COMBAT? 

(C) Tables 64 and 65 show where the Americans 
died in combat. Table 64 indicates that more than 
halj (53 percent) were killed in Military Region 1 
and most of the rest died in Military Region 3. 
Three provinces (7 percent of the total) accounted 
for 40 percent of the U.S. combat deaths. They were 
Quang Tri, Quang Nam, and Thua Thien. All 
three, as one would suspect, are in Military 
Region 1. The other provinces in Military Region 1 
also had high U.S. casualty rates and appear 
among the ten highest provinces shown in 
Table 65. The ten provinces accounted for 77 percent 
oj the U.S. combat deaths. The remaining 34 
provinces accounted for the rest. The pattern 
suggests that U.S. forces were present in largest 
numbers and fought hardest in Military Region 1, 
in Kontum and Binh Dinh provinces of Military 
Region 2, and in Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, and Hau 


Nghia provinces of Military Region 3. In sum, 
U.S. combat deaths were concentrated in some of the 
areas introduced in Chapter II as trouble spots 
since at least 1946. 

WHAT KILLED THEM? 

(U) Table 66 shows that 9 percent of the U.S. 
combat dead were killed in aircraft losses, 40 
percent died of gunshot wounds, and 45 percent 
were killed by some form of indirect fire. More 
than two-thirds of the deaths from aircraft losses were 
Army and Marine Corps troops killed in helicopters. 
About 85 percent of the gunshot and indirect 
fire deaths were also suffered bv soldiers and 
marines. The causes of death were distributed 
about the same in the Arm}'' and Marine Corps, 
except for deaths in the air. The Army lost 8 
percent of its deaths in the air, compared to 4 
percent for the Marine Corps. The other main 
differences are in the reporting of deaths from 
indirect fire. The Army reported that about 25 
percent of its deaths were from multiple fragmen¬ 
tation wounds, while the Marines reported that 
the same percentage were killed by other ex¬ 
plosives. This was probably no more than a 
difference in reporting style. The Marine Corps 
also reported a higher percentage of deaths (16 
percent) from artillery or rocket fire than did the 


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1 able 67. Eighty-two percent oj the nonhostile U.S. deaths occurred in accidents. (Table unclassified.) 


ACCIDENTS 

Aircraft Losses: 

Army 

Marines 

Navy 

USAF 

Total 

Fixed Wing 

284 

47 

200 

284 

815 

Helicopter 

192b 

246 

60 

19 

2245 

Subtotal 

2204 

293 

260 

303 

3060 

Vehicle Loss/Crash 

836 

148 

37 

54 

1075 

Drowned Suffocated 

633 

168 

190 

24 

1015 

Burns 

Accidental Self- 

96 

31 

13 

7 

147 

Destruction 

632 

131 

5 

25 

793 

Accidental Homicide 

581 

312 

59 

21 

973 

Other Accidents 

867 

402 

97 

54 

1420 

Total Accidents 

5849 

1485 

661 

488 

8483 

ILLNESS 

Malaria-Hepatitis 

451 

98 

29 

41 

619 

Heart Attack-Stroke 

208 

28 

24 

50 

310 

Total Illnesses 

659 

126 

53 

91 

929 

INTENTIONAL HOMICIDE 

159 

22 

4 

5 

190 

SUICIDE 

353 

22 

4 

0 

379 

OTHER CAUSES 

96 

22 

154 

5 

277 

UNKNOWN OR NOT REPORTED 

31 

4 

10 

0 

45 

TOTAL 

7147 

1681 

882 

593 

10303 


Through March 1973. 

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 

Directorate for Information Operations, April 


Army (8 percent). This, too, may only be a 
difference in reporting, but it may also reflect the 
intensity of rocket attacks on the Marine Corps 
bases in Military Region 1. * 

U.S. COMBAT DEATHS: CONCLUSION 

(U) The analysis so far has addressed the U.S. 
combat deaths in terms of who died, where they 
died, and how they were killed. It shows that most 
of the Americans killed were young, white, enlisted 
men serving in Army and Marine Corps maneuver 
units. Most of them died in Military Region 1, in 
Kontum and Binh Dinh provinces of Military 
Region 2, and in Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, and 
Hau Nghia in Military Region 3. They died on the 
ground, of gunshot wounds or fragments from 
indirect fire. 

*The ambiguities of the data suggest that the analysts 
should be careful about drawing any conclusions from 
differences among the indirect fire categories. 


U.S. DEATHS FROM NONCOMBAT CAUSES 

(U) The analysis now turns to the U.S. deaths 
that resulted from accidents, illness, and other 
causes not directly related to combat. 

HOW DID THEY DIE? 

(U) Table 67 indicates that 82 percent of the 
10,300 U.S. deaths not resulting from hostile 
action occurred in accidents. Illness and other 
causes accounted for 9 percent each. The largest 
single cause of noncombat deaths was helicopter 
accidents , which accounted for 22 percent of the total. 
Aircraft accidents of all types accounted for 30 
percent of the deaths. (Only 9 percent of the 
combat deaths occurred in aircraft losses.) Such 
accidents accounted for half of the Air Force 
noncombat deaths, 30 percent of the Army and 
the Marine Corps deaths, and 17 percent of the 
Navy deaths. Other significant losses occurred 
from vehicle accidents, drownings, and accidental 
homicides and self-destruction. 


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Table 68 . United States combat and nonhostile 
deaths. (Table unclassified.) 


Deaths 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

Cumbat 

5008 

9378 

14592 

9414 

4221 

1380 

300 

Non-Hostile 

1045 

1680 

1919 

2113 

1844 

968 

261 

Total 

6053 

11058 

16511 

11527 

6065 

2348 

561 

Non-Hostile Deaths 

as 7» of Total 

17 

15 

12 

18 

30 

41 

47 

Deaths per 1000 

Troops a/ 

Combat 

18 

21 

28 

20 

11 

6 

5 

Non-Hostile 

3.8 

3.8 

3.7 

4.4 

4.9 

4.3 

4.7 


"Non-Hostile U.S. Deaths in RVN", Southeast Asia Analysis Report . 
Jan-Feb 1971, p. 30. Table 2, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary 
and CAS 23.7 (through Jan 1973), Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (Comptroller), Directorate for Information Operations, 
a/ Computed on a monthly basis using end of month strengths and 
averaging them for the year. 

WHO DIED? 

(U) The profile of the troops who died from 
noncombat causes is similar to those who died in 
combat, but the patterns are not as clear. Enlisted 
troops accounted for 83 percent of the noncombat 
deaths, compared to 89 percent of the combat 
deaths. Seventy-six percent of the noncombat 
dead were 25 years old or younger. The figure for 
combat deaths was 85 percent. Forty-two percent 
of the noncombat dead had been in the military 
service for less than two years, compared to 65 
percent for combat deaths. 

(U) The pattern of noncombat deaths as a function 
of length of service in Vietnam was much the same 
as for combat deaths. As time elapsed in a 12- 
month tour of duty, the chance of suffering a non¬ 
combat death declined. The first three months of 
the tour generated 31 percent of the noncombat 
deaths (compared to 40 percent of the combat 
deaths), and the percentage declined as the year 
progressed. In the final 3 months only 10 percent 
of the noncombat deaths occurred. 

(U) In terms of race, the combat and noncombat 
death patterns were about the same: 84 percent of 
the noncombat deaths were white, compared to 
87 percent of the combat deaths. About 15 percent 
of the noncombat deaths were among blacks, 
compared to 12 percent of the combat deaths. 

NONCOMBAT DEATHS: CONCLUSION 

(U) The troops killed in noncombat incidents 
represented much the same profile as those who 


died in combat, although the noncombat deaths 
were more evenly distributed throughout the 
forces. The most striking factor about the noncombat 
deaths was the large number resulting from heli¬ 
copter crashes: A total of 5,260 Americans died in 
helicopters during the Vietnam War, 43 percent as 
results of accidents. 

WHAT FACTORS INFLUENCED THE 
NUMBER OF U.S. DEATHS? 

(U) Two basic factors had to be present for U.S. 
deaths to occur. One was U.S. troops and the other 
was the action that killed them. This suggests 
that U.S. force levels could be an important in¬ 
fluence on the levels of combat deaths and non¬ 
combat deaths. Table 68 shows the relationship, 
expressed as deaths per 1,000 U.S. troops. It 
suggests that combat deaths are heavily influenced 
by something besides troop strengths, because the 
deaths per thousand troops did not remain con¬ 
stant, but followed the intensity of combat in 
South Vietnam until 1972, building to a peak in 
1968 and then declining every year thereafter. By 
1972 there were so few U.S. troops left in South 
Vietnam that the 1972 offensive had little effect 
on the U.S. death rates. So, the troop strength 
was an important factor in the number of U.S. 
combat deaths, but it cannot explain all of the 
fluctuations in those rates. The other factors are 
discussed below, after consideration of the non¬ 
combat deaths. 

WHAT FACTORS INFLUENCED U.S. 
NONCOMBAT DEATH RATES? 

(U) Noncombat deaths were directly related to 
U.S. troop strength. The relatively consistent 
behavior of the number of noncombat deaths per 
1,000 troops in the last seven years is a clear 
indication of this. The increase during 1969-72 
(Table 68) was most likely related to the following 
factors. Troops previously in combat were engaged 
more and more in noncombat-related duties (for 
example, maintaining equipment, training, con¬ 
struction). Accidents related to these activities 
would contribute to noncombat death rates and 
could be expected to rise slightly. With fewer 
combat operations, more free time was available 
to the troops, possibly resulting in more mishaps 
during off-duty hours. The lowering of morale, the 
drug and race problems in South Vietnam, and 


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easy access to alcoholic beverages (and greater 
opportunities to use them) could have contributed 
to a rise in noncombat deaths. The mix of U.S. 
forces changed as combat troops were withdrawn 
faster than support forces. Combat troops ac¬ 
counted for 28 percent of the total U.S^force in 
July 1969, when withdrawals started. Two years 
later, only 21 percent were combat troops. By 
then, U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam had 
been reduced by 65 percent, compared to a 54 
percent reduction of total U.S. forces. In sum, 
after mid-1969, a higher percentage of the U.S. 
forces were located in cities and in densely popu¬ 
lated U.S. bases. These are the places where 
deaths from noncombat causes are probably more 
likely to occur. 

(U) The stability of the noncombat death and 
troop strength relationship is supported by a 
detailed examination of the noncombat deaths per 
10,000 troops each month for the five years from 
1966 through 1970. The analysis showed that the 
ratio remained within a narrow range. At its 
widest extremes, it never went below 2.1 deaths 
per 10,000 troops per month or above 5.4.( 8 ) Thus, 
it seems safe to conclude that the level of non¬ 
combat U.S. deaths in South Vietnam was funda¬ 
mentally determined by the numbers and types of 
U.S. forces stationed there. 

WHAT FACTORS INFLUENCED U.S. 
COMBAT DEATH RATES? 

(U) As already seen, troop strength alone does not 
explain the fluctuations in U.S. combat death 
rates. An analvsis of U.S. combat deaths in South 
Vietnam from 1965 through 1970 suggested that 
two factors influenced the levels of U.S. combat 
deaths. The first was the yearly cycle of combat, 
which peaked during the spring and ebbed in early 
summer and fall. The second was the level and 
type of U.S. troop strength which, during periods 
of low activity, seemed to establish a floor or 
minimum level of U.S. combat deaths. 

(U) Using these two observations as a starting- 
point, the analysis attempted in December 1970 to 
estimate the probable number of U.S. combat 
deaths for each of the next six months (January 
through June 1971). ( 9 ) The forecast began with 
the previous year’s data averaged around a given 
month and then adjusted for current trends and 



Figure 12. United States combat deaths in South Vietnam. 

(Figure unclassified.) 


Table 69. The percentage reductions oj the United 
States KIA and U.S. maneuver battalions moved 
together. (Table unclassified.) 



KI* S/ 

1970 

1971 

1972 

% Reduction of U.S. 

-557. 

-677. 

-787. 

7. Reduction of U.S. 
Battalions a/ 

Maneuver 

-437. 

-707. 

-1007. 

a/ Reduction from 

the previous year. 





magnitudes. The results of this exercise are por¬ 
trayed in Fig. 12, which shows actual combat 
deaths (dash line) and estimated combat deaths 
(solid line) over a four-year period. Although the 
technique appeared to work well for the past, the 
uncertainty of the forecast was still great. The 
chances were estimated as one in three that the 
actual number of combat deaths in any given 
month would be outside the range predicted. 

(U) As it turned out, the forecast of combat 
deaths was remarkably accurate on two counts 
and less satisfactory on a third. The prediction 
called for an average of 42 U.S. combat deaths 
per week( 9 ) for the six-month period and the actual 
figure was 43. In addition, the forecast traced the 
month-to-month patterns fairly well. The three 
months predicted to be highest were highest and 
the three predicted to be lowest were lowest. On 
the third count, however, the average monthly 
error was 22 percent. Thus, the forecast picked 
the average level of combat deaths correctly and 


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predicted which months would be high and which 
would be low, but did less well on estimating each 
monthly figure. 

(U) Encouraged by the results, the analysts 
attempted to predict U.S. combat deaths for the 
next six months (June through December 1971). 
This time an average of 20 combat deaths per 
week was estimated for the period. The actual 
figure, happily, was 11. Only one month fell within 
the predicted range. ( 10 ) 

(U) What went wrong? The answer lies in the 
tempo of Communist activity and in the rede¬ 
ployment of U.S. maneuver battalions from South 
Vietnam during the period. 

(U) Part of the answer is that the VC/NVA 
attack rate, a good sign of their willingness to 
fight and which correlated well with U.S. combat 
deaths, dropped 50 percent in the second half of 
1971, the period of the second forecast. [For a 
discussion of the relationship between the VC/ 
NVA attack rate and U.S. combat deaths, see 
Chapter IX. ( n )] In the previous year, 1970, 
attacks had dropped only 30 percent in the second 
half. The same had been true in 1969. So the 
attacks, and therefore the VC/NVA willingness or 
ability to increase the tempo of combat, were 
overestimated. 

(U) The second factor not taken fully into account 
was the effect of withdrawing U.S. maneuver 
battalions. Recall that U.S. Army and Marine 


Corps maneuver battalions accounted for about 
70 percent of all U.S. combat deaths in the Viet¬ 
nam War. If a large portion of the U.S. maneuver 
battalions in South Vietnam were withdrawn, it 
would be reasonable to expect a proportional 
decrease in U.S. combat deaths. The forecast was 
based on a planned withdrawal of 71,000 U.S. 
troops during the six-month period, a decline of 
28 percent. The actual reduction was 34 percent. 
More important, U.S. maneuver battalions were 
reduced from 33 at the beginning of the period to 
16 at the end of it, a reduction of 52 percent, the 
largest percentage reduction up to that time. 
Symbolic of the change, on July 1 , 1971, the start 
of the forecast period, MACV announced the 
“biggest single cutback of American troops in 
Vietnam” up to that time, 40 Army units with an 
authorized strength of 6,095 men being pulled out 
of combat that month. The strong role of the 
maneuver battalions in setting U.S. combat death 
rates is suggested by Table 69. It shows that the 
percentage reductions of U.S. combat deaths and 
of U.S. maneuver battalions for 1970 through 1972 
are quite similar. 

(U) It seems reasonably clear that the low VC/ 
NVA combat levels, the high percentage of maneu¬ 
ver battalions withdrawn, and the small number 
of maneuver battalions left in the country (which 
signified the end of the U.S. offensive role in 
ground combat) together reduced the U.S. com¬ 
bat death rates below the estimate. 


860 JDRB 


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Chapter XII 

How Many Civilian Casualties? 


(U) “Statistics are not available which would 
permit an estimate to be made of civilian casualties 
in Vietnam caused by U.S./ARVN/FWMAF/VC/ 
NVA in the course of military operations,” 
according to the State Department early in 
1970. ( 12 ) What the Department should have 
said is that no official U.S. estimate of civilian 
casualties exists for the Vietnam War, because 
statistics are available which permit estimates of 
the toll. Indeed, an estimate is developed here and 
compared with another one made by the Kennedy 
Subcommittee on Refugees. But it is important to 
remember that both estimates, as well as any 
others, are unofficial guesses. 

THE FRAGMENTARY DATA 

(U) Civilian casualties are found in two types of 
data: in records of civilian war casualties ad¬ 
mitted to U.S. military or GVN hospitals and 
in computer records of combat actions. The com¬ 
bat actions data are incomplete and obviously 
fragmentary, because none of the civilian cas¬ 
ualties resulting from U.S. or third-nation combat 
actions are recorded. So the focus here is on the 
hospital admissions data, which appear to be more 
nearly complete and are the best statistics to use 
as the point of departure for an estimate of 
civilian casualties. The data are shown in Table 70. 

(U) The table suggests that the average monthly 
rate of civilian war casualties admitted to hospitals 
ranged from about 3,000 per month in 1971 to 
about 7,000 per month in 1968. But actual civilian 
casualties surely were much higher. The most 


obvious omissions from the hospital data were the 
civilian casualties who were never admitted to a 
GVN or U.S. hospital. This included civilians 
killed outright, those treated as outpatients at a 
hospital or in the field, and those treated by 
doctors or hospitals outside of the reporting sys¬ 
tem. The count of hospitals includes only the GVN 
and U.S. hospitals, although these were the vast 
majority. It does not include the two or three 
hospitals run by private charitable groups, such as 
the Catholics and American Friends. ( 13 ) Civilian 
war casualties treated at such hospitals were not 
included in the table. Chinese doctors practicing 
traditional Chinese medicine may have treated 
some casualties, and the VC/NVA may have 
treated still others. Also, the reporting of hospital 
admissions was not precise. Senate investigators 
in 1968 claimed that 10 percent of the GVN 
hospitals were not reporting at all. ( 14 ) On the basis 
of spot checks in those that did report, they 
claimed that the figures were 10 to 50 percent 
below the number of civilian casualties actually 
present in the hospitals.( 13 ) Finally, no data from 
1972 are shown in the table, because the intense 
combat in that year, with its high patient loads, 
washed out the remaining reliability of the 
statistics. 

(U) Despite all these problems, the hospital 
admissions data are the best point of departure for 
estimating civilian casualties.( lo ) Moreover, the 
availability of hospital treatment and its quality 
rose sharply in 1966-70 because ol major U.S. 
efforts to improve them. 


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JDltB 861 


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Table 70. Hospital admissions summary. From 
the statement of R. H. Nooter before the Senate 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees , May 8, 
1972, page 1+0. (Table unclassified.) 


Civilian War Casualties 


CY 

Total 

GVN 

Hospitals 

U.S. 

Military 

Hospitals 

Total Hospital 
Admissions 
From All Causes 

1967 

48,734 

46,783 

1,951 

473,140 

1968 

84,492 

76,702 

7,790 

456,972 

1969 

67,767 

59,223 

8,544 

525,772 

1970 

50,882 

46,247 

4,635 

574,814 

1971 

39,395 

38,318 

1,077 

597,423 


(U) Table 71 shows that the hospital admissions 
data for civilian war casualties fluctuated with the 
intensity of the war, as measured by Allied combat 
deaths. Furthermore, the relationship was strong, 
as shown by the narrow range of the ratios shown 
in the table, although civilian hospital admissions 
fell faster than military combat deaths in 1970 and 
1971. Movement of the war out of densely popu¬ 
lated areas in those years, as indicated by the 
population control figures in Chapter XIII and by 
the air sortie data shown later in this chapter, 
could account for the downturn. 

(U) Another type of downturn is suggested upon 
returning to Table 70. Civilian war casualties as a 
percentage of total hospital admissions dropped 
from 18 percent in 1968 to 6 percent in 1970. Total 
admissions went up every year as medical care and 
facilities increased. This undoubtedly influenced 
the percentages shown, but it is not enough to 
account for the entire change. The increase in 
medical care may even have led to better reporting 
of civilian war casualties after 1968; but in the 
absence of solid evidence, this must remain an 
assumption. At any rate, the trend of civilian 
casualties, as measured by the hospital admissions 
data from 1968 through 1971, was clearly down, 
until 1972. 

TWO ESTIMATES OF CIVILIAN CASUAL¬ 
TIES 

(U) Two estimates of total civilian casualties in 
South Vietnam for 1965 through 1972 are discussed 
here. The first is constructed, step by step, while 
the second is an estimate made by Senator 


Table 71. Hospital admissions of civilian war 
casualties move with military combat deaths , but 
fell faster in 1970 and 1971. (Table unclassified.) 



1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

Total RVNAF/U.S./ 

Third Nation Combat 
Deaths (000) £/ 

23 

44 

32 

28 

25 

Hospital Admissions 
of Civilian War . , 
Casualties (000)— 

49 

85 

68 

51 

39 

Ratio 

2.1 

1.9 

2.1 

1.8 

1.6 


a/ Source: Chapter X. 

b/ Source: Table 70, preceding. 


Kennedy’s U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees 
and Escapees. 

FIRST ESTIMATE 

(U) The first estimate addresses three kinds of 
civilian war casualties: those admitted to hospitals, 
wounded who didn’t need hospital care or couldn’t 
get it, and deaths. 

(U) From the ratios between military combat 
deaths and hospital admissions shown in Table 71, 
it is possible to develop an estimate of hospital 
admissions of civilian war casualties for the missing 
years—1965, 1966, and 1972. There were 1.9 war- 
casualty admissions, on the average, for each 
Allied combat death from 1967 through 1971. 
Applying this factor to the killed-in-action figures 
for 1965, 1966, and 1972* yields a total of 135,000 
assumed hospital admissions of civilian war casual¬ 
ties for those three years. Adding this to the 
Table 71 figures yields a grand total of 427,000 
hospital admissions for the period from 1965 
through 1972. But the Senate investigators claim 
that the reported figures are too low, on the basis 
of some spot checks at provincial hospitals and 
the fact that some hospitals and doctors are out¬ 
side the reporting system. To compensate, the 
427,000 is increased by 20 percent, which yields a 
new total of 512,000, and that figure rounds off 
to 515,000. 

(U) In December 1967 the former Assistant 
Director of USAID’s Public Health Division in 
Saigon estimated that hospital admissions prob¬ 
ably represented about 50 percent of all wounded 
Vietnamese civilians.( 16 ) He further suggested that 

*See Chapter X for the kia figures. 


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Table 72. Shelling and bombing as causes of civilian 
casualties dropped from percent to 22 percent 
of the total. (Table unclassified.) 



Mine & 
Mortar 

Gun/ 

Grenade 

Shelling & 
Bombing 

Total 

1967 

15,253 

9,785 

18,811 " X 

. 43,849 

1968 

31,244 

15,107 

28,052 

74,403 

1969 

24,648 

11,814 

16,183 

52,645 

1970 

22,049 

7,650 

8,607 

38,306 


Source: W. E. Colby, Statement to the Senate Subcommittee on 
Refugees and Escapees, April 21, 1972, p.41 and Annex K. 


the additional 50 percent consisted of 30 percent 
who suffered minor wounds not requiring hospital 
treatment and 20 percent who were killed outright 
or died before reaching a hospital.( 16 ) Applying 
these “rules of thumb” to the raw hospital- 
admissions estimate would yield a total of 854,000 
casualties for the period from 1965 through 1972, 
comprising 427,000 hospital admissions, 256,000 
minor wounded, and 171,000 deaths. Adding the 
20 percent factor would take the total to 1,025,000, 
which would include 205,000 deaths. 

(U) The military casualty data lend some credence 
to the AID official’s factors. His estimate of civilian 
war deaths works out to one death per 2.5 seriously 
wounded (hospital admissions), compared to one 
RVNAF death per 2.65 seriously wounded* for 
the period from 1965 through 1972. His notion that 
one additional casualty exists for each one ad¬ 
mitted to a hospital gets some support from the 
U.S. wounded-in-action figures for the period from 
1965 through 1972.f Those numbers indicate one 
minor injury (not hospitalized) in addition to 
each serious wound (hospitalized). But in the U.S. 
case, the killed must be added to the entire total ; 
they do not come out of the minor-wounded 
category. 

(U) Application of the RVNAF factor of 2.65 
seriously wounded for each combat death, plus the 
U.S. pattern of doubling the wounded number and 
then adding the kia, plus adding 20 percent to the 
hospital admissions figure, yields a 1965-72 war 
casualty total of 1,225,000, which would include 

*RVNAF wounded figures include only those hospitalized. 
The U.S. ratio of killed to hospitalized wounded for 1965 
through 1972 is one killed for 3.5 wounded. 

fSee Chapter XI. 


515,000 hospitalized, 515,000 more not hospital¬ 
ized, and 195,000 killed. 

(U) There is some evidence to suggest that most of 
the civilians wounded, but not hospitalized, 
probably suffered from minor wounds not requir¬ 
ing a trip to the hospital. For example, U.S. 
military medical officers and technicians, as part 
of civic action programs in the countryside, 
administered more than 2.2 million outpatient 
treatments to the civilian population in 1969 
alone, including 16,000 treatments of civilian war 
casualties. ( 17 ) t This suggests that widespread 
medical treatment was being made available to 
the rural areas. Moreover, in the 25 months from 
January 1969 through February 1971, a total of 
102,406 Vietnamese civilians (not restricted to war 
casualties) were transported by U.S. medical air¬ 
craft, some 98,100 by helicopter. ( 18 ) This all sug¬ 
gests that, especially where Allied troops were 
operating and where U.S. district advisory teams 
were functioning, civilian casualties had a reason¬ 
able chance of receiving medical care and evacua¬ 
tion to hospitals if required. If this is so, it indicates 
that the civilian casualties can be stated as 195,000 
killed, 515,000 seriously wounded, and 515,000 not 
seriously wounded. This suggests a toll in serious 
casualties that was closer to 700,000 than to 1,225,000. 

SECOND ESTIMATE 

(U) The U.S. Senate Subcommittee to Investigate 
Problems Connected With Refugees and Escapees 
estimated that civilian war casualties in South 
Vietnam were higher: 415,000 killed and 935,000 
wounded, for a total of 1,350,000 civilian 
casualties. ( 19 ) 

COMPARISON 

(U) The totals of the two estimates are not very 
far apart. The principal difference lies in the toll of 
civilians killed; 195,000 as opposed to 415,000. 
This is a significant difference, and there is no way 
to resolve it. The higher estimate assumes that the 
civilian casualty pattern is markedly different 
from the military pattern, in terms of the ratio of 
killed to wounded. The lower estimate assumes 
that the patterns are similar. It also makes a dis- 

|For an account of U.S. Army medical aid to civilians see 
Ref. 18. Some of the war casualties may have been admit¬ 
ted to GVN or U.S. hospitals and also picked up in those 
figures. 


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JI)RB 863 










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Table 73. Were any friendly artillery or air strikes directed in or near the inhabited area of this village this 

month? (Table unclassified.) 



(Percentage of Population) 




Dec. 69 

Dec. 70 

Dec. 71 

Dec. 72 


7o 

% 

7» 

7o 

No 

69.8 

83.5 

89.0 

82.7 

Yes: 

Once 

3.1 

4.7 

2.7 

4.8 

Sporadically 

16.2 

9.4 

5.8 

8.2 

Repeatedly 

7.8 

2.2 

2.3 

3.7 

Sub-Total 

27.1 

16.3 

10.8 

16.7 

Source: Hamlet 

Evaluation 

System computer printout of 

question 




VMC-2 for months shown. 


tinction between serious wounds and minor 
wounds. 

(U) The high estimate suggests that civilian 
casualties averaged about 165,000 per year. The 
low estimate suggests a maximum of 150,000 per 
year, with about 85,000 being seriously wounded 
or killed. In either case, the casualties amounted 
to less than 1 percent of the population each year, 
with the low estimate’s seriously wounded and 
killed hovering at about 0.5 percent. This is not 
to belittle the losses, which were tragic, but to 
place them in some perspective and to indicate 

Table 74. Air strikes moved away f rom the popula¬ 
tion. (Table classified Confidential.) 


POPULATION (Thousands-000 ) 


Jan. 1969^ 
00 


Jan. 1971 
00 


b/ 


Jan. 1972^ 
00 


Within 1 km of air strikes 

700 

150 

100 

From 1-2 km 

1,240 

330 

230 

From 2-3 km 

1,330 

420 

310 

Outside 3 km 

10,900 

15,100 

17,910 

No UTM's reported 

2,600 a/ 

1,900 a/ 

250 

RVN Total 

16,770 

17,900 

18,800 

Cumulative Percent of Population 
with Reported UTM Locations 

Within 1 km of air strikes 

5.0 

0.9 

0.5 

Within 2 km 

13.7 

3.0 

1.8 

Within 3 km 

23.0 

5.6 

3.5 


a/ Includes Saigon's 1.7 million population. 

b/ Source: "Air Strikes Near RVN Population", Southeast Asia Analysis 
Report , March - April 1971, p. 29. 

c/ Source: "Air Strikes Near RVN Population", unpublished paper by 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), 
October 17, 1972, p. 3. 


that they (plus the military losses) were not 
large enough to keep the population from growing 
by 3 percent or so each year during the period 
1965-72. 

CAUSES 

(U) Much of the discussion in the United States 
about civilian casualties seemed to imply that 
the U.S. forces and their firepower were responsible 
for most, if not all, of them. This, of course, is 
nonsense: The Communists systematically at¬ 
tacked civilians. The RVNAF troops reported 
some civilian casualties from their operations, and 
the Koreans allegedly inflicted high civilian 
casualties in their areas of operation. However, 
the U.S., while not reporting them in the combat 
records, inevitably must have caused quite a 
few, given the kind of war that was fought in 
Vietnam. 

(U) But as the Allied forces succeeded in pushing 
the war out of the populated areas, evidence 
emerges that the VC/NVA became increasingly 
responsible for the civilian casualties. The hospital- 
admissions data furnish the clues. The GVN 
Ministry of Health required that reports be 
submitted by ministry hospitals on the causes of 
wounds. No absolute conclusion can be drawn from 
these, but they can be crudely grouped as in¬ 
flicted by the VC/NVA (mines, mortars), either 
side (guns, grenades), or the Allies (bombing, 
artillery). Table 72 suggests a clear increase in the 


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Table 75. The more secure the hamlet , the less 
chance oj an air strike near it (population in 
millions). (Table classified Confidential.) 


POPULATION WITHIN 3 
KILOMETERS OF AIR STRIKES 

Jan. 1969 

Jan. 1971 

Jan. 1972 

A-B Hamlets 

Pop. Near Air 

Strikes 

.9 

(177.) 

.5 (47.) 

.3 

(27.) 

Pop. Not Near 


4.5 


10.9 

15.2 


C Hamlets 

Pop. Near Air 

Strikes 

1.0 

(197.) 

.3 (97.) 

.2 

(87.) 

Pop. Not Near 


4.3 


3.4 

2.2 


D-E-VC Hamlets 

Pop. Near Air 

Strikes 

1.4 

(417.) 

.1 (117.) 

.1 

(177.) 

Pop. Not Near 


2.0 


.8 

.5 


All Hamlets 

Pop. Near Air 

Strikes 

3.3 

(237.) 

.9 (67.) 

.6 

(37.) 

Pop. Not Near 


10.8 


15.1 

17.9 



Source: "Air Strikes Near RVN Population", Southeast Asia Analysis Report . 


March-April 1971, p. 30. 

percentage of VC/NVA-inflicted wounds, a mod¬ 
erate drop in those inflicted by either side, and a 
50 percent drop in those caused by the Allies. 

(U) The downward trend for shelling and bomb¬ 
ing in Table 71 is supported by data from the 
Hamlet Evaluation System and from analysis of 
air strikes near populated areas. The Hamlet 
Evaluation System asked, “Were any friendly 
artillery or air strikes directed in or near the in¬ 
habited areas of this village* this month?” 
Negative answers increased noticeably from De¬ 
cember 1969 through December 1971, as shown in 
Table 73. The increased intensity of combat in 
1972 shows up as fewer negative replies in 1972. 

AIR STRIKES NEAR THE CIVILIAN POPULATION 

(U) A much clearer picture of the downward trend 
in Allies-caused civilian casualties emerges from an 
analysis of air strikes in relation to hamlet loca¬ 
tions. It yields a much more precise result, one 
that shows a sharp decline in air strikes near 
populated areas between January 1969 and 
January 1972. 

(U) The distance of air strikes from hamlets is one 
measure of how close the main-force war was to 
the population. As pacification proceeded, and as 
Allied forces gained superiority over the VC/NVA 
main forces, the distance ought to have increased. 
As a result, the likelihood of civilian casualties and 
disruption of civilian life should decrease. To 

*A village in Vietnam is an area similar to a township in 
the United States; the sum of all of the villages adds up 
to the entire area of South Vietnam. 

CONFIDENTIAL 



Figure 13. South Vietnam air strike locations, January 
1969. (Figure classified Confidential.) 

measure the distance of tactical air sorties from 
population centers in South Vietnam, the following 
data were used: 

• Air strike locations. Computerized pilot reports 
from the JCS-J3 CO ACT (1969) and 7 th Air 
Force OPREP 4/SEADAB (1971 and 1972) 
systems. One set of utm coordinates is avail¬ 
able for each fighter attack mission (consisting 
of an average of two sorties) that dropped 
ordnance. Similar data on B-52 bombers and 
helicopter gunships are not available. 

• Population locations. MACV/CORDS Hamlet 
Evaluation System (HES) data, contained in 

JDRB 865 


5P8- 672 0 - 75 -8 























CONFIDENTIAL 



Figure 14. South Vietnam air strike locations, January- 
1971. (Figure classified Confidential.) 

computer tapes sent to Washington (see 
Chapter XII). United States district advisors 
provided coordinates for the centers of all 
12,000 reported hamlets in South Vietnam, 
containing about 16 million people. Saigon’s 2 
million people are excluded from the analysis 
for 1969 and 1971, because air strikes rarely 
occurred there, and detailed coordinates were 
not reported for all precincts until 1972. 

(U) Clearances for air strikes in populated areas 
were required in advance from either the province 
chief or Vietnamese military commanders respon¬ 
sible for the area. The friendly civilian population 
was supposed to have advance warning that their 

866 JDRB 


area was in a target zone. The HES was not 
sensitive enough to reflect temporary population 
movements, so the exact numbers of people 
actually present in their hamlets on the days and 
hours of the reported air strikes is not known. 
Therefore, all inhabitants are assumed to be 
present. Three sample months were selected for 
the analysis, that is, January in each of 1969, 1971, 
and 1972. Thus, since they spanned a three-year 
period, they should reveal any meaningful trends. 

(C) Air strikes affected less of the population in 
1972 than in 1969 or 1971 .( 20 ) Table 74 shows 
that in January 1969, twenty-three percent of the 
population had one or more air strikes within 3 km 
(2 miles) of their hamlet; in January 1972, the 
figure dropped to less than 4 percent. A better 
measure, the 'population directly affected by the air 
strikes—that is, within 1 km ( 0.6 mile)—fell from 5 
percent in 1969 to 0.5 percent in 1972. Thus, the 
air-strike data support the trends shown in the 
hospital-admissions data, which are used as the 
basis foi judging the proportion of civilian casual¬ 
ties that can be attributed to each side. 

(C) There are at least two reasons for the improve¬ 
ment. First, military operations and pacification 
separated the main-force war from the population, 
so the distance of sorties from hamlets increased. 
In 1969, thirty-two percent of all attack missions 
were flown within 3 km of hamlets; by 1971, the 
figure was down to 16 percent. ( 21 ) Second, the 
number of tactical air strikes flown in South 
Vietnam declined in each month shown, from 
17,500 in January 1969 to 3,620 in January 
1972. ( 22 ) 

(C) Movement of the war away from the 
population was the more important of the two 
reasons. As noted earlier, 23 percent of the popula¬ 
tion of South Vietnam lived within 3 km of air 
strikes during January 1969, when 17,500 attack 
sorties were flown. In April 1972, the same level of 
air activity (17,200 attack sorties) affected only 14 
percent of the population. ( 23 ) Table 75 provides 
further support for the pacification explanation 
by showing that the more secure the hamlet was, 
the less was the chance of an air strike near it. 
Moreover, for the “secure” (A-B) and “relatively 
secure” (C) hamlets, chances of an air strike 
nearby declined as time passed. Add to this the 
increase in secure population during the period, 

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and it is clear that the main reason for fewer air 
strikes near hamlets was the movement of the war 
away from populated areas, not the reduction in air 
sorties. And this probably contributed to the 
decline in civilian casualties reflected An the 
hospital-admissions figures. 

(C) Map plots of the data help to show the im¬ 
proved nature of the air war. Air mission locations 
are plotted as small black squares on a map 
showing the population locations as gray areas. 
In 1969 there were many areas of dense sortie 


concentrations (Fig. 13), two (Quang Nam 
province in Military Region 1 and the U.S. 9th 
Division area in Military Region 4) seeming to be 
located very close to population centers. ( 24 ) These 
two areas Were strongly contested in 1969, with 
large main-force units in combat. In January 1971 
there were very few dense concentrations, except 
for a few in the very sparsely populated A Sliau 
Valley (Military Region 1), Cambodian border 
(Military Region 3), and U Minh Forest (Military 
Region 4) areas; see Fig. 14.( 24 ) 


REFERENCES FOR PART THREE 


1. “Estimates of VC/NVA Combat Deaths/’ 
SEA Analysis Rpt., November 1967, quoting 
an MACV stud}q p. 2. 

2. “VC/NVA Personnel Losses: A New Estimate 
From Captured Documents/’ SEA Analysis 
Rpt., October 1968, p. 16. 

3. “Army and Marine KIA,” SEA Analysis Rpt., 
November 1968, pp. 20-21. 

4. “Experience in Command and Battle Deaths,” 
SEA Analysis Rpt., January 1968, pp. 24-30. 

5. “Computer vs. Battalion CO,” Army Times, 
Dec. 4, 1968, p. 71. 

6. “Volunteer Army—Is It Working?” U.S. 
News and World Report, Aug. 6, 1973. 

7. “U.S. Military Personnel on Active Duty by 
Service, Pay Grade, and Race,” as of Dec. 31, 
1974, Off. of the Asst. Sec. of Defense (Comp¬ 
troller), Directorate for Information Opera¬ 
tions, April 24, 1973, table 306. 

8. “Nonhostile U.S. Deaths in RVN,” SEA 
Analysis Rpt., Jan.-Feb. 1971, pp. 30-31. 

9. “U.S. Death Rates in RVN: A Forecast,” 
SEA Analysis Rpt., Nov.-Dee. 1970, p. 47. 

10. “U.S. Death Rate in RVN,” SEA Analysis 
Rpt., May 1971, p. 3, as updated for this 
analysis. 

11. Southeast Asia Statistical Summary, Off. of the 
Asst. Sec. of Defense (Comptroller), Direc¬ 
torate of Information Operations, May 9, 
1973, table 100, p. 1. 


12. “Vietnam: Policy and Prospects, 1970,” hear¬ 
ings before the Committee on Foreign Rela¬ 
tions on Civil Operations and Rural Develop¬ 
ment Support Program, Ninety-First Congress, 
Second Session, U.S. Senate, February and 
March 1970, p. 40. 

13. “Civilian Casualty and Refugee Problems in 
South Vietnam,” Findings and Recommenda¬ 
tions of the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems 
Connected With Refugees and Escapees, of the 
Committee on the Judiciary , U.S. Senate, 
May 9, 1968, p. 17. 

14. Ibid., p. 16. 

15. “Statement of Robert H. Nooter, Deputy 
Coordinator, Bureau of Supporting Assistance, 
AID,” before the Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Refugees, U.S. Senate, May 8, 1972, p. 32. 

16. “General Accounting Office, Supplemental 
Inquiry Concerning the Civilian Health and 
War-Related Casualty Program in Vietnam 
(B 133001),” see p. 40 of the Senate Subcom¬ 
mittee report cited in Ref. 13, above. 

17. Statement of Ambassador W. E. Colby, 
Deputy to the Commander, U.S. Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUS 
MACV), for Civil Operations and Rural 
Development Support, April 21, 1971, p. 37 
and Annex I. 

18. Vietnam Studies: Medical Support of the U.S. 
Army in Vietnam, 1965-70, Department of the 
Army, Washington, D.C., 1973. 


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JDRB 867 


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19. “Vietnam War Casualties/’ New York Times, 
Jan. 24, 1973. 

20. “Pentagon Defends Air War/’ Washington 
Star, April 25, 1971, p. 4. 

21. “Air Strikes Near RVN Population,” SEA 
Analysis Bpt., March-April 1971, p. 28. 

22. Southeast Asia Statistical Summary, Off. of the 
Asst. Sec. of Defense (Comptroller), table 2, 


pp. 1 and 4, April 11, 1973 and July 26, 1972, 
respectively. 

23. “Air Strikes Near RVN Population,” unpub¬ 
lished paper by the Off. of the Asst. Sec. of 
Defense (Systems Analysis), Oct. 17, 1972, 

p. 2. 

24. “Air Strikes,” SEA Analysis Bpt., March- 
April 1971, pp. 32-34. 





868 JDRB 


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UNCLASSIFIED 



PART FOUR 

THE PACIFICATION DIMENSION 


UNCLASSIFIED 




















CONFIDENTIAL 



Chapter XIII 

Trying to Measure Population Security 


/ 

(U) The most important objective of both sides in 
a war without fronts is control of the population, 
not the destruction of the enemy’s armed fortes. 
Influence (or control) over the population, and 
support from it, is what such a war is about, and 
Mao Tse Tung, Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, 
and others understood this principle very well. 
So did the British in Malaya and Magsaysay in 
the Philippines. The Americans (and French) gave 
it lip service in Vietnam, but the bulk of the effort 
was never directed to this objective. In the U.S. 
case, the attrition strategy dominated, as shown 
by the pattern of resource allocation described in 
Chapter III. Nonetheless, the pacification pro¬ 
gram, especially after 1967, when resources began 
to flow into it, made significant strides in gaining 
population support for the Government of 
Vietnam. 

(U) Security for the South Vietnamese population 
from Viet Cong and North Vietnamese harassment 
and exploitation always had to be an essential 
part of pacification in South Vietnam and a key 
objective of the U.S./GVN war effort, although it 
was given much less emphasis than attrition was. 
Security of the populace is used here as a key 
criterion for evaluating the progress of pacification, 
although the pacification effort, despite its rela¬ 
tively meager resources, encompassed much more. 
Efforts to measure the level of security began at 
least as early as 1963, well before the commitment 
of U.S. ground combat forces in mid-1965, and it 
continued throughout the war amidst publicity 
and controversy. This chapter describes the devel¬ 


opment and evolution of the systems designed to 
measure security of the populace, presents the 
trends they showed, and discusses their validity. 

THE MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS 

(U) Vietnamese attempts to measure the security 
of the population began at least as early as 1963, 
and it featured a wide variety of systematic reports 
about the situation in the countryside. (*) * However, 
the reporting was oversimplified and of poor 
quality, and it exaggerated the amount of securit}^ 
that actually existed in the countryside. For 
example, after the death of President Ngo Dinh 
Diem in November 1963, the number of “secure” 
hamlets in Long An Province was revised down¬ 
ward from over 200 to about 10. The discussion 
begins with the joint GVN-U.S. reporting system 
that was adopted in May 1964 and that continued 
in use until June 1967, when the U.S. Hamlet 
Evaluation System became the single, official 
system. 

(U) The GVN/U.S. systemf attempted to portray 
military security, with little emphasis on admin¬ 
istrative control and economic development. 
Reports on each hamlet in the GVN pacification 
plan were developed by the U.S. district advisor 
and the Vietnamese district chief and sent sepa- 
ratety to their respective headquarters at the 
province level and in Saigon. The U.S. advisor was 

* References for Part Four begin on page 939. 
fA detailed description of the GYN-U.S. system and its 
shortcomings appears in Ref. 2. 


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supposed to make an independent assessment, but 
this was often impossible, because he seldom knew 
the history of his district very well and he had to 
rely on Vietnamese interpreters to obtain infor¬ 
mation in the hamlets. Thus, the system is best 
described as a joint GVN/U.S. one. 

(U) There is probably an optimistic bias in the 
1964-67 statistics, because the reporting tended to 
concentrate on changes resulting from ongoing 
work. As a result, backsliding in areas previously 
“pacified’’ probably didn’t show up as well as 
progress in active areas. The data support the 
notion of an optimistic bias. 

(U) A major new departure occurred in January 
1967, when U.S. advisors began reporting their 
evaluations of hamlet status through the Hamlet 
Evaluation System (HES). Shortcomings in the 
previous GVN/U.S. reporting of population and 
hamlet control in South Vietnam led the Secretary 
of Defense (in October 1966) to request a better 
system for measuring pacification progress, and 
HES was the result. The HES was designed to 
yield comprehensive, quantifiable data on the 
security and development of every hamlet in 
South Vietnam under some degree of GVN con¬ 
trol and to identify hamlets that were under VC/ 
NVA control. Data collation at the Saigon level 
was completely automated for computer process¬ 
ing, and duplicates of the MACV computer tapes 
were sent to Washington. 

(U) The basic evaluation of each hamlet’s status 
came from the lowest possible level of the U.S. 
advisory chain—the district advisors who filled 
out the work sheets. Each hamlet was evaluated 
on six factors, with three indicators in each factor, 
and each indicator graded from A (=best) to E 
(=bad), for a total of 18 grades per hamlet. 
Three of the factors related to the security status 
of the hamlet: VC/NVA military activities, Viet 
Cong political and subversive activities, and Allied 
capabilities. The other three measured develop¬ 
ment status: administrative and political activi¬ 
ties, economic development, and health, education, 
and welfare. The letter grade assigned to each 
factor depended on the numerical scores given to 
each indicator, and the average of the six factor 
grades determined the single composite grade for 
the hamlet. The reporter also stated the level of 
confidence he placed on his evaluation. In addi¬ 


tion, information regarding problem areas in each 
hamlet was reported, and this was also sent to 
Washington. 

(U) The system was a U.S. reporting system, 
although American advisors had to work closely 
with their Vietnamese counterparts in imple¬ 
menting parts of it. This turned out to be a 
critically important difference from the old GVN/ 
U.S. system, because it gave the U.S. advisor 
complete control of the final scores and enabled 
him to make an independent report on the pacifi¬ 
cation performance of his Vietnamese counterpart. 
Also, the new system represented the view from 
the cutting edge, since higher echelons were not 
allowed to change the ratings. 

(U) The top Vietnamese officials in Saigon came to 
rely on the HES as an independent report card on 
their provincial and district leaders, and this gave 
U.S. advisors in the field a good deal of leverage on 
the latter. While pacification always remained a 
Vietnamese program, in contrast to the military 
effort, it was graded by the Americans, and even 
the President and Prime Minister of South Viet¬ 
nam acted on the reports. 

(U) The district HES reports were collated, 
although they could not be changed, by the U.S. 
interagency province team before being sent to 
MACV for countrywide collation. The results 
were displayed in computer printouts and monthly 
summaries. 

(U) In setting up the system, MACV ran into 
problems, but it made rapid progress. For ex¬ 
ample, a complete and accurate inventory of the 
hamlets in South Vietnam was not available. No 
census had been taken for years. In compiling a 
new inventory and checking the location and 
characteristics of each hamlet in the system, 
MACV found that many hamlets no longer 
existed or that they were unpopulated. These 
were dropped from the lists. 

(U) In addition to the ratings, basic elements of 
information reported in the Hamlet Evaluation 
System included the name of the hamlet, its 
utm coordinate location, its village, district, 
province, and militar}^ region, and its population. 
The system also provided information regarding 
the control status of the population residing out¬ 
side officially recognized hamlets (for example, in 


872 JDRB 


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Table 76. The old HES was more subjective than HES/70. (Table unclassified.) 


"Old HES" 

January 1967-December 1969 

Summary: Subjective "A-E" ratings 
by District Senior advisors^^SAs) 

37 multiple-choice questions per 
month per hamlet (18 indicators, 

19 problem areas) 

Training required to make ratings 

Different DSAs used different 
criteria at different times 

Gaps in coverage (e.g., economics, 
information, education, land 
reform) 

DSAs disliked "unclear" rating 
criteria 

Three-year data base 


provincial towns, etc.). Thus, it yielded infor¬ 
mation about the control of hamlets, control of 
populations in rural hamlets, and control of the 
total population in South Vietnam. 

(U) Because all 18 indicators entered into a 
hamlet’s overall rating (A through E), it is 
difficult to give a concise interpretation of what 
constituted an “A” or a “B” hamlet. There is no 
clear relationship between the previous GVN/U.S. 
categories and the HES classification, and this 
makes it difficult to link the two systems for an 
analysis of trends. For a broad comparison, the 
sum of nonhamlet population and the popula¬ 
tions in A, B, and C hamlets seemed to be roughly 
equivalent to the GVN/U.S. “Secure” category; 
the D and E hamlet populations seemed equivalent 
to “Contested”; and VC was equivalent to “VC/ 
N VA-Con trolled. 1 ’ 

(U) The composite HES scores were weighted 
more toward social and economic development 
than the criteria for the 1964-67 GVN/U.S. 
reports, and they gave a better measure of per¬ 
manent pacification progress, as opposed to in¬ 
creased security protection. The latter, of course, 
can be examined separately in the HES, as can 


HES/70 

(Tested July-December 1969) 
Began January 1970 

Summary: Objective "factual" reports by 

DSAs; conversion to experts' A-E 
ratings 

21 monthly hamlet questions 
4 monthly village questions 

56 quarterly hamlet questions 

58 quarterly village questions 

Asks detailed questions about verifiable 
facts 

Standard countrywide rating criteria 
did not change over time 

Covered all aspects of pacification 
(security, political, socio-economic) 

DSAs preferred providing "facts", even 
though more detailed 

One-time discontinuity in trend lines; 
but new data base rested on more 
realistic foundation 


/ 


many other questions. For example, the August 
1967 HES score on the nine security indicators 
alone included 2 percent more of the South 
Vietnamese population in the A-B-C hamlet 
grouping than did the overall HES scores (that is, 
security ratings were slightly higher than de¬ 
velopment scores). ( 3 ) 

(U) The first version of HES remained in use 
until January 1970, when a complete revision 
was adopted. Seeing shortcomings in the Hamlet 
Evaluation System (HES), CORDS undertook 
a two-year reassessment of it, with professional 
consultant advice, and implemented a carefully 
revised system, called HES/70, in January 1970. 
HES/70 attempted to overcome the known biases 
that had developed in three years of HES 
reporting. It asked U.S. district senior advisors 
(dsa’s) to supply facts, not subjective judgments, 
and it applied expert weighting criteria uniformly 
throughout the country to develop the composite 
HES/70 hamlet and village scores. Table 76 
shows the differences between HES and HES/70. 

(U) To obtain A, B, C, D, E, and VC ratings 
comparable to those in HES, HES/70 used a uni¬ 
form, but complex, weighting scheme built upon 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 873 


















CONFIDENTIAL 

Table 77. Some J+.2 million people entered the secure category. (Table unclassified.) 


Degree of 

Military 

1964 

1965 

1965 

Security 

Dec 

Jun 

Dec 

POPULATION 
(In Millions) 

Secure bj 

6.8 

7.7 

9.0 

Contested 

6.0 

4.9 

4.0 

VC Control c/ 

3.3 

3.7 

3.5 

Total 

16.1 

16.3 

16.5 

BUT 

GAINS IN 

TERRITORY 

DID NOT 

HAMLETS d/ 

(In Thousands) 

Secure b/ 


3.5 

4.2 

Contested 


4.5 

3.6 

VC Control c/ 


3.9 

4.1 

Total 


11.9 

11.9 


1966 

1966 

1967 a/ 

1964-67 

Jun 

Dec 

Jun 

Change 


9.5 

10.3 

11.0 

4.2 

3.8 

3.9 

3.8 

-2.2 

3.4 

2.8 

2.4 

- .9 

16.7 

17.0 

17.2 

1 .1 

EXPLAIN THE 

4.2 

INCREASE 

4.7 

4.7 

1.2 

3.6 

3.7 

4.1 

- .8 

4.1 

3.5 

3.1 

- .4 

1179 

11.9 

1179 

0 


Source: "Population Security Statistics," Southeast Asia Analysis Report , 
October 1967, p.22. 

a/ The GVN/US system continued during the first six months of HES reporting 
(January-June 1967) 

b/ Population or hamlets in areas reportedly under allied military protection 
and subject to at least some deqree of continuing GVN administration, 
c/ Population or hamlets reportedly in areas over which GVN exerciser no 
effective control. 

d/ Separate accounting for hamlets did not start until April 1965. 


expert judgments of 18 different aspects of pacifi¬ 
cation. The experts’ judgments were converted to 
A, B, C, D, E, and VC scores by a standard 
mathematical technique called Bayesian proba¬ 
bility analysis. The HES/70 reports for the testing 
period of July-December 1969 showed about 1 
percent less A-B population and 4 to 6 percent less 
A-B-C population than the old HES showed for 
the same period, and they registered less sensi¬ 
tivity to changes in GVN pacification goals. The 
difference suggests that HES/70 was more con¬ 
servative than the old HES. 

(U) In January 1971, CORDS changed the scoring 
system and called it HES/71, to give greater weight 
to political factors (VC/NVA infrastructure, ter¬ 
rorism, etc.) in describing security. The HES/71 
was still in use at the end of 1972, and the system 
was gradually turned over to the Vietnamese 
before the U.S. forces completed their withdrawal. 


By the end of 1972, eighty percent of all HES/71 
reporting was being done by the South Vietnamese 
personnel themselves. 

(U) The detailed questions and observations con¬ 
tained in the Hamlet Evaluation System (partic¬ 
ularly HES/70) can be used to analyze many 
dimensions of the situation in South Vietnam. For 
example, HES/70 contained data about the VC/ 
NVA infrastructure, land reform, economics, 
VC/NVA forces and actions, politics, and health 
care, to name a few topics. In the diversity of its 
components, the HES is similar to the PAAS 
(Pacification Attitude Analysis System), and the 
data are used in other chapters in the same manner 
as the PAAS data are used.* For example, the land 
reform analysis (Chapter XIX) contains data 

*See Chapter XV for a full discussion and analysis of 
results from the PAAS. 


874 JDRB 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


from the HES and PAAS, as well as from the 
Land-to-the-Tiller Program. 

(U) The HES data are useful in another way, 
because they constitute the only record in South 
Vietnam of where the population is located. The 
locations are marked by utm map coordinates, 
which can be compared with similar location data 
in other computer files to judge the relationship 
of a given activity to the population. This tech¬ 
nique was used to match air strikes to civilian 
population in the analysis of civilian casualties 
(Chapter XII) and to match the spraying opera¬ 
tions to the population in the herbicides analysis 
(Chapter VIII). 

(U) Finally, the HES data base may be the most 
complete, systematic record of rural security and 
development in a less-developed country that 
exists anywhere, despite problems with the report¬ 
ing of the development indicators (discussed 
below). 

THE TRENDS 

gvn/u.s. system 

(U) The trends portrayed by the GVN/U.S. 
system appear in Table 77. The raw data are 
adjusted retrospectively to compensate for changes 
to the system during 1964-66. Tests of the assump¬ 
tions that went into the adjustments indicate that 
the trends shown in the table constitute an 
accurate portrayal of the results from the system, 
although the accuracy of each figure is not precise.* 

(U) The retrospective estimate suggests an increase 
of 4.2 million people in the “ Secure ” category 
between December 1964 and June 1967 (2% years) 
and a reduction of about 900,000 in the number of 
people under “VC Control.” In terms of percent¬ 
ages, the “Secure” population increased from 42 
percent to 64 percent of the total. 

(U) The gains appear to be significant ones for the 
GVN, but Table 77 suggests that much of the 
increase resulted from the movement of people 
into GVN secure areas instead of expansion of 
territory (hamlets) protected by Allied military 
forces. Take the period from December 1965 to 
June 1967, for example, when the “Secure” popu¬ 
lation increased by 2 million. There were about 1.2 

*For a full account of the changes and assumptions made, 
see Ref. 4. 


million officially recorded refugees during the 
period, which may account for 60 percent of the 
increase.f Natural population growth (at least 

2.5 percent per year) would account for another 
0.3 million (15 percent) of the increase.^) 

(U) Other factors could account for the remainder: 
extension of Allied protection; job seekers moving 
to the cities; “unofficial” refugees; and over- 
optimistic evaluation of programs. The hamlet 
data suggest that the extension of Allied pro¬ 
tection is probably the main factor. About 500 
hamlets were added to the secure category, and 
the average population per hamlet, countrywide, 
was about 1,000 at that time, so this would yield 
the 500,000 people needed to complete the 2 
million gain.( 5 ) This is not to say that the gain 
occurred precisely this way, but simply to indicate 
the kinds of factors at work, which in turn suggest 
that the gain may be reasonably valid. 

(U) Intelligence reports and captured VC/NVA 
documents lent some credence to the trend in the 
Viet Cong’s loss of control shown in Table 77, but 
they also suggest that the VC-control figures were 
too low. For example, a captured document of 
early 1966 stated that 5 million people lived in 
“liberated” (Viet Cong) areas and 9 million resided 
in government-held areas.! The retrospective 
estimate for December 1965 showed the same 9 
million in the GVN-secure category, but only 

3.6 million in the VC-controlled category, a 
shortfall of 1.4 million. 

(U) The method of reporting also suggests that 
the population in VC/NVA-controlled areas was 
understated, because the pre-1967 GVN/U.S. 
system counted only the hamlets “planned for 
pacification.” It ignored hamlets not in the 
pacification plan, most of which were probably 
VC/NVA hamlets. Table 77 shows 11,900 hamlets, 
but the HES system, which attempted to count 
all hamlets, counted about 12,600 of them and, for 
administrative purposes other than planning, the 
GVN counted some 13,000 plus.( 6 ) 

(U) The same 1966 captured document lamented 
the loss of a million people from the countryside 
into government-controlled urban areas as a 

fAlthough up to half of them may have returned home 
after the winter-spring fighting subsided. 

JFive million in rural areas, and four million in cities and 
towns; see Ref. 5. 


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JDRB 875 








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Table 78. Some 8.2 million people became “ secure ” between 1967 and 1972. (Table classified Confidential.) 


COUNTRYWIDE 
POPULATION 
(In millions 
end of year) 1967 

Secure (A&B) 7.2 

(C) Relatively Secure (C) 4.3 

Contested (D&E) 2.7 

VC/NVA Control 2.9 

SVN Total 17.2 


1968 

1969 

1970 

8.2 

12.5 

13.4 

5.2 

3.8 

3.5 

1.9 

.8 

.9 

2.2 

.4 

- 

17.5 

17.6 

17.9 


1971 

1972 

1967-72 

Change 

15.8 

15.4 

8.2 

2.3 

2.6 

-1.7 

.6 

1.0 

-1.7 

- 

.2 

-2.7 

18.7 

19.3 

2.1 


THIS RAISED THE PERCENTAGE OF 


1 of SVN 



POPULATION 



Secure (A&B) 

42 

47 

Relatively Secure 

25 

30 

Contested (D&E) 

16 

11 

VC/NVA Control 

17 

12 


SECURE" 

FROM 42 

TO 80 PERCENT 



71 

75 

84 

80 

38 

21 

20 

13 

14 

-11 

5 

5 

3 

5 

-11 

2 

0 

0 

1 

-16 


Source: Hamlet Evaluation System Computer Tapes 1967-1972. 

All figures are based on total HES scores, which include the security, 
political, and socio-economic dimensions. 

Total includes population in unevaluated hamlets, which is not shown 
in the table, so some of the columns do not add precisely to the totals. 
The table includes the urban population, which means that the C-D-E-VC 
population is mostly concentrated in the rural areas. 


result of the presence of U.S. troops. The estimates 
in Table 77 show a loss of only 200,000 in Viet 
Cong control between June (arrival of U.S. combat 
troops) and December 1965. But the contested 
category dropped by 900,000 during the same 
period, and this may account for the rest of the 
“million” to which the document referred. 

(U) Another captured document, dated Oct. 30, 
1966, indicated that Allied operations and pro¬ 
grams produced “some relatively significant re¬ 
sults” in the form of 400 additional GVN hamlets 
“built” and 400,000 people brought under GVN 
control. Other documents referred to a loss of 
VC/NVA influence and control over the rural 
population and described the declines in VC/NVA 
food production, tax revenues, and manpower as a 
result of shrinkage in its population base.( 7 ) 


(U) The trends shown in Table 77 are also con¬ 
sistent with results of the September 1967 presi¬ 
dential election in South Vietnam. About 5.9 
million voters were registered for that election, 
more than one-half of the secure population of 
June 1967. This was a gain of 600,000 over the 
number of registered voters a year earlier. ( 8 ) The 
estimates in Table 77 show an increase in the 
secure population of 1.5 million over the com¬ 
parable period (June 1966 to June 1967), of whom 
approximately one-half would be eligible to vote. 
Details are not available to verify that both gains 
occurred in the same group of population, but at 
least the trends moved in the same direction. 

(U) In summary , then, the figures in Table 77, 
captured VC/NVA documents, and the voter registra¬ 
tion statistics all show the same trends. While the 
evidence is by no means conclusive, it does suggest 


876 JDRB 


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I able 79. Military Region 4 had the largest 
gains. (Table unclassified.) 


SECURE POPULATION 

IN THE MILITARY 

REGIONS £/ 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

Change 

1967-1972 

(In Millions- 
End of Year) 






MR 1 

1.2 

1.2 

1.8 

2.4 

2.7 

2.4 

1.2 

MR 2 

1.2 

1.4 

2.1 

2.0 

2.4 


1.2 

MR 3 

3.0 

3.3 

4.8 

4.7 

5.2 

5.2 ^ 

2.2 

MR 4 

1.8 

2.3 

3.8 

4.3 

5.5 

5.4 

3.6 

BUT MILITARY 

REGION 3 

WAS THE 

MOST SECURE 


X 


(% OF POPULATION 

SECURE IN EACH MR)- 








MR 1 

36 

41 

61 

76 

84 

73 

37 

MR 2 

43 

47 

67 

63 

72 

70 

27 

MR 3 

57 

59 

86 

89 

95 

91 

34 

MR 4 

31 

38 

64 

68 

82 

78 

47 


Source: HES Computer Tapes 1967-72. 

a/ All figures are based on total HES scores, which include the 


security, political, and socio-economic dimensions. 


that the portrayal of the situation in Table 77 is 
probably not too far wrong , except that the truly 
11 Secure” population is probably overstated and more 
people and hamlets were almost certainly under VC/ 
NVA control than the table shows. But the funda¬ 
mental trends appear sound, and they support the 
notion of a gain of 4 million people in the “Secure” 
category between December 1964 and June 1967. 

TRENDS FROM THE HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM 

(hes) 

(U) The major trends from the Hamlet Evaluation 
System appear in Table 78, which suggests that: 

• There were 8.2 million people made “secure” 
during the five years between December 1967 and 
December 1972. This raised the proportion in 
this category to 80 percent of the total 
population in South Vietnam. 

• The losses in the Tet offensive were recovered 
by the end of 1968. Indeed, gains were made, 
with 1 million people added to the secure 
category by year’s end. 

• The pacification effort really produced results 
in 1969, when 4.3 million people were added 
to the secure category. The contested and 
VC/NVA-controlled populations fell below all 
previous levels. 

• The VC/NVA offensive in 1972 eroded the 
gains, but not in any major way for the 
country as a whole. 

(U) Table 79 shows the HES trends for each of the 


Table 80. The South Vietnamese gained some 
control over 11 million people. (Table unclassified.) 


"SECURE" POPULATION - 
(In Millions) 

1964 

1967 

1972 

6.8 

11.5 

18.0 

7» of Total 

42 

67 

93 

Total Population 
(In Millions) 

16.1 

17.2 

19.3 


a/ "Secure" category from GVN/U.S. system for 1964; A+B+C HES 


population (total scores) for 1967 and 1972. 


four military regions in two ways: ( 1) in terms of 
population in the secure category and (2) in 
terms of the percentage of each region’s population in 
that category. In terms of secure population, 
Military Region 4 gained the most. This also was 
the area where CORDS put greatest pacification 
emphasis. Military Regions 3 and 4 accounted for 
70 percent of the countrywide gain. All of the 
regions except Military Region 1 showed gains in 
1968 despite the Tet offensive, and Military 
Region 1 recovered its losses. In 1969, all four 
regions showed major gains. And in the 1972 
offensive, Military Regions 1 and 4 lost ground, 
but the other two did not. 

(U) In terms of percentages, Military Region 3 
(which includes Saigon) was the most secure 
throughout the five-year period, and it pulled the 
countrywide average up to 80 percent in 1972. 
Military Region 4 started below the others in 
1967, but surpassed the two northern regions 
by the end of 1972. In percentage terms, all four 
regions showed losses as a result of the 1972 
offensive, with Military Region 1 falling the most.* 

(U) Table 80 shows what happens when a time 
series is constructed joining the GVN/U.S. system 
and the results of the HES. The linkage is crude, 
and it simply assumes that the HES A-B-C total 
was roughly equivalent to the GVN/U.S. “Secure” 
population, which was the case in January 1967, 
when the systems were operating side by side. The 
results are not precise, but they do suggest sig¬ 
nificant Allied progress between December 1964 
and December 1972. 


*Population in the secure category in Military Regions 2 
and 3 remained constant, but the total population in each 
military region increased during the year; hence, the 
percentage declines. 


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(U) The table indicates that the Government of South 
Vietnam gained some sort of control over more than 
11 million people. In percentage terms , the gain is 
from 1+2 percent oj the total population in 196If. to 
93 percent in 1972. The qualitative improvement 
doesn’t show in the table, but from Table 78 it can 
be determined that 15.4 million of the 1972 figure 
represented population in the A-B categories, as 
opposed to only 7.2 million of the 1967 figure. 
The results are impressive. 

RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF THE 

HES TRENDS 

(U) A key question at this point is concerned with 
the reliability and validity of the HES results. It 
has already been suggested that the GVN/U.S. 
system results were not too bad. Flow good—or 
bad—was the HES? Did it reflect what was 
actually happening? As used here, validity is the 
extent to which indicators actually measure the 
phenomena under investigation. Did the HES 
actually measure the status of population secu¬ 
rity? Reliability refers to the consistency in 
reporting (or coding) by one reporter (coder) over 
a period of time or among several reporters (or 
coders) at one point in time. 

(U) The analysis of HES reliability and validity 
proceeds in three stages and examines (1) some 
formal studies conducted to check the validity of 
the HES, particularly in its first stages from 1967 
through 1969, (2) what rigorous analyses of the 
HES details revealed, and (5) what streams of 
evidence from other reporting systems, independ¬ 
ent of HES, implied about the validity of HES 
trends. 

FORMAL STUDIES 

(U) When the HES was adopted, considerable 
concern was expressed about the validity of the 
system, particularly in its early stages of develop¬ 
ment, and several studies to identify problems in 
the HES and check its validity were undertaken. 
Their main results are summarized below. 

(U) In December 1967, Department of Defense 
analysts noted the factors that combined to make 
HES reporting difficult.( 9 ) Only a few of the 18 
indicators could be rated on the basis of direct 
observation of a clear-cut condition. (HES/70 
solved much of this problem.) Much of the HES 
information could be obtained only from the 


Vietnamese, and surveys indicated that U.S. 
advisors relied on their Vietnamese counterparts 
for at least half of the raw data they were using to 
answer the HES questions. Finally, most advisors 
could not visit all of their hamlets during any 
one month. 

(U) Despite these difficulties, the analysts found 
that the HES results correlated well with non-HES 
data, such as VC/NVA-initiated incidents. For 
example, antiaircraft fire tended to occur over 
VC/NVA-controlled hamlets, and incidents around 
“Secure” (A or B) hamlets tended to be charac¬ 
terized by terror. The analysts also found by 
statistical analysis of the April 1967 HES reports 
that the raters were not mechanically grading all 
of the indicators according to a single criterion. 
The wide variety of hamlet characteristics was 
reflected in the range of grades for each hamlet. 

(U) Another early study was performed in 
Washington by the Institute for Defense Analy¬ 
ses, ( 10 ) and this developed a three-part methodol¬ 
ogy to check the HES results. One part compared 
map plots of HES data with map plots of VC/NVA 
military actions, while the second part showed 
combinations of various levels of security and 
development factors. The third step assigned 
VC/NVA military incidents to the closest hamlet 
by matching the geographical coordinates of the 
incident and the hamlet. 

(U) The methodology was applied to three sample 
districts, with use of the HES data for January 
1967 through May 1967, the earliest stage of the 
HES operation. Most of the conclusions dealt with 
methodological problems, but one of them stated: 

Application of the methodology to the develop¬ 
ing HES data gave many indications that the 
HES will provide meaningful data when the 
system is fully in operation. 

and 

. . . the sample data studied were found to be 
very compatible within themselves and with 
other data.( n ) 

(U) The next study was a major effort conducted 
in Vietnam by the Simulmatics Corporation for 
the U.S. Army Concept Team in Vietnam.( 12 ) 
The U.S.-Vietnamese study team conducted 
interviews, researched records, and went into the 
field to develop its conclusions. Basically, the 
team compared the advisor’s inputs to the HES 


878 JDRB 


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with the opinions of other observers, such as the 
people in the hamlet, the hamlet chief, and the 
team members themselves, after direct observa¬ 
tion of the hamlet being studied. The major 
conclusions were: ( 13 ) 

The results of this study indicate That the 
Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) as a total 
system is basically sound as a reporting device 
for the entire country and for political divisions 
down to the district level, and should be con¬ 
tinued. A distinction is made, however, between 
security ,and development factors . . . HES is 
a reasonably reliable method of estimating 
security trends. The interjudge reliability of the 
development factors is less clear. 

Aggregate data on a hamlet appear to be 
sufficiently reliable for evaluation of the progress 
of pacification within districts. Ratings of some 
specific indicators in a hamlet, however, appear 
questionable if used to evaluate individual 
hamlets. 

Our data suggest that there is a relationship 
between an advisor’s knowledge of Vietnamese 
and the reliability of his overall ratings. The 
presence of a civilian advisor in a district was 
also found to be related to reliable overall 
ratings. 

The evidence indicates that advisors are not 
inflating their ratings. There is no evidence 
that indicates an upward bias to advisors’ 
ratings over the length of their tours. There is 
evidence that advisors tend to make the largest 
number of rating changes at the beginning and 
the middle of their tours. 

(U) A third study, in the form of an informal 
working paper in November 1969, attempted to 
establish the statistical characteristics of the 
HES data. It found that the average hamlet 
security scores represented a normal distribution 
of data, which meant that approximately 68 
percent of the time the reported score would be 
within 0.2 point of the real score (five-point 
scoring scale) and 95 percent of the time it would 
be within 0.4 of the real score. For example, if 
the composite hamlet score was reported as 3.7, 
then the actual score would be between 3.3 and 
4.1 ninety-five percent of the time. 

(U) From these types of studies, and working 
with the data from the system, the following 
consensus developed among HES analysts: 

• Changes in the HES security scores were 
sensitive enough to identify progress or 
regression in areas over time. 


• HES measurements were not precise enough 
to make point estimates—that is, to measure 
precisely the position along a scale between 
“least secure” and “most secure.” The preci¬ 
sion, naturally, increased for higher levels of 
aggregation. At lower levels (village, district, 
province) it was generally agreed to be on the 
order of plus-or-minus one letter grade. 

• Comparisons among different geographic areas 
in South Vietnam at a single point in time may 
be of questionable reliability, because of wide 
differences in the characteristics of various 
areas. 

ANALYSIS OF HES DETAILS 

(U) Considerable insight into the reliability and 
meaning of the HES trends can be gained from 
analyzing the details reported in the HES. Several 
examples of such analysis are presented here. The 
first describes the development of an indicator of 
rural security and its trends. The rest present 
trends resulting from some of the detailed ques¬ 
tions asked by the HES about each hamlet or 
village. 

(U) Rural Control Indicator. Of course, the HES 
trends presented above included people living in 
cities in the secure population. They were reason¬ 
ably secure to begin with; and with few exceptions, 
they remained so throughout the period. The 
emphasis of the pacification effort was on the rural 
countryside, and the situation there was masked 
by the presence of the urban population in the 
estimates. (CORDS used rural HES data alone for 
its own management analyses.)* Moreover, the 
HES data shown so far included many items 
besides security factors, because many of the HES 
questions related to the socio-economic and 
political situations. 

(U) To overcome these problems, an indicator of 
rural control was developed out of HES data. It 
used 10 carefully selected HES questions and 
began with the assumption that a primary objec¬ 
tive of both sides in the Vietnam War was to 
achieve control of the people and resources of the 
countryside. The rural control indicator assigned 
a hamlet to the side which had enough piilitary 
and political strength to administer the hamlet 

*One of the virtues of HES was that it allowed easy 
computer separation of such data elements. 


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Table 81. South Vietnamese Government control 
showed large gains in the rural areas during 1970. 
(Table unclassified.) 


SOUTH VIET-NAM 

Rural Control 
Indicator 

Dec 1969 

Dec 1970 

Dec 1971 

Dec 1972 

GVN Control 

487. 

677. 

767. 

687. 

Contested 

467. 

317. 

237. 

297. 

VC/NVA Control 

67. 

27. 

17. 

37. 

Rural Population 
(In Millions) 

10.5 

11.1 

11.8 

11.6 


effectively, while preventing the other side from 
doing so. Doubtful cases were assigned to a 
“neither side controls” category. The indicator 
made the following assumptions: 

• The GVN required both military strength 
(local security forces) and political and admin¬ 
istrative organization (hamlet chief, village 
council, administrative personnel) to achieve 
control over a hamlet. However, a single 
indicator of significant VC/NVA presence 
(armed enemy forces, regular covert VCI 
activity, significant access at night) could veto 
GVN control. 

• The VC/NVA, on the other hand, could 
achieve control with a strong political organi¬ 
zation alone (the VC/NVA infrastructure). 
The GVN could veto VC/NVA control with a 
strong military or political/administrative 
presence. 

• The GVN could achieve control only when full 
local security was provided. When a hamlet 
had to rely primarily on external forces for 
defense, a key element of lasting control— 
local participation—was considered lost. Ex¬ 
ternal forces could not serve as a proxy for 
GVN military strength in the hamlet. 

(U) Table 81 shows the results for 1969 through 
1972. Comparing them with the results in Table 
78 shows that the rural control indicator portrays a 
somewhat different rural picture than the HES 
total scores for the entire country: 

• In December 1969, the total HES scores 
suggest that 71 percent of the total population 
was “secure.” However, only 48 percent of 
the rural population was under South Viet¬ 
namese “control.” In 1972, the figures were 
80 percent and 68 percent. (The HES A-B 
security scores for rural 'population alone 


Table 82. What do detailed questions from HES 170 
say about VC/NVA control? (Table unclassified.) 


POPULATION (000) UNDER 

VC/NVA CONTROL 

Dec 

1969 

Dec 

1970 

Dec 

1971 

Dec 

1972 

HES/70 (Total Scores) 

412 

38 

7 

220 

Rural Control Indicator 

590 

233 

153 

370 

POPULATION (000) IN HAMLETS WHERE: a/ 





1. VC/NVA Forces Physically Control 

412 

38 

7 

220 

2. VC/NVA Military Forces are 
Regularly Present 

537 

191 

106 

384 

3. The VC/NVA Infrastructure is the 
Primary Authority b/ 

594 

219 

133 

339 

4. The GVN Hamlet Chief is not 
Regularly Present 

975 

796 

284 

316 


a/ The four factors are based on the following HES/70 questions: 

(1) HMB-1; (2) HMB-4; (3) HQB-1; (4) HQE-2. An attempt to add 

the figures shown will result in an unknown degree of double counting. 


b/ This judgement is highly subjective and may be of questionable validity. 

indicated that 55 percent of the rural popula¬ 
tion had A-B security ratings in December 
1969, as opposed to a reading of 48 percent 
for rural control. The rural A-B ratings for 
HES showed the same trends as the rural 
security indicator, but usually they were eight 
to ten percentage points higher.) 

• The total HES scores indicate that pacifica¬ 
tion progress was slow in 1970 (gain of four 
percentage points) after large gains in 1969, 
but the rural control indicator suggests that 
pacification really began to show results in 
the countryside during 1970 (gain of 19 
percentage points). 

• The impact of the 1972 offensive shows more 
clearly in the rural control indicator. Control 
by GVN slipped eight percentage points* (as 
opposed to 4 percent for total HES scores), 
and control by the VC/NVA rose to 3 percent 
(as opposed to 0.2 percent). 

(U) After all the calculations, assumptions, and 
effort that went into constructing the rural security 
indicator, it is interesting—and significant—to see 
that both ways of measuring pacification progress 
show the same result between 1969 and 1972. The 
HES total scores indicate that 2.9 million people 
were made secure during the period, while the 
rural control indicator suggests that 2.8 million 

*By July 1972 it had dropped to 62 percent, or 15 percent¬ 
age points below the previous December (1971). The HES, 
as well as showing progress, rapidly showed the impact 
of YC/NVA offensives or other setbacks. Regressions 
showed up fairly clearly and were not masked to any 
significant extent. 


880 JDRB 


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people were brought under control in the rural 
areas. 

(U) At the minimum , the data suggest that after 1969 
GV A security for the population was really reaching 
out into the countryside , in contrast to earlier years , 
when much of the increase consisted oft people 
moving from the countryside into the secure areas . 
The statistics also suggest that one can gain almost 
as much insight into the rural situation by using 
the HES A-B scores for the rural population only 
as CORDS officials did. However, this analysis 
continues to use the control indicator to view 
results in the rural areas, because the rural indi¬ 
cator statistics happen to be readily available and 
the rural HES scores are not. 

(U) Individual HES Questions. Table 82 compares 
answers to some of the individual HES/70 ques¬ 
tions with the VC/NVA control data from the 
total scores and from the rural control indicator. 
The table gives some insight into what the indi¬ 
cators really mean. For example, a VC/NVA- 
controlled hamlet, defined by the total HES scores, 
simply is one in which the VC/NVA forces physi¬ 
cally control the hamlet. The VC/NVA military 
forces could be present in the hamlet regularly, or 
the VC/NVA infrastructure could reportedly be 
the primary authority in the hamlet, but the HES/ 
70 total score would not place it in the VC/NVA 
control category. This indicates what the D and E 
categories must be like. 

DO TRENDS REPORTED FROM OTHER SOURCES AGREE 

WITH HES TRENDS? 

(U) Another way to add perspective to the validity 
of HES results is to examine the security situation 
as reported independently of HES. Casualty data, 
public-attitude surveys, and reports of the security 
conditions of roads and waterways furnish data for 
crude comparison. 

(U) Casualties among Allied forces and favorable 
HES results tend to move in opposite directions. 
During 1969 through 1971, the Allied casualties 
declined each year and HES security ratings rose. 
In 1972, the casualties rose with the VC/NVA 
offensive, and HES showed a loss of security for 
the population. This is a crude comparison, but it 
does suggest that HES results moved with the 
intensity of the war. Whether things were going 
poorly or well for the Allies, HES showed it. 

CONFIDENTIAL 


(U) The public attitude surveys suggest that, on 
average, the hamlet residents felt less secure than 
the HES ratings showed. In one comparison, 44 
percent of the hamlet residents described their 
hamlets as being less secure than the HES rating 
indicated; 54 percent of the respondents generally 
agreed with the HES description of their hamlet, 
and 2 percent said security was better. The 
Simulmatics Corporation study of HES validity, 
employing U.S. researchers in the field, found the 
same phenomenon. Hamlet residents were more 
conservative in their assessments than were the 
independent researchers, and the latter implied 
that the results were as much in the eves of hamlet 
residents as in the facts of the situation. Perhaps 
the results of the attitude survey have the same 
characteristic. 

(U) The data reporting the security status of 
essential roads and waterways support the HES 
population security trends in general. There are 
problems with the time series, but in December 
1971, eighty percent of the essential roads and 75 
percent of the essential waterways were considered 
safe. In addition, polls in the summer of 1972 
suggested that 75 percent of the rural population 
had no difficulty getting themselves or their pro¬ 
duce to market. In this case, the polls were more 
optimistic than the HES data, which indicated 
that 70 percent of the rural population was free of 
VC/NVA taxation on produce moving to and from 
their hamlets. Thus, the progress in making roads 
and waterways safe for travel was significant. All 
three sets of data support the assertion that 
conditions were reasonably good by the end of 1971 
and held fairly well in 1972. 

(U) Comments of U.S. advisors and other U.S. 
personnel returning to the United States in 1971 
and 1972 consistently supported the notion that 
considerable progress had been made in making 
roads safe. Often, the returning person, whose 
experience in Vietnam was normally limited to 
one year, was unaware of the significance of his 
remarks until another person who had served in 
the same area a few years before expressed 
astonishment at the conditions being described. 
The surprise was usually expressed in response to 
a casual comment from the new arrival that he 
had taken a jeep and driven from point A to 
point B by himself. The old timer would sputter, 

JDRB 881 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


“It used to take a battalion to travel on that 
road.” Such exchanges were frequent. 

CONCLUSION 

(U) The data all combine to suggest that it is 
possible to gain some notion of how secure or how 
well under control the population is, but it all 
depends upon how security and control are defined 
and on what universe is being measured (for 
example, urban or rural). In the absence of an 
absolute criterion of truth, the data can be 
interpreted in many ways and at various levels of 
aggregation. Indeed, this chapter has done so and 
has shown the futility of assuming that the data 
represent a completely accurate statement at any 
point in time. 

(U) The question of validity remains. Were the 
HES reports reasonably valid? Did they reflect 
reliably the changing situation in South Vietnam, 
and particularly in the rural areas? The answer to 
both questions is yes. The trends seem reasonable. 
Detailed analysis of the HES data confirms them, 
and so do independent reporting systems outside of 
the HES. 

(U) Obviously, great progress was made in gaining 
influence and control of the South Vietnamese 
countryside. It is apparent that the process of 


providing GVN security for the population, as 
measured by the HES results and the other data 
presented here, took hold gradually and made 
great strides in 1969 and 1970. Most of those gains 
held through the intense fighting of 1972, although 
significant regressions were clearly evident in the 
areas of most intense combat. Most of the credit 
for this probably belongs to the pacification 
program. It undoubtedly benefited from RVNAF 
regular forces, who furnished a critical shield for 
the program, but it seems clear that without a 
pacification program the gains would not have 
been anywhere near as great. After years of 
criticism of the HES results, it is interesting to 
read (in 1974) accounts of the situation in South 
Vietnam which cite the strong GVN influence and 
control of the countryside. 

(U) The security improvement in the country¬ 
side permitted other important developments. 
Food production rose dramatically, reducing 
South Vietnam’s reliance on rice imports and 
bringing new prosperity to the farmers. The 
improved security also permitted the massive 
1970-73 land reform effort, which distributed 2.5 
million acres of land to 800,000 tenant farmer 
families (see Chapter XIX). As a result, the farm 
tenancy rate dropped from 60 percent of all crop¬ 
land to 10 percent of it. 


882 JDRB 


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Chapter XIV 

How Well Did the Territorial Forces Perform? 


(U) Chapter VII, in discussing the improvement of 
RVNAF effectiveness, suggests that forces from 
outside of the country seldom win a war without 
fronts, and that the capabilities of the indigenous 
forces are critical to the outcome. Chapter VII 
deals mostly with improving the regular forces of 
RVNAF—the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In 
contrast, this chapter discusses the role and per¬ 
formance of the South Vietnamese territorial 
forces, who were badly neglected until 1967, when 
CORDS took over the U.S. advisory effort and 
support to them. 

(U) The territorial forces were extremely impor¬ 
tant to the Allied war effort in Vietnam. The 
objective in any war without fronts is to gain the 
support of the population, with particular em¬ 
phasis on the rural population. The territorial 
forces were the troops closest to the population, 
and they had the primary mission of protecting 
the people from the attacks and terrorism of the 
Communists. In a war without fronts, action can 
occur throughout the country, with forces of both 
sides operating in the same areas for years at a 
time. The permanent resident forces in the con¬ 
tested areas of South Vietnam were the territorial 
forces on each side—the VC/NVA guerrillas, local 
forces, and cadre versus the GVN territorial forces 
and cadre. The outcome of the struggle to gain the 
support of the rural population depended in large 
part on the effectiveness of these respective forces. 

(U) The forces addressed here were generally 
under the command of pacification authorities, 
somewhat separated from the formal chain of 


command for the South Vietnamese regular forces. 
Their mission was to defend the population and 
to bring the people over to the GVN, behind the 
security shield furnished by the regular forces. 

WHO WERE THEY? 

(U) Five types of forces are considered: 

• RF (Regular Forces), who basically operated 
as infantry companies within a district or 
province. 

• PF (Popular Forces), who were local platoons 
usually assigned to a specific village or other 
local security task. 

• NP (National Police), who operated in the 
cities and towns of South Vietnam and, later, 
in most of the villages. 

• RD (Revolutionary Development) and 
Truong Son Cadre, who went into villages and 
hamlets after a modicum of security had been 
established to bring GVN programs to the 
people and organize support for the govern¬ 
ment. The RD Cadre operated in Vietnamese 
hamlets and the Truong Son Cadre in 
Montagnard villages. 

• PSDF (People’s Self Defense Forces), who 
were village and hamlet militia, lightly armed 
and trained to resist small VC/NVA incursions 
into their hamlets. 

Table 83 displays their personnel strengths. The 
People’s Self Defense Forces (PSDF) are not 
included in the total, because they were not full¬ 
time troops paid by the GVN, and also because 
the meaning of the data is in considerable doubt 
(see discussion of the PSDF later in this chapter). 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 883 


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Table 83. South Vietnamese pacification forces; end-of-year strength in thousands. (Table classified Confi¬ 
dential.) 



1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

cl / 

Regional Forces (RF)— 

ILL 

ILL. 

ILL 

ILL 

ILL 

ILL 

ILL 

ILL 

132 

150 

151 

220 

261 

283 

284 

301 

Popular Forces (PF)—^ 

136 

150 

149 

172 

214 

251 

248 

219 

Subtotal 

268 

300 

300 

392 

475 

534 

532 

520 

Si / 

National Police- 

52 

58 

74 

79 

85 

88 

114 

121 

Revolutionary Development 
Cadre a/ 


21- 

37 

46 

44 

37 

28 

21 

Truong Son Cadre 

— 

£ 

7 

_7 

_7 

7 

5 

2 

Total GVN Forces 

320 

391 

418 

524 

611 

666 

679 

664 

People's Self Defense 
Forces b/ 




X481 £/ 

3219 

3489^ 

4429 

e/ 

3829 s ' 


a/ Source: Table 3, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary , Department of 
Defense, OASD (Comptroller), February 14, 1973. 
b/ Source: Army Activities Report: Southeast Asia (U), Final Issue 

(CSDCS-74), December 20, 1972, pp. 45 and 50. 
c/ June 1969 figure. No data for 1968. 
d/ November 30, 1970 figure, 
e/ September 30, 1972 figure. 

f/ Source: ''Revolutionary Development (RD) Personnel' 1 , Southeast Asia 
Analysis Report , July 1967, p. 32. 


(U) The Regional and Popular Forces furnished 
the bulk of the full-time GVN territorial forces. 
The Regional Forces and the National Police grew 
throughout the period, while the Popular Forces 
and RD Cadre grew to a peak and then declined 
during the later years of the war. 

(U) The basic mission of the territorial forces was 
to provide hamlet and village security. A series of 
questions in the HES (Hamlet Evaluation System) 

Table 84. Which force is primarily responsible for 
the security of this hamlet? (Percentage of South 
Vietnamese population.) (Table unclassified.) 



1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 


Dec 

Dec 

Dec 

Dec 

Regional Forces 

m 

16 

m 

12 

m 

8 

(%) 

7 

Popular Forces 

47 

48 

44 

39 

National Police 

5 

9 

14 

17 

People's Self Defense Forces 

24 

29 

33 

35 


Source: Hamlet Evaluation System Quarterly Question HQC 1: "Which of 


the following is primarily responsible for conducting military 
security operations, patrols, ambushes, listening posts, etc., 
in the immediate vicinity of this hamlet? (If more than one 
select the force making the largest contribution)". From 
unpublished computer printout. 

884 JDRB 


shed some light on which forces were primarily 
responsible for security and on the tempo of ac¬ 
tivity in and around the hamlets. 

(U) Popular Forces were considered to be the 
primary security forces for about 40 percent of the 
South Vietnamese population, and the People’s 
Self Defense Forces covered another 30 percent, 
as shown in Table 84. The trends show increasing 
security roles for the National Police and PSDF, 
as the Regional and Popular Forces hamlet 
security roles declined late in the war 

(U) The increasing security roles of the National 
Police and PSDF fit well with the results of Table 
85, which show a growing percentage of the South 
Vietnamese population living in areas where GVN 
security operations were no longer necessary. The 
pattern reflects progress in establishing security 
in the countryside, which allowed the National 
Police and PSDF to take over much of the security 
function, freeing the Regional and Popular Forces 
for additional missions. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


























CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 85. Do GVN local security forces conduct 
security operations ? (.Percentage oj South Vietna¬ 
mese population.) (Table unclassified?) 



1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

DURING THE DAY - 

Dec 

a) 

Dec 

Dec 

a) 

Dec 

m. 

No 

3 

1 

2 

i 

Yes 

82 

79 

62 

58 

Not Needed (No Threat) 

AT NIGHT 

13 

20 

36 

40 

No 

3 

1 

2 

2 

Yes 

93 

93 

83 

78 

Not Needed 

2 

6 

15 

19 


a/ Source: Hamlet Evaluation System Quarterly Question HQC-2: "During 
daylight hours, do friendly local security forces conduct necessary 
security operations along approaches to this hamlet? (e.g., patrols, 
ambushes, listening posts, check points, etc.)". From unpublished 
computer printout. 

b/ Source: HES Quarterly Question HQC-3: "During hours of darkness, do 
friendly local security forces conduct necessary security operations 
along approaches to this hamlet? (e.g., patrols, ambushes, listening 
posts, check points, etc.)". From unpublished computer printout. 

Table 86. Have GVN forces from outside operated 
in this village during the month? (Percentage oj 
South Vietnamese population.) (Table unclas¬ 
sified.) 



1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 


Dec 

Dec 

Dec 

Dec 


(%) 

HL_ 

m 

m 

No 

38 

62 

73 

59 

Yes 

35 

24 

19 

29 

Yes - Contact with VC/NVA Force 

24 

14 

8 

11 


Source: HES Monthly Question VMC-1: "Have friendly external forces 


(forces normally based outside the village) operated in this 
village during the month"? From unpublished computer printout. 

(U) Table 86 further supports the notions of 
growing self-reliance and movement of the war 
away from populated areas. It suggests that out¬ 
side GVN forces operated in the populated areas 
less and less and made fewer and fewer contacts 
there, until the VC/NVA offensive reversed the 
trend in 1972. 

(U) Table 87 suggests that few of the local security 
forces made contact with the VC/NVA during the 
month. It alsc shows a declining trend in the 
population living where contacts occurred, until 
1972. 

THE REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES 
WERE THE MOST COST EFFECTIVE 
MILITARY FORCES EMPLOYED ON THE 
ALLIED SIDE 

FORCES AND MISSIONS 

(U) The Regional Forces and Popular Forces 


Table 87. Have local security-force operations 
resulted in contact with VC/NVA forces during 
the month? (Percentages of South Vietnamese 
population.) (Table unclassified.) 



1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 


Dec 

Dec 

Dec 

Dec 


(%) 

(Z) 


a) 

No 

88 

92 

94 

91 

Yes, Once 

6 

5 

4 

5 

Yes, More than once 

4 

3 

2 

3 


Source: HES Monthly Question HMC-3, as stated above. From un¬ 


published computer printout. 


Table 88. Regional and Popular Forces increased 
by 73 percent; troop strength in thousands. (Table 
classified Confidential.) 


Military Region 

1966 

IML. 

1967 

1HL_ 

1968 

m_ 

1969 

ic 1 _ 

1970 

1971 

iCL_ 

1972 

ici_ 

MR 1 

45 

46 

58 

74 

82 

80 

78 

MR 2 

72 

74 

95 

110 

119 

121 

116 

MR 3 

68 

65 

91 

109 

122 

115 

118 

MR 4 

115 

115 

148 

182 

211 

216 

208 

SVN Total 

300 

300 

392 

475 

534 

532 

520 


Source: Table 106, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary , Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), pp. 1, 3, and 5. 


Table 89. Regional Force companies doubled in five 
years. (Table classified Confidential.) 



1968 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 


Jan 

Dec 

Dec 

Dec 

Dec 

Dec 

Regional Force Companies 

i (U) 

m_ 

l£l_ 

IC1_ 

m_ 

IQ- 

MR 1 

122 

155 

212 

227 

235 

252 

MR 2 

242 

293 

359 

411 

412 

427 

MR 3 

219 

272 

371 

407 

413 

429 

MR 4 

312 

399 

529 

’ 627 

616 

715 

SVN Total 

895 

1119 

1471 

1672 

1676 

1823 


Source: CORDS, Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES). From 
unpublished computer printouts. 

were the main territorial troops operating for the 
GVN in the countryside and, as already indicated 
in Chapter III, they received a small share of the 
resources devoted to the war. Both relied heavily 
(but not exclusively) on local recruiting and 
normally did not operate outside of their own 
provinces or districts, although some Regional 
Force troops fought outside of their provinces 
during the 1972 VC/NVA offensive, particularly 
in Military Region 4. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 885 
































CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 90. The Regional Forces build-up focused on Table 92. The Popular Forces build-up focused on 

hamlet-village security first, and then shifted to hamlet and village security. (Table classified 
active operations. (Table classified Confidential.) Confidential.) 



1968 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 


Jan 

Dec 

Dec 

Dec 

Dec 

Jun 


jqo_ 


SSL. 

SSL. 

SSL. 

ssl. 

Missions 

Security: 

Hamlet-Village 

319 

348 

626 

560 

513 

395 

Roads & Waterways 

127 

159 

191 

167 

185 

170 

Other 

309 

283 

257 

252 

266 

273 

Subtotal 

755 

790 

1074 

979 

964 

838 

Active: 

Offensive Operations 

55 

182 

280 

206 

374 

448 

Reaction Forces 

28 

57 

62 

70 

130 

206 

Other 

57 

90 

55 

417 

208 

111 








Subtotal 

140 

329 

397 

693 

712 

831 

Total 

895 

1119 

1471 

1672 

1676 

1669 


Source: MACV-CORDS, Territorial Forces Evaluation System. From 


unpublished computer printouts. 

Table 91. Popular Force platoons doubled by 1971 
and then declined. (Table classified Confidential.) 



1968 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 


Jan 

Dec 

Dec 

Dec 

Dec 

Dec 

Popular Force Platoons 

SSL. 

m_ 

SSL. 

SSL. 

SSL. 

SSL. 

MR 1 

708 

755 

920 

1115 

1218 

1209 

MR 2 

1055 

1177 

1311 

1586 

1843 

1752 

MR 3 

739 

851 

1028 

1194 

1266 

1304 

MR 4 

1669 

1948 

2413 

3327 

3752 

3208 

SVN Total 

4171 

4731 

5672 

7222 

8079 

7473 


Source: MACV-CORDS, Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES). 
From unpublished computer printouts. 

(U) Table 88 displays the combined RF-PF 
strength by military region in South Vietnam. 
Between 1966 and 1972, the forces grew by 73 
percent, the increase being fairly uniform among 
the four military regions, whose gains ranged from 
61 to 80 percent. Throughout the period, Military 
Region 1 had 15 percent of the forces, Military 
Region 2 had 23 percent, Military Region 3 had 
23 percent, and Military Region 4 had about 39 
percent. The distribution of forces changed very 
little, as the entire force structure grew from 
300,000 troops in 1966 to 520,000 in 1972. 

(U) Regional Forces operated in 100-man com¬ 
panies, usually within a single South Vietnamese 
province or district, and the number of Regional 
Forces companies doubled between January 1968 
and December 1972, from 895 to 1823 (Table 89). 
Some of the companies were organized into bat¬ 


1968 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

Jan 

Dec 

Dec 

Dec 

Dec 

Jun 

SSL. 

SSL. 

SSL. 

SSI. 

SSL. 

SSL. 

Missions 






Security: 






Hamlet-Village 2714 

3114 

4079 

3887 

5181 

4695 

Roads and Waterways 517 

579 

548 

674 

945 

1005 

Other 693 

684 

621 

631 

786 

776 

Subtotal 3924 

4377 

5248 

5192 

6912 

6476 

Active: 






Offensive Operations 86 

108 

141 

168 

240 

366 

Reaction Forces 32 

43 

58 

78 

134 

338 

Other 129 

203 

225 

1784 

793 

692 

Subtotal 247 

354 

424 

2030 

1167 

1396 

Total 4171 

4731 

5672 

7222 

8079 

7872 


Source: MACV-CORDS, Territorial Forces Evaluation System. From un _ 
published computer printouts. 

talions late in the period, but the company re¬ 
mained the basic operating unit and the discussion 
here focuses on that unit. 

(U) The buildup of Regional Forces shows up 
primarily as additional units assigned to hamlet 
and village security until December 1969, although 
companies on offensive missions increased sharply, 
too. After 1969, as the need to use Regional and 
Popular Forces for hamlet-village security mis¬ 
sions declined, they shifted to local offensive 
operations; and in December 1969, forty-three 
percent of the companies were on hamlet-village 
security missions. This dropped to 24 percent 2% 
years later, as the percentage of units on active 
missions increased from 27 to 50 percent (see 
Table 90). 

(U) The RF patterns in the four military regions 
were similar Jo the countrywide pattern, with the 
data showing a pervasive buildup of security 
forces, which then shifted to more active operations 
as security in the rural areas improved. The period 
began with 755 RF companies on security mis¬ 
sions, compared to 140 on active missions, and it 
ended with approximately 830 companies assigned 
to each mission. 

(U) The Popular Force platoons, 30-man units 
that operated in specific villages or hamlets, 


886 jdrb CONFIDENTIAL 







































CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 93. It was more dangerous to serve with the Regional and Popular Forces than with the regular forces. 

(Table unclassified.) 



1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

Regional and Popular Forces: 






o / 

As a 7o of RVNAF Forces- 

47 

48 

49 

51 

51 

As a 7. of RVNAF Combat Deaths^ 

52 

47 

54 

59 

60 

RF/PF Combat Deaths Per 1000 RF/PF 
Personnel Strength c/ 

22 

29 

22 

22 

25 

Regular Force Combat Deaths per 

1000 Regular Personnel Strength^/ 

18 

30 

17 

16 

17 


a/ Source: Derived from Table 3, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary , 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), February 14, 1973. 


b/ Source: Derived from Table 53, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary , 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 18, 1971, 
and February 16, 1972, pp. 1-5. 

c/ Source: Derived from Tables 3 and 53 noted in a/ and b/ above. 


Table 94. The Regional and Popular Forces took the brunt of the VC/NVA-initiated action. (Table un¬ 
classified.) 


1967 1968 

RF/PF 7c of RVNAF Killed 

By VC/NVA Initiated actions 607, 557, 


1969 1970 1971 1972 

557o 667, 657, 457, 


Source: Unpublished SEAPRS Computer File Printout. 


doubled between January 1968 and December 
1971 and then decreased by 606 platoons, for a net 
growth of 80 percent (Table 91). The number of 
PF platoons went from approximately 4,200 to 
8,100 and then dropped to about 7,500, for a net 
gain of approximately 3,300 platoons. 

(U) As expected, the Popular Forces buildup 
focused on security missions, although the platoons 
on active missions increased, too. Platoons on 
hamlet-village security missions increased from 
2,714 in January 1968 to 5,181 in December 1971, 
and then declined. In December 1969, hamlet- 
village security missions accounted for 72 percent 
of the platoons. By June 1972, this had declined to 
60 percent. In the same period, platoons on active 
missions increased from 7 to 18 percent. Table 92 
displays the data. As with the Regional Forces, 


the military regions reflect the countrywide 
pattern in varying degrees, indicating similar 
movement throughout South Vietnam. 

(U) The RF/PF buildups and their gradual shift 
to more active missions accord well with the HES 
results, which show the National Police and the 
People’s Self Defense Forces taking more of the 
responsibility for hamlet security as time passes. 
The HES data also reflect the sharp decrease in 
RF responsibility for hamlet security, as well as 
the much slower decline in the PF role. 

COMBAT PERFORMANCE OF THE REGIONAL ANI) 

POPULAR FORCES 

(U) The Regional and Popular Forces took the 
brunt of the war, more than any other South 
Vietnamese armed force. They had a higher pro- 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 887 






















CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 95. The Regional and Popular Forces accounted for about 30 percent of the VC/NVA killed by the 

RVNAF. (Table unclassified.) 


1967 


1968 


1969 


1970 


1971 


% of VC/NVA Combat Deaths 
Inflicted by RF/PF a/ 


N/A 


237o- / 307, 


30% 


33% 


1972 

28% 


a/ MACV Measurements of Progress Report , April 1968 through December 1972. 
b/ April through December. 


portion of combat deaths than the regulars and 
were the prime targets of VC/NVA attacks until 
1972 

(U) The RF/PF share of combat deaths was 
higher than their percentage in the RVNAF 
force composition. In 1971, for example, the 
RF/PF accounted for 51 percent of the total forces, 
but 60 percent of the combat deaths, and this 
figure probably is conservative.* The intensity 
figures—combat deaths per 1,000 personnel 
strength—show the same relationship. In every 
year except 1968, the chances of getting killed in 
the RF/PF were higher than in the regular forces 
(Table 93). Moreover, the gap between the RF/PF 
and the regulars widened each year from 1969 
through 1971; relative to the regular forces, service 
in the RF/PF got more dangerous each year. One 
reason for the widening gap between the regular 
and territorial forces was that the territorial forces 
accounted for an increasing proportion of the 
RVNAF killed in VC/NVA attacks. They suffered 
55 to 66 percent of all RVNAF deaths from such 
causes in every year except 1972 (Table 94). 

(U) The question on the other side of the coin is, 
to what extent did the RF/PF inflict casualties on 
the VC/NVA forces? Table 95 has the answer. 
The data suggest that the RF/PF accounted for 
about 30 percent of the VC/NVA combat deaths 
inflicted by RVNAF forces, although this figure, 
too, may be conservative.f In any case, it is clear 
that the territorial forces inflicted a lower per- 

*The 60 percent figure may be too low. The TFES reports 
more RF/PF combat deaths than do the Southeast Asia 
Statistical Summary data used here. The TFES figures 
raise the RF/PF share of 1971 RVNAF combat deaths to 
68 percent, for example. 

fOther figures from TFES, possibly more accurate, imply 
that a higher percentage of VC/NVA combat deaths were 
inflicted by the RF/PF. 


centage of VC/NVA casualties than they took (33 
percent inflicted versus 60 percent taken in 1971). 

(U) Several factors help to explain the dis¬ 
crepancy. First, the territorial forces operated in 
the rural areas, where the VC/NVA forces found 
them more readily available, softer targets than 
the regular forces. The RF/PF bore the brunt of 
VC/NVA offensive actions, and the VC/NVA 
enjoyed exceptionally favorable kill ratios in such 
actions. At one point, actions initiated by the 
VC/NVA inflicted 28 percent of the total Allied 
combat deaths, while costing them only 5 percent 
of theirs. ( 14 ) The RF/PF suffered accordingly. 

(U) Second, RF/PF fights with the VC/NVA 
tended to occur at night, often unexpectedly and 
far from combat support. Data from Military 
Region 3 for the period from October 1966 to 
March 1967 suggest that, when attacked, RF/PF 
troops received outside support in only 45 percent 
of the actions and ground reinforcements arrived 
only 11 percent of the time. The other side of the 
picture is even worse. When their offensive opera¬ 
tions contacted the VC/NVA, the territorials 
received outside help in only 17 percent of the 
Military Region 3 actions and ground reinforce¬ 
ments in only 3 percent of them.( 15 ) With Viet- 
namization, the situation undoubtedly improved, 
but even as late as 1969, the RF/PF units were 
receiving only 30 percent of the Vietnamese-fired 
artillery support, and half of that consisted not of 
support during a contact, but of small barrages at 
suspected VC/NVA locations, or preplanned fires 
against likely VC/NVA routes of attack. ( 16 ) 

(U) Finally, the RF/PF for much of the war 
simply had poorer leadership, training, and arms 
than their VC/NVA counterparts, so they could 
not hold their own, particularly without support. 


888 JDItB 


CONFIDENTIAL 













CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 96. The Regional and Popular Forces 
inflicted 30 percent of the VC/NVA deaths for less 
than 20 percent of the RVNAF dollar costs, 
(Table unclassified .) 


Regional Forces and Popular Forces: 

1969 

1970 

1971 

% of RVNAF Combat Deaths 

54 

59 

60 

% of VC/NVA Combat Deaths 

30 

30 

33 

% of RVNAF Program Budget Costs— 

16 

19 

18 


a/ Source: Tables 7, 8, and 9 of Chapter III. Budget years are 


Fiscal Years. 

The Vietnamization program improved the situa¬ 
tion by furnishing M-16 rifles, mortars, radios, 
training, etc. to every RF/PF unit, but even this 
was not enough to redress the imbalance between 
casulaties inflicted and casualties absorbed. 

(U) The RF/PF forces performed well in helping 
to counter the VC/NVA Easter offensive in 1972. 
The shift to large-scale, main-force combat put 
them in the position of supporting main-force 
units in battle, and in many cases they fought 
VC/NVA regular units by themselves. A review 
of RF/PF operations during April-July 1972 sug¬ 
gests that they made a major contribution to the 
war effort. The data suggest that they even tempo¬ 
rarily redressed the imbalance between casualties 
taken and casualties inflicted, which may mean 
that they were surprised by the VC/NVA fewer 
times and received more combat reinforcement 
and support. However, this is conjecture. What¬ 
ever the case, the RF/PF suffered 28 percent of 
the RVNAF combat deaths and claimed 37 percent 
of the VC/NVA combat deaths. ( 17 ) Their kill 
ratio (VC/NVA to RVNAF) was 2 to 1, the same 
as for the regulars. This all suggests that the 
Vietnamization effort paid off handsomely in the 
1972 offensive when the PF/PF apparently fought 
about as well as the regulars, at least in terms of 
casualty exchanges. 

(U) Adding cost data to the assessment of effective¬ 
ness suggests that the PF/PF, dollar for dollar, were 
the 7 nost effective large force in killing VC/NVA 
troops in South Vietnam. The figures indicate that 
the RF/PF accounted for 30 percent of the VC/ 
NVA combat deaths inflicted by RVNAF forces, 
but received less than 20 percent of the RVNAF 
program budget costs (Table 96). More startling, 
the territorial forces accounted for 12 to 30 


Table 97. The Regional and Popular Forces 
accounted for up to 30 percent of the VC/NVA 
combat deaths for J+ percent of the total war costs. 
(Table unclassified.) 


Regional Forces and Popular Forces 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1 of Total VC/NVA Combat Deaths^ 

12 

20 

30 

% of Total Program Budget Costs^ 

2 

3 

4 


a/ Source: MACV Measurements of Progress Reports . January 1969- 
December 1971. 

b/ Source: Tables 7, 8, and 9 of Chapter III. The Budget 
Years are Fiscal Years. 

percent of all VC/NVA combat deaths, depending 
on the year, but for only 2 to 4 percent of the total 
program budget costs of the war (Table 97). 

(U) These are macabre calculations because they 
purport to equate dollars and deaths, which is 
nonsense, but they do point up the incredibly 
unbalanced allocation of resources within the 
Allied war effort. The attrition objective alone 
would seem to have called for more resources and 
emphasis to the territorial forces. If 30 percent of 
the VC/NVA casualties can be gotten for only 4 
percent of the resources, what might have hap¬ 
pened if the Allies had allocated 10 percent of the 
resources to the RF/PF? The potential effects 
might have been staggering. And the RF/PF role 
in establishing territorial security has not even 
been put into the calculation yet. 

(U) The primary mission of the territorial forces 
was to protect and secure the population, particu¬ 
larly in the rural areas. The HES data suggest that 
about half of the population relied on the RF/PF 
for the security of their hamlets (Table 84). 
Chapter XVII indicates that the RF/PF killed or 
captured more of the VC/NVA clandestine infra¬ 
structure than any other force. 

(U) There is no doubt that the RF/PF contributed 
to the increasing security of the countryside dis¬ 
cussed in Chapter XIII. It is tempting to give 
them all of the credit for the gains, but that is 
probably not the case, because the situation is 
more complex than that. Many other forces and 
programs participated in the pacification effort and 
surely had some effect. Nonetheless, it is inter¬ 
esting to note that the RF/PF increased 58 percent 
during 1968-69, while the secure population 
(A and B) increased 74 percent. And most of the 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 889 















CONFIDENTIAL 


gain in security came in 1969 and 1970 after most 
of the RF/PF buildup was complete. 

(U) Comparing the growth of the RF/PF with 
progress of the Rural Control Indicator in 1970-71 
yields the interesting statistic that about 60 rural 
inhabitants came under GVN control for each 
RF/PF soldier added during the period (62 in 
1970; 59 in 1971).* From mid-1969 to mid-1970, 
the increase of 807 new units in Military Region 4 
closely parallels the pacification gain of 801 
hamlets in the A and B security ratings. ( 18 ) 

(U) However, rel}dng on the foregoing data to 
make the case for RF/PF can be misleading, 
because analysis of the period from April to 
September 1968 yields the dismaying findings (for 
RF/PF boosters) that the security ratings of the 
population not protected by the RF/PF improved 
about as often as the population they protected 
(11 percent of the unprotected population in- 
increased, compared to 12 percent of the pro¬ 
tected). ( 19 ) This clearly suggests that other factors 
were also working to improve population security 
ratings. 

(U) The same analysis indicated that RF/PF, 
working together, had the best effect on HES 
scores, followed by PF operating alone. The RF 
alone tended to be associated with security regres¬ 
sions, except in Military Region 4, where the 
RF/PF were the primary RVNAF combat 
forces. ( 19 ) The findings are reasonable. The RF 
were considered to be a flexible, mobile force, 
which could take part in large-unit operations 
with regular forces, replace ARVN battalions in 
providing territorial security, and provide a secu¬ 
rity umbrella for PF, RD Cadre, PSDF, and other 
GVN personnel tied down to hamlets. 

(U) Thus, RF/PF working together provided 
mobile and static defense, and they could be 
expected to have a favorable impact on HES 
scores. About 80 percent of the PF units were 
recruited primarily from their own or adjacent 
villages, so they could not appear on the scene 
until the RF and regulars had established enough 
security in the area to allow the GVN to recruit 
the Popular Forces. Logically then, one could 


*Calculated on the basis of present-for-duty strength in 
RF/PF combat units, not the authorized strengths shown 
elsewhere in this chapter. 


expect to find improving security where PF appear. 
On the other hand, RF units were the mobile 
units that were supposed to show up in trouble 
spots to counter VC/NVA actions, which drag 
down the HES scores. 

(U) The results of public opinion surveys in South 
Vietnam suggest that the people were more im¬ 
pressed with RF performance than with PF 
performance, and that they equated it with 
regular army (ARVN) performance. Forty percent 
thought the PF were effective, and 70 percent 
thought the RF were effective. Seventy percent of 
another sample thought the ARVN were effec¬ 
tive. ( 20 ) Thus, the RF seemed to rate as well with 
the rural population as the ARVN. 

(U) It seems clear that the RF/PF , by their combat 
perjorman ce and their 'permanent presence in the 
countryside , had a profound and perhaps decisive 
effect on improving the security of the rural popula¬ 
tion. Yet they consumed less than 5 percent of the 
total costs of the war. There can be little question that 
the Regional and Popular Forces were the most cost- 
effective military forces employed on the Allied side. 
However , until the big pacification effort began in 
1967-68, they were consistently neglected by both 
the GVN and United States. 

THE PARAMILITARY FORCES 

(U) The paramilitary forces discussed here are the 
National Police, the RD Cadre, Truong Son 
Cadre, and the PSDF (People’s Self Defense 
Forces). These forces were not expected to seek 
combat with the VC/NVA forces, but, operating in 
the rural areas, they took a significant number of 
casualties while inflicting some on the VC/NVA. 
From 1968 through 1972, about 10,000 paramili¬ 
tary personnel were killed in action.( 21 ) They were 
credited with about 2,500 VC/NVA combat deaths, 
which indicates the disadvantage they suffered in 
fights with VC/NVA forces. ( 22 ) 

THE NATIONAL POLICE 

(U) The National Police of South Vietnam per¬ 
formed normal police functions throughout the 
country, particularly in the cities and towns. In 
addition, the Field Police and Special Police (an 
intelligence collection branch) had special roles to 
play in the GVN war effort. Their primary mission 
was supposed to be the anti-VC Infrastructure 


890 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 



CONFIDENTIAL 


I able 98. National Police components; strength in Table 99. The People’s Self Defense Forces. (Table 
thousands. {Table classified Confidential.) unclassified.) 

---In 



1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 


Jun 

Jun 

Jun 

Jun 

Jun 


UD_ 

icy 

icy 

icy 

icy 

Police 

68 

48 

58 

86 

80 

Field Police^ 

12 

14 

15 

16*/ 

17 

Special Police 

" *" 

15 

15 


20 

Total National Police 

80 

77 

88 

116 

117 

Source: Army Activities 

Report: 

Southeast 

Asia - 

Final Issue 

y 


Dec. 20, 1972, p. 45). 
a/ As of September 30. 

b/ Formerly National Police Field Force (NPFF). 


campaign. ( 23 ) Their performance in this task is 
discussed later, in Chapter XVII. It was not very 
good, but they did manage to account for 20 per¬ 
cent of the VCI neutralized in 1970. ( 24 ) Table 83 
(page 884) showed that the strength of the 
National Police increased from 52,000 in 1965 to 
121,000 in December 1972, a gain of 130 percent. 
Table 98 shows the three components of the 
National Police from June 1968 through June 1972. 
The Field and Special Police made up about 30 
percent of the police strength from 1969 onward. 

(U) Until 1969, the National Police were most 
active in the secure areas where the population 
density was highest, and they concentrated on 
providing the services of a civil police body. Below 
the provincial level, police operations were cen¬ 
tered in district towns. As security increased in 
the rural areas during 1969, the police expanded 
their operations from coverage of the district 
towns downward into villages, and at the end of 
1969 more than 6,000 uniformed police were 
assigned to 1,621 villages. ( 23 ) From then on, much 
of the police expansion went into the rural areas. 
The HES data support the notion of a move¬ 
ment of the police into the countryside. In Decem¬ 
ber 1969, about 65 percent of the population lived 
in villages that had National Police substations 
within the village. B}^ December 1972, three years 
later, the figure was 95 percent. ( 25 ) As already seen 
in Table 84, the National Police were the force 
primarily responsible for the security of 17 percent 
of South Vietnam’s population by December 1972. 

(U) In the villages the National Police were 
charged with registering the village population 



1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

Combat 

Inter Team Members: 

Organized 


447 

498 

460 

Trained 


372 

486 

435 

Other Combat: 

Organized 


731 

895 

543 

Trained 


671 

837 

324 

Armed 


380 

593 

558 

Support: 

Organized 


2311 

3036 

2826 

Trained 


1597 

2508 

N/A 

Total: 

Organized 

3219 

3489 

4429 

3829 

Trained 

1898 

2640 

3831 

N/A 

Armed 

400 

380 

593 

558 


Source: Army Activities Report: Southeast Asia - Final Issue (CSDCS-74), 
December 20, 1972, p. 51. 

(issuing identification cards, establishing family 
books, census of village residents, etc.). In Decem¬ 
ber 1969 the HES reported that these measures 
were complete and up to date for 40 percent of 
the total South Vietnamese population; three 
years later the figure was 89 percent. ( 26 ) 

(U) The villagers were not impressed with the 
performance of the police. Only 30 percent thought 
they were effective in maintaining order, ( 27 ) and 
only 19 percent thought they were effective in 
upholding the law.( 28 ) On the other hand, 71 per¬ 
cent of the villagers thought that the National 
Police acted fairly and justly with the people of 
the community all or most of the time; 20 percent 
thought they didn’t.( 29 ) This runs counter to the 
conventional stereotype of the South Vietnamese 
police held in the United States. But the sample 
Avas large (7,201 people) and the question was 
asked in eight different months, so the stereotype 
may be overdraAAn. Indeed , the data suggest that 
the police were considered inept , but tolerably fair. 

(U) Most observers would probably agree that 
the police Averen’t as effective as they needed to 
be. They didn’t receive much in the Avay of GVN 
attention or resources until late in the Avar, partly 
because military mobilization absorbed all of the 
available manpower and RVNAF received priority. 
As security spread into the countryside, the GVN 
finally turned its attention to the police, transfer¬ 
ring ARVN personnel to the force and initiating 
other measures to improve its capability. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 891 


















CONFIDENTIAL 


REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE 

(U) Begun in 1965 in Binh Dinh Province, the 
59-man RD Cadre teams became the cutting 
edge of the new GVN Ministry of Revolutionary 
Development, created in 1965. The structure of 
the 59-man team was a defense platoon of 34 
men, with the rest in small civic action teams. A 
team would go into a rural village and spend 
some time working with the people, attempting to 
gain their support for the GVN through a variety 
of civic action types of projects, and then moving 
on to another village. Later, beginning with the 
Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) of late 
1968, after ARVN battalions and the RF/PF 
were providing more security for pacification, 
each team was split into two 30-man civic-action 
teams, which were assigned to villages on a semi¬ 
permanent basis. 

(U) The effectiveness of the RD Cadre and 
Truong Son Cadre is implied by the extent of 
the VC/NVA efforts against them. The cadres 
were designed to help the people and to counter 
the operations of the VC/NVA cadres operating 
in the hamlets and villages, and the VC/NVA 
immediately recognized the significance of the 
new group. Intelligence reports signified the VC/ 
NVA intent to attack RD Cadre teams, and the 
latter began taking casualties soon after they 
started operating in 1966, when they lost almost 
700 killed and captured./ 30 ) By 1967-68, relative 
to their personnel strength, the cadre were being 
killed and were deserting at rates comparable to 
the RVNAF, and usually higher. Attrition of the 
RD Cadre for the first half of 1968 was at an 
annual rate of 26 percent./ 31 ) 

(U) As pacification succeeded and fewer new 
hamlets needed the cadre treatment, they were 
phased down, as shown in Table 83, from a peak 
of 53,000 in 1968 to 23,000 by the end of 1972. 

THE PEOPLE’S SELF DEFENSE FORCES 

(U) The People’s Self Defense Forces, created in 
1968, were civilian forces organized into two 
groups—combat and support forces—ostensibly 
for local defense and as a supplement to the 
RF/PF. Major purposes were to commit as many 
people as possible to the GVN and to soak up 
manpower so as to deny it to the VC/NVA re¬ 
cruiters. Membership in the support forces was 


voluntary, and all citizens 7 years of age or older 
could join. Support forces consisted of three 
groups: youth, women, and elders. Although sup¬ 
port members were theoretically trained in first 
aid, medical evacuation, etc., a key purpose was 
to commit a large bloc of the population to the 
government./ 32 ) 

(U) The combat forces consisted of male citizens 
of ages 16 and 17 and those between 38 and 50, 
who were recpiired by the National Mobilization 
Law to serve in the Combat PSDF. This encom¬ 
passed all the non-draft-age men up to the age of 
50. Able-bodied women and elders (over 50) could 
volunteer to serve in the combat forces./ 32 ) 
Included in the combat forces were key interteam 
members, who were organized into 35-man teams, 
with each man being armed. (Combat PSDF in 
general were supposed to receive about one weapon 
for each five persons.) The key inter teams were 
called KIT’s. Their leaders and members were 
supposed to receive training over and above that 
given to general Combat PSDF, and several 
members from each KIT attended a 4-week KIT 
leader course./ 33 ) 

(U) Table 99 displays the data showing the size 
and status of the various segments of the force. 
The figures are notoriously unreliable, but they 
do serve to indicate the magnitude of the program, 
which claimed to have armed more than 500,000 
people with M-l rifles, bar’s, M-l and M-2 
carbines, and a few shotguns./ 33 ) 


(U) It seems clear from Table 84 (above) that the 
PSDF KIT’s did replace some PF units as the 
force primarily responsible for the security of 
certain hamlets with high security ratings./ 34 ) 
Coverage of the population by the PF dropped 
from 47 percent to 39 percent between 1969 and 
1972, while the PSDF coverage rose from 24 to 
35 percent. By December 1972, more than 90 
percent of the population reportedly lived in 
hamlets where the PSDF were standing armed 
guard (20 percent) or were conducting armed 
patrols within the hamlets (73 percent)./ 35 ) 

(U) When asked if they took part in PSDF 
activities, 66 percent of the rural PAAS respond¬ 
ents said no./ 36 ) When asked why, they gave sex 
and age as the reason for not participating,/ 37 ) 
which suggests they may not have been aware of 
the requirements for joining the PSDF. On the 


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892 JDRB 










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other hand, 22 percent of the respondents said 
they had been issued weapons and stood guard in 
the hamlet. Asked about the performance of the 

X, 


PSDF, 49 percent of the respondents rated them 
effective.( 38 ) This was a better rating than the 
PF got. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 893 


CONFIDENTIAL 


Chapter XV 

Gauging Vietnamese Popular Attitudes 


(U) Extensive efforts were made to discern popular 
attitudes in a war that was regarded as being 
fought for the people’s support. Again, it was the 
CORDS pacification advisors who took the lead, 
with monthly opinion polls from late 1969 onward. 

(U) Three sets of Vietnamese public opinion sur¬ 
veys are analyzed here. The first set consists of 
two surveys by the JUSPAO (Joint U.S. Public 
Affairs Office) in South Vietnam from October 
through December 1965. The second survey was 
done for CBS by the Opinion Research Corpora¬ 
tion a year later (November 1966 to February 
1967). The third, and most important, set of 
surveys is the PAAS (Pacification Attitude Analy¬ 
sis System), a monthly survey started during the 
fourth quarter of 1969. The JUSPAO and CBS 
polls are summarized briefly below. Some general 
findings from the PAAS are also discussed, but 
specific results dealing with security, land reform, 
economics, etc. appear in the appropriate chapters 
on those topics. 

THE JUSPAO SURVEY (OCTOBER- 
DECEMBER 1965)( 39 ) 

(U) The JUSPAO surveys were not taken as 
carefully as the CBS survey. Interviewers could 
select their respondents at will in many cases. Age, 
sex, and religious distributions were distorted, and 
the lower economic classes were overrepresented. 
Similar problems appear in the PAAS, but in both 
cases the results are interesting and useful. 

(U) The JUSPAO surveys suggest that the average 


Vietnamese in 1965 considered personal economic 
problems to be his primary concern; 42 percent of a 
Saigon sample (of 410 people) cited the high cost of 
living or personal finances as the most important 
problem they faced. In a combined urban-rural 
sample (1,141 people), 41 percent were dissatisfied 
with life. Most of them cited the cost of living and 
family finances as the source of dissatisfaction. 
The one wish for life that all respondents cited 
most often (35 percent of all responses) was for 
a better working condition and a lower cost of 
living. A desire for greater government responsive¬ 
ness to their needs was the next most frequent wish 
(29 percent), followed by a wish for peace and 
unity (20 percent). Thus , the Vietnamese in late 
1965 were engrossed in their personal economic 
problems. Only 6 percent considered the war to be of 
primary concern. 

THE CBS SURVEY (NOVEMBER 1966- 
FEBRUARY 1967) ( 40 ) 

(U) The CBS survey covered 436 Saigon residents, 
132 residents of smaller cities, and 745 people in 
11 provinces, all in secure areas. The survey 
underrepresents males of military age and farmers. 
But it has the virtue of being conducted without 
the knowledge of U.S. or GVN officials, and it 
used rigid statistical sampling techniques to ensure 
a representative sample of all age categories and 
social strata. 

(U) The survey confirms that economic goals ranked 
very high in Vietnamese personal aspirations. A 
majority (64 percent) of the 1,413 respondents 


894 JDRB 


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chose better employment, income, or cost of living 
conditions as their first wish for self or family. 
They cited economic factors (cost of hving3\unem- 
ployment, income opportunities, family finances) 
most frequently as the main causes for improve¬ 
ment or deterioration in their lives during the 
past year. 

(U) For their country , the Vietnamese respondents 
overwhelmingly desired peace and security as their 
first wish (84 percent). Victory, independence, and 
freedom drew a response of only 9 percent. In 
answer to the question, “What should the Ameri¬ 
can forces do in the South?” the Vietnamese 
responded as shown in Table 100. When asked 
whether the Americans should devote more 
attention to negotiating with North Vietnam or 
fighting, 63 percent opted for more negotiations. 
Only 15 percent chose more military action (22 
percent had no opinion). 

(U) In sum, the CBS survey suggested a strong 
personal concern with economic problems and a 
general wish for peace and security, preferably from 
negotiation, not fighting. 

THE PACIFICATION ATTITUDE ANALYSIS 

SYSTEM (PAAS) 

(U) The Pacification Attitude Analysis System 
(PAAS) attempted to portray urban and rural 
South Vietnamese attitudes toward security, 
politics, and economic development. It was devel¬ 
oped by the Pacification Studies Group of CORDS 
and by the Central Pacification and Development 
Council of the Government of Vietnam, with the 
help of U.S. contract survey experts. Monthly 
PAAS results began with October 1969 for the 
rural population and with March 1971 for the 
urban population. The surveys portrayed two 
types of information: trends or shifts in opinion 
and reactions to specific events. To indicate 
trends, the same questions were used at reasonable 
intervals. Special questions were asked to elicit 
reactions to specific events. As the system ma¬ 
tured, special questions became the rule, and the 
trends are difficult to follow. 

(U) The surveys were based on semistructured 
interviews conducted by trained Vietnamese inter¬ 
viewers who worked for CORDS, not the GVN. 
A typical rural survey covered 30 to 35 provinces, 


Table 100. What should the American forces do in 
the south? (Table unclassified.) 


Go on fighting 


39% 

Stop fighting. 

stay as advisors 

21% 

Stop fighting. 

go home 

10% 

No opinion 


30% 

Total 


100% 


and three-man teams (three per province) were 
assigned to a specific hamlet for interviews. The 
cadre memorized the survey questions before 
entering the hamlet and, guided by pre-established 
criteria, selected respondents. The questions were 
asked indirectly in the course of conversation, and 
the replies were coded in predetermined cate¬ 
gories immediately afterward. The same procedure 
was followed in the urban interviews, which con¬ 
centrated on the 13 autonomous cities. 

(U) Any systematic effort to portray attitudes and 
beliefs is subject to error, and conditions in South 
Vietnam further limit the accuracy that is possible. 
The limitations of PAAS outlined below need to be 
kept in mind when reviewing the PAAS data 
presented here and elsewhere, but it was the only 
regular polling done in South Vietnam other than 
elections and was quite useful in providing indica¬ 
tions of Vietnamese public opinion. In August 
1970, for example, answers to the question, “What 
tickets will win in the Senate election?” called the 
first three winning tickets in exact order. ( 41 ) 

PAAS LIMITATIONS 

(U) Two limitations of the PAAS should be kept 
in mind when viewing the results. They stem from 
the way in which the data were collected and from 
deficiencies in the sampling techniques used. 

(U) Data Collection Limitations. Semistructured 
interviews which sought opinions indirectly during 
conversation instead of posing direct, precise 
questions were probably the only realistic means 
to obtain a frank response from the Vietnamese at 
any time, let alone in the middle of a war. Unfortu¬ 
nately, the technique could not avoid introducing 
the bias of the questioner into the results, because 
PAAS actually presented what the interviewer 
thought the respondent meant in responding to a 


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JDRB 895 




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Table 101. What are your aspirations for the 
future? (Table unclassified.) 


Peace for Viet-Nam 49% 
Security in the countryside 27% 
Stabilization and normalization of social standards 127o 
Better economic life 11% 


Source: PAAS Rural Question 55, from published reports. 

line of conversation that the interviewer devel¬ 
oped. The PAAS did not record a respondent’s 
clear-cut answer to a direct, precisely stated ques¬ 
tion. It therefore differs from some public opinion 
polls conducted in the United States, and the 
results must be viewed as being much less precise. 

(U) Interview training can minimize interviewer 
bias, and the training was careful and rigorous, 
but it cannot completely eliminate the tendency of 
the interviewer to interject his own beliefs and 
opinions into the way he phrases the question and 
interprets the response. In addition, most re¬ 
spondents were probably reluctant to be com¬ 
pletely candid on all subjects surveyed (the results 
on payment of taxes bear this out). The questioners 
were not formally identified as GVN agents, and 
they employed a wide range of “covers” 
designed to allay suspicion. But they could not 
help being viewed as “strangers” by respondents, 
who probably often associated the questioner with 
the GVN because of his conversational interests. 
Respondents undoubtedly considered these factors 
in responding, which in turn limited the accuracy 
of the survev. 

(U) Sampling Limitations. Quota rather than 
probability sampling techniques were used to 
select the hamlets and the individual respondents, 
so the sample from which interviews were drawn 
was not necessarily an accurate representation of 
the South Vietnamese population. The rural PAAS 
tended, for example, to overrepresent the attitudes 
of “C” hamlet populations in 1970. In October 
1970, “C” hamlets accounted for 18 percent of the 
rural population, but for 37 percent of the rural 
respondents to PAAS. Women represented only 
30 to 40 percent of the respondents and no civilian 
authorities or paid members of a military organi¬ 
zation were interviewed. 

(U) The second difficulty with the sample was its 
size. As many as 3,000 respondents were inter- 


Table 102. What do you consider the most important 
problem facing the country at this time? (Table 
unclassified.) 



Rural a/ 

Urban b/ 

Peace — End the War As Soon 
as Possible 

527. 

457. 

Security 

167. 

147. 

Fight the VC Harder 

137. 

117. 

Economic 

137. 

207. 

Number of Respondents 

3781 

3183 


a/ PAAS Rural Question Number 135 asked in June 1971 and June, July, 
August 1972. 


b/ PAAS Urban Question Number 5038 asked March, June, July 1971 and 
June, July, August 1972. 

viewed in a given month, but in most cases each 
respondent was asked only one-third of the ques¬ 
tions involved in the three-part interview. In effect, 
only about 30 people in a given province answered 
a given question in the monthly rural PAAS. A 
different sample was supposed to be used each 
month, but even so, the limitations were probably 
significant. 

(U) But the PAAS was a useful system, despite 
its limitations, and it yielded considerable insight 
into the situation in South Vietnam—insight 
that probably could not have been gained in 
any other way. 

PAAS RESULTS* 

(U) A few themes from the PAAS 1970-72 are 
explored here. These include surveys of the 
people’s views about their problems and aspira¬ 
tions, security, the media, government perform¬ 
ance, the war, and the Americans. Other themes, 
such as inflation, land reform, performance of 
Allied forces, the Chieu Hoi Program, etc. are 
addressed in the chapters devoted to those 
subjects. 

ASPIRATIONS 

(U) During every month in 1970, as well as in 

*Most of the figures used here and in the following chapters 
were derived from CORDS computer tapes. They some¬ 
times differ slightly from those published in the PAAS 
monthly hard copy report because they have been adjusted 
to reflect the actual geographical distribution of the rural 
South Vietnamese population. The adjustment compen¬ 
sates for the tendency of the quota interview system used 
by the PAAS to overrepresent the opinions collected from 
less populated areas of the country. 


89 G JDRB 


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Table 103. It hat is the most severe problem facing 
you? (Table unclassified.) 


Increased Prices and Financial Problems 

X 

567. 

Security 


247. 

Other 


207. 

Respondents 

27. 

,483 


Source: PAAS published reports for 1970. 


Table 104. What is the most severe rural problem? 

(Table unclassified.) 

None 187. 

Security 257 

Lack of Means (127.) or Money (57.) to Grow Crops 177„ 

Lack of Essential Goods or Their Very High Prices 177, 


Source: PAAS Rural Question 467, asked in January 1972, 
from unpublished computer printout. 

February 1971,* the PAAS teams asked rural 
respondents, “What are your aspirations for the 
future?” Altogether, about 15,000 people responded 
as shown in Table 101. About 75 percent of the 
respondents, on average, expressed a desire for 
peace or security as their first aspiration, with the 
monthly percentages ranging from 73 to 84 per¬ 
cent. These results agree well with those of the 
CBS poll taken four years earlier, when 84 percent 
expressed an aspiration for peace and security. 

(U) The proportion aspiring to peace jumped to 
about 60 percent after the GVN/U.S. peace 
initiative in October 1970, with most of the gain 
coming out of the aspiration for security. Aware¬ 
ness of the peace initiative was high: In the 
November 1970 survey, 79 percent of the rural 
respondents said they were aware that a new 
proposal had been made. A special survey con¬ 
ducted in provincial capitals—areas of greater 
exposure to national news media—indicated that 
97 percent knew about the initiative. The high 
rates of awareness reflect the extensive publicity 
that accompanied the proposal in South Vietnam 
and the strong desire for peace. 

(U) An urban survey in October 1971 suggested 
that aspirations of the city dwellers were less 

*The question was not asked in the rural ar as after 
February. 

CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 105. What is the most severe urban problem? 

(Table unclassified.) 


Theft 29% 

Crowded Conditions, Lack of Housing 14% 

Inadequate Garbage Collection, 14% 

Water and Electricity 

Flooding in Slum Areas 13%, 

Traffic io% 

Poor Social Environment for 9% 

Raising Children 

Number of Respondents 3054 


Source: PAAS Urban Question 5101, asked in 
March, April, May, June, July, and Octo¬ 
ber 1971 and in September 1972, from un¬ 
published computer printout. 

concerned about security (7 percent) than those 
of the respondents in the rural areas and were 
more concerned about social standards (16 per¬ 
cent) and a better economic life (15 percent).( 42 ) 
The pattern reflects the insulation of city dwellers 
from the security problems of the war, and it 
seems reasonable. 

problems 

(U) In 1971 and 1972, rural and urban respondents 
were asked, “What do you consider the most 
important problem facing the country at this 
time?” Table 102 shows again a difference between 
the rural and urban attitudes. Sixty-eight percent 
of the rural respondents considered peace and 
security the most important problem, while 59 
percent of the urban dwellers agreed. Only 13 
percent of the rural respondents considered 
economic problems the most important, in com¬ 
parison to 20 percent of the urban dwellers. But 
the similarity regarding the war was perhaps most 
significant: Few urban (11 percent) and rural (13 
percent) respondents thought fighting harder 
against the VC/NVA was the main problem. This 
was comparable to the CBS response of only 9 
percent who aspired to victory, ind pendence, and 
freedom rather than peace and s; • 

(U) Throughout 1970, PAAS rural su- veys asked, 
“What is the most severe problem facing you?” 

JDRB 897 


588 - 67 ? 0 - 75-10 










CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 106. How does security compare with last 
month? {Percentage.) {Table unclassified.) 



1969 

1970 

1971 

1971 


Dec 

Jun 

Dec 

Jun 

Jan 

Jun 

Dec 

Better (%) 

35 

33 

45 

22 

30 

14 

25 

Worse (7.) 

15 

20 

6 

11 

9 

16 

9 

Same (%) 

48 

47 

48 

67 

59 

69 

63 

Number of Respondents 

n/a 

n/a 

1104 

936 

930 

898 1343 


Source: PAAS Rural Survey Reports and unpublished computer printouts of 


Question 32. 

Table 107. How do you get information about 
national I international and local affairs? {Per¬ 
centage of respondents.) {Table unclassified.) 


National/International Local/Provineia1 


Source 

Rural 

Urban 

Rural 

Urban 

Radio 

49 

28 

19 

18 

Television 

3 

13 

a/ 

7 

Newspapers 

6 

31 

5 

4 

Local Officials 

16 

3 

34 

43 

Friends & Neighbors 

12 

8 

21 

13 

Don't know or 

Don't care 

13 

18 

11 

10 

No. of Respondents 

4904 

599 

4904 

599 


Sources: PAAS published reports. Rural surveys taken in March, July, 

October, December 1970; and February 1971 (Questions 46 and 47). 

PAAS Urban survey January 1972; Questions 5269 and 5270. 
a/ TV was not a response for local/provincial affairs in the rural surveys. 

The cumulative answer is shown in Table 103. 
Increased prices and financial problems were con¬ 
sidered the worst problems by more than half of 
the respondents, and the trend during the year 
was upward—from 48 percent in the second 
quarter of 1970 to 64 percent in the fourth quarter. 

(U) On the other hand, the percentage who con¬ 
sidered security their worst problem stayed fairly 
constant at about 24 percent throughout the year. 
This percentage is about the same as the 27 percent 
who aspired to security for Vietnam during the 
same period. Taken together, they suggest that at 
least 25 percent of the South Vietnamese popula¬ 
tion in the rural areas lived under insecure con¬ 
ditions during 1970. According to the HES 
(Chapter XIII), 75 percent of the population were 
rated secure (A and B) in December 1970, so there 
is some convergence of PAAS and HES here. 
Moreover, when 922 rural respondents were asked, 
in January 1972, “What is the most severe rural 
problem?” 25 percent responded, “security.” The 
range of responses is shown in Table 104. The 
urban form of insecurity seemed to be theft. When 
asked, “What is the most severe urban problem?” 


Table 108. Do the people have the responsibility of 
helping the government keep the Viet Cong out of 

their hamlets? {Table uncalssified.) 

✓ 



Rural iP 

Urban —l 

No 

24% 

11% 

Yes 

71% 

83% 

No. of Respondents 

11,190 

1989 


a/ "What the Vietnamese Peasant Thinks," SEA 
Analysis Rpt. , Jan-Feb 1971, p. 21; includes 
data for all of 1970. 

b/ PAAS Urban Question 5065, asked in March, 

June, and July 1972; from unpublished compu¬ 
ter printout. 


Table 109. Whose responsibility is it to improve 
community life? {Table unclassified.) 



Rural 

Urbarr 

The Government (%) 

t 

36 

24 

The People (%) 

7 

6 

Both (%) 

52 

61 

No. of Respondents 

898 

700 


Source: PAAS Rural Question 129 and Urban Ques¬ 
tion 5129, both asked in June 1972. 

29 percent of the urban respondents answered, 
“Theft.” See Table 105. 

security 

(U) From the beginning of PAAS in the late 1969, 
respondents were frequently asked to compare the 
state of security this month with security last 
month. The results at the end and middle of each 
year are shown in Table 106. The only pronounced 
trend seems to be a one-time shift of opinion from 
the “security is better” category to the “security 
is the same” category in June 1971. This can be 
interpreted to suggest that the security situation 
had stabilized by then in the eyes of most of the 
rural population. The urban surveys tended to 
support this, because the respondents in the cities 
were more secure to begin with and 85 percent of 
them, on average, indicated security was the 
same( 43 ) this month as last month. 

(U) The other pattern of interest suggests that the 
rural Vietnamese clearly felt the war cycle described 


898 JDRB 


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1 able 110. How well does the government perform? 

(Table unclassified.) 


As well as can be 
expected under the 
circumstances 

Rural 

417o 


Urban 

45% 

Adequate 

30% 


29% 

Inadequate 

8% 


15% 

No. of Respondents 

4209 


2865 

Source: PAAS Rural Question 243 and 
tion 5243, both asked in June, July, 
December 1972. 

Urban Ques- 
August, and 

Table 111. How well does your provincial {city) 
council perform? (Table unclassified.) 

As well as could be expected 
under the circumstances 

Rural 

6% 


Urban 

4% 

Adequate 

17% 


16% 

Inadequate or Incapable 

36% 


46% 

Does Not Know 

40% 


30% 

No. of Respondents 

4414 


2063 


Source: PAAS Rural Question 201 and Urban Question 5202, 
both asked in March, April, May, and June 1971 and May 
1972. 


in Chapter II. The “better” ratings were always 
higher in December and January than in June, 
and each year the “worse” ratings were highest 
in June, the month when the VC/NVA winter¬ 
spring offensive was finally coming to an end. The 
same pattern held for the urban respondents.^ 3 ) 

INFORMATION SOURCES 

(U) Radio, newspapers (for city dwellers), and 
local officials were the predominant sources of 
news and information about international, 

f 

national, and local affairs, according to PAAS. 

(U) Three rural surveys( 44 ) asked 2,846 re¬ 
spondents whether they owned a radio, and one 
(895 respondents) also asked if they had access to 
one. Fifty-one percent of the rural respondents 
said they owned a radio, 7 percent said they had 
regular access to one, and 20 percent had infre¬ 
quent access. Only 22 percent had no radio or no 
access to one. In the urban areas, 76 percent of 
the respondents said they owned a radio in each 
of the two surveys taken. ( 45 ) The question of 


Table 112. How will the war end? (Table unclas¬ 
sified.) 


Rural 

1970 

1971 

1972 

GVN Victory 

287. 

327. 

127. 

Paris Talks 

167. 

157. 

217. 

Don't Know 

187. 

237. 

487. 

No. of Rural 

11,149 

1968 

1744 

Respondents 




1970 data is from "What 

the Vietnamese Peasant Thinks", 


Southeast Asia Analysis 

Report, Januarv-Februarv 1971, p. 

18. 

1971-1972 data are from 

PAAS Rural Question 

266 asked in 


February and May 1971, and in June and July 

1972. 


Table 113. When 

will the war end? (Table 

un- 


classified.) 




Rural 

Urban 


1971 1972 

1971 

1972 

Within 6 Months 

17. 137. 

57. 

187. 

Within 1 year 

_77. 167. 

_67. 

227. 

Subtotal 

87. 297. 

117. 

407. 

Within 1-2 Years 

167. 77. 

117. 

97. 

Will Go on Indefinitely^ 

1 227. 97. 

397. 

147. 

Don't Know 

537. 557. 

357. 

377. 

No. of Respondents 

2736 2693 

1192 

1895 


PAAS Urban Question 5214, and PAAS Rural Question 213 for May, 
June, and July in 1971 and in 1972. From unpublished computer 
printouts. 

a/ Includes within 2-4 years and within 4-8 years responses. 

access was posed to 687 respondents in the second 
urban survey; 10 percent had regular access to 
radio, 5 percent had infrequent access, and 9 
percent had no access to a radio. Thus, 86 percent 
of the urban respondents had regular access to a 
radio. 

(U) Urban respondents also read newspapers. A 
survey of 269 respondents in March 1972 revealed 
that 40 percent read newspapers frequently, 31 
percent read them but seldom, and only 29 percent 
didn’t read them at all.( 46 ) The sample was small, 
but the results probably were roughly right, 
because newspapers have remained a contentious 
issue in Vietnam, and, in Saigon at least, were for 
sale everywhere. 

(U) Thus, the South Vietnamese people were being 
reached b}^ modern methods of communication. 
Table 107 shows that 49 percent of the rural 
respondents got their national and international 
news from radio. The city dwellers got theirs from 


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Table 114. Why do the VC/NVA continue to fight? 

(Table unclassified.) 



Rural 

1970 1972 

Urban 

1972 

Influence of North Viet-Nam 

387. 

247. 

307. 

Influence of Other Foreign 

Powers 

_67. 

137. 

237. 

Subtotal 

447. 

377. 

537. 

Believe Their Cause is Just 

67. 

107. 

77. 

Haven't Accomplished Their 

Goal 

117. 

187. 

187. 

Don't Know or Won't Respond 

347. 

317. 

227. 

No. of Respondents 

1806 

1852 

1384 


Sources: 

PAAS Rural Questions 56 in June and July 1970, plus Question 244 
in June and July 1972. PAAS Urban Question 5244 in June and 
July 1972. From published PAAS reports and unpublished computer 
printouts. 


Table 115. Do you want a cease-fire? (Table 

unclassified.) 


Yes, under any circumstances 

Rural 

167. 

Urban 

147. 

Yes, if no GVN territory is lost 

727. 

747. 

Yes, if I don't have to live under 
VC/NVA control 

117. 

107. 

Yes, if I don't have to live under 

GVN control 

17. 

17. 

No. of Respondents 

1843 

2182 


Sources: 

PAAS Rural Question 263 asked in June and July 1972, and PAAS 
Urban Question 5263 asked in June, July and October 1972. From 
unpublished computer printouts. 

the radio (28 percent) and the newspaper (31 
percent). The prime source of local news was local 
officials (rural, 34 percent, and urban, 43 percent). 

THE GOVERNMENT 

(U) More Vietnamese in the rural areas than the 
people in the cities seemed to expect the govern¬ 
ment to assume responsibilities a bit more. When 
asked if the people had the responsibility of helping 
the government keep the VC/NVA out of their 
hamlet, rural and urban respondents answered as 
in Table 108. The same tendency showed up in 
response to the question, “Whose responsibility is 
it to improve community life?” More rural people 
expected the government to shoulder the responsi¬ 
bility; see Table 109. 

(U) Rural and urban respondents felt about the 


Table 116. Is there anti-American feeling in your 
community? (Table unclassified.) 


Yes 

Rural 

57. 

Urban 

10% 

Yes, but only among a very 
few people 

137. 

23% 

Subtotal - Yes 

187. 

33% 

No 

62% 

51% 

Does not know 

187. 

16% 

No. of Respondents 

4463 

1975 

Sources: 

PAAS Rural Question 219, and 

PAAS Urban Question 5220 

both 


asked in March, April, May, June and July 1971. From 
unpublished computer printout. 


Table 117. Has the presence oj the Americans been 
beneficial to the people oj Vietnam? (Table 

unclassified.) 



Rural 

Urban 

Greatly 

367. 

137. 

To Some Extent 

247. 

337. 

Subtotal-Beneficial 

607. 

467. 

Scarcely 

19 

30 

No Benefit, No Harm 

11 

11 

Bad Effect 

2 

5 

No. of Respondents 

1732 

774 


Sources: 

PAAS Rural Question 214 and PAAS Urban Question 5215 asked 
in March and April 1971. From unpublished computer printout. 


same when asked about the performance of the 
national government, although a higher percentage 
of urban respondents thought government per¬ 
formance was inadequate, as shown in Table 110. 
The differences between the two stem largely from 
the fewer urban responses in the “don’t know” 
category (9 percent urban versus 20 percent rural). 
In both the rural and urban cases, the number of 
people who thought the government was perform¬ 
ing fairly well outnumbered those who thought it 
was only adequate or inadequate. This could stem 
from a reluctance to criticize the national govern¬ 
ment. On the other hand, a significant number of 
people did not hesitate to label the government as 
inadequate, so other factors are likely at play here. 
Moreover, the respondents did not hesitate to 
express their dissatisfaction with the performance 
of their local provincial or city council, although 


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Table 118. Whether or not you think the Americans 
have helped Vietnam , do you like them personally ? 
(Table unclassified.) 


Table 119. How do you think the American charac¬ 
ter harmonizes with the Vietnamese character? 
(Table unclassified.) 



Rural 

Urban 

Like (7.) 

37 

12 V 

Don't Like, but Don't Hate (7.) 

52 

78 

Hate (7.) 

3 

6 

No. of Respondents 

1729 

772 


PAAS Rural Question 215 and PAAS Urban Question 5216, both asked 
in March and April 1971. From unpublished computer printouts. 


the number of “don’t know” responses was large; 
see Table 111. 

THE WAR 

(U) Four PAAS questions were designed to solicit 
the Vietnamese people’s view of the war. They 
were asked how and when the war would end, 
why the VC/NVA continued to fight, and if the 
respondent wanted a cease-fire. All four questions, 
except the one about the cease-fire, drew many 
“don’t know” responses—and well they might! 

(U) Rural responses about how the war would end 
are shown in Table 112. (Urban responses, if any, 
are not available). The big shift of views came in 
1972, when the percentage expecting GVN victory 
dropped sharply, with most of the drop showing 
up in the “don’t know” category and some going 
into “Paris talks.” The 1972 surveys were taken 
in June and July, and the results suggest that the 
VC/NVA offensive had taken its toll of hopes for 
a GVN victory. The VC/NVA victory choice (not 
shown) drew little or no response, but this notion 
may have entered into some of the “don’t know” 
responses. There is no way to determine if this 
was the case. The trends may be more reliable 
than some others from the PAAS, because it is 
possible to compare two sets of identical months 
with similar sample sizes, and the “don’t know” 
responses did not change much over time. Rural 
and urban data are available for both samples. 
The data suggest that in 1971 few people expected 
the war to end within a year (8 percent rural and 
11 percent urban), but many changed to a more 
optimistic view in 1972 (rural now at 29 percent, 
urban at 40 percent); see Table 113. The shift 
came from those who had expected the war to 
last longer, because the “don’t knows” changed 
little. 

(U) When asked why the VC/NVA continued to 
CONFIDENTIAL 



Rural 

Urban 

Good Harmony 

47. 

07. 

Fair Harmony 

267. 

137. 

Little Harmony 

347. 

347. 

Disharmony 

137. 

327. 

Do Not Know 

227. 

197. 

No. of Respondents 

1732 

774 


PAAS Rural Question 216 and Urban Question 5217, asked in March 
and April 1971. From unpublished computer printouts. 


Table 120. On which side does most of the dislike or 
hostility lie? (Table unclassified.) 



Rural 

Urban 

On the Vietnamese side 

97. 

37. 

Equally on both sides 

547. 

537. 

On the American side 

357. 

377. 

No. of Respondents 

368 

274 


PAAS Rural Question 218 and PAAS Urban Question 5219, asked 
in March and April 1971. From unpublished computer printouts. 


fight, the most frequent response (37 and 53 
percent) cited the influence of North Vietnam 
and other foreign powers. A few mentioned the 
VC/NVA inability to accomplish its goal yet. 
Table 114 displays the data. 

(U) Did the South Vietnamese people want a 
cease-fire? The PAAS data answered with a 
resounding yes. The “don’t knows” disappeared 
as the people answered with some variation of 
“yes.” Table 115 shows the results. The cease-fire 
pattern fits well with the answers to questions 
about the people’s aspirations over the years, in 
which peace and security consistently accounted 
for 75 to 85 percent of the responses. 

THE AMERICANS 

(U) During the first half of 1971 the urban and 
rural surveys asked questions about the Viet¬ 
namese attitudes toward Americans and relations 
with them. One finding that emerges from all of the 
questions is that the rural population held Americans 
in higher regard than did the urban population. This 
may be partly because U.S.-backed pacification 
programs were focused primarily in rural areas, 

JDRB 901 

















CONFIDENTIAL 

Table 121. What do you think of the U.S. troop withdrawal? (Table unclassified.) 



3.1 

Apri1-May-June- 
1970 1971 

7. 7, 

1970 

% 

May^ 

1971 

7, 

1972 

% 

GVN Troops Should Replace U.S. 
Forces as Soon as Possible 

2 c/ 

7 

2 cl 

7 

6 

Withdrawal Necessary, But do it 
Only When GVN Forces can 
Replace 

12 

19 

15 

18 

18 

GVN Can Replace, but Need Some 
U.S. Until War is Over 

19 

23 

21 

24 

23 

Withdrawal Will Make it Harder 
for GVN to Win 

11 

9 

15 

11 

17 

Not Aware of Withdrawal 

42 

31 

34 

31 

16 

Don 1 t Know 

12 

7 

11 

5 

17 

No. of Respondents 

2621 

2695 

856 

927 

848 


a/ Sources for 1970 are published PAAS reports for April, May and July 
1970. Source for 1971 is unpublished computer printout displaying 
PAAS Rural Question 67 for April, May and July 1971. 
b/ Sources are published May PAAS report for May 1970, and unpublished 

computer printouts displaying Rural Question 67 for May 1971 and 
May 1972. 

cf In 1970 this statement said that GVN troops can and should replace 
U.S. forces as soon as possible. 


Table 122. Why are the American troops being 
withdrawn? (Table unclassified.) 


Rural 

They have defeated the VC/NVA, so are 9% 

no longer required 

They can't defeat the VC/NVA, so are 4% 

withdrawing 

GVN has asked the U.S. to withdraw, 207. 

because they are strong enough 
to defeat the VC/NVA 

The U.S. is negotiating with North 137. 

Viet-Nam so that U.S. and NVA forces 
will leave Viet-Nam 

Pressure from the American people has 377. 

forced the withdrawal of U.S. forces 

No. of Respondents 3500 


Published PAAS reports for April, May, and July 1970. PAAS 
Rural Question 68, asked in April, May, June, and July 1971, 
from unpublished computer printout. 


with CORDS advisory teams in every district 
and province. 

(U) Table 116 indicates that 18 percent of the 
rural population thought anti-American feeling 
existed in their communities, and most of that 
feeling was thought to be limited to a very few 
people. The urban response was 33 percent. In 
both cases, though, more than half of the re¬ 
spondents thought there was no perceptible anti- 
American feeling in their communities. 


Table 123. Is it wise for the U.S. troops to with¬ 
draw? (Table unclassified.) 


Wise (7.) 

May-June 

1970 

May-June 

1971 

May 

1972 

44 

64 

59 

Unwise (7.) 

15 

17 

18 

Does Not Know (7) 

20 

23 

38 

No. of Respondents 

2650 (est) 

1212 

804 


PAAS published reports for May and June, 1970. PAAS Rural 
Question 69 from unpublished computer printout for 1971 and 1972. 


902 JDRB 


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Table 124. Why do you think the decision to with¬ 
draw U.S. troops is a wise one? (Table unclassified.) 


Table 125. If all U.S. troops leave Vietnam , what 
will happen to the war? (Table unclassified.) 



May-June 

1970 

May-June 

1971 

May 

1972 

Neutralizes an important 

VC/NVA propaganda weapon 

337. 

237. \ 

327. 

Promotes Nationalism and 
self sufficiency 

177. 

187. 

287. 

Will help promote results at 
the Paris peace talks 

167. 

137. 

197. 

Will help reduce disruption 
of the Vietnamese economy 

117. 

37. 

77. 

Will help silence anti-war 
sentiment in the U.S. 

87. 

317. 

107. 

Withdrawal will reduce fighting 
and killing in Viet-Nam 

147. 

87. 

47. 

No. of Respondents 

1700 (est.) 

715 

354 


Sources: Published PAAS reports for May and June 1970; 
tion 70, from unpublished computer printout for 1971 


Rural Ques- 
and 1972. 



1971 

May 

1971 

May 

1972 

No Problem 

137. 

147. 

87. 

Some Problems 

367. 

407. 

307. 

Very Dangerous 

227. 

207. 

257. 

Subtotal 

587. 

607. 

557. 

Coalition Government, 
Cede Some Areas to the 
VC/NVA 

27. 

27. 

47. 

Communists Will Win 

27. 

17. 

27. 

Does Not Know 

247. 

217. 

267. 

Does Not Want to Respond 

27. 

17. 

57. 

Number of Respondents 4450 

928 

848 


(U) In March and May 1971, the PAAS conducted 
a special survey asking about the Vietnamese 
view of Americans and the relations between the 
two. Again, the rural respondents had a more 
favorable view of the Americans. Table 117 indi¬ 
cates that 60 percent of the rural respondents felt 
the American presence had been beneficial to the 
people of South Vietnam; 46 percent of the urban 
respondents thought so, too. These percentages 
agree well with those who felt that no anti- 
American feeling existed in their communities 
(62 percent and 51 percent; see Table 116). 

(U) In Table 118, thirty-seven percent of the rural 
respondents said they liked Americans, but only 
12 percent of the urban respondents said they did. 
More than half of all respondents said they didn’t 
like Americans, but they didn’t hate them either. 
A few hated them. The size of the two groups who 
liked Americans corresponds closely to those who 
thought that the American presence was greatly 
beneficial, and the other categories match prett}^ 
well, too. 


(U) The next question asked about the harmony 
between the American and Vietnamese characters, 
and very few thought good harmony existed 
between the two. Most thought there was little 
harmony or disharmony. Table 119 shows the 
results. 


(U) In another variation on the theme, the surveys 
asked if dislike or hostility existed between 
Americans and Vietnamese. ( 47 ) The patterns are 
similar to those regarding anti-American feelings 


PAAS Rural Question 71, asked in April, Hay, June, and 
July 1971, and in May 1972. From unpublished computer 
printout. 


(Table 116). When the respondents who said 
hostility existed were asked on which side the 
hostility lay, the rural and urban respondents 
agreed for the first time (Table 120). More than 
half felt the dislike was on both sides, and other 
35 percent felt it was on the American side, be¬ 
cause “Americans do not like Vietnamese.” 

U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWALS 

(U) The PAAS rural surveys asked people what 
they thought of the U.S. troop withdrawals in 
1970, 1971, and 1972; moreover, they asked them 
in some of the same months, so trends can be 
addressed. Table 121 shows the results. In the 
second quarter of 1970, 42 percent of the rural 
respondents didn’t know about the withdrawals, 
although they started in the summer of 1969. By 
May 1972 only 16 percent were unaware of them. 
Vietnamese opinion remained fairly stable during 
the periods shown, and no trends are apparent. 

(U) If the respondent was aware of the troop with¬ 
drawals, he or she was asked why the troops were 
withdrawing. Data for several months in 1970 and 
1971 indicate that 37 percent of the rural respond¬ 
ents said that the U.S. withdrawals were caused 
by pressure from the American people. The results 
are shown in Table 122. 


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(U) Respondents aware of the withdrawals were 
also asked whether the decision was wise. The data 
indicate that 64 percent thought it was wise in 
1970, but Ma}^ 1972 people were having second 
thoughts (as the VC/NVA offensive peaked) and 
the percentage was down to 44 percent. Table 123 
shows the results for three comparable periods in 
1970, 1971, and 1972. 

(U) Of the respondents who thought it was wise 
for the U.S. troops to withdraw, it was asked why 
they thought so, and the results are shown in 
Table 124. Note the emphasis on neutralizing 
VC/NVA propaganda in all years, particularly in 
1970 and 1972. Silencing U.S. antiwar sentiment 


was given as a major reason (31 percent) in 1971, 
and the promotion of nationalism and self- 
sufficiency also was a major reason (28 percent) 
in 1972. 

(U) In 1971 and 1972, rural surveys asked 4,450 
respondents what would happen to the war if 
all U.S. troops left Vietnam. The results are 
shown in Table 125. Fifty-five to sixty percent of 
the respondents consistently thought there would 
be some problems or danger if all U.S. forces left 
Vietnam. As in other data, May 1972 is the most 
pessimistic month, but the differences are not 
great. 


904 JDRB 


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Chapter XVI 

Chieu Hoi 


(U) Through its Chieu Hoi (“Open Arms”) Pro¬ 
gram, the GVN offered the Viet Cong and the 
North Vietnamese operating in the south an oppor¬ 
tunity to defect, gain a political pardon, and even 
take vocational training to help them find jobs 
after leaving the Chieu Center. The defectors were 
called ralliers (Hoi Chanh). 

THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM 

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS 

(U) The GVN established the Chieu Hoi program 
in 1963 at the urging of advisors who were familiar 
with the successful amnesty and resettlement pro¬ 
grams in the Philippines and Malaya. ( 48 ) Despite 
misgivings about amnesty for the VC/NVA, 
President Diem approved the program, and 
almost 5,000 ralliers came in during the first three 
months. ( 49 ) But the South Vietnamese were not 
enthusiastic, and 18 months later, the program 
remained a modest, underfunded effort. By 1965, 
the U.S. Government had endorsed the program 
but did not pour resources into it (only one 
American was formally associated with the pro¬ 
gram in Vietnam); and the GVN, noting this, 
continued to give the program a low priority, 
downgrading it to the point where a Vietnamese 
Army captain was the top Chieu Hoi official. ( 50 ) 

(U) By 1966, the low cost and high benefits of the 
program were evident to all, and it began to gain 
momentum. United States officials, fortified by 
the program’s success, were able to turn it around, 
and by December 1967 it was being run by a 
GVN cabinet minister. ( 51 ) But the GVN still was 
not completely convinced. 


(U) Meanwhile, in April 1967, the GVN adopted 
the policy of “national reconciliation.” Its intent 
was to not only give the rallier amnesty and return 
his political and civil rights, but to add training 
and aid in finding new careers commensurate 
with the Hoi Chanh’s experience, ability, and 
loyalty. The policy was designed to induce high 
level VC/NVA to rally; but few did, and the 
program was never widely implemented. ( 49 ) The 
GVN remained reluctant to give the Hoi Chanh 
good jobs. 

(U) The Tet offensive in 1968 marked a watershed 
in the program. At first it lost momentum, but 
its assets and people survived intact. More 
important, the GVN attitude changed for the 
better because, with few exceptions, the ralliers 
remained loyal during the offensive. ( 52 ) As 1968 
drew to a close the Hoi Chanh began to pour in, 
and in 1969 the Chieu Hoi program hit its peak, 
as the factors contributing to a large flow of 
ralliers came into full play: ( 1 ) a well-organized 
and well-funded Chieu Hoi program; ( 2 ) lots of 
potential ralliers who were tapped as the GVN 
expanded its presence into the countryside;* and 
( 3 ) increased security in the rural areas with 
economic development beginning to reach down 
to the village level. 

WHAT DID THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE THINK 
ABOUT THE PROGRAM? 

(U) The rural South Vietnamese said that the 
Chieu Hoi Program was a good idea, but they 

♦Recall the population security data for 1969 (Chapter 
XIII), which showed the GVN moving out into the country¬ 
side in a significant way for the first time ever. 


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JDRB 905 







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shared the GVN’s reluctance to trust the Hoi 
Chanh who came in under the program. In August 
1972, a PAAS rural survey asked 1,025 respond¬ 
ents: “Do you feel that it is wise for the GVN to 
give the VC an opportunity to rally? ,, ( 53 ) Eighty 
percent said yes, only 2 percent said no, and the 
other 18 percent didn’t know. In October 1971, 
and again in August 1972, the PAAS asked a total 
of 1,943 rural respondents: “Do you feel that the 
existence of a Chieu Hoi policy will help end the 
war more quickly?” ( 54 ) This time, only 65 percent 
of the respondents said yes (72 percent in the 
August sample), 7 percent said no, and 28 percent 
didn’t know. 

(U) Both results are highly favorable to the 
program, but the respondents were less enthusi¬ 
astic about the ralliers themselves. In the October 
1971 and August 1972 polls, 1,956 rural respondents 
were asked: “Do you trust Hoi Chanh?”( 55 ) This 
time, only 17 percent replied with an unqualified 
yes, while an additional 23 percent would “only 
trust those Hoi Chanh who showed their good 
will.” Thirty-fcur percent would “trust, but their 
actions should be watched,” and 8 percent wouldn’t 
trust them at all. 

KEY ELEMENTS OF THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM* 

(U) The key elements of the Chieu Hoi Program 
were the inducements to rally and the rallier’s 
reception, vocational training, resettlement, and 
follow-up. The latter three turned out to be the 
weakest parts of the program. 

(U) Inducements took the form of psychological 
operations and rewards to pursuade the VC/NVA 
to rally to the government. The psychological 
warfare material focused on the potential rallier’s 
grievances, emotions, and aspirations, not—except 
for hard-core Viet Cong Infrastructure or North 
Vietnamese—on ideological commitment. Infor¬ 
mation about the program reached potential 
ralliers through a variety of channels: leaflets 
dropped from aircraft or distributed by hand, 
newspapers, aerial loudspeaker broadcasts, radio, 
tv, movies, family influence, and contact with 
ralliers. The leaflet proved to be an effective 
Chieu Hoi appeal, and a multilingual “Safe 
Conduct Pass” blanketed South Vietnam. Ralliers 


^Except where noted, this entire section draws heavily 
on Koch, ( 48 ) pp. viii, ix, x, and 59 through 90. 

906 JDRB 


described it as the best-known appeal and the 
one most conducive to rallying. After one en¬ 
gagement, 90 percent of the VC/NVA searched 
afterward were carrying it, despite the risk of 
punishment if their leaders caught them with the 
passes. 

(U) Two kinds of cash rewards were employed to 
lure ralliers. The first rewarded Hoi Chanh who 
came in with a weapon or led government forces 
to weapons or weapon caches. The other rewarded 
people who induced a VC/NVA to surrender, and 
this was called the third-party inducement pro¬ 
gram. The weapons reward program was estab¬ 
lished in September 1964 and reaffirmed in 1967. 
By March 1970, the rewards ranged from VN 
$ 1,200 f for a hand weapon up to VN $1 million 
for leading Allied troops to large VC/NVA 
weapons caches. Many large caches were found in 
this manner. The third-party inducement pro¬ 
gram began in the summer of 1967 in Military 
Region 4. The program paid rewards to any 
Vietnamese citizen or rallier who could get a 
VC/NVA to rally. It proved quite successful in 
raising the rallier counts, but corruption killed it 
off two years later. Before it ended, there were all 
sorts of schemes to collect the reward money. Too 
many ralliers turned out to have an “inducer” 
who had little or nothing to do with their decision 
to rally, and the government seemed to be getting 
little for its money. 

(U) The rallier’s reception at the Chieu Hoi Center 
was important. The inducement promises had to 
be fulfilled if the program was to remain effective. 
On arrival at the reception center the rallier was 
screened to determine his legitimacy as a defector. 
An interrogation to gain tactical intelligence 
followed, and then the rallier had to attend 
political lectures (usually mediocre at best), and 
he could receive vocational training, if he desired 
(few did). After 45 to 60 days, the rallier left the 
center as a free person with a military deferment 
for six months. 

(U) Resettlement and employment of the Hoi 
Chanh after leaving the center was also important. 
Many ralliers volunteered for the government’s 
military and paramilitary forces, and some found 
jobs in government agencies, particularly the 

f Approximately 10 U.S. dollars, at that time. 

CONFIDENTIAL 




CONFIDENTIAL 


1 able 126. More than 200,000 VC/NVA rallied to the South Vietnamese Government; numbers in thousands. 

{Table unclassified.) 


VC/NVA Ralliers 
(In Thousands) 


.1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 

11 5 il 20 27 18 47 


1970 1971 

33 20 


1972 Total 
11 203 


Source: Table 2, So utheast Asia Statistical Summary . Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) March 25, 1971 - January 17, 1973, 
pp. 1 through 7. 


Chieu Hoi ministry. After 1969, Hoi Chanh were 
used increasingly as interrogators in the Phung 
Hoang program to neutralize the VC/NVA infra¬ 
structure. Resettlement of ralliers who did not join 
the military or the government was a problem, 
since employers were reluctant to hire Hoi Chanh 
because they didn’t trust them. 

(U) Follow-up of ralliers after they left the Chieu 
Hoi Center was not effective, and there was no 
system to do this until late 1971, when an auto¬ 
mated tracking system under the National Police 
was established. Thus, an assessment of the 
ralliers’ economic, political, and social activities is 
not possible. 

HOW MANY RALLIED, AND WHERE DID 
THEY COME FROM? 

(U) The VC/NVA rallied for personal, not ideo¬ 
logical, reasons. With few exceptions, the growing 
pressure of Allied military efforts, hardship, war¬ 
weariness, uncertainty about the future, doubts 


Table 127. More than half of the ralliers were from 
Military Region 1+. {Table unclassified.) 


In Thousands 

1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

Total 

MR 1 

1.2 

1.7 

2.5 

3.1 

6.0 

4.6 

1.2 

20.3 

MR 2 

2.3 

9.1 

7.2 

1.9 

3.2 

2.5 

2.3 

28.5 

MR 3 

2.7 

3.7 

8.0 

2.8 

8.1 

5.9 

2.9 

34.1 

MR 4 

4.9 

5.7 

9.4 

10.4 

29.8 

19.7 

13.9 

93.8 

Total 

11.1 

20.2 

27.1 

18.2 

47.1 

32.7 

20.3 

176.7 


Sources: For 1965, 1966, and 1967, Koch, J. A., The Chieu Hoi Program 


In South Vietnam. 1963-1971 . RAND Report R-1172-ARPA, January 
1973, p. 111. 

For 1968-1971, Table 4, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary . 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 
October 22, 1970 and February 11, 1972, pp. 1 and 2. 


about the VC/NVA ability to take over South 
Vietnam, disillusionment with VC/NVA policies 
and promises, and family concern all went into 
decisions to rally. ( 48 ) The Chieu Hoi Program was 
their escape hatch. 

(U) Table 126 shows that, in the ten years from 
1963 through 1972, more than 200,000 VC/NVA 
personnel surrendered to the government through 
the Chieu Hoi Program. The table indicates a 
buildup to a peak in 1969, when 47,000 ralliers 
came in, followed by a steady decline to 1972, when 
11,000 came in, matching the 1965 level. 

(U) Tables 127 and 128 show where the ralliers 
surrendered. Table 127 says that more than half 

Table 128. Eleven provinces accounted for half of 
the ralliers. {Table unclassified.) 


Provinces 1965-1971 


Binh Dinh (MR 2) 10,627 
Kien Hoa (MR 4) 9,672 
An Xuyen (MR 4) 9,083 
Kien Giang (MR 4) 8,844 
Phong Dinh (MR 4) 8,393 

Vinh Long (MR 4) 7,983 
Chuong Thien (MR 4) 7,009 
Dinh Tuong (MR 4) 6,783 
Long An (MR 3) 6,698 
Quang Tin (MR 1) 6,146 

Phu Yen (MR 2) 6,025 


Province Total 87,263 

(49%) 

Countrywide Total 176,756 


Source: Koch, J. A., Ref. 48, p. 111. 


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JDRB 907 















































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Table 129. The Chieu Hoi rate remained fairly 
stable the year around; monthly averages for 1965 
through 1972. (Table unclassified.) 



Hoi Chanh a/ 



Hoi Chanh a/ 

Jan 

1701 




Feb 

1853 


1st Quarter 

1975 

Mar 

2371 




Apr 

1872 




May 

1879 


2nd Quarter 

1791 

Jun 

1622 




Jul 

2027 




Aug 

2005 


3rd Quarter 

1924 

Sep 

1739 




Oct 

2102 




Nov 

2267 


4th Quarter 

2086 

Dec 

1891 




BUT 

1 WHEN THE COMBAT 

CYCLE 

W^S HIGH, THE 

CHIEU HOI RATE WAS LOW 

Allied 

1 Combat Deaths^/ 


Chieu Hoi a/ 

(Monthly Averages 1966- 

-1972) 

(Monthly Averages 1965-1972) 

Feb - 

June 2967 

High 

Low 

1919 

Jul 

2097 

Low 

High 

2027 

Aug - 

Sep 2330 

High 

Low 

1872 

Oct - 

Jan 2001 

Low 

High 

1990 


a_/ Source: Table 2, Southeast Asia Statistical Summary , Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 25, 1971 - 
January 17, 1973, pp. 1 through 7. 
b/ See Chapter II. 

of them rallied in Military Region 4, doubtless 
because the VC/NVA troops were mostly VC and 
not NVA. Table 128 indicates that 11 provinces 
accounted for half of the ralliers in the period from 
1965 through 1971. As expected, seven of the 
leaders are in Military Region 4. 

(U) Military Region 1 produced only 11 percent 
of the ralliers. The low rate is not surprising, 
because Military Region 1 was right next to 
North Vietnam, and a high proportion of the 
VC/NVA troops operating in the area comprised 
NVA troop units or NVA fillers in Viet Cong 
units. Few NVA troops rallied anywhere in the 
country. 

(U) Military Region 2 accounted for 16 percent 
of the ralliers. This was a respectable showing, 
but the interesting question is why Military Region 
2 was able to produce 35 percent of all the Hoi 
Chanh in the country during 1966-67. The results 
dropped sharply after 1967. Part of the answer 
may lie in the saturation of the Military Region 
2 populated areas (Binh Dinh and Phu Yen) with 
Allied forces, particularly the Koreans. They 
entered Military Region 2 in October 1965, and 
their operating areas produced unusually large 
numbers of Hoi Chanh. ( 56 ) Intelligence reports 
and rallier comments indicated that the VC/NVA 


had an obsession with what it believed to be the 
unpredictable brutality of the Koreans. Part of 
the reaction probably stemmed from the Koreans’ 
use of fear to induce ralliers. A psychological 
operations worker would tell families living in 
VC/NVA areas that they should influence their 
men to rally because future operations would 
kill all Viet Cong soldiers in given areas. ( 56 ) 

(U) Military Region 3 accounted for 19 percent of 
the ralliers, and showed a fairly consistent per¬ 
formance, following the countrywide trends each 
year. 

(U) Military Region 4 was far and away the leader 
in ralliers, accounting for more than half of them 
and being the leader in every year except 1966, 
when Military Region 2 was doing so well. Military 
Region 4 had only about 40 percent of the Viet 
Cong combat forces.( 57 ) Why did it do so well? 
The Chieu Hoi program in Military Region 4 took 
off in 1968, when the region accounted for 57 
percent of all Hoi Chanh that year, and it never 
fell below 60 percent after that. Two reasons for 
its success were that few NVA troops were present 
in Military Region 4 and the Chieu Hoi Program 
there was managed well. A more important reason 
was the increased Allied pressure after the 1968 
Tet offensive. For example, Hoi Chanh in Vinh 
Long province began to complain during 1968 
about the effectiveness of Allied military opera¬ 
tions, which reportedly destroyed 20 percent of the 
guerrilla forces in Vinh Long and caused 5 percent 
of them to rally. ( 58 ) In 1969, Allied pressure 
intensified,( 57 ) and the percentage of “secure” 
population in Military Region 4 jumped from 38 
percent in 1968 to 64 percent in 1969.* Progress 
continued until the 1972 offensive. For example, 
the rallier rate in Kien Hoa province rose sharply 
in 4th quarter 1970, accounting for 62 percent of 
the Military Region 4 ralliers. This was the result 
of GVN forces opening up Viet Cong strongholds 
and erecting permanent GVN outposts there. ( 59 ) 
Another reason for the large numbers of ralliers 
reported in Military Region 4 was the Third-Party 
Inducement Program, which began in Vinh Binh 
and Vinh Long Provinces during the summer of 
1967.( 60 ) During the first six months of 1969, 

*See Table 78 in Chapter XIII. 


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Table 130. Sixty 'percent oj the ralliers were military. (Table unclassified.) 


Type of Rallier 

1965 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1970 

1971 

Total 

(In thousands) 
Military 

7.9 

12.Y- 

17.7 

12.6 

28.4 

17.1 

10.9 

107.5 

Political 

2.6 

6.3 

7.9 

3.8 

12.6 

11.4 

6.6 

51.2 

Other a/ 

.6 

1.0 

1.6 

1.8 

6.0 

4.1 

2.8 

17.9 

Total 

11.1 

20.2 

27.2 

18.2 

47.0 

32.7 

20.3 

176.6 


Sources: For 1965: "Chieu Hoi: VC/NVA In 1968”, Southeast Asia Analysis 


Report , February 1969, p. 31. 

For 1966-1971: Koch, J. A., The Chieu Hoi Program in South Viet-Nam 
1963-^1971 , R-112-ARPA, The RAND Corporation, January 1973, p. 11. 

«*/ Includes dissidents, followers, draft dodgers, deserters, porters, etc., 
who actively supported the VC/NVA. 

of the war cycle had low Chieu Hoi rates , and the low 
periods had high rates , although the dififerences 
between high and low Chieu Hoi rates was not 
great. 

WHO RALLIED? 

(U) A detailed stmty of 20,000 returnees from 
July 1965 through June 1967 gave a fairly com¬ 
plete profile of the Hoi Chanh for that period. ( 62 ) 
About two-thirds (66 percent) of the ralliers were 
military, but the civilian proportion tended to 
increase when the rate increased. About 40 per¬ 
cent of the Hoi Chanh were village and hamlet 
guerrillas, 20 percent were civilian defectors from 
party organizations, 10 to 20 percent were regular 
military personnel, and the remaining 25 percent 
defected from militia, commo-liaison units, libera¬ 
tion associations, labor groups, etc. The proportion 
of cadre in the Hoi Chanh ranged from 15 to 19 
percent, indicating little difference between cadre 
and rank-and-file defection trends during the two 
years. Senior cadre* accounted for 5 to 8 percent 
of the ralliers. 

(U) A majority of the Hoi Chanh were 16 to 30 
years old. Generally, the higher the rallier’s unit, 
the lower his average age; guerrillas were usually 
older than main-force troops, for example. Mili¬ 
tary Hoi Chanh from Military Regions 3 and 4 

* Assistant platoon leader and above for regular military 
forces; assistant unit leader and up for guerrillas and 
militia. 

CONFIDENTIAL JDRB 909 


seventy-five percent of the Military Region 4 
ralliers were attributed to this program.( 60 ) Later, 
some of them were reclassified as refugees or 
impressed laborers, or they turned out to be party 
to false inducement practices, ( 61 ) but still, even 
allowing for inflation of the figures, the flow was 
large. ( 57 ) 

WHEN DID THEY RALLY? 

(U) Table 129 shows that the Chieu rate remained 
fairly stable throughout the year. The lowest 
month, on average, was June (1,622), the highest, 
March (2,371). January and February are the 
months in which the Vietnamese lunar New 
Year, or Tet, usually occurs, and every year 
intensive efforts were made to induce VC/NVA 
to rally at Tet. But January and February did 
not attract high numbers of Chieu Hoi, on average, 
although March is the top month. The perform¬ 
ance in March may be due to some spillover from 
the Tet campaign. Another possible explanation 
is that the tempo of combat usually picks up in 
February, and the potential ralliers may know 
that heavy fighting will continue until June and 
they simply decide not to endure it, and so they 
rally in March. Also, as they emerge from the 
isolation of their base areas to enter combat, this 
may give them their first opportunity to defect 
in a long time. 

(U) The combat cycle, expressed in Allied combat 
deaths, had some impact on the flow of Hoi 
Chanh, as shown in Table 129. The high periods 






























CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 131. Military Regions 3 and 4 had a higher 
proportion oj military Hoi Chanh than Military 
Regions 1 and 2, where the NVA forces were 
prevalent. (Table unclassified.) 


Military Region 


(1967-71) 

No. 

1 


No. 

7. 


(000) 



(000) 


MR 1 



MR 3 



Military 

8.8 

51 


17.9 

65 

Political 

7.0 

40 


5.7 

20 

Other 

1.6 

9 


4.1 

15 

MR 2 



MR 4 



Military 

7.6 

45 


52.4 

63 

Political 

6.9 

40 


22.8 

27 

Other 

2.6 

15 


8.0 

10 


Sources: For 1967: "Chieu Hoi: A Quarterly Report", 

SEA Analysis Rpt ., April 1968, p. 8. For 1968-1971: 

Table 4, SEA Statistical Summary , Office of the Asst. 

Sec. Def. (Comptroller), Oct. 22, 1970 and Feb. 11, 

1972, pp. 1-2. 

were older and had longer service than those from 
Military Regions 1 and 2. Cadre were generally 
older than their followers, and a majority of the 
ralliers had 12 or more months of VC/NVA service. 
Less than 15 percent were GVN deserters or had 
served the GVN before joining the VC/NVA. 

(U) The Hoi Chanh may have represented only a 
partial manpower loss to the VC/NVA, because 
most of them came from Viet Cong villages and 
wanted to return home. A few (0.5 percent) were 
defecting for the second time. A much higher 
percentage probably faced further service with the 
Viet Cong if they went home, and late in the war 
they might be executed if they returned to VC/ 
NVA areas. 

(U) The study indicated that it was tougher to 
defect from regular force units than from other 
VC/NVA organizations. The proportion of defec¬ 
tors from regular forces in the sample was about 
half of the proportion of regular forces in the total 
VC/NVA strength. The percentage of guerrilla 
and civilian ralliers was greater than their share 
of VC/NVA strength. One interpretation of the 
difference is that few regular force troops are 
able to defect, while another is that the strengths 
of guerrilla and civilian units were under¬ 
estimated. Evidence exists to bolster either case. 

(U) Table 130 shows that 60 percent of the Hoi 
Chanh came from military units of one sort or 
another, and 30 percent were from the VC/NVA 
political structure. Approximately 1,200 NVA 


troops rallied, or 1 percent of the military total ( 63 ) 
through 1971. 

(U) Table 131 shows the pattern by military 
region. Military Hoi Chanh predominated in the 
southern part of the country (Military Regions 
3 and 4) where Viet Cong forces were prevalent. 
Further north, (Military Regions 1 and 2) where 
NVA forces predominated, the military Hoi 
Chanh accounted for only half of the total. 

HOI CHANH HELPED THE GVN 

(U) Many Hoi Chanh decided to work with the 
GVN after their release from the Chieu Hoi 
Center. Some worked as interrogators in the Phung 
Hoang program to neutralize the VCI. Others 
volunteered to serve with GVN military or 
paramilitary forces. Hoi Chanh were particularly 
effective in two special roles, the Armed Propa¬ 
ganda Teams and the Kit Carson Scouts. 

(U) The Armed Propaganda Teams were lightly 
armed paramilitary units that became the primary 
action arm of the Chieu Hoi ministry for face-to- 
face inducement of potential ralliers in VC/NVA 
areas. The teams would go into VC/NVA-con- 
trolled or contested areas as former Viet Cong who 
had seen the light and would tell the people how 
to rally. The teams also assisted the National 
Police as interrogators and helped identify Viet 
Cong trying to pass through GVN check points. 
They helped train the PSDF, and five-man lecture 
teams visited schools, business groups, and military 
camps. 

(U) “Kit Carson Scouts” were Hoi Chanh who 
volunteered to serve with U.S. and third-nation 
units in combat. They usually served in their home 
areas and were helpful because they knew how and 
where the VC/NVA units operated. By the end of 
1968, 1,500 Scouts were deployed with U.S. and 
third-nation units all over the country./ 64 ) 

VC/NVA REACTION 

(U) The VC/NVA reaction to the Chieu Hoi 
program ranged from propaganda to attacks on 
Chieu Hoi centers, and it increased as the program 
continued to induce defectors from the VC/NVA 
political and military units. At first, the VC/NVA 
regarded Hoi Chanh who had simply passed 
through the Chieu Hoi Center as misguided 


910 JDItB 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


brothers to be given a second chance. ( 62 ) However, 
if the rallier had turned his weapons in or had 
helped the GVN by locating VC/NVA weapons 
and supplies or by furnishing intelligence, he was 
to be killed. 

(U) By 1970, the VC/NVA leadership was dis¬ 
turbed enough to announce that anyone who killed 
a returnee would become a member of the Order 
of the Valiant Knights. Up to this point, the honor 
had been reserved for VC/NVA personnel who had 
killed at least ten Vietnamese and American 
soldiers. ( 6j ) A captured VC/NVA document as¬ 
sessed the program in April 1971: 

The trend of defection continued to increase . . . 
The detections among the local force and 
guerrilla elements were critical. ... In some 
districts, half of the local guerrillas joined the 
enemy. . . . Mass defections were also recorded 
among troop units and included battalion and 
company political cadres. ( 66 ) 

Efforts were made to prevent knowledge of the 
Chieu Hoi Program from reaching the VC/NVA 
troops, but they were not successful, given the 
flood of leaflets and the growing word-of-mouth 
news about the program. Propaganda leaflets and 
safe-conduct passes were quickly gathered up and 
burned. Attempts were made to interfere with 
broadcasts from aircraft, and VC/NVA propaganda 
stressed the “torture and mistreatment” that 
awaited the person who tried to rally to the GVN. 
After the defection of a high-ranking cadre (few 
defected), the political cadres subjected their 
people to thorough reindoctrination. 

(U) The danger of infiltration is inherent in any 
defector program, and the Chieu Hoi Program was 
no exception. Evidence of false ralliers appeared 
first in April 1967.( 56 ) By late 1970 and early 1971, 
recurring evidence suggested a coordinated VC/ 
NVA strategy for infiltration of the Chieu Hoi 
Centers, wherein the agent would rally and then 
join a local paramilitary force. Thirty-one RF/PF 
outposts were overrun in the spring of 1971, 
compared to nine during the same period the year 
before, with indications of collusion between 
some of the false ralliers in the outposts and the 
VC/NVA forces outside. ( 67 ) Evidence also suggests 
that the VC/NVA used the Chieu Hoi Program 
to secure legitimacy for some of its people as the 


cease-fire approached. However, no evidence of 
widespread infiltration was found, despite a 
program of surveillance and interrogation directed 
at spotting such cases. ( 68 ) 

(U) All jactors considered, the VC/NVA reactions to 
the Chieu Hoi Program suggests that it caused them 
real 'problems . 

CONCLUSIONS 

(U) The Chieu Hoi Program probably had the most 
favorable cost/benefit ratio of any GVN program in 
South Vietnam. The cost of bringing in 27,789 
ralliers from 1963 through 1965 was $14 apiece. ( 69 ) 
B}^ 1966, the cost was up to $150 per rallier, ( 70 ) 
and by 1969 it had leveled off at $350. ( 71 ) Con¬ 
trast this with the $60,000 it cost to kill a VC/NVA 
soldier during fiscal 1969 in a main force operation.* 

(U) More important, the Chieu Hoi Program 
removed VC/NVA from their military forces at no 
direct cost in Allied casualties. During 1963-72, 
more than 200,000 returnees surrendered to the 
GVN, and approximately 60 percent, or 120,000 
of them, came from military units. Meanwhile, 
890,000 VC/NVA troops were reportedly killed. 
Thus, the military Chieu Hoi total is equivalent 
to approximately 14 percent of the VC/NVA 
combat deaths. During the same period, the Allied 
forces lost 235,000 killed in action, or 0.27 killed 
for each VC/NVA killed. By extrapolation, it 
would have cost 32,000 Allied kia to kill the 
120,000 VC/NVA troops, if they hadn’t rallied. 

(U) This calculation shouldn’t be taken too 
seriously, because many Hoi Chanh were driven 
to defect by the pressure of Allied military opera¬ 
tions and because such calculations ignore the 
complexity of the factors at work. But it does 
serve to make the point that , by any standards and 
by any calculation, the Chieu Hoi Program fur¬ 
nished a low-cost escape hatch for VC/NVA de¬ 
fectors and thereby generated high benefits for low 
costs. 


*Nine billion dollars cost of U.S. and RVNAF main-force 
operations in fiscal 1969 divided by the 155,727 VC/NVA 
reportedly killed in fiscal 1969. Cost data are from Table 7 
of Chapter III. KIA data from Table 6, Southeast Asia 
Statistical Summary, Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller). 


JDRB 911 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


Chapter XVII 


How Well Was the Viet Gong Politico-Military Apparatus Dismantled? 


(U) The Communist’s subversive political-mili¬ 
tary apparatus in South Vietnam was often called 
the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). It was the 
clandestine organization that not only commanded 
most VC/NVA operations, but directed the flow 
of manpower, supplies, and intelligence to local 
VC/NVA forces and conducted much of the terror¬ 
ism and other actions against the populace and 
local GVN officials. Many VCI simultaneously 
held military commands. This chapter discusses 
(1) the official estimates of VCI strength and where 
it was concentrated, (2) the Phung Hoang (or 
Phoenix) campaign against the VCI, ( 3) what the 
Vietnamese thought of the campaign, and (J) its 
probable impact on the VCI. 

VCI STRENGTH AND LOCATION 

(U) As indicated in Chapter IV, order-of-battle 
estimating techniques didn’t , work very well to 
estimate the strength of the VCI, because it was 
not organized in military units, but in a hier¬ 
archical structure common to clandestine organi¬ 
zations, with many members operating on their 
own. The CORDS organization in MACV, in 
cooperation with the intelligence community and 
the police, attempted to estimate the numbers and 
types of VCI by adopting techniques used by 
police everywhere to compile lists of persons 
wanted for crimes. The British in Malaya used 
the techniques, which called for a description of 
the clandestine organizations and then attempted 
to find out who filled the positions in them. Since 
the techniques and the intelligence on which 


they were based were often ambiguous, the num¬ 
bers presented here should be taken as orders of 
magnitude—nothing more. 

(U) Table 132 indicates that the estimated VCI 
strength declined gradually between August 1967 
and October 1971, by 22 percent. However, the 
reporting system changed in November 1970, so 
the October figure is not strictly comparable to 
the earlier figures.( 72 ) Comparable data, if avail¬ 
able, would probably show a larger decline. 

(U) More interesting than the estimates of 
strength are the estimates of VCI presence that 
can be obtained from questions about the status 
of the VCI found in the HES (Hamlet Evaluation 
System) and the PAAS (Pacification Attitude 
Analysis System), although these estimates are 
tenuous, too. In July 1969, the HES reported that 
74 percent of the population were subjected to the 
covert activity of the VCI and another 5 percent 
were under its control. ( 73 ) Only 18 percent of the 
population reportedly was free of VCI influence. 
By June 1971, the figure had risen to 32 percent. 
By comparison, the PAAS data for June 1971 sug¬ 
gest that only 14 percent of the respondents lived 
in an area where no VCI cadre were present. 
Another 14 percent said VCI cadre were present 
but ineffective. ( 74 ) Adding these two figures yields 
fairly good agreement (28 percent) with the 32 
percent from the HES data applied to the urban 
as well as rural population, and it can be expected 
to show a higher percentage free of the VCI. The 
PAAS in this case applied only to the rural popu¬ 
lation, where the VCI presence ought to be 


912 JDRB 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 132. The VCI estimated strength dropped 22 
j percent; figures in thousands. (Table unclassified.) 


1967 

Aug 

Dec 

1968 (U) 

Dec 

1969 (C) 

Dec 

1970 (C) 

Dec 

1971 (C) 
Oct 

85 

84 

83 

74 

72 

X 66 

Sources: 

"Phoenix Program: 

1970 Results", 

SEA Analysis 

Rpt. , 


September-October 1970, p. 20. 

"Phoenix", SEA Analysis Report . June-July 1971, p. 2. 

MACV Measurement of Progress Report . December 1971, p. 67. 


stronger, and the PAAS is more conservative than 
HES as a general rule. At any rate, both sets of 
data suggest that, as late as June 1971, the Viet 
Cong clandestine cadre were conducting some 
activities among two-thirds of the South Viet¬ 
namese population. 

(U) Data for March 1971 indicate that more than 
half of the estimated VCI strength was found in 13 
provinces of South Vietnam, i 75 ) The map (Fig. 15) 
suggests that the situation in those areas was more 
serious than the numbers alone would indicate, 
because 11 of the 13 provinces formed three con¬ 
tiguous groups. The grouping suggests pockets of 
strength and the ability to provide mutual support 
and operating flexibility. (The pattern of the map 
is not totally unfamiliar; see Chapter II). 

THE PHUNG HOANG (PHOENIX) 
PROGRAM 

(U) Defeating a flexible, clandestine organization 
such as the VCI requires more than a purely 
military effort. Ideally, it demands the type of 
multilevel, coordinated counterespionage organi¬ 
zation that the British developed so well during the 
Malayan emergency. By contrast, the South 
Vietnamese counterespionage effort was splintered, 
badly led, poorly financed, and understaffed. 

(U) Throughout the Vietnam War, indeed from 
1954 on, the GVN tried to get at the VCI, but its 
efforts were so uncoordinated, diffused, and feeble 
as to have little impact. In 1967, the Phung Hoang 
Program was established in an attempt to remedy 
some of the shortcomings. The basic concept was to 
enlist and coordinate the efforts of local leaders, 
police, and paramilitary groups to identify and 
dismantle the VCI. 

CONFIDENTIAL 



Figure 15. Provinces having high strengths in Yiet Cong 
infrastructure. (Figure classified Confidential.) 


(U) The Phung Hoang Program itself was not 
intended to he the actual instrument of neutralizing 
the VCI. It was only supposed to coordinate the 
efforts of district and province intelligence opera¬ 
tions coordinating committees (DIOCC’s and 
PIOCC’s) in identifying the local VCI cadre and 
planning operations against them. These commit¬ 
tees in turn were coordinating bodies. In addition 
to a full-time National Police staff, they included 
village council chairmen, village commissioners, 
hamlet chiefs, and others as ex ofiicio members. 
Peoples Self Defense Force (PSDF) group leaders 
and other paramilitary personnel also partici¬ 
pated. Phung Hoang was a Vietnamese program, 
although this coordinating effort was pressed on 
them by the Americans. The U.S. role was to 
provide advisory support, predominately technical 
advice, and very limited logistical help. 

(U) Once plans were developed and VCI cadre 
identified, the operations were carried out by 
various Vietnamese forces. They included the 
National Police, the Field Police, Special Police, 
RVNAF Military Security Teams, Armed Propa¬ 
ganda Teams, Census Grievance Cadre, RD 

JDRB 913 


588-672 0 - 75-11 
































CONFIDENTIAL 

Table 133. Viet Cong Infrastructure taken out oj Table 134. Viet Cong Infrastructure neutralization 
action. (Table classified Confidential.) by echelon and party membership; totals and 

percent. (Table classified Confidential.) 


1968 ~ 1969 - 1970 - 7 1971 - 1972 ^ 

Yearly Total (000) 15.8 19.5 21.1 18.0 12.0 (est.) 

Monthly Average 1315 1628 1763 1528 1047 

Sources: "Phoenix Program: 1970 Results", Southeast Asia Analysis Repor t, 
September-October 1970, p. 23. 

"Phoenix", Southeast Asia Analysis Report . June-July 1971, p. 2. 
MACV Measurement of Progress Report . December 1971, p. 68. 
a/ 1968 and 1969 figures include all VCI killed, rallied, or captured , 

whether sentenced or not. 1970-72 figures included all VCI killed, 
rallied, or sentenced . 

b/ 1972 figure is based on January-August data only, which averaged 
1047 per month for that eight month period. 

Cadre, Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU), 
and RVNAF forces. 

(U) The Phung Hoang Program was supposed to 
be directed at high-ranking VCI cadre. The pro¬ 
gram was to focus its greatest efforts against 
executive cadre at all levels of the VCI organiza¬ 
tion and to concentrate special attention on 
members of the National Liberation Councils and 
Committees, finance-economy cadre of the People’s 
Revolutionary Party, and members of National 
Alliances for Democracy and Peace. The goal 
suffered greatly in the application. In practice, 
well over half of all VCI neutralized were nonparty 
members (although the party was very small, so 
this result was no surprise), and three-quarters 
operated at the village-level or lower. 

RESULTS 

(U) The objective was to dismantle the VCI. By 
January . 1970, this was measured as all VCI 
killed, rallied, or sentenced. Persons captured, 
but not yet convicted and sentenced, did not 
count in the official totals. The sentencing proviso 
was not required before January 1970. ( 76 ) Under 
the previous definition, VCI taken out of action 
included all VCI captured, whether sentenced or 
not. By this definition, 15,800 and 19,500 VCI 
were taken out of action in 1968 and 1969, respec¬ 
tively (Table 133). Since VCI taken into custody 
were not always tried or sentenced, and since 
prisons were known to leak captives almost as 
rapidly as they received them, this definition 
clearly led to inflated figures for those years. Under 



Jan 1970 

- Mar 1971 


Number 

Percent 

Province, Saigon, 

Region, and COSVN 

Full or Probationary Party Member 

769 

3 

Other 

1,030 

4 

Subtotal 

1,799 

7 

District 

Full or Probationary Party Member 

1,932 

7 

Other 

2,318 

8 

Subtotal 

4,250 

15 

City 

Full or Probationary Party Member 

149 

- 

Other 

279 

1 

Subtotal 

428 

1 

Village and Hamlet 

Full or Probationary Party Member 

9,070 

33 

Other 

11,877 

43 

Subtotal 

20,947 

76 

All Levels 

Full or Probationary Party Member 

11,920 

43 

Other 

15,504 

57 

Total Neutralized 

27,424 

100 


the new definition, about 21,000 VCI were re¬ 
ported out of action in 1970 and 18,000 in 1971, 
but even these numbers are not precise. About 60 
percent of the 1971 figure came from the 13 provinces 
where the VCI were concentrated . ( 72 ) 

(U) The real problems of Phung Hoang effec¬ 
tiveness began to appear when the quality of the 
VCI taken out of action was examined. The 
purpose of the program was to dismantle the 
driving force behind the VC/NVA forces, namely, 
the party leaders operating at the top of the 
structure. However, in 1970 and 1971 (through 
March) less than 3 percent of the VCI killed, 
captured, or rallied were full or probationary 
party members above the district level.( 72 ) In 
1970, the six most important VCI taken out of 
action were:( 72 ) 

• A chief, Cadre Affairs Section, Peoples Revolu¬ 
tionary Party (PRP) (captured August 1970); 

• A deputy chief, Military Proselyting Section, 
PRP (rallied May 1970); 

• A chief, Documentation Subsection (Espi¬ 
onage/Intelligence), Security Section PRP 
(captured February 1970); 

• A deputy detention chief, Interrogation/ 
Detention Subsection (POW and Detention 
Camps), Security Section, PRP (rallied De¬ 
cember 1970); and 


914 JDRB 


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Table 135. Vietnamese action forces versus targeting; 
totals and percent. {Table classified Confidential.) 



1970 


1971 




(through March) 


Number 

Percent 

Number^. 

Percent 

Kills and Captures 





by Phung Hoang Forces: 





Specific Targeting 

2,806 

11 

648 

9 

General Targeting 

2,692 

10 

833 

12 

Subtotal 

5,498 

21 

1,481 

21 

by Military Forces: 





Specific Targeting 

2,622 

10 

1,179 

16 

General Targeting 

10,354 

40 

2,254 

32 

Subtotal 

12,976 

50 

3,433 

48 

Rallies (Chieu Hoi) 

7,562 

29 

2,194 

31 

TOTAL 

26,036 

100 

7,108 

100 

Source: "Phoenix," Southeast 

Asia Analysis 

Report, June-July 1971, p. 

5. 


Table 136. Only 2 percent oj the VCI taken out oj 
action were specifically targeted and killed by 
Chung Hoang Forces in the period from January 
1970 through March 1971. (Table classified 
Confidential.) 


VCI Killed 

Specific 

Targeting 

General 

Targeting 

Total 

Force Responsible: 




Military 

2,267 

6,885 

9,152 

Phung Hoang 

616 

675 

1,291 

Total Killed 

2,883 

7,560 

10,443 

VCI Captured 

4,372 

8,573 

12,945 

VCI Rallied 

N/A 

N/A 

9,756 

Grand Total 

7,255 

16,133 

33,144 

Source: "Phoenix", 

Southeast Asia Analysis 

Report. June-July 1971, p. 6. 


• A deputy chief, Rear Service Section, PRP, 
(captured October 1970). 

(U) Table 134 shows that three out of four people 
killed, captured, or defected in both 1970 and early 
1971 were from the lowest levels of the organiza¬ 
tion—village or hamlet—and the majority of these 
were not party members. Although not shown in 
the table, the pattern continued throughout 1971 
and may have been the norm for the program. ( 77 ) 
The effect at the village and hamlet level cannot 
be dismissed as unimportant, because it made it 
more difficult for the VCI to operate and recruit. 
The impact at low levels was probably the most 
successful aspect of the program. 

(U) The inability of Phung Hoang to go to the 
heart of the VC/NVA control organization can be 
explained b} r looking at which GVN forces were 
most effective and under what circumstances. 


Table 137. The backlog of VCI cases exceeded 2,000. 
{Table classified Confidential.) 


1970 _ 1971 



1st Qtr 

2nd Qtr 

3rd Qtr 

4th Qtr 

1st Qtr 

Captured in Period 

2,301 

3,105 

2,477 

2,483 

2,581 

Cases Acted Upon 






Sentenced 

432 

1,480 

1,841 

1,736 

1,735 

Released 

85 

223 

440 

356 

356 

Transferred a/ 

28 

205 

428 

213 

248 

Unaccounted for 

0 

0 

313 

473 

138 

Total 

545 

1,908 

3,022 

2,778 

2,477 

Backlog at End of Quarter 

1,756 

2,953 

2,408 

2,113 

2,217 

MOST VCI SENTENCES (707.) 

WERE FOR 

LESS THAN 



2 YEARS 

, BUT C0ULE 

i BE EXTENDED 



Length of Sentence b/ 






0-6 months 

54 

109 

178 

131 

107 

6-12 months 

86 

198 

234 

203 

148 

12-24 months 

168 

702 

841 

882 

933 

Over 24 months 

124 

471 

588 

520 

547 

Total 

432 

1,480 

1,841 

1,736 

1,735 


Source: "Phoenix", SEA Analysis Report . June-July, 1971, p. 7. 

a/ To military or civil court, to another province, drafted, classified as 
"POW" or listed as "other". 

b/ Initial sentence only. Sentence could subsequently be extended by 
administrative action of the Province Security Committee. 

Phung Hoang forces* accounted for only just over 
20 percent of all VCI killed, captured, or rallied 
and only half of their results (9 percent of the 
total) were the result of specific targeting. Mili¬ 
tary forces killed or captured about half the VCI 
taken, and the remaining 30 percent rallied 
through the Chieu Hoi Program.f In short, only 
ten percent oj the job was being done in an organized 
way by the forces chiefly tasked to do it {Table 135). 
In earlier years this percentage was even lower. 

(U) Detailed data {not shown here) indicate that the 
territorial forces {BF/PF), especially in Military 
Regions 1 and J+, accounted for the largest share of 
VCI killed or captured by a single force {1970, 50 
percent; early 1971, 39 percent). Police brought in 
20 percent in 1970 and 14 percent in early 1971. 
On a man-for-man basis, the single most effective 
anti-VCI force was the Provincial Reconnaissance 
Units (PRU). This 4,400-man force killed or 
captured 1,683 VCI in 1970, about 380 for every 
thousand men in the force; in early 1971 they were 
capturing and killing VCI at an annual rate of 263 
per thousand. No other force came close to this. 
The police (about 109,000 strong in 1971) killed 
or captured only about 40 VCI per 1,000 per year; 

♦National Police, Field Police, Special Police, Provincial 
Reconnaissance Units, RD Cadre, Census Grievance 
teams, Armed Propaganda teams. 

fThe VCT who rallied may or may not have reduced VC/ 
NVA effectiveness. The tactic of legitimizing cadre by 
rallying became a goal of the VCI late in war. See Chapter 
XVI for an analysis of the Chieu Hoi Program. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 915 






























































CONFIDENTIAL 


RF/PF about 20 per 1,000 per year. (The PRU 
were later incorporated into the special branch of 
the National Police.) 

(U) Critics of the Phung Hoang Program have 
asserted that it was used more as a convenient 
way to assassinate political enemies than to dis¬ 
mantle the VCI. But Table 136 shows that, during 
the 15 months from January 1970 through March 
1971, less than 2 percent of all VCI put out of action 
were specifically targeted and killed by Phung Hoang 
forces. Most of the VCI were either killed or captured 
as a by-product of military operations , or as a result 
of general screening operations , and were identified 
as VCl afterwards. There is no way of telling from 
the data whether any political assassinations were 
taking place, but the data do suggest that such 
activity was not the primary aim of the program. 
Indeed, if the VC/NVA were worried about the 
Phung Hoang Program, and there are reports that 
they were, they could do worse than to label 
Phung Hoang a political assassination program. In 
short, the numbers alone will not answer the 
allegations of political assassinations, but they 
won’t support them either. 

(U) Until January 1970 there was no system to 
provide follow-up on persons captured as suspected 
VCI. It was impossible to determine systematically 
whether captured persons were ever processed by 
the Province Security Committee and sentenced 
or released. To remedy this situation, an informa¬ 
tion system (VCINIS) was started in January 
1970. It assigned an identification (id) number to 
each detainee on the basis of his name, birthdate, 
and time and place of capture. Data on the indi¬ 
vidual’s processing and sentence or release were 
entered into the system at a later date, keyed to 
the id number assigned. ( 78 ) 

(U) Another difficulty the GVN faced in disman¬ 
tling the VCI was its own cumbersome and leaky 
judicial machinery. Despite American pleas to 
upgrade the judicial machinery, Table 137 shows 
that after a data base was established during the 
first quarter of 1970, the backlog of cases consist¬ 
ently exceeded 2,000. During the last three 
quarters of the period, the backlog was reduced 
by an increase in the number of persons released 
after trial, transferred out of the system, or 
unaccounted for. The table indicates that most 
sentences were for less than two years, but they 


could be extended by administrative action of 
the Province Security Committee. 

(U) The South Vietnamese people clearly sensed 
the shortcomings of the system for trying VCI 
suspects. When asked about the treatment given 
to VCI when they were arrested or captured, 6,298 
respondents in a series of PAAS rural surveys 
responded as follows :( 79 ) Usually fair and just, 56 
percent; sometimes fair and just, 17 percent; 
usually unfair and unjust, 10 percent; don’t know, 
33 percent. When asked if the judicial proceedings 
for the VCI should be made public, more than half 
of the 4,444 respondents to this question answered 
yes (53 percent). Only 17 percent said no, and 29 
percent did not know.( 80 ) 

WHAT DID THE VIETNAMESE THINK OF 
THE PHUNG HOANG PROGRAM? 

(U) Awareness of the Phung Hoang Program 
increased steadily from January 1970 through 
August 1972, the period for which data are avail - 
able.( 81 ) Even though efforts were made to 
publicize the program, 67 percent of the respond¬ 
ents to a PAAS rural survey in January 1970 said 
they did not know what the words Phung Hoang 
meant. By August 1972, only 26 percent said they 
were not aware of the Phung Hoang program. The 
question was changed in March 1971 and this may 
have affected the figures, but the trend seems 
clear; more people became aware of the program 
as time passed. 

(LI) But the level of awareness was not high. The 
PAAS rural surveys asked 6,431 people during 
1971 and 1972 whether they were aware of the 
Phung Hoang Program. Only 8 percent said they 
clearly understood the program. Thirty-two per¬ 
cent said they had a general idea of it, and another 
32 percent said they had heard the name.( 82 ) 

(U) Some clues to the attitude of the Vietnamese 
rural population toward the Phung Hoang Pro¬ 
gram are furnished by answers to questions about 
how much effort the National Police should devote 
to the VCI problem and whether rewards should 
be offered to the populace for information leading 
to the capture of VCI cadre. In 1971 and 1972, 
5,556 respondents were asked: “How much effort 
should the National Police devote to dealing with 
the elimination of VCI?” Sixty-seven percent 
thought the police should spend at least half of 


910 JDRB 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


their time on the VCI.( 83 ) When asked: “Should 
the GVN pay for information that leads to the 
capture of VCI cadre?” 73 percent of 945 respond¬ 
ents answered yes, 5 percent said no, and 22 
percent didn’t know.( 84 ) But when askeditypeople 
would approve of those who provide information 
about Communist activities for money, only 49 
percent of the same sample said yes, 15 percent 
said no, and 31 percent didn’t know.( 85 ) 

(U) Taken as a whole, the data seem to suggest 
that a hard core of about 40 percent of the rural 
population knew something about the program, 
thought the police should really concentrate on it 
(more than half their time), and would approve of 
rewards to people who furnished information about 
Communist activities. 

(U) When 2,170 respondents were asked about the 
performance of Phung Hoang in eliminating the 
VCI, only 30 percent thought the program was 
effective. Twenty-eight percent thought its per¬ 
formance was fairly effective because it helped 
force the VCI to modify, but not necessarily cease, 
its activities. Nine percent thought performance 
was poor, and 20 percent didn’t know.( 86 ) When 
8,219 rural respondents were asked about the per¬ 
formance of the National Police in dealing with 
the VCI, only 28 percent thought the police were 
effective.( 87 ) When asked: “Do village and district 
officials place emphasis on eliminating VC/VCI?” 
55 percent of a sample of 5,464 replied: Yes, 
considerable. ( 88 ) A sample of 5,470 was then asked: 
“What do the majority of the people think of the 
village/district officials’ efforts to eliminate the 
VC/VCI?” Fifty-seven percent said that their 
efforts were appreciated and had community 
support. ( 89 ) 

(U) Taken as a whole, the data suggest that about 
55 percent of the respondents to the questions 
thought that the program’s performance was at 
least fairly effective and that local officials were 
emphasizing Phung Hoang with the support of the 
community. 

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE VCI? 

(U) The HES and PA AS data give some clues to 
the status and effectiveness of the VCI by 1972 
and are probably better indicators of the state of 
affairs than the order-of-battle approach presented 


at the beginning of this analysis, although they, 
too, must be viewed with caution. 

(U) The HES regularly asked a question each 
quarter about the status of the VCI in every ham¬ 
let. The results suggest that ( 1 ) the population 
living free of the VC/NVA infrastructure tripled 
between 1969 and 1972, with most of the progress 
made in 1971, and that by December 1972 fifty- 
five percent had reached this condition; (2) after 
1969, the population subjected to the most intense 
VCI activity (regular covert activity or primary 
authority) leveled off at 8 to 10 percent of the 
total; and (8) still, at the end of 1972, forty-five 
percent of the population was reportedly subject 
to at least sporadic, covert activity by the Viet 
Cong Infrastructure. ( 90 ) 

(U) The PAAS data, once again, were more 
conservative than the HES data, partly because 
they did not include the urban population. Only 23 
percent of the respondents in 1972 said that there 
were no VCI cadre in the area or, if present, that 
they were ineffective. ( 91 ) The changes from 1971 to 
1972 in the PAAS data show a pattern not unlike 
the HES, in that the “no VCI” category sta} r ed 
about the same. However, 15 percent of the 
respondents rated the VCI more effective in 1972, 
compared to 4 percent in 1971, and only 34 
percent rated the VCI as less effective in 1972, 
compared to 52 percent in 1971. The PAAS re¬ 
spondents clearly felt that the VCI recovered 
some lost ground in 1972. 

(U) To be effective, the VCI had to be able to 
recruit new members. The HES didn’t ask a 
specific cpiestion about the VCI ability to recruit, 
but it did ask whether any people in the hamlet 
lived where VCI recruiters, tax collecters, and 
other cadre could move freely at night.( 92 ) Shown 
below is the growing percentage of the population 
which did not live in such areas: 


Dec 

Dec 

Dec 

Dec 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

56% 

71% 

80% 

79% 

PAAS 

data are 

not sufficient 

to show a 


trend about recruiting; but in 1972, 3,475 rural 
respondents were asked: “Is the VCI presently 
able to recruit any new members in this 
village?”( 93 ) Sixty percent answered no, 20 percent 
answered yes, and 19 percent did not know. Half 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDItB 917 







CONFIDENTIAL 


of those who answered yes said that the VCI 
could recruit only with great difficulty. 

(U) Another criterion of VCI effectiveness was its 
ability to tax the population for funds to keep its 
organization and efforts going. The HES and the 
PAAS both asked about the VCI ability to tax. 
Again, a trend is available from the HES, but 
not from the PAAS. The HES asked if the VCI 
collected taxes from hamlet households, in cash 
or in kind. By December 1971, the answer was no 
for 82 percent of the population.( 94 ) The PAAS 
rural survey asked 3,476 respondents in 1972: 
“Have VCI cadre been able to tax the people of 
this village in recent months?” Fifty-seven percent 
answered no, 19 percent said yes, a few times a 
month, 8 percent said the VCI taxed almost 
daily( 95 ) Again, the PAAS rural data were more 
conservative than the view from HES, which 
included the cities. The HES trend indicates that 
the VCI were collecting taxes from fewer people 
each year. 

(U) A key facet of VCI effectiveness was to keep 
the identity of its members secret, particularly 
from the GVN. The HES asked: “Are the identi¬ 
ties of members of the enemy infrastructure for 
this village known to friendly intelligence per¬ 
sonnel?” The answers are interesting but trouble¬ 
some, because they contradict some of the HES 
data presented above. As with the other data, the 
trends are favorable to the GVN, but these data 
from HES suggest that onty 29 percent of the 
population in December 1972 lived where no VCI 
existed, in sharp contrast to the 55 percent figure 
from another HES question discussed above. No 


explanation for the difference is readily available. 
The 55 percent version of the question asks about 
VCI in the hamlets and the 29 percent version asks 
about VCI in the villages. The village is an area 
like a township, and it includes hamlets within its 
borders, so on that basis the figures ought to agree. 
It may be significant that the 29-percent answer 
agrees well with the 23-percent answer from the 
PAAS presented earlier in this chapter. The PAAS 
rural survey asked 851 respondents in March 1971 
if they were aware of the present Viet Cong 
village/hamlet officials (the HES asked if GVN 
intelligence personnel knew the identities of the 
VCI).( 97 ) As might be expected (the VCI was 
supposed to be clandestine, and this could be a 
dangerous question to answer), most of them (68 
percent) said they were not aware of the VCI 
officials. Another 24 percent said they were aware 
of a few of them. 

CONCLUSION ^ 

(U) The picture that emerges from the data is a 
VCI that was battered as a by-product of the war, 
rather than by an intense Phung Hoang effort, but 
still able to function among a significant portion 
of the South Vietnamese population in December 
1972, just before the cease-fire. There is no 
evidence in the data of a Phung Hoang Program 
of systematic political assassinations, although 
people were specifically targeted and killed by 
Vietnamese action forces. Finally, the Phung 
Hoang Program was not very effective, but it 
seems to have been supported by a substantial 
portion of the South Vietnamese population. 


918 JDRB 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


Chapter XVIII 

Refugee Problems 


(U) Vietnamese Government records suggest that 
about 7 million people at one time or another were 
officially" registered as refugees or war victims 
during 1965-72. Stated another way, a third of 
South Vietnam’s population were official refugees 
or war victims at some point in time. Of course 
more than a million of these were people whose 
homes were destroyed or damaged by the Tet 
1968 offensive, and they were not displaced from 
their area of residence. 

(U) Many people undoubtedly registered as refugees 
or war victims more than once. For example, 
Military Region 1 was hit hard in the 1968 Tet 
offensive and, again, even harder in the 1972 
offensive, long after most of the Tet 1968 refugees 
and war victims had returned to their homes. It 
seems reasonable to assume that many of the 1968 
refugees and victims were caught in the 1972 
offensive and registered for government assist¬ 
ance again, but no records exist to confirm it. 
On the other hand, others who were displaced or 
injured, or who suffered property damage from the 
war, never entered the official system for care and 
relief, so it is probably safe to assume that one- 
third of the population had been displaced by the 
war at one time or another. 

i (U) This does not mean that 7 million people in 
South Vietnam, were on the refugees or war victims 
rolls at the end of 1972. Most of them had passed 
through the system , received some benefits, and re¬ 
turned to their homes or resettled. The number of 
refugees in December 1972 was probably down to less 
than a million, because the number living in official 


refugee camps and receiving government assistance 
was 650,000; an estimated 450,000 displaced by the 
1972 offensive had already returned home, and 
another 200,000 were believed to be living with 
relatives or otherwise caring for themselves.( 98 ) 

THE STATISTICS 

(U) It is important to recognize the function and 
frailty of the refugee and war victim statistics, 
the function being to identify numbers of indi¬ 
viduals to whom payments were due,(") not to 
count all refugees and war victims in South 
Vietnam. The refugee and war victim counts 
were simply the key to distributing assistance to 
those who registered officially with the government. 

(U) The statistics were a source of misunder¬ 
standing, because outside observers believed they 
represented the total number of refugees, while 
the officials working in the refugee program con¬ 
sidered them to be the current number of refugees 
or war victims to whom payments were due. The 
nature of the figures meant that the case load 
might rise because of delays in paying benefits, 
even though the refugees might have found em¬ 
ployment or returned to their homes. Or the case 
load might be too low because refugees weren’t 
being registered, although many^ existed. To 
compound the problem, the statistics weren’t 
reported with a great deal of accuracy. In 1967, 
U.S. Senate investigators asserted that . . noth¬ 
ing resembling even remotely accurate information 
on the numbers of refugees has been made avail¬ 
able.’^ 100 ) Although the reporting improved, Gen- 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JI)RB 919 








CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 138 If you can get a higher paying job, but 
have to move to another province, would you accept 
this job? (Table unclassified.) 



Rural 

Urban 

Yes 

13% 

23% 

No 

86% 

76% 

No. of 



Respondents 

1919 

2312 


Source: PAAS Rural Question 422, asked in 
January and March 1972; Urban Question 
5423, asked in January, February, March, 
and September 1972. 


era! Accounting Office investigators more than 
two years later, observed: 

Since February 1968 the refugee reporting sys¬ 
tem has undergone three major revisions but the 
information being reported is still conflicting, 
confusing, and inconsistent—in part, because it 
is compiled by untrained personnel. ( 101 ) 

Despite their lack of precision, the refugee figures 
are fairly reliable in indicating the magnitude of 
the problem, and the}" did fluctuate with the tempo 
of the combat. When combat increased, so did the 
number of refugees. When it decreased, the num¬ 
ber of refugees did too. 

REFUGEES, WAR VICTIMS, AND 
MIGRANTS 

(U) Three groups commonly called refugees are 
addressed here: war victims, migrants, and 
refugees. Refugees were people who were forced to 
move away from their homes and employment and 
who registered for government benefits. War vic¬ 
tims were civilians who suffered property damage 
or personal injury from the war, but who did not 
have to leave their homes or employment for an 
extended period of time.( 102 ) They also registered 
for government benefits. Most of the “refugees” 
from the Tet 1968 offensive were really war victims, 
as almost all remained in the same urban locales. 
Migrants, for the purpose of this paper, were the 
people who moved to the cities, not as refugees, 
but to get jobs. They did not register for govern¬ 
ment benefits. 


MIGRANTS 

(U) Some observers persistently lumped migrants 
into the refugee totals. For example: 

Presently there is high employment in the urban 
areas and most refugees [emphasis added] have 
found means of support either directly because 
of the U.S. troops or indirectly by providing the 
troops with needed services, such as laundries 
and housekeeping^ 103 ) 

(U) Dr. Gerald C. Hickey, a leading authority on 
Vietnamese society, stated the situation more 
accurately: 

... a good percentage of the people who 
flocked to the cities are not actually refugees. 
What happened is that the American military 
build-up and the way we fought the war 
basically restructured Vietnamese society from 
predominantly rural to predominantly urban. 

At one time we had 60,000 American troops in 
Saigon alone, living in about 500 different 
buildings. This created a huge demand for maids, 
cooks, drivers, all kinds of services. So people 
came in to get jobs, to earn more cash than they 
ever had in their lives. They have found an 
entirely new way of life. They like it and they 
hope to stay put. 

Out in the country, life is very quiet and iso¬ 
lated. In the cities, you stay up late, it is lots of 
fun with all kinds of people around. Vietnamese 
are very gregarious; they like the feeling of 
living all together in a crowd, with lots going on. 

If you have just a little money in the city, you 
have electricity. Even a 20-watt bulb is better 
than an oil lamp. There are services people do 
not find in the countryside. ( 104 ) 

Results from the PAAS (Pacification Attitude 
Analysis System) support Dr. Hickey’s major 
points. 

(U) Urbanization. When asked if they were native 
to the area, 75 percent of the urban respondents said 
no. Only 25 percent were native to the city they 
were living in.( 105 ) The rest had come from some¬ 
where else. 

(U) Jobs. Many Vietnamese said they would move 
to another place to get a better job, according to 
the PAAS results shown in Table 138. The data 
suggest that the urban resident was more willing 
to move to another province than the rural resi¬ 
dent. This is probably because he assumed he 
would be moving to another city. He had already 
moved to the one he is in now, so the idea of 
moving was not new. On the other hand, 22 percent 


920 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 






CONFIDENTIAL 


of the rural respondents were willing to move to 
another district in the same province to obtain a 
better job, so there may not have been much 
difference between the two groups on thisdssue.( 106 ) 

(U) Not only did significant portions of both 
groups say the}^ would move to get a better job, 
but a significant percentage of them actually did 
move. The data from small samples suggest that 
55 percent of the rural respondents and 33 percent 
of the urban respondents moved in their last job 
change; see Table 139. 

(U) The differences suggest that it was easier for 
the urban respondent to find another job where he 
lived, than it was for the rural respondent. But 
when the urban respondent did move, he tended to 
move to another province. This suggests that he 
probably moved to an urban area in another 
province, since most provinces had only one 
major urban center. It may be a coincidence, but 
22 percent of the Table 138 rural sample* said 
they would move to another district or farther to 
get a better job, and 22 percent of the Table 139 
rural sample actually moved that far or farther 
to get one. 

(U) “They Hope to Stay Put.” When asked: 
“What do you like best about living in an urban 
area?”( 107 ) 48 percent of the respondents cited 
better security than in the countryside, which 
might suggest that security was the prime motive 
for living in the city. The rest of the sample cited 
better economic opportunities (19 percent), better 
educational and health facilities (10 percent), and 
better entertainment and atmosphere (4 percent) 
as the best aspects of urban life. 

(U) Only 12 percent of the respondents said they 
didn’t like living in an urban area and would 
return to the countryside when security permitted. 
Another set of PAAS questions suggests that only 
15 percent of the urban respondents would return 
to their native rural area “if the war were to end 
today and peace were permanent.”( 108 ) Finally, 
92 percent of the urban respondents native to their 
area said that they planned to remain where they 
were if the war ended.( 109 ) More significant, 62 
percent oj the nonnative residents said they also 
planned to stay put.{ no ) Most urban dwellers 
clearly planned to stay in the city, even when 

*Detail not shown in the table. 


Table 139. Did your last job change require you to 
move your place oj residence? (Table unclassified.) 



Rural 

Urban 

No 

45% 

67% 

Yes - To Another: 



Hamlet 

13 

2 

Village 

20 

4 

District 

15 

3 

Province 

5 

21 

Military Region 

_2 

_J3 

Subtotal Yes: 

55% 

33% 

No. of Respondents 

146 

131 


Source: PAAS Rural Question 177, asked in 
December 1971; Urban Question 5400, asked 
in December 1971 and September 1972. 


security ceased to become a significant factor. 
Other research supports the notion that a great 
many migrants moved to the cities and towns for 
reasons other than security: 

Among the most striking findings of the research 
reported here were that the war was only one of a 
number of reasons why people migrated to 
Saigon, that once in the city it did not figure 
prominently in the lives of those interviewed, 
and that it had relative^ little significance to 
migrants in deciding if Saigon was to be their 
permanent home. In sharp contrast to the por¬ 
trait of the population advanced by many as 
one caught between the two fires of the war— 
the GVN and the PRG—the authors found little 
evidence that this was the case. Instead, the 
migrants studied appeared suspended between 
war and peace, responding to pressures and 
events associated with neither. ( m ) 

(U) The data also suggest that there was a good 
deal of mobilit}^ and aggressive job hunting in 
South Vietnam. It is simply not correct to say that 
the urban growth there was solely a product of 
refugee movements. Many of the rural families 
that moved to the cities went there to improve 
their lives, and they planned to stay. Urbanization 
has been a worldwide phenomenon for some time, 
so this should not be surprising. 

REFUGEES 

(U) Refugees were defined as people who were 
forced to move away from their homes and employ - 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 921 













CONFIDENTIAL 


ment and who registered for government benefits. 
If they didn’t register, they didn’t show up in the 
statistics. 

(U) Although other large-scale displacements of 
people have occurred in Vietnam’s history, two of 
them can be directly related to events in Vietnam 
since World War II. The first occurred as a result 
of the Geneva Agreement of 1954, which gave all 
Vietnamese people 300 days to choose whether 
they wanted to live in North or South Vietnam. 
Approximately 900,000 people moved south and 
about 75,000 went north. ( 112 ) The Diem govern¬ 
ment and the French were swamped, and the 
United States became a third partner in the 
resettlement effort, providing $56.8 million in 
aid.( 113 ) Resettlement of the refugees was difficult, 
because there was little time for comprehensive 
planning and little resettlement land available. 
Yet the South Vietnamese Government and U.S. 
officials could point with pride to their accom¬ 
plishments over the next three years, as some 
660,000 of the refugees became nearly self-suffi¬ 
cient. ( 113 ) Work with the refugees continued 
through the late 1950’s and into the 1960’s, with 
important assistance coming from a number of 
U.S. voluntary agencies, but for all practical pur¬ 
poses the refugee problem was solved. A new but 
smaller crisis arose in 1962 and 1963 when Viet 
Cong harassment and terror drove approximately 
150,000 Montagnards from their mountain 
homes. ( 114 ) But with the experience of the 1950’s, 
this problem was quickly solved. 

(U) The second large-scale displacement of people 
began to occur as the war intensified in 1965, and 
the problem began to build to 1954 levels and 
beyond. The second wave had at least one impor¬ 
tant difference from the first one: This time, most 
refugees moved only a few miles. The movement 
had little in common with the mass movements of 
refugees in Europe during World War II, when 
people were driven from their homelands and 
stayed homeless for years. Since the Vietnamese 
refugees remained nearby, for the most part, many 
of them were able to return home as security began 
to spread into the countryside in 1969. 

(U) Throughout the country, but particularly in 
the camps in the northern part of South Vietnam, 
the continuous stream of refugees between 1965 
and 1967 created widespread confusion and uncer¬ 


tainty about how to deal with the problem. The 
challenge of caring for so many people while 
fighting a war was great. Lacking an adequate 
program or the resources for one, the GVN 
response was slow and hesitant. ( 115 ) United States 
concern about the problem began to mount, and 
American efforts to assist the refugees began to 
increase. In 1966 and 1967, the GVN and U.S. 
efforts were concentrated on developing an organi¬ 
zation, recruiting people, finding resources, identi¬ 
fying the kinds of aid required in different refugee 
situations, and building up the necessary logistic 
support. ( 116 ) By the end of 1967 the stage was set 
for an all-out attack on the refugee problem. Then 
the VC/NVA launched its large offensives in 1968, 
starting at Tet, and temporarity displaced more 
than a million additional people; GVN and U.S. 
efforts concentrated on caring for them, and 
another year passed before efforts got under way 
in earnest to return the long-term refugees to their 
homes or resettle them. 

(U) The problems of trying to get organized while 
the flow of refugees continued led the refugee 
program to be concentrated on payments to indi¬ 
viduals who qualified. (") This ensured that 
refugees received some assistance, but it also led 
to complex bureaucratic procedures of registration, 
authentication, and financial accounting, which 
generated delays when the refugee flows were 
highest. The focus on these procedures also cut 
into the ability of the GVN to give much assistance 
to refugee communities and camps. (") 

(U) In 1969, considerable progress was made in 
paying refugees their allowances (some long over¬ 
due), returning 200,000 of them to their homes, ( 117 ) 
and resettling others. The program continued to 
gain momentum, and then in 1972 the intense 
fighting leading up to the cease-fire agreement 
dislocated an estimated 1.2 million people, and the 
effort focused once again on short-term relief. 

THE REFUGEE STATISTICS 

(U) Table 140 shows summary statistics of the 
number of refugees who registered and to whom 
benefits were paid through the end of 1971. The 
reliability of the data is limited,* but the table 
does give some idea of the enormity of the prob- 

♦Despite considerable reporting efforts by CORDS and 
the GVN, the data in the table and those that follow 
remain crude estimates, and they don’t track very well. 


922 JDRB 


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lem. And the 1972 offensive generated another 1.2 
million refugees. The number of benefits exceeded 
the number of refugees, because many refugees 
received more than one set of benefits. Fdr exam¬ 
ple, refugees might receive temporary benefits at 
the time they were registered and then be paid 
resettlement or return-to-village benefits when 
they went off the rolls. 

THE REFUGEE PROGRAM 

(U) The GVN refugee program did not provide 
extensive assistance to any individual or family, 
because the number of refugees was so large and 
the resources made available to help them so 
small.( 11S ) The program worked somewhat as 
follows. Soon after refugee families reached secure 
areas, those seeking assistance were housed in 
temporary camps. Each newly arrived family 
received emergency food commodities for seven 
days, followed by a 2-month( 119 ) temporary al¬ 
lowance, which was normalfy extended until the 
family could return home or begin to settle else¬ 
where, at which time additional benefits were 
paid.( 118 ) 

(U) Temporary benefits were designed to give 
interim assistance to people thrown into refugee 
status. Through the first quarter of 1971, 2.3 
million refugees reportedly had received tempo¬ 
rary benefits. ( 12 °) 

(U) The benefits were provided by the GVN 
Ministry of Refugees and Social Welfare after the 
individual or family registered. The registration 
was handled by local officials, by the Ministry 
staff, or by special teams sent to register refugees. 
For the first seven days, the refugees would 
receive 500 grams of rice per person per day, three 
cans of condensed milk per family of at least five 
members, and 20 grams of salt per person per day, 
plus whatever shelter was available.( 119 ) After the 
first week, refugees received either VN $20 or 
500 grams of rice per person per day, and tempo¬ 
rary shelter was provided for the in-camp refugees. 
These benefits lasted two months, or until the 
refugees resettled or returned to their villages.( 119 ) 
Added to these benefits was additional assistance 
in the form of PL-480 foods, aid from voluntary 
agencies, civic action assistance from military 
units that were located in the neighborhood, and 
assistance from international agencies and from 
other nations. 


Table 140. Refugees and benefits; thousands of 
persons. (Table unclassified.) 



3/ 

Newly Registered- 

Benefits Paid To^/ 

Prior to 1967 

1678 

1(082 

1967 

463 

572 

1968 

494 

576 

1969 

114 

(+476 registered 
for out-of-camp 
benefits)c/ 

1277 

1970 

129 

(+281 registered 
for retum-to-village 
benefits)c/ 

925 

1971 

136 

450 plus 


4012 (sic)-/ 

4882 plus 


a/ Source: Nooter, p. 38. 
b/ Source: Colby, p. 24. 

c/ Refugees generated in prior years but registered this year for 
out-of-camp or retum-to-village benefits, 
d/ Figures add to 3771, but 4012 total is shown in source document, 
so there may be a typographical or other error in the yearly 
figures shown. 

(U) Temporary benefits were paid to refugees not 
housed in temporary camps, if they lived in groups 
of 20 or more families, ( 12 °) and they were reported 
as out-of-camp refugees. Out-of-camp refugees 
gained attention in November 1968, when the 
GVN initiated a program to find and register all 
refugees throughout South Vietnam. The initial 
results of the survey added approximately 500,000 
refugees to the rolls. 

(U) Resettlement benefits were designed to assist 
refugees in settling somewhere other than their 
original homes. Before 1970, refugees receiving 
these benefits were reported as being resettled, 
although their problems were usually far from 
over. From 1970 on, they were reported as 
“resettlement benefits paid” in an attempt to 
reflect their status more accurately. ( 121 > 122 ) 

(U) Basic resettlement benefits consisted of a 
VN$3,600 food allowance per person for six 
months and VN$7,500 and 10 sheets of roofing 
per family. Montagnards received, in addition, 20 
grams of salt per person per day for six months. 
Additional aid was available from the PL-480 
and other programs. Through the first quarter of 
1971, approximately 1.7 million refugees report¬ 
edly had received resettlement benefits. ( 121>122 ) The 
figure is a crude estimate, although reported by 
GVN officials through the official reporting sys¬ 
tem, and there are allegations that some refugees 
reportedly receiving benefits did not receive them. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 923 











CONFIDENTIAL 


In Pleiku, Senate Subcommittee investigators in 
19G7 asserted that one group of 13,000 refugees 
was counted as resettled, but 10,000 of them had 
never received any part of a resettlement allow¬ 
ance^ 100 ) In Binh Thuan, U.S. officials reportedly 
told subcommittee members that 115,000 refugees 
reportedly received resettlement allowances, but 
65,000 of them got only part of their allowances or 
nothing at all.( 10 °) As to those who were paid, 
GAO investigators—who were hardly to be con¬ 
sidered experts in this field—found that “many of 
the refugees paid allowances by the GVN were, 
in our opinion, only slightly better off than prior 
to receipt of payments. ”( 123 ) 

(U) The return-to-village program, began in 1968 as 
a reflection of the improving security situation 
and to help people move back to their original 
villages. It became a major aspect of the pacifica¬ 
tion program to repopulate the countr 3 ^side.( 124 ) 
As a result of this emphasis, benefits—the same 
as for resettlement—were paid to people who had 
already received resettlement benefits, but wanted 
to return to their villages. Eligibility for benefits 
was also extended to those who had moved to 
Saigon, whether originally registered as refugees 
or not. On the other hand, more than 800,000 
refugees are estimated to have returned to their 
villages before the program began, without receiv¬ 
ing the benefits. ( 125 ) 

(U) More than 600,000 refugees were reportedly 
paid return-to-village benefits during the period 
from 1969 through March 1971, and 280,000 were 
in the process of receiving the assistance at the 
end of that period. ( 125 ) The USAID/Vietnam Mis¬ 
sion Director in April 1970 estimated that refugees 
returning to their villages under the program 
probably were about half as well off as before they 
were displaced.( 126 ) Not too bad, given the numbers 
involved and continuation of the war that had 
displaced them. 

(U) In 1970, two events generated more than 
500,000 refugees independently of the war in 
South Vietnam. After Sihanouk’s fall in Cambodia, 
the new government’s anti-Communist stance 
there spilled over to affect all Vietnamese living 
in Cambodia, Communist or not. As a result, 
some 210,000 Vietnamese residents of Cambodia 
moved to South Vietnam with GVN assistance^ 127 ) 
Most of the refugees went into hastily erected 


camps, where they received temporary benefits, 
were released at their request, or were given help 
in finding a resettlement area. The second event 
was an extensive flood in six provinces of central 
Vietnam, which struck with little warning and 
within days made 325,000 people homeless. ( 128 ) 
They, too, received aid from the GVN, supported 
by U.S. helicopters and other resources. 

two issues: refugee camps and relocations 

(U) The two refugee issues that drew the most 
criticism were conditions in the refugee camps and 
the occasional practice of forcing people to leave 
their homes and relocate elsewhere. These prob¬ 
lems were most evident in the northern areas of 
South Vietnam where the fighting was most intense 
(see Chapter II) and where it was tougher to 
make a living than in the delta. 

(U) The first issue was the refugee camps. Indi¬ 
vidual benefits have already been discussed, but 
there were additional needs beyond food and 
shelter for the refugees. Special programs were 
developed to address the needs of refugee camps 
(sites), resettlement centers, and return-to-village 
communities. The Ministry of Social Welfare 
Refugee Site Development Program, started in 
late 1966,( 129 ) was designed to help refugees estab¬ 
lish themselves in resettlement sites by providing 
facilities and services, such as wells, latrines, 
classrooms, simple health facilities and services, 
vocational training, and, where land was avail¬ 
able,* vegetable seeds and other agricultural 
assistance. 

(U) Until 1970, the site-development program was 
impeded by the diversion of resources and empha¬ 
sis to the higher priority needs of emergency relief 
and paying individual benefits. In 1970, reduced 
case loads, pacification momentum, and the 
emerging effects of the return-to-village program 
began to eliminate the need for some refugee 
camps and freed resources to improve others. The 
Ministry of Social Welfare budget in 1971 included 
VN $538 million specifically earmarked for devel¬ 
opment of resettlement sites and reconstruction of 
community facilities in the refugees’ original 
villages. ( 130 ) 

*Land was in short supply in Military Regions 1 and 2 ’ 
see Chapter XIX. 


924 JDRB 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


(U) Special efforts were made in Military Region 1, 
which had the worst camps. ( 131 ) In the delta 
(Military Region 4) many people also fled from 
their homes but, given the relative ease^of sub¬ 
sisting there, they were quickly assimilated and 
never became the obvious problem represented by 
the people in northern refugee camps. ( 132 ) 

(U) The shortcomings of the refugee camps were 
well known to the people trying to correct them. 
There was no attempt to hide the problem. For 
example, a monthly refugee report (March 20, 
1970) for 402 occupied sites in South Vietnam 
said that 176 sites (42 percent of them) were 
overcrowded and 87 sites (21 percent) were 
deficient in medical support. In addition, 833 
classrooms were needed and an undetermined 
number of sites had poor water supplies. Of the 
382 sites assigned ratings by the Ministry of 
Social Welfare, 91 (24 percent) were rated 

substandard. ( 133 ) 

(U) To sum up the problem, the USAID/Vietnam 
Mission Director estimated that most people in 
resettlement sites were only about one-third as 
well off as before being displaced.! 134 ) Incidentally, 
it is important to remember that the war was 
fundamentally to blame, not the refugee program. 

(U) The second issue involved relocations, forced 
and voluntary. During the height of the fighting 
in 1967 and 1968, and again in 1970 and 1971 
(during the relocation of Montagnards in the 
Central Highlands and the ARVN operations in 
the U Minh Forest in the delta) civilians were 
forcibty removed from their homes at the insistence 
of the GVN military. However, when compared to 
the refugee totals, the numbers were relatively 
small. In fact, there are relatively few documented 
cases of forced relocation. 

(U) The purpose of forced relocations was to move 
the people out of the way of military actions or to 
prevent their being used by the VC/NVA as 
sources of manpower, supplies, or intelligence. 
Criticism of forced relocations mounted because of 
the hardships they imposed on the people who 
were moved, so the GVN early in 1970 adopted a 
formal policy that called for bringing “security to 
the people instead of bringing people to security.”* 
The policy and guidelines for the exceptions where 

*This was always CORDS policy, and it protested several 
military relocation schemes. 


relocation was really considered necessary were 
incorporated in decrees issued by the South 
Vietnamese Prime Minister on March 2 and 
April 18, 1970. ( 134 ) During the relocation of 
Montagnards from the Central Highlands in late 
1970 and early 1971, GVN military and civilian 
authorities failed to comply with the directives. ( 135 ) 
The CORDS ad visors at all levels made a con¬ 
centrated effort to stop further forced relocations. 
These efforts resulted in another decree from the 
Prime Minister on May 12, 1971, reaffirming the 
GVN policy, restricting relocation of people, 
and tightening procedures by requiring on-the-spot 
inspection by regional and national pacification 
officials before approval of any relocation plan.( 135 ) 
This reduced the problem to tolerable levels from 
then on. 

(U) In contrast to forced relocation, designed to 
clear civilians out of an area until security could 
be established, voluntary relocation was designed 
to provide a new life for refugees who had little 
chance of returning to their original homes. As 
might be expected, voluntary relocation got mixed 
up with forced relocation in the eyes of the U.S. 
press, which raised an outcry when the program 
surfaced. 

(U) A number of refugees from communities in 
Military Regions 1 and 2 had little or no hope of 
returning to their original homes or of supporting 
themselves where the refugee settlements were 
organized. Their plight generated the idea of 
voluntary relocation, and the GVN established a 
Directorate of Land Development and Hamlet 
Building, which drew up a plan to resettle people 
in need of land on land in need of people. The plan 
had two goals :( 136 ) 

• To offer refugee communities with no future 
an opportunity to move of their own free will 
to areas where the}^ could make a living. 

• To open up for productive use several hundred 
thousand hectares of idle government land 
and thereby aid the economic development of 
South Vietnam. 

The goals were laudable, and they could benefit 
the people and the country. The danger, of course, 
was that the second aim could erode the voluntary 
nature of the first, if heavy emphasis was placed on 
opening up and taking control of vacant land. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 925 








CONFIDENTIAL 

Table 141. Refugee and social welfare funding summary; millions of U.S. dollars. (Table unclassified.) 



FY 68 

FY 69 

FY 70 

FY 71 

FY 72 

Totals 

Percent 

AID Budget 

17.9 

9.5 

5.9 

3.8 

1.7 

38.8 

9 

3 / 

Counterpart Funds— 

20.0 

28.4 

32.1 

31.5 

42.4 

154.4 

34 

PL-480 Food 

(as programmed) 

32.3 

33.9 

24.2 

10.0 

5.0 

105.4 

23 

Ministry of Social , 

Welfare (GVN Budget)- 

4.3 

3.6 

7.6 

8.7 

10.2 

34.4 

8 

U.S. Voluntary Agencies 

22.4 

25.9 

22.4 

19.4 

16.8 

106.9 

23 

Free World Assistance 

3.1 

3.1 

3.1 

3.1 

3.1 

15.5 

3 

Military Civic Action 
(estimated) 

.2 

.2 

.2 

.2 

N/A 

.8 


TOTAL 

100.2 

104.6 

95.5 

76.7 

79.2 

456.2 


Sources: Colby, Annex D, 

for FY 

68 through FY 70. 

Nooter 

, P. 39 

for FY 71- 

■72. 


Piasters converted to dollars at 118 piasters to 1 dollar. 


(U) It is clear that South Vietnamese people were 
willing to move to other areas to improve their 
standards of living. The PAAS data have shown 
this to be true. Also, there is the precedent of 
900,000 people voting with their feet and moving 
south in 1954 to settle on vacant land. The 200,000 
refugees from Cambodia also moved into some of 
the vacant land owned by the GVN. 

(U) Preparations for the first pilot project under 
the new program began in the summer of 1971. 
Ha Thanh hamlet in Quang Tri province was the 
first hamlet to be offered resettlement. Ha Thanh, 
two miles below the DMZ, was established as a 
temporary refugee camp in 1967 for 15,000 
refugees, but it never became self-supporting. 
About two-thirds of its population drifted away, 
leaving about 5,000 people living in abject pov¬ 
erty. ( 137 ) After a process that included consultation 
with provincial and district officials, a presentation 
to the villagers, a request from them for more 
particulars, and a trip by hamlet representatives 
to Militar}^ Region 3, where they inspected various 
sites, the population of Ha Thanh and their 
personal belongings were taken by air or ship to 
various sites in Military Region 3. With the help 
of resettlement allowances and other GVN assist¬ 
ance, they began to work the land alloted to them, 
build houses, and settle down. By May of 1972, 
the GVN had requests from another 12,000 
refugees to relocate from Military Region 1 to 
Military Regions 3 and 4 during the remainder of 
19 72.( 138 ) 


WAR VICTIMS 

(U) War victims constituted a separate category 
developed in 1968 to provide benefits to civilians 
who, as a result of the war, suffered personal 
injury or damage to property, but who did not 
have to leave their homes for a long time. The war 
victim benefits for property damage, death, and 
injuries were as follows.( 139 ) All families whose 
houses were damaged 20 percent or more were 
eligible to receive the following commodities: 2 
meters of cloth per person, one blanket and one 
mosquito net per family of two to four persons, 
and two mosquito nets for each family with five 
or more members. If money was paid in lieu of 
commodities, the rates were 50 piasters per meter 
of cloth, 400 piasters per blanket, and 400 piasters 
per mosquito net. Families with houses damaged 
20 to 50 percent received in addition 500 grams of 
rice per person per day for 15 days, or money at the 
rate of 40 piasters per kilogram of rice. A house- 
construction allowance of 3,000 piasters was also 
provided. Families with houses damaged more 
than 50 percent received the same rice allowance, 
but for 30 days (not 15), and they also received a 
house-construction allowance of 7,500 piasters plus 
10 sheets of roofing. Death benefits were 4,000 
piasters if the deceased was 15 years old or older 
and 2,000 piasters if the deceased was younger. 
Injuries requiring medical treatment for at least 7 
days received a benefit in the amount of 2,000 
piasters. 


926 JDRB 


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(U) By the first quarter of 1971, approximately 
1.6 million war victims had registered for benefits, 
and 1.35 million (83 percent) had reportedly 
received them.( 140 ) The totals include ^approxi¬ 
mately 1 million temporary victims of the Tet 
and May 1968 offensives. Most of the Tet 1968 
‘‘refugees” were actually war victims, aided 
through Project Recovery and other civil 
programs. ( 116 - 117> 14 °) 

RESOURCES 

(U) Table 141 shows that funding support for the 
refugee and social welfare programs in South 
Vietnam amounted to about $100 million per 
year until fiscal 1971 when it dropped to about 
$75 million to $80 million. The decline stemmed 
from reductions in the AID budget, PL-480 food, 
and U.S. voluntary assistance, but it was attenu- 
ated somewhat by rises in counterpart funds and 
the GVN budget. 


(U) For the period as a whole, 80 percent of the 
funding support for refugee and social welfare 
programs came from three sources,: counterpart 
funds (34 percent), PL-480 food (23 percent), and 
U.S. voluntary agencies (23 percent). The rest 
came from the GVN. It must also be acknowledged 
that the much larger amounts of U.S. aid and 
GVN funds spent on local economic revival, anti¬ 
inflation programs, and repair and maintenance of 
transport and communications also benefited 
refugees, along with the general population. More¬ 
over, most refugees did earn some income on their 
own. 

(U) On the other hand , it is difficult, to understand 
why the United States didn’t spend more on assistance 
for refugees and war victims , given the billions of 
U.S. dollars spent on the war effort. It is also 
surprising that Congressional critics of the refugee 
conditions did not push harder to appropriate or 
earmark more funds for this purpose. 






CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 927 





CONFIDENTIAL 


Chapter XIX 

How Extensive Was Land Reform? 

• 

Sixteen years of broken promises on land reform provide warrant for skepti¬ 
cism about the new legislation President Thieu has signed, yet there is now 
more reason than before to believe that tenant farming at last will be virtually 
ended in South Vietnam. 

. . . the far-reaching nature of the legislation— probably the most ambitious 
and progressive land reform of the Twentieth Century —provides built-in 
safeguards against evasion. ( 141 ) 

New York Times Editorial, April 1070 

In fact, the land distribution programme implemented by Saigon has effec¬ 
tively taken place; it does not exist only on paper. ( 142 ) 

Oliver Todd, September 1973 * 


(U) A key Communist strategy in South Vietnam 
was to concentrate on the rural population, and 
perhaps their most powerful appeal was the 
promise of land. When the VC/NVA forces took 
over a village, they told the farmers that the 
landlords would be chased out or killed and that 
the tenant farmers would be given the land they 
were fa: aing. But they didn’t tell them that land 
would be given only to those who actively sup¬ 
ported Communists. No title would be issued. If 
the tenant farmer died, the land would not be left 
with the widow and children, but would be given 
to another farmer who was friendly to the VC/ 
NVA. Finally, after an interval of, say, five or ten 
years, the farmers would surrender their lands to 
a commune, of which they would then be part.( 143 ) 

(U) The promise of land had powerful appeal in 
South Vietnam, as seen below, and land reform 
was a constant GVN theme from the early 1950’s. 
But little land was distributed to landless peasants 
until the Land-to-the-Tiller Program began in 1970. 


SITUATION PRIOR TO 1970 

(U) South Vietnam had one of the world’s highest 
tenancy rates before the Land-to-the-Tiller Program 
began in 1970. The GVN estimated that approxi¬ 
mately 60 percent of all the rice and secondary- 
crop land was being farmed by tenant farmers who 
did not own the land.( 143 ) A U.S. consultant to the 
1967-68 study of South Vietnam’s land tenure 
situation stated that: “In its percentage of land¬ 
lessness, the Mekong Delta . . . qualified as one 
of the five worst areas of the world.”( 144 ) 

(U) A tenant farmer in southern South Vietnam 
cultivated 2 hectares (1 hectare=2.47 acres) 
on average, paying a rent that averaged about 35 
percent of his crop. In the Central Highlands of 
South Vietnam the plot averaged about 1 hec¬ 
tare. ( 14 °) The farmer was a manager, and the 
landlord normally did not participate in the 
production process. He did not furnish seed, 
credit, farm implements, or marketing outlets—he 
simply collected the rent. 


*Mr. Todd, a British-born writer, has closely observed Vietnam for almost two decades, and he is a long-time associate 
of Le Nouvel-Observateur, a leading left-of-center French weekly. 


928 JDRB 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


(U) Land tenancy had been high for a long time, 
particularly in the southern portion of South 
Vietnam. In 1945, about 6,000 landowners held 
1.2 million hectares (nearly 3 million ^acres) of 
cultivated land there, while in the Mekong Delta, 
430 French nationals owned 250,000 hectares of 
land. Eighty percent of the land in that area was 
farmed by tenants, who were paying rentals as 
high as 50 percent of the crop.( 146 ) 

(U) Early in 1951, Emperor Bao Dai proclaimed a 
land tenure reform program, but the committee to 
carry it out was not organized until late 1952. 
By then, political difficulties and the deteriorating 
military situation prevented execution of the 
program. ( 146 ) * 

(U) In 1956, under U.S. pressure, President Ngo 
Dinh Diem decreed a 100-hectare limit (247 
acres) to riceland ownership (Ordinance 57). Any 
excess was to be expropriated and sold to the 
farmers. The owners received 10 percent of the 
land price in cash and the remaining 90 percent 
in government bonds redeemable over 12 years. ( 146 ) 
The redistribution of land to the farmers pro¬ 
ceeded slowly. The 100 hectare ceiling freed only 
453,000 hectares for redistribution, plus 230,000f 
hectares (of the French-owned land) bought in 
1958. By the end of 1962, some 428,000 hectares 
had been expropriated,( 147 ) but a year later only 
about half of that land (246,000 hectares) had 
been sold to the farmers, benefiting 115,000 
families. ( 141 ) Only 45,000 additional hectares of 
land were distributed to 21,000 families during the 
five years between the end of 1963 and the end 
of 19 6 8.( 148 ) None of the former French land was 
distributed until 1966, and most of it was still in 
government hands at the end of 1968. ( 148 ) 

(U) The new constitution for South Vietnam, 
promulgated in April 1967, emphasized in Article 
19 that “The State advocates a policy of making 
the people property owners/’ and in Article 21, 
“The State advocates raising the standard of 
living of rural citizens and especially helping 
farmers to have land for cultivation.” No effects 
were seen until 1969, when land reform began to 

♦For an account of earliest land reform efforts in Vietnam, 
see “Land Reform of Vietnam Through History”, by 
Phuong Anh Trang, in Viet-Nam Bulletin of March 22, 
1971, pages 2-4. 

tNinety-two percent of the total of 250,000 hectares 
owned by the French. 

CONFIDENTIAL 


gather momentum. Land distribution skyrocketed, 
by previous standards, and 310,000 hectares were 
distributed to 232,000 tenant families under the 
various programs in existence.( 148 ) In April 1969, 
the government froze land occupancy and rents 
for one year to prepare for the new land reform. 
This prevented landlords from changing tenants 
before the new program could go into effect, and 
the rent freeze permitted tenants to retain the 
increased returns from using fertilizers and new 
seeds. ( 149 ) In June 1969, the “Land-to-the-Tiller” 
bill was approved by the Cabinet and sent to the 
National Assembly the following month. ( 149 ) 

(U) The stage was set for a major land reform 
program, and the South Vietnamese tenant 
farmers were ready for it. Surveys of Vietnamese 
attitudes( 15 °) in Military Regions 3 and 4 toward 
land ownership and reform indicated that strong 
antagonism between landlords and tenants was 
rare (some were relatives), even though the average 
rent being charged was 35 percent of the crop, 
above the 25 percent maximum fixed by law. 
Landlords were not meeting their obligation to 
reduce rents in case of total or partial crop failure, 
and more than half of the tenants eligible for 
reductions in 1966 did not get what they were 
entitled to. Eighty percent of the tenants said they 
would be willing to bu}^ the property they rented 
and woidd pay its current market value, if the 
purchase was divided into 12 annual installments. 
Offered a choice between 'permanent guaranteed 
occupancy arid purchase , 85 percent preferred 
purchase. When asked what was needed to improve 
life in the village , 37 percent of the respondents 
mentioned land ownership . (The need for credit was 
a close second with 36 percent.) Only 6 percent of 
the respondents had received land under President 
Diem’s Ordinance 57, and 84 percent of them said 
the plots were too small. 

(U) On the.other hand, 91 percent of the landlord 
respondents who had held more than 100 hectares 
lost the surplus hectares. Eighty-three percent of 
the landlords interviewed said they had approved 
of Ordinance 57 in principle, because the 3 r were 
aware of the need for it. Landlord complaints 
about Ordinance 57 centered on the administration 
of it, including compensation, and the fact that 
the government held on to the expropriated lands 
and rented them out for years. Absentee landlords 

JDRB 929 




588-672 0 - 75-12 







CONFIDENTIAL 


were asked about future land reform; 20 percent 
said they favored it, 32 percent would not oppose 
it, and 25 percent would abide by the government’s 
decision. Some of those most favorabty inclined 
held land in areas that were not secure, so the idea 
of government payment for land they couldn’t use 
anyway probably had considerable appeal. 

(U) Thus, the results suggest that the tenant 
farmers were eager to own their land—even at full 
current prices—and most of the landlords said 
the} 7 were not opposed to a land reform program. 

LAND-TO-THE-TILLER LAW 

(U) On March 26, 1970 after passage by the 
legislative bodies, President Thieu, who had 
“fought a bitter battle to get the reform adopted 
without crippling amendments,” ( 141 ) signed the 
Land-to-the-Tiller bill into law. Its stated purpose 
was to abolish farm tenancy and create a nation of 
landowners. Title was to be given, free of charge, 
to all persons farming rice land as tenants, share¬ 
croppers, squatters, or Viet Cong appointed culti¬ 
vators. The bill was expected to affect approxi¬ 
mately 800,000 farm families who were farming 
1.3 million hectares of rice land,( 151 ) and the 16,000 
landlords who owned the land.( 152 ) 

(U) The main features of the program resulting 
from the bill were:( 152 ) 

• Land holdings were limited to 15 hectares 
(37 acres). All other land would be redistrib¬ 
uted, free, to the farmers, a significant 
departure from past programs. 

• Titles were to be issued by the village Admin¬ 
istrative Committee and registered with the 
Province and Central Governments. (Only 10 
percent of people on the village committees 
were landlords, and 30 percent of the village 
officials would benefit from the program.) 

• Landlords were to be paid a price equal to 2.5 
times the annual paddy yield of the land; 20 
percent in cash immediately, the balance in 
negotiable bonds redeemable over eight years 
and bearing 10 percent interest. 

• Farmers would receive a 3-hectare plot in the 
delta (1 hectare in central Vietnam) and would 
not be liable for back taxes or back rent, but 
would pay taxes in the future, after they had 
held the land for one year. 

• Farmers had to till the land to keep it. 


THE PROGRAM I 

(U) In signing the new law, President Thieu 
announced that the GVN would distribute 1 
million hectares (2.5 million acres) of land to 
tenant farmers within three years. ( 153 ) They did it. 
By April 1973 the GVN had printed the new titles 
for 2.5 million acres and had distributed about 
75 percent of this land to farmers. It had issued 
60,700 checks for VN$14.8 billion and 506,600 
bonds valued at VN$82 billion. ( 154 ) Several key 
elements combined to enable the program to meet 
its goals. First, it had the advantage of top level 
leadership and ability. President Thieu gave clear, 
unwavering support to the program and put good 
leaders in charge of it. 

(U) Second, and perhaps even more important, the 
program was decentralized to the village. A Land 
Distribution Committee was established in each 
village, with the authority to make the decisions 
about who received the land. It also made the 
decisions about compensation, particularly deter¬ 
minations of true owners and plot yields. The 
typical province administration (with 40 to 50 
villages) simply could not have handled the volume 
and met the deadline. 

(U) Third, aerial photography instead of land 
cadastral surveys was used to locate and identify 
the plots of land to be distributed, and the entire 
process of registering the land, issuing it, and 
paying for it was done with the assistance of 
computers. The semiautomatic system thus cre¬ 
ated was instrumental in overcoming bureaucratic 
delays in title preparation and distribution. 

(U) Fourth, the GVN focused sharply on two main 
tasks, distributing land and paying for it. As soon 
as the land was identified and allocated by the 
village committee, it was issued, even though 
precise records were often not available. In this 
manner, and with the assistance of the aerial 
photography and computers, the GVN avoided a 
long tooling up period and got the program moving 
right away. This contrasted sharply with the 
previous land reform programs in South Vietnam. 

(U) Finally, the program was given massive 
publicity. During 1970, the PAAS suggested that 
70 to 80 percent of the rural population had some 
awareness of the Land-to-the-Tiller Law,( 155 ) with 
approximately 45 percent of them having heard 


930 JDRB 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 142. Basic statistics of the Land-to-the-Tiller 
Program through March 81, 1973. (Table unclas¬ 
sified.) 




"^Jectares 

Applications Approved 

910,915 

1,067,512 

Titles Issued 

867,592 

1,007,217 

Titles Distributed 

680,136 

792,491 


about it from the radio.( lo6 ) It was a popular topic 
with the people and, when asked what kind of 
people’s information should be emphasized and 
which they liked best, Land-to-the-Tiller was a 
favorite topic. ( 157 ) 

(U) Although the farmers were willing to pay for 
the land, the GVN, possibly to counter the 
Communist program of free land, decided to give 
the land away and have the government pay the 
landlord. The payments were estimated at the 
equivalent of $537 million through 1981. ( 15S ) This 
placed a serious financial burden on the GVN, and 
U.S. assistance was expected to be necessary to 
help meet the expense. 


THE RESULTS 






(U) Table 142 displays the basic statistics of the 
Land-to-the-Tiller Program through March 31, 
19 7 3.( 159 ) The table implies that the average plot 
of land involved with each application and title 
was 1.16 hectares, or 2.9 acres. In a PAAS survey 
of 938 rural respondents in January 1972, seventy- 
two percent said their family owned less than two 
hectares of land and 55 percent owned less than 
one hectare. ( 160 ) (The plot sizes above don’t seem 
so small, after all.) 


(U) When the 495,000 hectares( 161 ) distributed by 
other land reform efforts are added to the Land- 
to-the-Tiller Program, the total land distribution 
is 1.5 million hectares. The total amount of rice land 
in South Vietnam was 2.3 million hectares. Between 
1956 and 1973, sixty-five percent of it was redistrib¬ 
uted. Nonetheless, the GVN continued to distribute 
the land remaining under the Land-to-the-Tiller 
Law, estimated at approximately 295,000 
hectares. ( 162 ) 

(U) In central Vietnam the program was not very 
effective, mainly because the land plots were small 
and there was little absentee ownership. ( 163>164 ) The 


Table 143. What is your occupation? (Table 

unclassified.) 



December 

December 


1970 

1972 


7. 

7, 

Farm Laborer 

16 

10 

Tenant Farmer 

28 

7 

Landowner 

29 

56 

Total 

737. 

737. 

Nr. Respondents (1007.) 

3307 

4032 


other main weakness was that the land reform 
program for Montagnards was poorly executed and 
did not receive adequate GVN support. ( 165 - 166 ) 

(U) The data are probably fairly reliable, because 
monitoring and inspection of the Land-to-the- 
Tiller Program was pretty good. The key decisions 
were made in the village, and this probably did 
much to ensure the fairness of the program. The 
local people knew the plots, who owned them, and 
who was tilling them. 

(U) The program appeared to be quite “clean,” 
given the large potential for corruption. There are 
reports of “tea money” being paid by landlords to 
get officials to expedite payments, but the griev¬ 
ance rate from farmers was low. Few, if any, 
scandals surfaced in the American press, and the 
U.S. General Accounting Office seemed satisfied 
with the program. 

(U) The Vietnamese peasant, as usual, wasn’t as 
impressed as the outsiders. Six rural PAAS surveys 
asked 5,900 rural respondents if they believed the 
Land-to-the-Tiller Law was being administered 
fairly in their village. Of the 3,500 who had an 
opinion, 47 percent said yes and 28 percent 
said no.( 167 ) 

(U) The VC/NVA never mounted much of an 
attack against the program. Isolated, critical 
statements were issued from time to time, but 
they did not amount to much.( 168 ) 

IMPACT OF THE PROGRAM 

(U) The Land-to-the-Tiller Program in three years 
dropped land tenancy in South Vietnam from 60 
percent of cropland down to 10 percent—and the 
GVN still continued to distribute land.( m ) Data 
from the PAAS support the contention that the 


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JDRB 931 









CONFIDENTIAL 


number of landowners increased dramatically. In 
December 1970 and in December 1972, seventy- 
three percent of the PAAS rural respondents said 
they were farmers. The shift from tenant to land- 
owner is shown in Table 143.( 17 °) Twenty-nine 
percent said they were landowners in 1970, and 
56 percent said so two years later. 

(U) As the results vanish into the Communist 
version of land reform, we shall probably never 
know whether the peasants receiving land provided 
real support to the GVN. But the short-term 
results appeared favorable. A study in 1972 con¬ 
cluded that the program had hurt the VC/NVA 
politically, reduced peasant neutrality, helped 
unify the village as a local government and com¬ 
munity, created an appetite for land among the 
landless, and received credit for more changes than 
it probably should have.( 171 ) A General Accounting 


Office team reported: “Most farmers we talked to 
were pleased to be landowners and believed they 
were better off now economically. ”( 158 ) 

(U) Before land reform, Japan’s tenancy rate was 
65 percent, Taiwan’s was 50 percent, and South 
Vietnam’s was 60 percent. Approximately 3.8 
million acres were distributed in South Vietnam, 
compared to Japan’s 4.2 million acres and Taiwan’s 
600,000 acres, ( 140 ) and land tenancy in Vietnam 
dropped to 10 percent. The New York Times was 
right—it probably was “the most ambitious and 
progressive land reform of the Twentieth Century.” 
The land reform program carried out in South 
Vietnam, in the midst of a war, was a remarkable 
accomplishment. The irony is that no one seemed to 
notice it (the VC/NVA and the American public 
ignored it), except the farmers who got to own their 
land. 






932 JDRB 


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Chapter XX 

How Well Was Inflation Contained? 


(U) Inflation is a by-product of war, and in this 
the Vietnam War was no exception. In that case, 
increased government spending for national de¬ 
fense, coupled with Allied spending (mostly by 
Americans), generated excessive demand for a 
limited supply of local goods, a supply that was 
sometimes reduced by the war. 

(U) The analysis here does not attempt to deal 
with the economics of South Vietnam during the 
war. That subject is much too complex to address 
here, and moreover it deserves treatment bv a 
qualified economist. The inquiry is limited to ( 1 ) a 
simple presentation of the inflation problem in 
South Vietnam 1965-72, (2) a comparison with 
wartime inflation in South Korea 1950-53, and 
( 3) some views of the South Vietnamese people 
about inflation and their economic situation. 

IMPACT OF THE WAR ON PRICES IN 

SOUTH VIETNAM 

(U) Inflation is expressed here by consumer price 
indexes. Table 144 displays consumer price indexes 
for South Vietnam, three other Southeast Asian 
countries, South Korea, and Brazil from 1963 
through 1972. The table suggests that consumer 
prices in South Vietnam rose more than four times 
as fast as they did in the other Southeast Asian 
countries, but not as fast as in Brazil. According 
to the International Monetary Fund, South 
Vietnam's inflation problem was worse than 65 
other countries listed.( 173 ) Only Uruguay, Brazil, 
and Chile had faster price rises. 

(U) The data suggest that the answer to the 


question “How well was inflation contained?" is 
“Not very well!" Inflation in South Vietnam was 
bad. However, to add perspective to the compari¬ 
son, it is necessary to find a country that suffered 
a war and relied heavily on outside forces to fight 
it. South Korea during the Korean War (1950-53) 
fits into that category. 

COMPARING WARTIME INFLATION IN 
KOREA AND VIETNAM 

(U) There are many differences between the 
situations in South Vietnam and Korea, including 
the kind of war being fought, the stability of the 
regimes, and many other factors, so care must be 
taken not to overstate the comparison or to draw 
far-reaching conclusions from it. Nonetheless, it is 
interesting and useful to compare the effects of the 
respective wars on price increases in the two 
economies. 

(U) In Korea and Vietnam, war brought inflation, 
with the inflation in Korea being much more 
severe than the inflation in South Vietnam, as 
shown in Table 145. In the first year of the Korean 
War, retail prices in Seoul rose nearly 300 percent, 
and before the war was over prices were more than 
20 times higher (1,980 percent) than they were 
before it started. Bv 1956 they were 57 times 
higher (5,623 percent), although they fell the 
following year. In South Vietnam prices rose less 
than 100 percent during the first year that U.S. 
troops were committed to the war. By the time of 
the cease-fire agreement in January 1973, prices 
had risen to a level about 10 times higher than 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 933 









CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 144. South Vietnam’s 'prices rose at least jour times asjast as prices in other Southeast Asian countries. 

(Table unclassified.) 


South 


End of Year: 

Viet-Nam 

Thailand 

Malaysia 

Philippines 

Korea 

Brazil 

1963 

100 

100 

100 

100 

100 

100 

1966 

194 

107 

101 

117 

163 

445 

1967 

279 

111 

105 

124 

180 

591 

1968 

358 

113 

105 

127 

201 

723 

1969 

431 

116 

104 

130 

221 

886 

1970 

590 

117 

106 

148 

249 

1082 

1971 

698 

119 

108 

170 

280 

1300 

1972 

875 

124 

112 

188 

313 

1514 


Source: International Monetary Fund, "Changes in Consumer Prices/' 
International Financial Statistics , Vol. XXVI, Number 9, September 
1973, p. 35. 


before U.S. forces went into combat, or 881 per¬ 
cent. This amounts to an average price increase of 
33 percent per year. 

(U) Inflation was a greater problem in Korea, even 
before the war began there. From 1946 through 
1950, Korean prices increased more than sixfold 


Table 145. Korean War inflation was much worse 
than Vietnam War inflation. (Table unclassified.) 


South Viet-Nam 

South 

Korea 


End of 

Retail Price 

Retail Price 


End of 

Year 

Index-Saigon a/ 

Index-Seoul b/ 


Year 

1964 

100 

100 


Mid-1950 

1965 

N/A 

189 


End-1950 

1966 

216 

607 


1951 

1967 

305 

1268 


1952 

1968 

408 

2080 


1953 

1969 

539 

3077 


1954 

1970 

698 

3920 


1955 

1971 

798 

5723 


1956 

1972 

981 

5209 


1957 

a/ Source: 

Viet-Nam Economic 

Data - December 1972, Office of 


Economic Policy, 

Viet-Nam Programs, 

Agency 

for 


International Development, p. 1. 



b/ Source: 

Table 43: Development of the Korean Economy. 1958, 


Ministry of Reconstruction, Republic of Korea. The 


index series was constructed on the basis of yearly 
percentage changes in the Bank of Korea Seoul Retail 
Price Index, June 30, 1950 = 100. 

NOTE: These indexes are based on a January 1, 1965 base for South 

Viet-Nam, and a June 30, 1950 base for South Korea, so the 
numbers are different from those in Table 144, which is based 
on a 1963 base. 


(500 percent). In the four years before 1965, South 
Vietnamese prices increased by about half (50 
percent).( 174 ) In both countries, the pace of infla¬ 
tion increased with the arrival of Allied forces. 
(U) According to the crude quantity theory of 
money, an increase in the money supply, all other 
things being equal, brings about a proportionate 
increase in prices. Loss of confidence in the 
currency, however, can generate exaggerated price 
rises in reaction to large and continued increases 
in the money supply. This happened in Korea, but 
not in South Vietnam. Table 146 shows that the 
Korean money supply was 290 times higher at the 
end of the period shown, while the Vietnamese 
money supply was only 11 times higher. 

(U) In Korea, the relationship between money- 
supply increases and price increases passed through 
three phases. In the first phase (the prewar years), 
prices rose at a slower rate than the increase in 
money supply—from the end of 1947 to the end 
of 1949, the money supply tripled and prices 
doubled. In the second phase (the first two years 
of the war, 1950 and 1951), prices rose much faster 
than the money supply—money supply up sixfold, 
prices up nearly twice as much. In the third phase 
(from the end of 1951 to the end of 1953), prices 
again rose at a slower rate—while the money 
supply quadrupled, price increases tripled. 

(U) In Vietnam, until 1966, price rises were slower 
than money-supply^ increases. From 1961 through 
the end of 1965, price rises were less than money- 


934 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 























CONFIDENTIAL 

Table 146. The money supplies rose. (Table unclassified.) 



South Viet-Nam 

South Korea 



Money Supply a/ 

Money Supply b/ 


End of Year 

(Billions of Piasters) 

(Billions of Hwan) 

End of Year 

1962 

19.5 

0.5 

1947 

1963 

22.3 

0.7 

1948 

1964 

27.4 

1.2 

1949 

1965 

47.6 

2.8 

1950 

1966 

65.4 

7.3 

1951 

1967 

82.2 

14.3 

1952 

1968 

124.1 

30.3 

1953 

1969 

140.7 

58.1 

1954 

1970 

162.9 

93.5 

1955 

1971 

208.4 

120.9 

1956 

1972 

220.6 

145.2 

1957 


a/ Source: For 1962-65: Table C-3; Annual Statistical Bulletin, Number 11 


and Supplement, Office of Joint Economic Affairs, USAID/VN. 

For 1966-72: Viet-Nam Economic Data - December 1972 , Office of 
Economic Policy, Viet-Nam Programs, Agency for International 
Development, p. 5. 

b/ Source: Tables A-35 and A-43; Development of the Korean Economy , 


1958 , Ministry of Reconstruction, Republic of Korea. 


supply increases in every year.( 175 ) The prime 
reason for this was that the economy was not yet 
fully employed. In addition, the increasing 
monetization of the rural areas was absorbing some 
of the increase in the money supply. 

(U) In 1966, however, with the advent of full 
employment, prices rose faster—while the money 
supply increased by slightly less than 50 percent, 
prices increased by slightly more than that. 
American stabilization policies had acted after 
1966 to limit inflation to an average of 30 percent 
per year until the end of 1972. The addition of 
effective Vietnamese economic reforms and U.S. 
troop withdrawals helped hold price rises to 14 
percent in 1971 and to 23 percent in 1972, despite 
extremely heavy fighting and disruption most of 
that 3 ^ear. 

WHY WAS INFLATION LESS OF A 
PROBLEM IN VIETNAM? 

(U) War almost invariably brings sharp increases 
in the money supply. Government expenditures 
increase while revenues, because of war disruption, 


decline. The government general^ resorts to 
printing money to finance the deficit. Controlling 
inflation must involve measures which either ( 1 ) 
increase revenues, ( 2) reduce costs (of the local 
government and of the Allied forces), (3) reduce 
extensions of credit, or (4) increase imports (that 
is, offsetting increasing demand through increasing 
imports). These factors were controlled better in 
Vietnam than in Korea, with the result that 
inflation was not as bad there. 

(U) In the first place, there was a much larger and 
more consistent import program in Vietnam. 
Imports more than absorbed the money created b}^ 
Allied spending in every } r ear from 1963 through 
1967. In Korea, imports never offset Allied spend¬ 
ing, and in the first phase of the war* imports were 
pitifully low. 

(U) Second, Allied spending was much more 
carefully controlled in Vietnam. In Korea, there 
were various recommendations to reduce local hire 
and to increase offshore purchases, but no control 

*Sccond quarter 1950 to first quarter 1951. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 935 
















CONFIDENTIAL 


Table 147. How do you rate GVN performance in 
handling economic problems? (Table unclassified.) 



Urban 

Rural 

Poor 

63% 

36% 

Successful 

23% 

42% 

Doesn't Know 

11% 

22% 

No. of Respondents 

5096 

8300 


PAAS Urban Question 5109, asked in March, April, May, June, July, 
and October 1971, and in May, June, July, August, 1972. PAAS 
Rural Question 101, asked in the same months, except May 1972. 


mechanism such as the “piaster ceiling’’ was 
introduced. Although the ceiling in Vietnam was 
useful in 1966-67, when the Saigon port was 
clogged, it eventually contributed to the problem 
by withholding U.S. dollars from the GVN. 

(U) Third, credit expansion in Korea was much 
greater and much more erratic. Until 1966, credit 
expansion in Vietnam was negligible, and the 
increases after that were primarily associated with 
the rising How of imports. 

(U) Finally, in both Korea and Vietnam, control¬ 
ling the government budget and increasing the 
revenues were difficult to achieve. The Korean 
government was able to balance its budget after 
March 1951 only by shifting the financial care of 
refugees and pow’s from its own account to the 
UN count. The GVN budget did not balance 
either. 

(U) It is clear that , by Korean War standards , the 
U.S. helped the South Vietnamese to contain their 
inflation fairly well. But the South Vietnamese 
people didn’t think so. 

WHAT DID THE PEOPLE THINK ABOUT 
THE ECONOMIC SITUATION? 

(U) The Pacification Attitude Analysis S}^stem 
(PAAS) offers some insights into what the South 
Vietnamese people thought about their economic 
situation. Remember, they were caught in one of 
the worst inflations in the world, although not as 
bad as the Brazilians or as the Koreans during the 
Korean War. 

(U) Urban respondents believed that the GVN 
performance in handling economic problems was 
poor. The results of urban and rural PAAS surveys 
are shown in Table 147. The rural respondents 
were happier with the GVN economic performance 

936 JDRB 


than were the urban respondents, who had to bear ji 
the full brunt of inflation. Actually, considering the 
rate of inflation, the results can be viewed as mild. 

(U) Urban and rural respondents agreed about 
which area of the economic sector had been hit 
hardest by rising prices, namely, everything 
(urban, 50 percent; rural, 56 percent). Most of the 
rest cited food (urban, 36 percent; rural, 31 per¬ 
cent)^ 176 ) But their views of who suffered the most 
from inflation varied in an expected way. Both 
sets of respondents agreed that soldiers, civil 
servants, and workers were suffering, but the rural 
respondents emphasized farmers, while the urban 
respondents emphasized workers. Neither believed 
that the merchants suffered most.( 177 ) 

(U) In 1971 and 1972, sixty-five percent of the 
urban and rural respondents agreed that “prices 
increased faster this year than they did last year’’ 
(64 percent urban; 66 percent rural). About 15 
percent said that the increase was the same, and 
another 15 percent said it was slower. ( 178 ) These 
responses clearly bear little relationship to the 
actual movements of the price indexes shown 
earlier (the 1971 increase was much less than the 
1970 increase), but they do convey a mood of 
dissatisfaction. 

(U) When asked about the causes of the inflation, 
urban and rural respondents most often blamed 
natural conditions of war and exploitation by 
merchants. Urban respondents also cited “heavy 
spending by U.S. troops and the GVN budget,” 
showing more sophistication than rural respond¬ 
ents, many of whom simply cited high prices as 
the “cause” of inflation. ( 179 ) 

(U) Urban and rural respondents were also asked 
what could be done to control inflation. Price 
controls, more production, and reducing govern¬ 
ment expenditures were the measures mentioned 
most often. Rural residents tended to favor price 
controls (39 percent) while the urban respondents 
split about evenly for price controls (22 percent) 
and higher production in Vietnam for sale outside 
of Vietnam (20 percent).( 180 ) 

(U) In summary, the Vietnamese people were 
acutely aware of the inflation and urban and rural 
respondents were in fair agreement that: 

• The GVN’s economic performance left some¬ 
thing to be desired, 

CONFIDENTIAL 











CONFIDENTIAL 


• Rising prices affected everything, particularly 
food, 

• Salaried people suffered the most, 

• Prices were always increasing faster ihun they 
did last year (even when they weren’t), 

• Inflation was caused by the natural conditions 
of war, exploitation by merchants, and heavy 
U.S. and GVN spending, and 

• Price controls, higher production, and reduced 
GVN spending would help solve the inflation 
problem. 

(U) In addition to asking about inflation, the 
PAAS covered other economic matters. One ques¬ 
tion had asked about general economic conditions 
now, compared to five years ago.( 180 ) The rural 
respondents generally felt they were better off, 
despite inflation, but the urban respondents did 
not; the pattern of their responses was exactly the 
opposite. This fits the situation, because the 
farmers were able to cope with inflation better 
than the city dwellers. They could raise the prices 
of their crops or even hold them off the market 
while prices rose. The radio ended the dominance 
of the Chinese rice merchants, because it told 
ever} T one the wholesale and retail prices of rice in 
Saigon and other cities. The farmers could bargain 
with the local rice dealer accordingly, knowing 
that inflation would continue to increase the price 
of rice, if they had to hold their crops for awhile. 
Also, many farmers were benefiting from land 
reform, becoming landowners for the first time 
(see Chapter XIX). 

(U) When rural respondents were asked what they 
liked best about living in a rural area, 40 percent 
cited the lower cost of living. ( 182 ) City dwellers had 
fewer ways to protect themselves. When asked 
what they disliked most about living in the city, 
42 percent cited the high cost of living. ( 183 ) Those 
in both groups who felt that economic conditions 
had improved thought the merchants had benefited 
most. Fifty-six percent of the 347 urban respond¬ 
ents felt this way, compared to 36 percent of the 


1,501 rural respondents. Twelve percent of the 
latter felt that poor farmers who owned their land 
had benefited most, perhaps an effect of land 
reform. ( 184 ) 

(U) Despite their complaints, it seems clear that 
the standards of living of most Vietnamese rose 
during the war. Refugees and others hard hit by 
the war were obvious exceptions. More people 
went to work and earned more money to buy more 
goods than ever before, and the import program 
kept the markets supplied with consumer goods 
of all types, bringing on the Honda and transistor 
revolutions. In the countryside, farmers took 
advantage of miracle rice, fertilizers, tractors, the 
ability to hold rice off the market to raise prices, 
and a variety of other techniques to increase their 
incomes. 

(U) Some clue to the standard of living can be 
gleaned from answers to the question: “If you had 
extra money, what would be the first thing that 
you woidd do with it?”( 185 ) Basically, both urban 
and rural respondents would either have fixed up 
their houses or invested the money—hardly the 
response of people who were destitute. Vietnamese 
interest in fixing up their homes was cited by a 
hardware dealer in the town of Gia Nghia, who 
bemoaned the lack of business since the VC/NVA 
had begun an effort to cut off the town. “In 
peacetime, people want to fix up their houses. But 
who wants to repair anything at a time like 
this?”( 186 ) 

CONCLUSION 

(U) To return to the question: How well was 
inflation contained? The Korean experience, the 
substantial reduction in inflation during 1971 and 
1972, and the rising standard of living of most 
South Vietnamese during the war all suggest that 
the effects of inflation were contained very well, 
given the circumstances. After the January 1973 
cease-fire, however, inflation became a serious 
problem again as U.S. levels of assistance declined 
markedly. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 937 









CONFIDENTIAL 


Epilogue 


(U) The United States committed its military 
forces to battle in 1965. Eight years later, at the 
end of 1972, after one final surge of bombing, they 
were gone and a “cease-fire” agreement was signed 
with the Communists in January 1973. All 
American ground, air, and naval forces were out 
of the conflict, and so were virtually all the 
military advisors. 

(U) The South Vietnamese forces appeared to be 
doing a good job. They had repulsed the 1972 
offensives without the help of U.S. ground forces, 
but with the aid of heavy American air and 
logistics support. On the other hand, they had not 
moved forcefully to solve their critical problem of 
poor leadership. Without improved leadership 
they could not improve their training, clean out 
their staffs, and fill their combat units to full 
strength. Moreover, the departure of U.S. and 
South Korean forces left the anti-Communist side 
weaker than before the “cease-fire.” 

(U) Pacification had been successful. There was 
widespread evidence and agreement that the 
Government of Vietnam exercised a predominant 
influence over the vast majority of South Viet¬ 
namese people, although the HES and other 
figures reflected setbacks during the heavy fighting 
of 1972. 

(U) But the Communist troops and infrastructure 
were still intact and in place, despite the tremen¬ 
dous allocation of Allied resources, effort, and lives 
to the strategy of attrition. At the end of 1972 the 
VC/NVA forces were battered, to be sure, but they 


1975 



were still in the fight and they had improved their 
ability to wage large-scale conventional warfare. 
Moreover, the “cease-fire” agreement was signed 
in January, which traditionally ushered in their 
peak combat effort of the year. Although it was 
not recognized at the time, the military balance 
was already shifting in their favor. 




(U) The South Vietnamese collapse and Commu¬ 
nist victory of 1975 are now history. They hap¬ 
pened with a speed that startled the world, 
including the victors, the vanquished, the Ameri¬ 
can people, and their leaders. How could it have 
happened so fast? Military scholars and others may 
argue about the causes for years. No definitive 
answers are attempted here, but some clues from 
the so-called “cease-fire” period are worth 
examining. 


(U) First, it must be stated categorically that 
there never was a cease-fire. This is not news. 
Everyone recognized that some fighting continued 
but no one in Washington realized how intense the 
fighting was—until October 1974, near the end. This 
incredible state of affairs resulted from poor 
reporting of South Vietnamese casualties. 


(U) Chapter II pointed out that “friendly” battle 
deaths are the single best measure of the intensity 
ol combat, and after the “cease-fire” agreement 
the South Vietnamese were the only “friendly” 
troops remaining in the action, so their battle 
deaths became the measure of combat intensity. 

(U) The figures for RVNAF combat deaths ret 
ported to Washington indicated that comba- 


938 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 












CONFIDENTIAL 


during the year following the “cease-fire” was 75 
percent below the 1972 level. This was duly 
reported to Congressional committees as evidence 
that the “cease-fire” was having a beneficiaLeffect. 
In turn, this “fact” was used as part of the 
rationale for slashing aid to South Vietnamese 
forces during the summer of 1974. 

(U) The problem was that the official South 
Vietnamese figures for battle deaths turned out 
to be twice as high as the figures reported to 
Washington in the operational messages.* Thus, 
for the RVNAF the war in 1973 was only 30 
percent less intense than in 1972, the worst year 
for casualties that the RVNAF ever had. 


*With the large changeover of U.S. personnel after the 
cease-fire agreement, the RVNAF casualty-reporting 
system slipped back into a reliance on daily and weekly 
operational reports, which didn’t pick up the late RVNAF 
reports—and half of the battle deaths were reported late. 
See Chapter X for a fuller description of the problem as 
it existed ca. 1967. 


(U) In short, the war during the “cease-fire” 
period continued on for the RVNAF at a level 
of intensity equivalent to their losses during 1968, 
the year of the Tet offensive. The RVNAF took 
more casualties during 1974 than it did in any 
prior year except 1972. By December 1974 the 
South Vietnamese Army was a badly battered 
force. The effects of the beating showed in the 
pacification statistics, as Hamlet Evaluation 
System ratings slipped back once again to levels 
existing in 1969. 

(U) The Communist forces, on the other hand, 
were getting stronger and stronger. They moved 
their logistics support into areas of South Vietnam 
they now controlled and protected it with strong 
antiaircraft defenses. They built roads, bridges, 
and pipelines, and they introduced several thou¬ 
sand more troops. the end of 1974 they were 
in the strongest position they had since at least 
1964. Tliev launched their offensive, and the rest 
is history. 


REFERENCES FOR PART FOUR 


1. Report of the MACV Information and Reports 
Working Group, January 1963, Annex D. 

2. “Population Security Statistics,” SEA Analy¬ 
sis Rpt., October 1967, pp. 21-35. 

3. Ibid., p. 30. 

4. Ibid., pp. 26-27. 

5. Ibid., p. 27. 

6. Ibid., p. 24. 

7. Ibid., p. 29. 

8. Ibid., p. 28. 

9. “Statistical Trends From the Hamlet Evalu¬ 
ation System,” SEA Analysis Rpt., December 

1967, p. 33. 

10. C. W. Marshall, “Proposed Research Paper: 
Preliminary Examination of the Hamlet 
Evaluation System (A Methodological 
Study),” Log No. HQ 67-6959/3, Institute 
for Defense Analyses, Arlington, Va,, Feb. 15, 

1968. 

11. Ibid., p. 6. 

12. Hamlet Evaluation System Study ( HES ), 
ACG60F, prepared by the Simulmatics 
Corp., Cambridge, Mass, for the Army 
Concept Team in Vietnam, May 1, 1968. 


13. Ibid., pp. 1-2. 

14. “Enemy-Initiated Activity Against Viet¬ 
namese Armed Forces,” SEA Analysis Rpt., 
July 1968, p. 3. 

15. “The Plight of the Vietnamese Popular 
Forces,” SEA Analysis Rpt., July 1968, p. 21. 

16. “Artillery Support for RVNAF,” SEA Anal¬ 
ysis Rpt., April-May 1970, p. 20. 

17. “Territorials and the Offensive,” paper pre¬ 
pared by the Off. of the Asst. Sec. of Defense 
(Systems Analysis), Regional Programs, 
Dec. 8, 1972, p. 1. 

18. “Military Region IV,” SEA Analysis Rpt., 
Nov.-Dee. 1970, p. 38. 

19. “RF/PF and Territorial Security in Viet¬ 
nam,” SEA Analysis Rpt., February 1969, 

p. 1. 

20. PAAS Rural Question 54, asked of a total of 
1,969 respondents during July, August 1972. 

21. Southeast Asia Statistical Summary, Off. of the 
Asst. Sec. of Defense (Comptroller), April 11, 
1973, table 2, pp. 1-5. 

22. MACV Measurements of Progress Reports, 
monthly April 1968 through December 1972. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 939 




CONFIDENTIAL 


23. “National Police,” SEA Analysis Rpt., March 

1970, p. 4. 

24. “Phoenix,” SEA Analysis Rpt., June-July 

1971, p. 5. 

25. Hamlet Evaluation System quarterly ques¬ 
tion VQD-1. 

26. Hamlet Evaluation System quarterly ques¬ 
tion VQD-4. 

27. PAAS Rural Question 65, asked in January, 
June, and July 1972; the cumulative sample 
was 2,766 respondents. 

28. PAAS Rural Question 66, asked in January 
1972 of 926 respondents. 

29. PAAS Rural Question 35, asked in March, 
April, May, June, and July 1971 and in 
January, June, and July 1972; the cumulative 
sample was 7,201 respondents. 

30. “Revolutionary Development Highlights— 
From RD Reports,” SEA Analysis Rpt., 
April 1967, p. 37. 

31. “RD Cadre Attrition: A Correction,” SEA 
Analysis Rpt., October 1968, p. 39. 

32. Army Activities Report: Southeast xisia, final 
issue, Dec. 20, 1972. 

33. Ibid., p. 51. 

34. “The Situation in M R4, ’’ SEA Analysis Rpt., 
June-July 1971, p. 33. 

35. Hamlet Evaluation System quarterly ques¬ 
tion HQC-7. 

36. PAAS Rural Question 58, asked in January, 
March, June, and July 1972; the cumulative, 
sample was 3,429 respondents. 

37. PAAS Rural Question 59, asked in January, 
March, June, and July 1972; the cumulative 
sample was 2,376 respondents. 

38. PAAS Rural Question 61, asked in January, 
March, June, and July 1972; the cumulative 
sample was 3,441 respondents. 

39. “Aspirations of the Vietnamese People,” SEA 
Analysis Rpt., August 1967, pp. 47 and 50. 

40. Ibid., pp. 47-49. 

41. “What the Vietnamese Peasant Thinks,” 
SEA Analysis Rpt., Jan-Feb. 1971, p. 14. 

42. PAAS Urban Question 5053, which had 339 
respondents; from unpublished computer 
printouts. 

43. PAAS Urban Question 5055, data for May, 
June, and July 1971 and January, March, 
May, June, July, and August 1972. 

44. PAAS Rural Question 191, asked in Decem¬ 
ber 1971 and March 1972, with a cumulative 


45. 


46. 

47. 

48. 


49. 

50. 

51. 

52. 


53. 


54. 

55. 

56. 

57. 

58. 

59. 

60. 
61. 
62. 


63. 

64. 

65. 

66 . 

67. 

68 . 

69. 


total of 1,951 respondents, and PAAS Rural 




Question 134, asked in June 1972, with 895 
respondents; from unpublished computer 
printouts. 

PAAS Urban Question 5160, asked in De¬ 
cember 1971, and PAAS Urban Question 
5278, asked in June 1972, with a cumulative 
total of 1,292 respondents; from unpublished 
computer printouts. 

PAAS Urban Question 5530, with 269 
respondents; from unpublished computer 
printouts. 

PAAS Rural Question 217 and Urban 
Question 5218. 

J. A. Koch, The Chieu Hoi Program in South 
Vietnam, 1963-1071, R-1172, The Rand 
Corp., Santa Monica, Calif., January 1973, 


p. v. 

Ibid., p. vi. 

Ibid., pp. vi and 25. 

Ibid., p. 34. 

Ibid., p. vii. 

PAAS Rural Question 272, from unpublished 
computer printout. 

PAAS Rural Question 270, from unpublished 
computer printout. 

PAAS Rural Question 271, from unpublished 
computer printout. 

“Chieu Hoi Decline,” SEA Analysis Rpt., 
January 1968, p. 43. 

“Chieu Hoi: A Quarterly Report,” SEA 
Analysis Rpt., May 1969, p. 36. 

“Chieu Hoi: VC/NVA in 1968,” SEA Analysis 
Rpt., February 1969, p. 29. 

Koch, op. cit., p. 51. 

Ibid., p. 72. 

Ibid., p. 46. 

J. M. Carrier, A Profile of Viet Cong Re¬ 
turnees: July 1965 to June 1967, RM-5577- 
ISA/ARPA, The Rand Corp., Santa Monica, 
Calif., October 1968; the material here was 
taken from a summary published in “Profile 
of Chieu Hoi Returnees,” SEA Analysis 
Rpt., November 1968, pp. 18-19. 

Koch, op. cit., p. 11. 

Ibid., p. 102. 

Ibid., p. 5. 

Ibid., p. 18. 

Ibid., pp. 49 and 57. 

Ibid., p. 49. 

Ibid., p. 26. 






940 JDRB 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


70. Ibid., p. 47. 

71. Ibid., pp. 29 and 47. 

72. “Phoenix,” SEA Analysis Rpt., June-July 
1971, p. 2. 

73. Hamlet Evaluation System question ljQB-1 
lor July 1969 and June 1971; from unpub¬ 
lished computer printouts. 

74. PA AS Rural Survey, Question 38, asked in 
June 1971. 

75. “Phoenix,” op. cit., p. 3. 

76. “Phoenix Program: 1970 Results,” op. cit., 
p. 23. 

77. MACV Measurement of Progress Report , 
December 1971, p. 68. 

78. “Phoenix Program: 1970 Results,” op. cit., 
p. 29. 

79. PA AS Rural Question 202, asked in March, 
April, May, June, and July 1971 and in June 
and July 1972; from unpublished computer 
printout. 

80. PAAS Rural Question 203, asked in March, 
April, May, June, and July 1971; from 
unpublished computer printout. 

81. PAAS Rural Surveys. From published PAAS 
reports in 1970, Question 32 in January 1970, 
Question 37 in June and December 1970, and 
other months shown; data from unpublished 
computer printouts. 

82. PAAS Rural Survey, Question 37, asked in 
March, April, May, June, July, and October 
1971 and August 1972; from unpublished 
computer printout. 

83. PAAS Rural Survey, Question 82, asked in 
April, May, June, and July 1971 and January 
and August 1972; from unpublished computer 
printout. 

84. PAAS Rural Survey, Question 88, asked in 
October 1971; from unpublished computer 
printout. 

85. PAAS Rural Survey, Question 90, asked in 
October 1971; from unpublished computer 
printout. 

86. PAAS Rural Survey, Question 74, asked in 
May, June, and July 1971; from unpublished 
computer printout. 

87. PAAS Rural Survey, Question 34, asked in 
March, April, May, June, and July 1971 
and in June, July, and August 1972—also 
Question 83, asked in January 1972; from 
unpublished computer printouts. 


88. PAAS Rural Survey, Question 40, asked in 
March, April, May, June, and July 1971 
and August 1972; from unpublished com¬ 
puter printout. 

89. PAAS Rural Survey, Question 41, asked in 
March, April, May, June, and July 1971 
and August 1972. 

90. Hamlet Evaluation System, Question HQB- 
1; from unpublished computer printout. 

91. PAAS Rural Survey, Question 38, asked in 
March, April, May, and June 1971 and 
January, June, July, and August 1972. 

92. Hamlet Evaluation System Question HQC-4; 
from unpublished computer printout. 

93. PAAS Rural Survey, Question 76, asked in 
January, June, July, and August 1972; from 
unpublished computer printout. 

94. Hamlet Evaluation System, Question HQB- 
2; from unpublished computer printout. 

95. PAAS Rural Survey, Question 75, asked in 
January, June, July, and August 1972. 

96. Hamlet Evaluation System, Question VQD- 
5; from unpublished computer printout. 

97. PAAS Rural Question 211; from unpublished 
computer printout. 

98. “Refugees, Weekly Summary Report , p. 1,” 
message Saigon 00431, 121255Z from Ameri¬ 
can Embassy Saigon to the Secretary of State. 

99. W. E. Colby, Deputy to COMUSMACV for 
CORDS, statement to the Senate Subcom¬ 
mittee on Refugees and Escapees, April 21, 
1972, p. 6. 

100. Civilian Casualty and Refugee Problems in 
SouthVietnam, findings and recommendations 
of the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems 
Connected With Refugees and Escapees of 
the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 
May 9, 1968. (Hereafter cited as “Senate.”) 

101. “Continuing Difficulties in Assisting War 
Victims in Vietnam,” by the Comptroller 
General of the United States (B-133001), 
Nov. 20, 1970, p. 2. (Hereafter cited as “GAO 
Report.”) 

102. R. H. Nooter, Deputy Coordinator, Bureau 
for Supporting Assistance, Agency for Inter¬ 
national Development, statement before the 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, U.S. 
Senate, May 8, 1972, p. 5. 

103. GAO Report, op. cit., p. 26. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 941 





CONFIDENTIAL 


104. “Can South Vietnam Make It On Its Own?” 
U.S. News eft World Report, Aug. 13, 1973, 
p. 7. 

105. PA AS Urban Question 5516, asked in October 
1971 and June, July, and October 1972, with 
cumulative number of respondents being 
2,526; from unpublished computer printouts. 

106. PAAS Rural Question 421, asked in January 
and March 1972; the cumulative number of 
respondents was 1,919. 

107. PAAS Urban Question 5102, asked in March, 
April, May, June, July, October, and Nov¬ 
ember 1971; the cumulative number of re¬ 
spondents was 2,905. 

108. From PAAS Urban Questions 5517 and 5518, 
asked in April, June, July, and October 1972. 
The two questions were identical, but 
Question 5517 was asked of 744 respondents 
who were native to the area and Question 
5518 was asked of 2,035 nonnatives. Of 
the combined sample, 422 nonnative re¬ 
spondents indicated they would return to 
their native rural areas if peace became per¬ 
manent. 

109. PAAS Urban Question 5517. 

110. PAAS Urban Question 5518. 

111. A. E. Goodman and L. M. Franks, Between 
War and Peace; A Profile oj Migrants to 
Saigon. New York: The Asia Society— 
SEADAG (p. 1). 

112. W. K. Hitchcock, Director, Refugee Direc¬ 
torate, CORDS, opening statement before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
hearings on Vietnam, Feb. 17-20, 1970. 

113. Senate, op. cit., p. 1. 

114. Ibid., p. 2. 

115. Hitchcock, op. cit., p. 5. 

116. Ibid., p. 7. 

117. Nooter, op. cit., p. 6. 

118. Hitchcock, op. cit., p. 8. 

119. Colby, op. cit., Annex A. 

120. GAO Report, op. cit., p. 23. 

121. Colby, op. cit., p. 19. 

122. GAO Report, op. cit., p. 11. 

123. Ibid., p. 20. 

124. Colby, op. cit., p. 20. 

125. Ibid., p. 21. 

126. GAO Report, op. cit., p. 22. 

127. Colby, op. cit., p. 26. 

128. Ibid., p. 27. 

129. Ibid., p. 28. 


130. Ibid., pp. 29-30. 

131. Ibid., p. 29. 

132. Hitchcock, op. cit., p. 4. 

133. GAO Report, op. cit., pp. 32-33. I 

134. Ibid., p. 21. 

135. Ibid., p. 10. 

136. Ibid., p. 11. || 

137. Ibid., p. 13. j 

138. Ibid., p. 14. 

139. Colby, op. cit., Annex A-l. 

140. Ibid., p. 22. 

141. “Vietnam Land Reform,” New York Times, 
April 9, 1970, p. 22. 

142. Congressional Record , April 23, 1974, U.S. 
Senate, p. 56126, quoting an article by Oliver 
Todd entitled “How I Let Myself Be 
Deceived by Hanoi,” published in Realities, 
September 1973. 

143. W. C. Muller, The Land-to-the-Tiller Pro¬ 
gram: The Operational Phase, USAID/Viet¬ 
nam, April 1973, p. 1. 

144. Ibid., quoting from R. L. Prosterman, “Land 

Reform in Vietnam,” Focus 22, 2 (January 
1972). I 

145. M. Salter, Land Reform in South Vietnam. 
Washington: Agency for International De¬ 
velopment, June 1970 (p. 2). 

146. “Land Reform in Vietnam,” Vietnam Bulletin, 
Embassy of Vietnam, Washington, D.C., 
March 1970, p. 1. 

147. Progress and Problems of U.S. Assistance for 
Land Reform in Vietnam, Comptroller General 
of the United States, June 22, 1973, p. 6. 

148. “Land Distribution 1963-71,” Vietnam Bul¬ 
letin, March 20, 1972, p. 10. 

149. “Land Reform in Vietnam,” op. cit., p. 2. 

150. R. Luedtke, “Land Reform: Summary of 
SRI Attitudinal Surveys in South Vietnam,” 
CORDS XIII, Sept. 10, 1969. 

151. H. Dong, “Technical, Economic, and Social 
Aspects of Land Reform in Vietnam,” 
Vietnam Bulletin, Embassy of Vietnam, 
Washington, D.C., March 22, 1971, p. 9. 

152. “Land Reform in Vietnam,” op. cit., p. 7. 

153. Muller, op. cit., p. 3. 

154. Ibid., p. 6. 

155. PAAS Rural Survey, Question S37, asked 
in April, May, July, October, and December 
1970. 

156. PAAS Rural Survey, Question S38, asked in 
April and May 1970. 


942 JDItB 


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CONFIDENTIAL 


157. PAAS Rural Survey, Questions 220 and 221, 
asked in March 1971 of 835 respondents. 

158. Comptroller General, op. cit., p. 13. 

' 159. Muller, op. cit., p. 37. 

160. PAAS Rural Question 431; from unpublished 
computer printout. 

161. Dong, op. cit., p. 12. 

162. Muller, op. cit., p. 36. 

163. Comptroller General, op. cit., p. 11. 

164. Muller, op. cit., p. 19. 

165. Comptroller General, op. cit., p. 17. 

166. Muller, op. cit., p. 23. 

167. PAAS Rural Question 104, asked in March, 
April, May, June, July, and November 1971 
and April 1972 of 5,863 respondents, of which 
3,488 had opinions. 

168. Muller, op. cit., p. 32. 

169. Ibid., p. 33. 

170. PAAS Rural Survey Question 15 for Decem¬ 
ber 1970 and Question 16 for December 1972. 

171. Comptroller General, op. cit., p. 12, sum¬ 
marizing The Impact oj the Land-to-the-Tiller 
Program in the Mekong Delta , written by 
H. C. Bush and Staff, Control Data Corp., 
1972. 

172. Muller, op. cit., p. 4. 

173. “Changes in Consumer Prices,” International 
Financial Statistics, Vol. XXVI, No. 9, 
September 1973, p. 35. 

174. “Economic Impact—Korea and South Viet¬ 
nam Buildups,” SEA Analysis Rpt., Febru¬ 
ary 1967, p. 49. 

175. Ibid., p. 50. 

176. PAAS Urban Question 5151, asked of a total 
of 2,685 respondents in July and October 1971 
and June, July, and August 1972; PAAS 
Rural Question 151, asked of 4,665 rural 
respondents during the same months. 

177. PAAS Urban Question 5132, asked in May 
and October 1971 and May, June, July, and 


August 1972; PAAS Rural Question 132, 
asked in April, May, and October 1971 and 
June, July, and August 1972. 

178. PAAS Urban Question 5150, asked of a total 
of 2,762 respondents in July and October 1971 
and June, July, and August 1972; PAAS 
Rural Question 150, asked of 4,704 respond¬ 
ents during the same months. 

179. PAAS Urban Question 5131, asked in May 
and October 1971 and May and June 1972 
of 1,962 respondents; PAAS Rural Question 
131, asked in March, May, and October 1971 
and June 1972 of 3,622 respondents. 

180. PAAS Urban Question 5133, asked of a total 
of 1,962 respondents in Ma} T and October 

1971 and May and June 1972; PAAS Rural 
Question 133, asked of a total of 2,682 
respondents in March and May 1971 and 
June 1972. 

181. PAAS Urban Question 5147, asked of 1,375 
respondents in June and July 1971 and 
March 1972; PAAS Rural Question 147, 
asked in July and October 1971 and March 

1972 of a cumulative total of 2,884 
respondents. 

182. PAAS Rural Question 468, asked of 922 
respondents in January 1972. 

183. PAAS Urban Question 5103, asked in March, 
April, May, June, July, October, and 
November 1971 and April and May 1972; 
total of 4,010 respondents. 

184. PAAS Urban Question 5148, asked in 
October 1971; PAAS Rural Question 148, 
asked in July and October 1971. 

185. PAAS Urban Question 5149, asked in June, 
July, and October 1971 and March 1972 of 
1,920 respondents; PAAS Rural Question 
149, asked in July, October, and November 
1971 and March 1972 of 3,834 respondents. 

186. Baltimore Sun, Nov. 13, 1973, p. 5. 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 943 






CONFIDENTIAL 


Appendix 

Index to Articles in the SEA Analysis Reports 


(U) Fifty issues of the Southeast Asia Analysis 
Report were published from January 1967 through 
i January 1972 by the Southeast Asia office under 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems 
Analysis). The Report had two purposes. First, 
it served as a vehicle to distribute the analyses 
produced by Systems Analysis on Southeast Asia. 
It thus provided other agencies an opportunity 
to tell us if we were wrong and to help prevent 
research duplications. We solicited and received 
frequent rebuttals or comments on our analyses, 
which sharpened our studies and stimulated better 
analysis by other agencies. Second, it was a useful 
management tool for getting more good work 
from our staff—they knew they must regularly 
produce studies which would be read critically 
throughout the Executive Branch. 

(U) The first page of the Report stated that it 
“is not an official publication of the Department of 
Defense, and does not necessarily reflect the 
views of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), or 
comparable officials.” The intent was solely to 
improve the quality of analysis on Southeast 
Asia problems, and to stimulate further thought 
and discussion. The report was successful in 
doing precisely this. 

(U) We distributed about 350 copies of the Report 
each month to OSD (Office of the Secretary of 
Defense), the Military Departments, CINCPAC, 
and Saigon and to other interested agencies such 
as the Paris Delegation, AID, State Department, 


CIA, and the White House Staff. Most copies 
circulated outside OSD were in response to specific 
requests from individual persons or agencies. 
Our readership included many of the key com¬ 
manders, staff officers, and analysts in Washington 
and in the field. Their comments were almost 
always generous and complimentary, even when 
they disagreed with our conclusions. Some excerpts 
appear below: 

(U) “I believe the SEA Analysis Report serves a 
useful purpose, and I would like to see its present 
distribution continued.” (Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, 31 May 1968) 

(U) “We used a highly interesting item in your 
May Analysis Report as the basis for a note to 
the Secretary, which Pve attached.” (State 
Department, 28 June 1967) . 

(U) “We were all most impressed with your first 
monthly Southeast Asia Analysis Report. Not 
only do we wish to continue to receive it, but we 
would appreciate it if we could receive 4 (four) 
copies from now on.” (White House, 9 February 
1967) 

(U) “Ambassador_has asked me to tell 

you that he has much appreciated and benefited 
from the studies and analyses of this publication.” 
(State Department/White House, 24 January 
1969) 

(U) “Congratulations on your January issue. The 
'Situation in South Vietnam’ article was especially 
interesting and provoking.” (State Department, 
24 January 1969) 


944 JDRB 


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(U) “I let Ambassador_take a swing 

at the paper. He made several comments which 
may be of interest to you. Many thanks for putting 
us back on distribution for your report. Also, 
despite the return volley, I hope you will continue 
sending your products.” (MACV-CORDS, 17 June 

1968) 

(U) “As an avid reader (and user) of the SEA 
Analysis Report, I see a need for more rounded 
analyses in the pacification field and fewer 
simplistic constructs.” (MACV-DEPCORDS, 
17 April 1968) 

(U) “The SEA Programs Division is to be com¬ 
mended for its perceptive analysis of topics 
that hold the continuing concern of this head¬ 
quarters . . . The approach was thoughtfully 
objective throughout and it was particularly 
pleasing to note a more incisive recognition of 
factors that defy quantified expression.” (Com¬ 
mander, US Army Vietnam-USARV, 29 Novem¬ 
ber 1967) 

(U) “In general, I think it is becoming the best 
analytical periodical I’ve seen yet on Vietnam 
(though there’s not much competition).” (MACV- 
DEPCORDS, 21 April 1967) 

(U) “Statistical extrapolations of this type serve 
an extremely useful purpose in many facets of 
our daily work.” (CIA, 6 February 1967) 

(U) “One of the most useful Systems Analysis 
products we have seen is the monthly Southeast 
Asia Progress Report. . . . Indeed it strikes 
many of us as perhaps the most searching and 
stimulating periodic analysis put out on Vietnam.” 
(President of The Rand Corporation, 22 October 

1969) 

(U) In November 1968, fifty-five addressees 
answered a questionnaire about the Report: 
52 said the report was useful, 2 said it was not, 
and 1 said, “The report does not meet an essential 
need of this headquarters”; nonetheless, it desired 
“to remain on distribution” for seven copies. 
From 48 questionnaires with complete responses, 
we found that an average 4.8 people read each 
copy—a projected readership of 500 to 950, 
depending on whether we assumed 1 or 2.4 
readers of copies for which no questionnaire was 
returned. 

(U) Readers responding to the questionnaire 
reported using the Report for the following 
purposes: 


Information 42% 

Analysis 31% 

Policy Making 11% 

Briefings 7 % 

Other 9% 


100 % 

In addition, readers reported about equal interest 
in each of the seven subject areas normally covered 
in the Report. 


VC/NVA 

18% 

Air Operations 

20% 

RVNAF 

17% 

Pacification 

13% 

Friendly Forces 

12% 

Deployments 

12% 

Logistics/Construction 

8% 


100 % 

(U) There was some negative reaction to the 
Report. Concern was expressed about “the 
distorted impressions” the Report left with the 
reader and its wide dissemination which “implies 
its acceptance by the Secretary of Defense, giving 
the document increased credibility.” 


THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 


A. SOUTH VIETNAM 


1. The Situation (also see Forces — Redeployments ) 


III Corps Preliminary Assessment 
The Situation in South Vietnam 
The Situation in South Vietnam: Overview 
Military Region I 
Military Region II 
Military Region III 
Military Region IV 
The Situation in MR IV 
Security Situation in Southern MR I 
Battle Prospects in the MR 2 Highlands 


Nov 67 
Jan. 69 
Nov/Dec 70 


Jun/Jul 71 
Jun/Jul 71 
Nov/Jan 72 


2. Trends (also see HES Trends) 

The War in Vietnam—Post-Tet Jun 68 

Lulls in Vietnam Nov 68 

Trends in 1968 Jan 69 

Trends in Vietnam: First Quarter 1969 Apr 69 

Trends in Vietnam: Second Quarter 1969 Jul 69 

The Current Lull in Combat Jul 69 

Indicators of Enemy Activity Levels in Nov/Dec 69 
Vietnam. 

Indicators of Enemy Activity Levels in Jan 70 

Vietnam. 

Comparison of Enemy Activity Levels with Apr/May 70 
Prior Years. 

Tempo of Activity in South Vietnam Mar/Apr 71 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 945 


588-672 0 - 75-13 








CONFIDENTIAL 


Tempo of the War 
Winding Down the Air War 
Winding Down the War 

B. CAMBODIA 

Cambodian Armed Forces 
The War in Cambodia 
The War in Cambodia 
The War in Cambodia 
The War in Cambodia 


C. THAILAND 

US Military Programs in Thailand 
Incidents in Thailand 

Thai Military Gets Larger Role in Counter¬ 
insurgency. 

Thai Military Role in Counterinsurgency: 

A Rebuttal. 

FORCES AND MANPOWER 

A. VIET CONG-NORTH VIETNAMESE 

1. Forces 

Estimating VC Irregular Strength 
Enemy Units Not Identified by Positive 
Contacts. 

Revised Estimates of VC/NVA Order of 
Battle. 

Enemy Guerrilla Forces in 1967 
NVA Forces in South Vietnam 
Projected VC/NVA Force Levels 
Projected VC/NVA Force Levels: A Re¬ 
buttal. 

2. Infiltration and Recruitment 

VC/NVA Personnel Input versus Losses 

VC/NVA Personnel Input versus Losses 

NVA Infiltration Data 

VC/NVA Gross Personnel Input by Corps 

VC/NVA Losses and Input 

VC/NVA Recruitment and Infiltration 

VC/NVA Recruitment and Infiltration 

Personnel Infiltration 

VC Recruitment 

NVN Infiltration Estimates 

NVN Infiltration Estimates 

NVN Infiltration into South Vietnam 

3. Special 

VC/NVA Experience 
Enemy Combat Effectiveness 

B. MANPOWER COMPARISONS 

Manpower Availability in North Vietnam 
GVN Manpower Mobilization 
Manpower Availability in North Vietnam 
A Comparison of Allied and VC/NVA 
Offensive Manpower in South Vietnam. 
GVN and VC Manpower Pools 
Joint Staff Comments on June Articles 
North and South Vietnamese Manpower 


May 

Aug/Oct 

Aug/Oct 


Apr/May 
Jan/Feb 
Mar/Apr 
Jun/Jul 
Nov/Jan 


Feb 

Jun 

Oct 

Nov 


Feb 

Feb 

Dec 

Mar 

May 

Jul 

Aug 


Jan 

Feb 

Mar 

Mar 

Apr 

Jun 

Aug 

Sep 

Oct 

Feb 

Nov 

Sep 


Jul 

Jul 


Sep 

Dec 

May 

Jun 

Jun 

Aug 

Aug 


71 

71 

71 


70 

71 
71 

71 

72 


67 

67 

67 

67 


67 

67 

67 

68 
68 
68 
68 


67 

67 

67 

67 

67 

67 

67 

67 

67 

68 
68 
69 


67 

67 


67 

67 

68 
68 

68 

68 

68 


Comparison of Allied and VC/NVA Man- Oct 68 

power. 

c. u.s. FORCES 


1. Deployments 


Status of Deployments to Southeast Asia 

Jan 

67 

Status of Deployments to Southeast Asia 

Feb 

67 

Status of Deployments to Southeast Asia 

Mar 

67 

Deployments to Southeast Asia 

Apr 

67 

Deployments to Southeast Asia 

May 

67 

Deployments to Southeast Asia 

Jun 

67 

Deployments to Southeast Asia 

Jul 

67 

Program Number 5 

Aug 

67 

Deployments to South Vietnam, Program 

Sep 

67 

No. 5 Force. 



Deployments 

Oct 

67 

Deployments 

Nov 

67 

Deployments 

Dec 

67 

Deployments 

Jan 

68 

Deployments 

Feb 

68 

Deployments 

Apr 

68 

Deployments 

Aug 

68 

Deployments 

Sep 

68 

Deployments 

Oct 

68 

Deployments 

Nov 

EH9 

00 

CO 

Deployments 

Dec 

68 

2. 'Redeployments and Their Impact 



Impact of U.S. Maneuver. Battalions in 

Jun 

69 

South Vietnam. 



Withdrawal of the U.S. 9th Division from 

Jul 

69 

IV CTZ. 



Vietnam Redeployments 

Jul 

69 

Impact of U.S. Withdrawals 

Sep 

69 

Vietnam Redeployments 

Sep 

69 

Impact of U.S. 9th Division Redeployment 

Oct 

69 

Vietnam Redeployments 

Oct 

69 

Redeployments from Vietnam—Phase 3 

Jan 

70 

Security Situation in Southern MR-1 

Jun/Jul 

71 

3. Special 



Contractor Assistance Provided to Forces 

Apr 

67 

in SVN. 



Distribution of U.S. Forces in South Viet- 

Apr 

67 


nam Between Combat and Support. 


REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES 

(RVNAF) 

A. EFFECTIVENESS (ALSO SEE TERRITORIAL FORCES) 


ARVN/US Effectiveness on Search and Mar 67 

Destroy Operations. 

RVNAF Effectiveness May 67 

RVNAF Effectiveness: A Rebuttal Jun 67 

GVN Regular Force Effectiveness Jun 67 

RVNAF Effectiveness Aug 67 

RVNAF Effectiveness Oct 67 

RVNAF Effectiveness: A Rebuttal Nov 67 

RVNAF Status—1967 Feb 68 

Status of RVNAF (29 Feb 68) Mar 68 

RVNAF Effectiveness: An Update Sep 68 


946 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 







Army Comments on September 1968 Ar¬ 
ticles. 

ARVN Performance in Combined Opera¬ 
tions. 

RVNAF Effectiveness: An Update 
RVNAF Effectiveness: An Update 
RVNAF Effectiveness 
ARVN Infantry Battalion Activities—First 
Half 1969. 

RVNAF Status 

Effectiveness Measures of ARVN Infantry 
Battalions. 

Notes on ARVN Infantry Battalions: Cor¬ 
rection and Updates. 

ARVN/VNMC Problem Area Progress Re¬ 
port. 

RVNAF Performance—A Corps and Coun¬ 
trywide Assessment. 

ARVN-US Combined Operations 
IV Corps—RVNAF Performance and Re¬ 
cent Activities. 

RVNAF Ground Interdiction in Cambodia 
and Laos. 

B. LEADERSHIP 

RVNAF Leadership 
RVNAF Leadership 

ARVN/RF/PF Combat Performance and 
Leadership. 

RVNAF Leadership 
RVNAF Leadership 
ARVN Division Commanders 
RVNAF Officer and NCO Shortage 
RVNAF Leadership and ARVN Combat 
Effectiveness. 

RVNAF Leadership 

Impact of a Change in Leadership: The 
ARVN 7th Division. 


C. TRAINING 

RVNAF Training 

RVNAF Ground Forces Training 

D. DESERTIONS 

GVN Forces—Desertions and Personnel 
Input. 

GVN Forces—Desertions and Personnel 
Input. 

GVN Forces—Desertions and Personnel 
Input. 

RVNAF Desertions 
RVNAF Combat Force Desertions 
RF/PF KIA and Desertion Numbers 
RVNAF Regular Force Desertions 
RVNAF Desertions 
ARVN Desertions and Combat Pay 
Desertion and Combat Pay: Comment. 
Desertions from ARVN/VNMC Ground 
Combat Forces. 

Causes of RVNAF Desertions 
RVNAF Desertions 
RVNAF Desertions 


CONFIDENTIAL 


Oct 68 

Dec 68 

_ Mar 69 
N Apr 69 
Aug 69 
Sep 69 

Sep 69 
Oct 69 

Nov/Dec 69 

Nov/Dec 69 

Nov/Dec 69 

Jan 70 
Feb 70 

May 71 


Jun 68 
Aug 68 
Apr 69 

Jun 69 
Oct 69 
Feb 70 
Mar 70 
Mar 70 

Apr/May 70 
Aug 70 


Feb 70 
Oct 69 


Jan 67 

Apr 67 

Jul 67 

Jul 68 
Oct 68 
Nov 68 
Nov 68 
Jun 69 
Jan 70 
Feb 70 
Feb 70 

Mar 70 
Aug 70 
Jun/Jul 71 


E. MODERNIZATION (ALSO SEE TERRITORIAL FORCES, BELOW) 

RVNAF Improvements from Phase I Oct 68 

Modernization Program. 

RVNAF Effectiveness and Modernization May 69 

RVNAF Expansion and Modernization Mar/Apr 71 


F. AIR AND ARTILLERY SUPPORT 

Artillery Support for RVNAF Sep 68 

Army Comments on September 1968 Oct 68 

Articles. 

Artillery Support for RVNAF Apr/May 70 

Air Support for RVNAF Nov 68 

Air Support for ARVN-VNMC Units Feb 70 

Air Support for ARVN-VNMC Units: Air Apr/May 70 
Staff Comments. 

Air Support for RVNAF Apr/May 70 


G. TERRITORIAL FORCES (RF & PF) 


Regional and Popular Forces Effectiveness Jun 67 

The Plight of the Vietnamese Popular Jul 68 

Forces. 

RF/PF Advisory Program Jul 68 

The Vietnamese Regional Forces Aug 68 

RF/PF and Territorial Security in Vietnam Feb 69 

RF/PF Modernization versus Combat Mar 69 

Performance. 

RF/PF Effectiveness Aug 69 

Territorials and the Offensive Dec 72 

H. SPECIAL (ALSO SEE COSTS) 

Vietnamese Language Training Sep 68 

How the Korean Army Improved: Interview Oct 69 

with General Matthew Ridgeway, USA, 

Retired. 

Illustrative RVNAF Force Structure to Im- Mar 70 

plement the Area Security Concept in 
SVN (also see Operations-Strategy). 

A GVN People’s Army Aug/Oct 71 


VIET CONG-NORTH VIETNAMESE OPERATIONS 


A. TARGETS 

Go Cong Province: Pacification and VC May 67 

Activity. 

Viet Cong Efforts to Disrupt Pacification Sep 67 

Enemy Initiated Activity Against RF/PF Jun 68 

Enemy Initiated Activity Against Viet- Jul 68 

namese Armed Forces. 

Enemy Offensive Actions Against Allied Oct 68 

Forces. 

Enemy Emphasis on Causing US Casualties Apr 69 

Enemy Emphasis on Causing US Casual- May 69 

ties: Follow-Up. 

Enemy Emphasis on Causing US Casualties Aug 69 

Enemy Targeting of US and RVNAF Forces Nov/Dec 69 

Enemy Targeting of US and RVNAF Forces Feb 70 


B. PATTERNS (ALSO SEE SITUATIONS-TRENDS) 

VC/NVA Offensive Capability Jan 67 

VC/NVA Attacks Apr 67 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 947 





CONFIDENTIAL 


Enemy Incidents in I Corps Apr 67 

VC/NVA Incidents in II Corps May 67 

Enemy Incidents in IV Corps May 67 

VC/NVA Attacks Jul 67 

VC/NVA Incidents 1963-67 Aug 67 

VC/NVA Patterns of Activity Dec 67 

VC/NVA Attacks in III CTZ Feb 68 

VC/NVA Attack Patterns 1965-67 May 68 

Reduced Enemy Activity Rate Sep 68 


Comparison of Enemy Activity Levels with Apr/May 70 
Prior Years. 

Standoff Attacks: A Major Element of Jan/Feb 71 
VC/NVA Strategy in RVN. 

Enemy Attack Patterns in SVN 1967-70 May 71 

c. TERROR 

VC Assassinations and Abductions of GVN 
Personnel. 

VC/NVA Assassinations and Abductions 
VC Assassinations and Abductions 
VC Assassinations and Abductions 
VC Assassinations and Abductions 
Assassinations and Abductions in SVN 
Terrorism in SVN 
Terrorism in SVN 
Terrorism in SVN 
Terrorism in SVN 
Terrorism in SVN 
Terrorism in SVN 
Terrorism in SVN 

D. SPECIAL 


Role of the Southern Vietminh Cadre in May 67 

South Vietnam. 

VC Cadres in Dinh Tuong Province Jun 67 

VC Operations in the Villages Sep 67 

The War in the Delta: Views from Three Dec 67 

VC Battalions. 

Joint Staff Comments on June Articles Aug 68 

VC/NVA Medical Materiel and Supplies Jun 68 

VC/NVA Base Areas Apr/May 70 


ALLIED GROUND AND NAVAL OPERATIONS 

A. STRATEGY (ALSO SEE PACIFICATION FORCES) 


The Strategy of Attrition May 67 

Military Initiative in South Vietnam Sep 68 

Army Comments on September 1968 Oct 68 

Articles. 

Tactical Initiative in Vietnam May 69 

Military Initiative in South Vietnam: A Jan 70 

Follow-Up. 

Long Range Patrols versus Search-And- Jun 67 

Destroy. 

Long Range Patrols versus Search-And- Jul 67 

Destroy: A Rebuttal. 

Long Range Patrols versus Search-And- Aug 67 

Destroy: A Rebuttal. 

1968 Military Strategy in SVN: General Dec 67 

Giap versus Allied Campaign Plan. 

1968 Military Strategy in SVN: Army Staff Jan 68 

Comments. 


Apr 67 

Jul 67 
Oct 67 
Mar 68 
May 68 
Dec 68 
Jun 69 
Sep 69 
Jun/Jul 70 
Sep/Oct 70 
Nov/Dec 70 
Mar/Apr 71 
Aug/Oct 71 




Application of the Area Security Concept 
Application of the Area Security Concept: 

Interim Report No. 2. 

Illustrative RVNAF Force Structure to 
Implement the Area Security Concept in 
SVN. 

A GVN People’s Army 


Jan 70 
Feb 70 

Mar 70 

Aug/Oct 71 


B. GROUND OPERATIONS (ALSO SEE RVNAF, US REDEPLOY¬ 

MENTS, AND THE SITUATION) 

Small Unit Actions 

Operation Cedar Falls 

Force Requirements in I Corps 

Force Effectiveness in II Corps 

Large US Army Ground Operations in II 
Corps. 

Efficiency in Inflicting Losses: Enemy vs. 

Friendly. 

Allocation of Ground Forces in SVN 

VC/NVA Killed by Army Helicopters and 
CIDG Forces. 

Results of Friendly Large Unit Operations 

Combat Performance of US and ARVN 
Divisions. 

Combat Performance of US and ARVN 
Divisions: An Update. 

Impact of U.S. Maneuver Battalions in 
South Vietnam. 

Withdrawal of the U.S. 9th Division from 
IV Corps. 

C. FIRE SUPPORT (ALSO SEE RVNAF AND AIR OPERATIONS) 


Air and Artillery Strikes Other than Close 

Jul 67 

Support. 


Air and Artillery Strikes Other than Close 

Aug 67 

Support: A Rebuttal. 


Air and Artillery Strikes: A Rebuttal 

Sep 67 

Unobserved Air and Artillery Strikes 

Nov 67 

Artillery Fire in Vietnam 

Aug 70 

D. NAVAL OPERATIONS 


Naval Gunfire Support—Korea and South¬ 

Mar 67 

east Asia. 


Sea Dragon Costs Compared to Tactical 

Dec 67 

Air Costs. 


Sea Dragon Costs Compared to Tactical 

Feb 68 

Air Costs: A Rebuttal. 


Market Time Effectiveness 

Jun/Jul 71 


Feb 67 
Apr 67 
Apr 67 
May 67 
May 67 

Jul 67 

Sep 67 
Jan 68 

May 68 
Feb 69 

Apr 69 

Jun 69 

Jul 69 


THE AIR WAR 

A. INTERDICTION OPERATIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS 


Results of Armed Reconnaissance Sorties Jan 67 

vs. Moving Targets in North Vietnam. 

Armed Reconnaissance in North Vietnam Apr 67 

Armed Reconnaissance in North Vietnam Jul 67 

Ground-Radar Controlled Bombing Aug 67 

Transportation Facilities in North Vietnam Aug 67 

Armed Reconnaissance Efficiency in North Nov 67 

Vietnam—A Reappraisal. 

The Cost of Bombing North Vietnam Dec 67 


948 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 









CONFIDENTIAL 


Truck Destruction in the Steel Tiger Area Feb 

The Bombing Its Economic Costs and Feb 

Benefits to Vietnam. 

Muscle Shoals/Mud River j an 

Muscle Shoals/Mud River: CINCPAC -.Mar 

Rebuttal. 

Muscle Shoals Apr 

Air Operations in North Vietnam May 

Truck Traffic in North Vietnam and Laos May 

Interdiction of Enemy Truck Traffic Jun 

Joint Staff Comments on June Articles Aug 

US Bombing Campaign in North Vietnam Jul 

and Laos. 

Interdiction Campaign Since March 31 Aug 

Interdiction in Laos Since the Bombing Dec 

Halt. 


Southeast Asia Tactical Aircraft Operations Jun/Jul 


B. AIR OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM 


An Appraisal of ARC LIGHT (B-52) Sep 

Operations. 

ARC LIGHT (B-52) Operations: Rebuttal Oct 

Tactical Air Operations in South Vietnam Aug 

Air Support for Troops in Contact Nov/Dec 

Airstrikes near RVN Population Mar/Apr 


68 

68 

68 

68 

68 

68 

68 

68 

68 

68 

68 

68 

70 


67 

67 

69 

69 

71 


Aircraft Sorties and Losses 
Aircraft Sorties and Losses 
Aircraft Sorties and Losses 
October Aircraft Losses 
Aircraft Sorties and Losses 
Aircraft Sorties and Losses 
Aircraft Sorties and Losses 
Aircraft Sorties and Losses 
Aircraft Sorties and Losses 
Aircraft Sorties and Losses 
Aircraft Sorties and Losses 
Aircraft Sorties and Losses 
Aircraft Sorties and Losses 
Aircraft Sorties and Losses 
Aircraft Sorties and Losses 
Aircraft Sorties and Losses 
Aircraft Sorties and Losses 
Aircraft Attrition in SEA 

F. SA-2 EFFECTIVENESS 

SA-2 Effectiveness Against US Aircraft 
SA-2 Effectiveness Against US Aircraft 
SA-2 Effectiveness Against US Aircraft 
SA-2 Effectiveness Against US Aircraft 
SA-2 Effectiveness Against US Aircraft 


Aug 67 
Sep 67 
Oct 67 
Nov 67 
Dec 67 
Jan 68 
Mar 68 
Apr 68 
Jun 68 
Jul 68 
Aug 68 
Seii 68 
Oct 68 
Dec 68 
Feb 69 
Mar 69 
May 69 
Jul 69 


Jan 67 
Apr 67 
Jul 67 
Oct 67 
Jan 68 


c. SPECIAL 

Air Crew Recovery Jul 67 

Aircrew Recovery Operations in SEA Feb 69 

Analysis of the Use of Propeller versus Jet Nov 67 

Aircraft in Laos. 

Use of Propeller and Jet Aircraft in Laos— Jan 68 

Joint Staff Comments. 

Killing Trucks in Laos Sep 68 

Jet and Propeller Aircraft Operations in Aug 69 

Southeast Asia. 

Winding Down the Air War Aug/Oct 71 


D. HERBICIDE OPERATIONS 

Effects of Crop Spraying in South Vietnam 
Effects of Crop Spraying in South Vietnam: 

A Reconsideration. 

The Herbicide Issue 

A Preliminary Response to Criticism of the 
Use of Herbicides in RVN. 

Impact of Herbicides 

E. SORTIES AND LOSSES 


Southeast Asia Losses—US and VNAF Jan 67 

Southeast Asia Aircraft Losses—US and Feb 67 

VNAF. 

Aircraft Losses and Production—Korea and Feb 67 

Southeast Asia. 

Air Operations Mar 67 

Aircraft Losses Apr 67 

Aircraft Losses May 67 

Aircraft Destroyed on the Ground by May 67 

Hostile Action. 

Aircraft Sorties and Losses Jun 67 

Aircraft Sorties and Losses Jul 67 


G. AIRCRAFT ORDNANCE CONSUMPTION 


Actual/Estimated Aircraft Ordnance Con- Jan 67 

sumption. 

Analysis of Aircraft Ordnance Consumption Feb 67 

Analysis of Aircraft Ordnance Consumption Mar 67 

Analysis of Aircraft Ordnance Consumption Apr 67 

Analysis of Aircraft Ordnance Consumption May 67 

Analysis of Aircraft Ordnance Consumption Jun 67 

Analysis of Aircraft Ordnance Consumption Jul 67 


CASUALTIES AND LOSSES 

A. VIET CONG-NORTH VIETNAMESE LOSSES 


1. Casualties 

VC/NVA Losses Jan 67 

VC/NVA Losses—A Reevaluation Feb 67 

Estimate of VC/NVA Combat Deaths Nov 67 

VC/NVA Personnel Losses: A New Estimate Jan 68 

from Captured Documents. 

VC/NVA Personnel Losses Estimated from Oct 68 

Captured Documents. 

2. Prisoners 

NVA/VC Prisoners of War Mar 70 

3. Defectors (Chieu Hoi ) 

National Reconciliation Feb 67 

Chieu Hoi Decline Aug 67 

Chieu Hoi Decline Jan 68 

Chieu Hoi: A Quarterly Report Apr 68 

Chieu Hoi $ e P 68 

Profile of Chieu Hoi Returnees Nov 68 

Chieu Hoi: VC/NVA in 1968 Feb 69 

Chieu Hoi: Quarterly Report May 69 

Chieu Hoi: A Follow-Up Jun 69 


Nov 67 
Mar 68 

Jan/Feb 71 
Mar/Apr 71 

Mar/Apr 71 


JDRB 949 


CONFIDENTIAL 







CONFIDENTIAL 


b. comparisons—vc/nva versus allies PACIFICATION AND CIVIL AFFAIRS 


Efficiency in Inflicting Losses: Enemy 
versus Friendly. 

Relative Kill Ratios in South Vietnam 
Relative Kill Ratios in South Vietnam: A 
Correction. 

C. ALLIED LOSSES 

1. US Casualties 

US Combat Deaths in SEA 
US Casualties 
US KIA in SVN 
Army and Marine KIA 
Where US Combat Deaths Occur in 
Vietnam. 

US Combat Deaths in Vietnam 
US Combat Deaths in Vietnam: An Over¬ 
view. 

US Deaths from Nonhostile Causes in 
Vietnam. 

Army and Marine Combat Deaths 
US Combat Deaths During the Lull 
US Combat Deaths in Vietnam 
US Combat Death Patterns in October 
Combat Deaths in SVN 
US Combat Deaths and Wounded 
US Army Combat Deaths in Vietnam 
US Death Rates in South Vietnam: A 
Forecast. 

Nonhostile US Deaths in RVN 
Combat Deaths in Southeast Asia 
US Death Rate in RVN: A Forecast 

2. US/South Vietnamese/Korean Casualties 

Comparison of US and GVN Combat Death 
Rates. 

Comparison of US and GVN Combat Death 
Rates. 

A Comparison of US and GVN Combat 
Death Rates. 

Comparison of Friendly Casualties in 
Vietnam. 

US vs. GVN Combat Deaths: Revised Data 
US vs. RVNAF Combat Deaths: Corrected 
Data. 

US KIA in SVN vs. Korea 
RVNAF KIA in 1968 

Allied Deaths from Hostile Actions in SEA 

3. Special 

Comparison of Friendly Losses: Pacification 
vs. Search and Destroy. 

Experience in Command vs. Battle Deaths 
Experience in Command vs. Battle Deaths: 

MACV Rebuttal. 

RD Cadre Attrition 

RD Cadre Attrition: A Correction 

V RVNAF Desertions (see RVNAF ) 


Jul 67 

Aug 68 
Sep 68 


Jun 67 
Oct 67 
Jun 68 
Nov 68 
Feb 69 

Apr 69 
May 69 

May 69 

Jul 69 
Jul 69 
Sep 69 
Oct 69 
Nov/Dec 69 
Jan 70 
Sep/Oct 70 
Nov/Dec 70 

Jan/Feb 71 
Mar/Apr 71 
May 71 

Jan 67 

Apr 67 

Jun 67 

Aug 67 

Dec 67 
Feb 68 

May 68 
Mar 69 
Jun/Jul 71 

Jan 67 

Jan 68 
Mar 68 

Sep 68 
Oct 68 


A. POPULATION SECURITY (HES TRENDS) 


Measuring Pacification Progress in SVN Jan 

Revolutionary Development Highlights Apr 

Hamlet Evaluation System Jun 

Hamlet Evaluation System Jul 

GVN Rural Population Control Progress Aug 

Population Control Oct 

HES Reporting as a Basis for Detailed Nov 

Analysis. 

Statistical Trends from the Hamlet Evalu- Dec 

ation System. 

RD Program: A 1967 Progress Report Jan 

Pacification Slowdown Feb 

Ambassador Komer Rebuts Our February Mar 

Pacification Article. 

1967 Security Setback and Early Tet HES Mar 

Results. 

Ambassador Komer Comments on March Apr 

1968 Articles. 

Post-Tet Pacification Regression Apr 

Status of Pacification Jul 

First Half 1968 HES Reports Aug 

Rebuttal from Ambassador Komer Sep 

Pacification Trends Sep 

GVN Population Control and Enemy Dec 

Activity. 

Pacification Assessment Feb 

Pacification Progress Report May 

Effects of the 1968 Accelerated Pacification Jun 

Campaign. 

Measurement of Security in RVN Jul 

Pacification Status Report Feb 

Hamlet Evaluation System: 1970 Revision Feb 

HES/70 Data for January 1970 Mar 

HES/70 Data for April 1970 Apr/May 

HES/70 Data for May 1970 Jun/Jul 

HES/70 Data for July 1970 Aug 

Pacification Progress: September 1970 Sep/Oct 

HES Data for November 1970 Nov/Dec 

HES Ratings for December 1970 Jan/Feb 

HES Ratings for January 1971 Jan/Feb 

HES Data for March 1971 Mar/Apr 

HES Data for April 1971 May 

Security Situation in Southern MR-1 Jun/Jul 

Pacification Status—September 1971 Aug/Oct 

Pacification Trends in 1971 Nov 71/Jan 

B. ROAD AND RAILROAD SECURITY 

Vietnamese National Railways Aug 

Route #4—Mekong Delta to Saigon Dec 


67 

67 

67 

67 

67 

67 

67 


67 

68 
68 
68 

68 

68 

68 

68 

68 

68 

68 

68 

69 

69 

69 

69 

70 
70 
70 
70 
70 
70 
70 

70 

71 
71 
71 
71 
71 

71 

72 


68 

67 


C. PACIFICATION FORCES (ALSO SEE RVN AF—TERRITORIAL 


FORCES) 

Marine Corps Pacification in I Corps Feb 67 

Marine Pacification in I Corps Mar 67 

USMC Combined Action Platoon Program Jul 67 

CAP vs. Non-CAP Hamlet HES Ratings in Jun 68 

I CTZ. 


950 JDRB 


CONFIDENTIAL 


CONFIDENTIAL 


U.S. Marine Corps Combined Action Pro- Nov 


gram. X, 

Problems in Providing Village Security Mar 

Revolutionary Development Personnel Jul 

Viet Cong Efforts to Disrupt Pacification Sep 

RD Cadre Attrition Sep 

RD Cadre Attrition: A Correction Oct 

National Police Mar 

D. VC INFRASTRUCTURE (vCl) 

VC Infrastructure Oct 

Phoenix Program and the VC Infrastructure Dec 

Phoenix and the NPFF Mar 

The Anti-Infrastructure Campaign in South Oct 

Vietnam. 

Phoenix Program: 1970 Results Sep/Oct 

Phoenix Jun/Jul 

Phung Hoang Results Aug/Oct 


E. CHIEU HOI (VC/NVA DEFECTORS) 

See VC/NVA Casualties and Losses 


F. REFUGEES 

The Refugee Problem in Vietnam Sep 

G. LAND REFORM 

Land Reform and GVN Control Jul 

Is Land Reform a Necessary U.S. Ob- Aug 

jective? 

Is Land Reform a Necessary U.S. Ob- Sep 


jective: A Rebuttal. 

H. ELECTIONS 


GVN versus VC Administration Dec 

GVN and VC Elections Aug 

Province/City Council Elections in RVN Aug 

The 1971 SVN Presidential Election May 

The August 29 Lower House Election Aug/Oct 

I. WHAT THE PEOPLE THOUGHT 

Aspirations of the Vietnamese People Aug 

What the Vietnamese Peasant Thinks Jan/Feb 


ECONOMICS: WAR COSTS AND INFLATION 


A. COSTS OF THE WAR 

Impact of Vietnam War on U.S. Balance of May 

Payments. 

Impact of Vietnam Conflict on Great So- Sep 

ciety Programs. 

The Cost of Bombing North Vietnam Dec 

The Bombing—Its Economic Costs and Feb 

Benefits to North Vietnam. 

The Cost of the Vietnam War Aug 

RVNAF and U.S. Advisory Costs F Y 65-67 Dec 

Cost of the War in Vietnam Sep 

Where the Money Goes: A Program Budget Nov/Dec 
for the Vietnam War FY 69. 

Where the Money Went Oct 


B. INFLATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM 


Economic Impact—Korea and SVN Build- Feb 67 

ups. 

DOD Piaster Spending in Vietnam Mar 67 

Inflationary Gap—CY 1967 Apr 67 

SVN Inflation in CY 1967 May 67 

Inflation in South Vietnam J U n 67 

Inflation, Wages and Incentives Nov 67 

Summary of Inflation in SVN During CY Feb 68 

1967. 

Wage and Real Income Changes in South Jun 68 

Vietnam. 

The Economic Situation in Vietnam for the Jul 68 

First Six Months of 1968. 

Budgetary and Foreign Exchange Impact Sep 68 

of the Civilianization Program. 

Inflation in RVN During 1968 Dec 68 

Vietnam’s Need for External Economic Jan 70 

Assistance 1970-74. 

C. SPECIAL 

Economic Warfare Against the VC Jun 67 

Economic Warfare Against the VC: A Jul 67 

Rebuttal. 

Social and Economic Development in the Jul 67 

SVN Highlands. 

Rice Production and Consumption Aug 67 

Rice Problems in SVN Nov 67 


CONSTRUCTION AND PORT OPERATIONS IN 

SOUTH VIETNAM 


A. CONSTRUCTION 

Southeast Asia Construction Feb 67 

Southeast Asia Construction Mar 67 

Construction Cost Growth in South Viet- Apr 67 

nam. 

SVN Lines of Communication (LOCs) Apr 67 

Construction Program Summary and Prog- May 67 

ress. 

Military Construction Jul 67 

SVN Construction Program Summary and Nov 67 

Progress. 

SVN FY 69 Military Construction Program Jan 68 

SVN Construction Progress Apr 68 

Thailand Construction Program May 68 

SEA Military Construction Program Apr 69 

B. CARGO 

Cargo Discharge Capability and Require- Jan 67 

rnents of U.S. Military Ports in South 
Vietnam. 

Ocean Cargo Shipments from CONUS to Jan 67 

SEA. 

Ship Flow (Turnaround Time) in SVN Jan 67 

Ocean Cargo Shipments from CONUS to Feb 67 

SEA. 

Ship Flow (Turnaround Time) in SVN Feb 67 

Ship Flow (Turnaround Time) in South Mar 67 

Vietnam. 


68 

67 

67 

67 

68 

68 

70 

68 

68 

69 

69 

70 

71 

71 

67 

67 

67 

67 

68 

69 

70 

71 

71 

67 

71 

67 

67 

67 

68 

68 

68 

69 

70 

71 


CONFIDENTIAL 


JDRB 951 









CONFIDENTIAL 


Saigon Port Mar 67 

Ocean Cargo Shipments from CONUS to Apr 67 

SEA. 

Ship Flow (Turnaround Time) in South Apr 67 

Vietnam. 

Ocean Cargo Shipments from CONUS to May 67 

SEA. 

Saigon Port May 67 

Air Cargo Shipments to SEA May 67 

POL Support for Military Operations in Jun 67 

SVN. 

SVN Port Development and Capability Jun 67 


Ocean Cargo Shipments from CONUS to Jul 67 

SEA. 

Saigon Port Jul 67 

Ocean Cargo Shipments from CONUS to Aug 67 

SEA. 

Cargo Sealift from CONUS to SVN Dec 67 

Effects of the Tet Offensive on SVN Port Feb 68 

Operations. 

Military Cargo Workload in SVN Feb 68 

C. OTHER SUPPORT 

CINCPAC Flagpole Items Feb 67 


952 jdrb CONFIDENTIAL 


U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 O - 588- 672 





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